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The designations French and Anglophone, as used in this study, signal primarily socio-intellectual 
affiliations. Scholars attributed to either of the two spheres of research are entangled with the institu-
tional landscape in France or the United States of America (US) and Great Britain (UK), they do not 
necessarily hold a French, US, or UK passport, however. This entanglement, although typically rooted 
in the early academic education of the respective practitioners, can be purely discursive (see Appendix 
I.1). Hence, classic ‘discourse analysis’ is generally capable to provide an entry point to characterising 
and unravelling the enigmatic French-Anglophone divide in Palaeolithic archaeology – the subject of 
the present investigation. 
 
Lithic research is understood pragmatically in this study. It comprises all scholarship that pays atten-
tion to the analysis of stone tools from the Palaeolithic period. The focus lies on the empirical analysis 
of lithic technology, including its theoretical and methodological background, and not so much on mat-
ters of excavation and field research. Key figures are primarily identified based on their contributions to 
the theoretical and methodological development of the field. This evaluation is based, firstly, on a de-
tailed survey of the dynamics characterising the history of research in France, the US, and the UK and, 
secondly, on a sociological study of relationships between scholars as well as between scholars and re-
search institutions (see Appendix I.1, I.2, III.4). As the following examination will ultimately disclose, 





















I hope that this dissertation will be of relevance for a variety of readers. It is written primarily for Pal-
aeolithic archaeologists but may also be of interest to other scholars fascinated by the stone tools left 
behind by the species of hominins that once populated the earth, some of which were our ancestors. 
This study also addresses longstanding philosophical issues that arise when researchers interrogate 
these ancient stones in the hope of enriching our knowledge about the deep past. The dissertation may 
therefore also speak to philosophers of science and other observers of scientific practice, as long as 
they are interested in the conceptual foundations of the empirical endeavour of stone tool analysis, 
with its specific interpretive problems and discursive preoccupations. The goal of the investigation 
therefore follows from its nature. On the one hand, I hope to elucidate the conceptual structure of cur-
rent lithic research in order to ignite new avenues of inquiry and to contribute to a more self-reflexive 
attitude among Palaeolithic archaeologists. On the other hand, I aim to show that lithic inquiry pro-
vides an interesting example of ‘science in practice,’ where practices and interpretations regularly clash 
and knowledge is constantly re-negotiated. The structural dynamics that drive this process are the 
subject of this study. 
The investigation covers a range of interconnected themes but its main focus lies on what I 
term the ‘French-Anglophone divide.’ This divide, particularly well-developed in lithic studies, results 
from divergent cognitive orientations propelling French and Anglophone research traditions in Palaeo-
lithic archaeology.1 As shown in great detail in this study, the two research traditions have developed 
distinct cognitive resources, and, as a consequence, often antagonistically handle the lithic evidence 
available to them. The result is a pervasive climate of methodological and interpretive friction, in 
which the very same lithic materials may be used to supply contrasting knowledge claims. The situa-
tion resonates with Bruce Trigger’s (2003: 1) symptomatic note that “[a]rchaeology might have been 
invented as a case study for the philosophy of science […]” since “[t]he paucity of evidential constraint 
renders [it] a very revealing example of how data are interpreted by social scientists.” 
Three cases of interpretive conflict may illustrate this general condition of lithic research in 
Palaeolithic archaeology. The first case concerns the lithic assemblage from level IIA at the open-air 
site Biache Saint-Vaast in Northern France. This assemblage, often considered a key instance of early 
Levallois technology, has sparked some controversy on method and interpretation in lithic research 
since the initial analysis by French technologist Éric Boëda (1988) yielded a radically different result 
than the subsequent re-investigation of the same assemblage by American archaeologist Harold Dibble 
(1995a). The second case concerns the level G assemblage from Gouzeaucourt, also situated in North-
ern France and dating to the Lower-to-Middle Palaeolithic transition. Its bifacial component has been 
interpreted in incompatible ways by Shannon McPherron (1994) and Sylvain Soriano (2000) in their 
                                                          
1 For a definition of these notions in the problem-context of this study, consult Appendix I.1. 
Is archaeology a science or is it art? 
“Neither – it’s a vendetta.”  
      – Mortimer Wheeler 
 
“What you find, archaeologically, has everything to do 
with what you look for with the questions you ask and 
the conceptual resources you bring to bear in attempting 
to answer them. And yet, you almost never find all or 
only what you expect.” 




doctoral dissertations. The third case of illustration, finally, concerns the Micoquian of Kulna cave with 
its combination of bifacial and discoid technology, which became the subject of similarly divergent 
inquiry by Éric Boëda (1995a) and Gilbert Tostevin (2000, 2012). These interpretive disparities are far 
too substantial to be explained by the deployed research designs, methodologies, and research ques-
tions. In fact, the disparities seem to be rooted in incompatible conceptualisations of lithic data them-
selves and appear to derive from a conflicting understanding of the basic observational and interpre-
tive categories used to interrogate the available evidence. 
How, then, do we explain such divergence? How to deal with a situation in which scholars 
seem to make contradictory sense of the very same lithic assemblages? What are the implications for 
lithic research at large? Can we just keep going, hoping that one day the difficulties will resolve them-
selves? The available expert literature is at least not helpful here. There seems to be either baffling 
perplexity, or open ignorance when these and cognate issues are raised. Yet, such problems are argua-
bly central to the field and its future development. If we cannot grasp what is going on in these para-
digm cases, it only proves how little we know about what we do; this, in turn, may be a dangerous, or at 
least ‘unsettling,’ situation to be in. For it can be argued that proper knowledge is only possible if 
transparency can be established in terms of how particular insights have been generated and why they 
conflict with competing knowledge claims. 
This study is an attempt to respond to these concerns and provides an in-depth analysis of the 
French-Anglophone divide. It reveals the substantive nature of the latter and clarifies its sources. The 
hope is to dispel the myth of a relative unity of lithic approaches in Palaeolithic archaeology once and 
for all. Lithic research faces similar problems as other fields of inquiry, albeit these problems of course 
effect lithic knowledge production in highly specific ways. Having said this, the French-Anglophone 
divide showcases a total bifurcation of the research landscape, with research varying on almost all 
levels of inquiry – testifying to ‘two cultures of science’ (sensu Snow (1998 [1959]) and attesting to a 
cherishing of distinct ‘cultural politics’ (sensu e.g., Shanks 1992: 2). 
Although this characterisation seems to primarily accentuate the negative aspects of the di-
vide, it also holds tremendous promise. The divide affords a range of possibilities for practitioners to 
broaden their conceptual horizon, to become inspired, and to learn from the issues at stake. Ironically, 
the careful examination of the French-Anglophone divide can therefore help improve the interrogation 
of the lithic evidence and to suggest new research avenues! I can only stress that exploring the episte-
mology of the divide is thus not a self-sufficient enterprise. Rather, epistemological and empirical 
questioning can and arguably should cross-fertilise each other. Put differently, the analysis of particu-
lar scientific practices has considerable potential to enhance these practices. Ultimately, it is in this 
respect that the present work seeks to make an original and lasting contribution. 
The key argument developed in this study is that the nature and structure of the French-Anglophone 
divide can be considerably clarified by drawing on the concepts and categories introduced by American 
philosopher Stephen C. Pepper in World Hypotheses (1942). Proceeding from Pepper’s insights, it can 
be proposed that central axes of divergence between French and Anglophone lithic inquiry may be the 
result of a reliance on different sets of world hypotheses. Such world hypotheses encapsulate basic 
assumptions about the structure and nature of reality and turn out to be the prerequisite of gathering 
and digesting empirical evidence. I argue that the difficulties of interpretation and communication that 
arise at the French-Anglophone interface are connected to the more general struggle of consolidating 
‘analytic’ and ‘synthetic’ science: French technological research fosters ‘synthetic’ inquiry – i.e., the 
view that wholes delineate the primary units of analysis – whereas Anglophone approaches cultivate 
‘analytic’ modes of investigation – i.e., the view that parts make up these primary units of analysis. 
How lithic research is conducted on both sides would seem to be a direct consequence of this organisa-
tion. Pepper further exposes that ‘analytic’ and ‘synthetic’ research supply different sets of world hy-
potheses: the former has given shape to ‘formism’ and ‘mechanism,’ the latter harbours ‘contextualism’ 
and ‘organicism.’ My contention is that these two sets of two world theories can be shown to power the 
French-Anglophone divide, explaining both its ‘DNA’ and its practical symptoms. 
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 How do these various standpoints relate to each other? Pepper’s work elucidates that the four 
world hypotheses represent equally adequate yet irreducible modes of knowledge production. There is 
an epistemological symmetry between these viewpoints. Any attempt to elevate a single perspective 
above all others must consequently remain dogmatic. What are the implications of this state of affairs? 
Can one with clear conscience discard any of the perspective sponsored by the four world hypotheses? 
I maintain that one cannot. The only reasonable solution is to acknowledge the fundamental pluralism 
that permeates the French-Anglophone boundary, and a fortiori lithic research as a whole. Each world 
theory inaugurates standards of research not shared or supported by any other theory. For this reason, 
I content, it is imperative to recognise and expose these varying standards of knowledge production if 
we wish to navigate and productively bridge the divide. 
The resultant disunity of lithic research, even though introducing some important caveats in 
how scholars can effectively interact, ultimately offers an advantage to lithic practitioners, who may 
quite literally learn from ‘other’ worlds of thought and profit from the unique resources and capacities 
put forth by the attendant ways of knowing. Taking all adequate viewpoints into account would place 
lithic research onto a much broader and ultimately firmer empirical basis. Yet, an important shift in 
emphasis would be required. Rather than regarding the French-Anglophone boundary as an obstacle 
to successful knowledge production, we should regard it as a meeting point of two broadly complemen-
tary yet irreconcilable groups of approaches, having the potential to cooperate in the quest for lithic 
knowledge in hitherto unconceived ways. It is only possible to appreciate this ‘productivity of episte-
mological diversity’ if one embraces the autonomy of the four cognitive orientations that participate in 
the divide. I therefore maintain that the French-Anglophone boundary strongly calls for the abandon-
ment of knowledge ‘monism’ in Palaeolithic archaeology – the idea that for every valid scientific ques-
tion there can only be one valid answer and one best method or practice to achieve it. From this per-
spective, the divide provides tangible evidence suggesting that a plurality of scientific viewpoints in 
fact enriches lithic discourse and knowledge, rather than curtailing them. 
The dissertation is divided into six individual chapters that differ somewhat in scope, but each con-
tributes in a well-defined manner to the argument. I begin with an outline of the problem of lithic 
knowledge and a preliminary survey of the French-Anglophone divide. I then develop the concepts and 
categories needed to analyse the logic of the divide in more detail. Subsequently, the resulting concep-
tual apparatus is applied to selected cases of French and Anglophone lithic research. Finally, the find-
ings of this examination are confronted with the initial formulation of the problem and evaluated in 
terms of their significance for the question of pluralism in lithic inquiry. 
 Chapter 1 introduces the problem of lithic knowledge in Palaeolithic archaeology, which relies 
on a fragmented and often mono-specific record dominated by lithic remains. A pragmatic definition 
of lithic knowledge is proposed and it is shown that this knowledge is crucial for understanding the 
Palaeolithic as a whole – it carries a heavy burden. The nature of evidence from the Palaeolithic includ-
ing its scarce supply create a temptation to populate dogmatic positions. This situation aggravates the 
problem of the underdetermination of interpretations by data. Together with the social dynamics of 
knowledge formation within research communities, this condition easily subverts the ability of schol-
ars to envision or consider alternative readings and thus to properly gauge the global status of particu-
lar knowledge claims. The second part of Chapter 1 provides a concise overview of what has been writ-
ten about the French-Anglophone divide. There appears to be a general consensus that French and 
Anglophone lithic approaches deviate in method and theory, but opinions greatly diverge as to the 
nature and significance of these differences. It is clear that the respective incompatibilities have gener-
ated much tacit hostility and latent misunderstanding. The ‘Binford-Bordes debate’ is shown to be a 
crucial yet often misunderstood historical forerunner of the divide. Furthermore, it is documented that 
the critique directed towards the respective ‘other’ is equally devastating for both sides (although the 
topic is treated somewhat asymmetrically). I then introduce the three comparative case studies already 
alluded to in order to argue that underdetermination not only plays a role in theoretical and methodo-
logical battles, but has tangible consequences for how individual lithic artefacts or entire assemblages 
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are understood. The chapter concludes with some reflections on the status of what I term ‘critical prac-
tice’ in the field. 
 Chapter 2 establishes the epistemological framework of the conceptual analysis that follows. It 
introduces Pepper’s ‘world hypotheses theory’ as a viable lens through which to study underdetermina-
tion in lithic research. The chapter provides an overview of Pepper’s relevant work, focussing on his 
proposition that Western thought can be collapsed into four equally adequate cognitive orientations: 
‘formism,’ ‘contextualism,’ ‘mechanism,’ and ‘organicism.’ These four orientations – the ‘pillars of 
Western cognition’ – rest on distinct ‘root metaphors,’ derived from common-sense experience and 
constantly refined over the course of intellectual history. Each cognitive orientation supplies a differ-
ent canon of structural categories, regulating how the available evidence is interpreted and criticised. 
This cognitive architecture is highlighted in detail since it delivers the analytical categories used in the 
consecutive chapters to examine particular instances of lithic research – it begs the question of the 
standpoint, i.e., the nature of the cognitive access of the analyst to the evidence. Subsequently, I survey 
the relationships and dynamics between the four world theories and demonstrate that they not only 
differ in their conceptual logic, but also in how they criticise knowledge claims and secure what they 
regard as scientific ‘truth.’ 
 Chapter 3 presents a general application of Pepper’s world theory framework to the French-
Anglophone divide. The divide is interpreted as the outcome of the conflict between two antagonistic 
visions of science: Anglophone lithic approaches tend to subscribe to an ‘analytic’ project of knowing, 
whereas French lithic inquiry gravitates toward a ‘synthetic’ understanding of the lithic record. This 
hypothesis is then tested and discussed in the remainder of the chapter by analysing some of the key 
coordinates of the divide. I examine and compare practices of lithic recording, adopted research de-
signs and the applied logic of inference, the role of theory and data, and the dominant practices of lith-
ic visualisation. Does the divide indeed conform to a clash of ‘analytic’ and ‘synthetic’ science? I pro-
vide a first answer by analysing the principal notions of variability and complexity on both sides in 
terms of the basic structure of the ‘analytic’-‘synthetic’ opposition. 
 Chapter 4 takes a closer look at the ‘analytic’ nature of Anglophone lithic inquiry. The main 
question is whether Anglophone approaches reflect ‘formistic’ and ‘mechanistic’ convictions respec-
tively. In other words, can Pepper’s respective world theory categories be productively applied to pro-
totypical occurrences of Anglophone lithic research? In order to answer this question, the chapter in-
troduces seven selected case studies of varying focus and examines them in detail. The first part of the 
chapter unmasks four cases of ‘formistic’ knowledge production, whereas the second part investigates 
the ‘mechanistic’ legacy of Anglophone research traditions by drawing on three lithic case studies. The 
chapter demonstrates that the core of the Anglophone research endeavour is built around ‘formistic’ 
and ‘mechanistic’ conceptualisations of how the lithic evidence ‘hangs together’! 
 Chapter 5 examines the ‘synthetic’ nature of French lithic inquiry by reconstructing some of its 
key strands in terms of the structural categories issued by the respective world theories. Can these 
prototypical French approaches be shown to rely on ‘contextualistic’ and ‘organicistic’ assumptions 
and concepts? The chapter draws together seven selected case studies to provide an answer to this 
question. The first part of the chapter highlights four cases or aspects of ‘contextualistic’ inquiry in the 
French scene, whereas the second part enumerates three cases of lithic research which are committed 
to ‘organicistic’ concepts. The analysis shows that French technological research is characterised by the 
tension and interaction between ‘contextualism’ and ‘organicism.’ 
 Chapter 6 reviews the main findings of Chapters 3 to 5 and explores their implications. It 
sheds new light on some of the long-standing issues created by the divide, for example the problematic 
relationship between chaîne opératoire and ‘reduction sequence’ approaches. The chapter makes a 
strong case for the irreducibility and equipotency of the four cognitive orientations lying at the heart of 
the divide. It shows that the parallelisation of the French-Anglophone boundary with the ‘analytic’-
‘synthetic’ polarity of world theories leads to the recognition that, in principle, no side can claim cogni-
tive superiority. Lithic research is argued to be fundamentally pluralistic to this effect. I draw out some 
consequences of this condition for practices of criticism at the French-Anglophone interface. It is con-
tended that critique can only be successful and productive if the cognitive standards under which par-
ticular knowledge claims have initially been generated are taken seriously and are respected to some 
extent. By reviewing the main lines of mutual criticism gathered in Chapter 1 in this light, I conclude 
5 
 
that the type of ‘signature critique’ currently deployed by both sides often turns out to be counterpro-
ductive and must thus be re-considered if a serious rapprochement is envisioned. The chapter closes 
with some thoughts on the overarching complementarities between the four cognitive orientations and 
the potential for future cooperation between the two factions of lithic knowledge production. Taken 
together, a key insight is that lithic research can improve its own practice by cultivating a self-
conscious and self-critical attitude in terms of its basic epistemological commitments. 
Since this study is potentially of interest to various audiences, a few words on preferable reading ap-
proaches may be useful. Most archaeological readers, especially those not so much interested in con-
ceptual details and technicalities, are advised to primarily consult Chapters 1 and 6. From there, one 
can easily go back to some of the selected details presented in Chapters 3 to 5. The latter chapters 
should consequently be of primary concern to anybody interested in the conceptual underpinnings of 
stone artefact analysis and the intricate relationship between different lithic approaches and Pepper’s 
four world hypotheses. Even though it should in principle be possible to understand the basic message 
of Chapters 3 to 5 without consulting Chapter 2, archaeological readers are at least encouraged to in-
spect the various info-boxes found in this chapter; these concisely outline the core features of each of 
Pepper’s four cognitive frameworks. The info-boxes are designed to guide readers through the special-
ised terminology encountered in Chapters 4 and 5.  
The core parts of interest for philosophy of science-oriented readers are Chapters 1, 2, and 6. 
Chapters 3 to 5 may be consulted selectively and according to individual preference after these core 
parts have been taken into account. 
For obvious reasons, it is recommended that all readers, irrespectively of their background, 
carefully engage with Chapter 1, which sets up the basic issues and introduces the French-Anglophone 
divide in some detail. Moreover, readers especially interested in the various aspects discussed in Chap-
ter 3 are encouraged to take into consideration the thorough juxtaposition of the three paired lithic 
case studies at the end of Chapter 1 before they start reading. 
 Supplementary information can be found in the Appendices. Appendix I clarifies the notions 
‘Anglophone’ and ‘French’ with regard to their utilization in the present research and discusses the 
criteria of selecting the three paired case studies, including what one can learn from them. Appendix II 
sketches some methodological aspects of using Pepper’s world hypotheses as a conceptual framework 
to study scientific practice and comprises a discussion of the conceptual shortcomings and potential 
inadequacies of each of the four world theories; it also stores additional information on the layer- and 
pound-cake model of cultural reality, which are referred to time and again in Chapters 3 to 5. Appen-
dix III contains the supplementary information for Chapters 3 to 5. It for example presents additional 
schemes of inference including an outline of the methodological procedure underlying their construc-
tion and the exposition of the general rationale which has guided the selection of the analysed cases in 
Chapters 4 and 5. Appendix Q, finally, lists all original French quotes which are given as English trans-
lations in the main text. 
  Since the present study has to deal with two, and sometimes three languages, original terms – 
where possible – are provided in parentheses. Round brackets are reserved for English and French, the 
two main languages under discussion, while German terminology – if useful – is given in square 
brackets. Original French terms which are non-commonplace2 or important to highlight are distin-
guished by the use of « ». 
 Finally, critical readers and those that find themselves in a position where many basic ques-
tions appear to have been unanswered are warmly invited to examine the FAQ section which has been 
included following Chapter 6. This section anticipates elementary questions as well as likely angles of 
criticism and reacts to them, showing that most of them are misconceived. Some readers may there-
fore want to to refer to this section as soon as possible, for example immediately after reading Chapter 
1, in order to dispel their early scepticism and to warrant their further engagement with the present 
analysis and its findings. 
 
 
                                                          
2 For example, the term chaîne opératoire is common-place – i.e., regularly used in the English expert literature – while the 

















The present chapter addresses pertinent questions of lithic knowledge that arise at the French-
Anglophone boundary, when practitioners from both camps examine knapped stone technology and 
assess its value for interpreting the Palaeolithic past. In this first section, the nature of lithic knowledge 
will be discussed and some of its epistemological ramifications exposed. This portrayal will both estab-
lish why an epistemological treatment of the topic is mandatory (and in fact long overdue) and lay the 
groundwork for the in-depth conceptual analysis to follow in the subsequent chapters. 
                                                          
3 For the original French version of the introductory quote, see Appendix Q.1. 
“[…] The second temptation [of human science] may be referred to as “esoteri-
cism.” It distances itself from the order of realities substituting the latter with a 
logical construction, a complex edifice of categories, principles, notions and 
concepts which are only accessible by initiation. The logical tie between them is 
then postulated to be identical with the logic of the real; the order of things mat-
ters less than the order of words. And the criteria of acquiescence eventually 
become those of faith, more than those of scientific reason. This realised tempta-
tion transforms scientific schools into chapels or sects, controversies into scholas-
tic debates, and doubts into heresies.”  





Knowledge can be defined in many ways.4 The same is of course true for ‘lithic knowledge.’ What can 
count as knowledge arguably depends on the context of research and the accepted standards of in-
quiry. Counteracting research agendas often adopt quite different concepts of knowledge. As a result, 
any clear-cut, substantial, prescriptive, or ‘normative’ definition of knowledge, and by implication ‘lith-
ic knowledge,’ tends to be compromised from the beginning. The concepts of knowledge brought to 
bear in Palaeolithic archaeology are theory-laden to the same extent as other tokens of research (cf. 
Collins 1999)5: 
What Gamble observes for archaeological ‘facts’ similarly applies to archaeological 
‘knowledge’; the relationship between the former and the latter is reflexive. His observation is also a 
timely one. As we shall see more clearly in the subsequent chapters, knowledge can indeed only be 
understood if the foundations of practices that produce it are taken into account. Refraining from any 
clear-cut or substantial definition of archaeological knowledge does therefore not imply to erode the 
very concept. Rather, the issue of knowledge is placed on the table of empirical investigation again, 
positing that knowledge can be studied as a real-world phenomenon – by examining how different 
archaeologists relate to it through their practices and theories. 
 Having said this, a more pragmatic definition of ‘lithic knowledge’ can help to situate the dis-
cussion. Broadly speaking, lithic knowledge is a subspecies of archaeological knowledge. The latter is 
characterised by a unique reliance on ‘material evidence’ (e.g., Wylie and Chapman 2015). The materi-
al evidence that is accessible to archaeologists may be only a part of a more extensive but unknown 
material context; this is because the availability of archaeological evidence naturally depends on its 
survivability (Collins 1999: 94, 102). Archaeological knowledge rests exclusively on materials which 
succeeded to survive into the present (cf. e.g., Renfrew and Bahn 2012 [1991]: 49, 53f.; Gamble 2001: 
67-72; Lucas 2015: 314). The specificity of archaeological knowledge is that it is ‘without alternative’ – 
it cannot be attained by any other means than questioning the material evidence gathered from exca-
vations (Boissinot 2011: 301).6 There are only two general categories of archaeological evidence – ‘ob-
jects’ and ‘features.’7 The first category is typically subdivided into ‘artefacts’ (human-made or human-
modified objects) and ‘ecofacts’ (objects fashioned or modified by non-human forces); the second cate-
gory covers the various configurations of objects (e.g., scatters, assemblages, sites) as well as the situ-
ated contexts of their discovery (e.g., layers, pits). Simply put, archaeological knowledge may arise if 
these sources of evidence are interrogated in maximally informative ways. 
 Analogously, we can hold that ‘lithic knowledge’ is a product of effectively examining the dis-
posable ‘lithic evidence,’ which is simply defined as the totality of ‘material evidence’ to do with lithic 
artefacts – that is, human-fabricated stone objects. To this effect, lithic knowledge claims pertain to a 
                                                          
4 Cf. Gibbon (2005: 68f.) for a very brief survey of the issue of ‘knowledge’ and ‘justification’ in archaeology. 
5 In his textbook discussion of the nature of archaeological data, Collins (1999: 87) confidently notes: “All data are biased: they 
have to be used and ‘read’ with care, and we cannot accept them at face value. It is this problem which is the major theme of this 
chapter.” 
6 An underrated but crucial peculiarity of archaeological knowledge is that it rests on a document – the excavation site – which is 
essentially destroyed during its investigation. Some scholars have even argued that archaeological knowledge is produced by 
means of a series of ‘unrepeated experiments’ (cf. Barker 1977: 12; but see Bradley 2015 for a more nuanced view). In general, 
this process renders archaeological evidence fragmentary in a dual sense: not only is it a fragment in and of itself but it is also 
actively fragmented by practices of excavation – the bulk of archaeologically available material evidence represents literally a 
‘left-over’ of excavating a site. 
7 Although it does not matter too much for the present argumentation, this point is admittedly somewhat contentious. Scholars 
do not always agree on the primary evidentiary categories that make up the archaeological record. Philippe Boissinot (2011: 267, 
2015) for example discriminates between three major categories – ‘stratigraphical units’ (which he further subdivides into ‘posi-
tive’ and ‘negative’ entities), ‘finds’ or individual ‘facts’ (faits), and ‘aggregates’ (ensembles). Collins (1999) distinguishes between 
‘individuals’ (artefacts and ecofacts), ‘contexts,’ ‘features,’ ‘structures,’ and ‘sites.’  For a general discussion of the features mak-
ing up the ‘archaeological record,’ see Patrik (1985). 
“Facts, or rather observations of data, are never simple. Neither are they neutral or value free. 
Facts are theory laden. They cannot be read objectively but come ready interpreted, owing to 
such factors as the history of the subject and how they have been interpreted within the narra-
tives we use. The archaeologist does not so much breathe life into them by, say, placing pots in 
a battleship curve […] or analysing animal bones as evidence of how a prehistoric butcher made 
decisions, but rather his or her interpretation is already driven by theory, however implicit and 




fragment of a fragment. They are harbingers of the notoriously incomplete nature of the archaeological 
record. Lithic knowledge is obtained from a particular inorganic source – knapped stone artefacts – 
and based on only a subset of the potentially available archaeological evidence. At the same time, how-
ever, lithic evidence tends to be readily available and can be developed rather reliably because its ma-
terial base is extremely durable and preserves even under unfavourable conditions. Yet this advantage 
is also a burden.  
Especially in Palaeolithic archaeology which effectively begins with the emergence of the first 
stone knapping technologies in human evolution, lithic artefacts are often the only remains to have 
withstood the exertions of time. The reconstruction of the Palaeolithic past, like no other period in 
human history, thus invariantly depends on interpreting the lithic record. It is mainly through the 
lithic evidence that we can come to an understanding of this early yet crucial epoch of human becom-
ing, rendering lithic knowledge almost automatically a contested arena. Lithic knowledge, like no other 
vector of archaeological judgement, seems to legislate about our basic image of the Palaeolithic as a 
period, legitimising certain narratives while deprecating others: 
This unique reliance on lithic knowledge has motivated students of the Palaeolithic to develop 
an entire phalanx of theories and methods for grasping the significance of ancient stone artefacts. The 
result is that we now know a great deal about them, but this knowledge is often disparate and contra-
dictory. Although the nature of the Palaeolithic record has clearly put the problem of lithic knowledge 
centre stage, conflicting knowledge claims are difficult to resolve and are often merely juxtaposed – 
most attempts to constrain or narrow down the interpretive space of lithic analysis remain equivocal or 
even controversial. Since the lithic evidence weights so heavy, disagreements in interpreting the lithic 
record may easily feed into questions of scholarly authority. The question, then, is not merely what to 
do with divergent lithic viewpoints but becomes a question of what to do with inconsistent visions of 
the Palaeolithic as a whole. The stakes of lithic knowledge are high for this reason alone. 
Although lithic knowledge appears to be contentious, stone tools are extremely ‘tangible’ and promise 
a ‘vivid’ portrayal of the circumstances and activities of the distant past they embody. Before anything 
else, lithic objects are realia – i.e. concrete rather than abstract objects. As such, the mode in which 
they enter the arena of scholarly investigation is characterised by ‘immediacy’ and ‘concreteness;’ 
studying lithic artefacts and generating lithic data typically implies to interact directly with material 
objects. It is this materiality of the lithic evidence that stands out the most, pledging to provide first-
hand insights into otherwise impalpable ways of Palaeolithic life. Despite the fact that stones cannot 
speak, the merit of lithic objects is that they presumably ‘objectify’ the past, by literally ‘casting it in 
stone’ – in ways that other sources, especially written texts, could not; it is their ostensible ‘banality’ as 
well as their ‘casual’ and ‘mundane’ character that seems to solidify their evidential authority. Lithic 
artefacts supposedly lack an agenda of their own. 
 This positive characterisation of the lithic evidence is counterbalanced, as we have seen, by its 
status as a fragment. The latter perspective often dominates the expert literature and captures how 
stone tools are usually conceptualised. They are seen as ‘vestiges,’ ‘traces,’ ‘residues,’ ‘remains,’ or, 
more rarely, ‘relics’ of long-deceased human lifeways. All of these terms emphasise the partiality of 
lithic knowledge and again call attention to the frustrating scarcity of evidentiary supply in the Palaeo-
lithic. The circumstance that lithic evidence in this period is sparse is not so much implicated by the 
character of the evidence itself, but rather a consequence of the nature of the Palaeolithic record, often 
offering only a handful of well-excavated sites per relevant spatiotemporal segment. This situation not 
only calls into question the representativeness of the available information, it prompts the critical issue 
of ‘negative’ evidence. For if the record is notoriously incomplete, the ‘absence of evidence’ is generally 
“If, thanks to [archaeology], we know of prehistoric man some aspects of her/his physical ap-
pearance, of her/his economic, artistic or religious life, it is mainly from the angle of the tool 
manufacturer that the human of this time is revealed to us. Very often, only knapped stone is 
preserved and testifies to the former presence and activities of a human group. As a result, the 
stone tool acquires a considerable value in many areas of prehistoric research.” (Perlès 1974: 




difficult to interpret as ‘evidence of absence,’ let alone in every single case (e.g., Collins 1999: 89). Each 
novel discovery may change the picture fundamentally. Palaeolithic archaeologists, therefore, must 
face an evidentiary reality in which the irresolvable ‘incompleteness’ of evidence threatens to under-
mine the security of lithic knowledge claims and forces practitioners to retreat to the ‘positive’ facts. 
 This retreat to the ‘positive’ and presumably most ‘impregnable’ lithic facts predisposes the 
idea that interpretative options are limited at best, putting practitioners into a difficult position to gain 
substantial knowledge. Palaeolithic archaeologists, like no other group of their kind, are kept busy by 
the need to brace or deflect epistemic deficiency. This focalisation of the predicaments to render lithic 
evidence intelligible or significant orientates research primarily towards the inherent dangers of inter-
pretation rather than its possibilities. The result is a condition of inquiry in which both over- and mis-
interpretation are greatly feared. Collin’s (1999: 129) alerting reminder that “[a]rchaeological data 
have enormous potential for interpretation, and even more possibilities for misinterpretation” is a 
prototypical example of this stance. What he formulates for archaeology as a whole offers an even 
more serious threat to students of the Palaeolithic. Especially in the latter’s branch of lithic research, 
efforts tend to be pooled in order to secure and solidify knowledge rather than to seek out new inter-
pretive options. Although it is only natural that most lithic approaches attempt to narrow down the 
space of credible interpretations, there is also the risk of too easily discarding, bypassing, or even ig-
noring alternative readings of the disposable evidence: 
As Boissinot (ibid.: 266) rightly points out, archaeological material, despite its tangibility and 
seemingly ‘objectifying’ qualities, is “much more problematic than one admits.” Not only is there a real 
tendency to ‘reify’ the findings of the past (ibid.: 255), it is practically very difficult to make sure that 
one covers all of the relevant interpretive alternatives. In philosophy of science, this difficulty is known 
as the ‘problem of unconceived alternatives’ (Box 1);8 it calls into question whether a convergence of 
evidence and interpretation is enough to mitigate the problem of knowledge. Even if researchers can 
assure that their knowledge claims are reasonably well-supported, there is still the possibility that 
some unconceived alternatives are equally substantiated by the evidence. How, then, can one ensure 
that all of the relevant alternatives are taken into consideration? The answer is that one cannot. The 
only solution is to bring the issue to the forefront of inquiry, and to impel scholars to not only work on 
the problem of corroboration but to actively explore the ‘space of interpretation’ as well. 
We may argue that the ‘problem of unconceived alternatives’ is significantly aggravated in Pal-
aeolithic research, not only because the latter’s evidential foundations are extremely thin and 
knowledge claims consequently less constrained by the data at hand but also, and perhaps more im-
portantly, because scholars are confronted with actors (and maybe even processes) that lack present-
day correlates or even close analogies.9 The prime examples are the various now extinct hominin spe-
cies, the Australopithecines and Homos who have created the bigger part of the artefactual record 
available for the Palaeolithic. Another example are the members of the now similarly ‘fossil’ communi-
ty of Pleistocene megafauna once populating the ancestral environments of the different stone tool 
producers. Again, how can one assure not to have missed an alternative yet crucial explanation in face 
of such basic uncertainty? The dangers of not even considering, let alone too quickly dismissing, po-
tentially relevant propositions are arguably elevated in this context of inquiry. 
Clearly, these considerations bring us back to the enduring and certainly influential picture of 
archaeology as an ‘imaginative enterprise,’ perhaps most lucidly articulated by Alain Schnapp (1993: 
                                                          
8 Cf. esp. Stanford (2001, 2008, 2015). 
9 Cf. Collins (1999: 90) for a similar insistence on the possibility that “archaeological finds may have been deposited by activities 
which have no modern correlates.” 
“Any archaeologist of good faith will recognise that the interpretation of the remains he offers is 
one of many other plausible ones; that it would be necessary to provide an inventory of all pos-
sible scenarios […] To take this plurality into account from the start indeed poses a cognitive 
challenge: the mind is not prepared to deal with such disparate, sometimes contradictory infor-
mation. To say it in a few words, this plurality is partly due to the fragmentary nature of the 
considered objects: the world of remains is a totality amputated by various factors and laws, 
those of chance being not negligible.” (Boissinot 2011: 267; my translation [the original French 




30).10 According to this widely held view, archaeologists cannot renounce from the exercise of ‘imagi-
native reconstruction’ since their evidence only weakly constraints their interpretations.  Even if this 
situation offers an adequate description of what archaeologists usually do when they try to make sense 
of their evidence, it is not necessarily bound to promote uncontrolled, overly speculative thought or 
even nurture ‘anything-goes’ attitudes but simply compels archaeological scholarship to recognise that 
‘imaginative reconstruction’ may be framed in different ways. The gap between archaeological data 
and archaeological interpretation solicited by the metaphor of ‘imagination’ clarifies that focussed 
archaeological ‘puzzle-solving’ (sensu Kuhn 1996 [1962]: 35-42) may require the development of pow-
erful yet necessarily ‘normative’ guidelines of research, dictating how ‘imaginative reconstruction’ 
ought to be practiced.11 Again, we should expect that these guidelines resonate with the sparse material 
evidence of the Palaeolithic in a much more ambiguous way than, say, with the comparatively rich 
Bronze Age record of Northwestern Europe. 
All of these aspects undoubtedly complicate the quest for lithic knowledge of the Palaeolithic 
past. The nature of the available lithic evidence only weakly determines the mode of inquiry and makes 
it necessary to adhere to some kind of orientating principles to define and work on research problems 
in a constructive way. Since the nature of the lithic record prompts radical epistemological questions 
and because scholars simply cannot pause all the time to examine and reflect on these issues, stand-
ards of research become easily paradigmatic and sometimes even a matter of ‘faith.’ Even though it is 
completely understandable that practitioners wish to advance knowledge rather than to constantly 
question its foundations – an attitude which indeed appears to be somewhat ‘masochistic’ (Boissinot 
2011: 301) – the threats of ‘ideologisation’ are definitely real. The apparent deficit of evidence and the 
lack of “natural” frames of reference promote ‘strong’ opinions on how lithic data should be handled. 
The temptation to fall back into a dogmatic stance is tremendously high (Box 2). 
 
The foregoing discussion indicates that lithic research in Palaeolithic archaeology is plagued by issues 
of underdetermination. Forcefully introduced by Willard O. Quine (1951, 1960) in the middle of last 
century, the ‘problem of underdetermination’ draws attention to the fact that substantial statements 
about the world may be systematically underdetermined by the disposable evidence (Box 3). If this 
contention, which in its elementary variant has become widely known as the ‘Duhem-Quine thesis,’ is 
accepted, one has to acknowledge the general possibility that evidence may be not enough to discrimi-
nate between two or more competing knowledge claims; these knowledge claims may turn out to be 
‘empirically equivalent,’ that is, may have the same factual implications (e.g. Kukla 1996: 137). The 
highly specific conditions of knowledge-formation outlined in the preceding sub-sections naturally 
render Palaeolithic archaeology a vulnerable target of various forms of knowledge-
underdetermination. As a consequence, its practitioners are strongly predisposed to author a number 
of incompatible yet underconstrained assertions about the distant past and its protagonists. 
 While there is basic disagreement about the scope of underdetermination in science (cf. Turn-
bull 2017),12 it is generally agreed that underdetermination plays a crucial role in sparking theoretical 
controversies and fuelling local interpretive conflicts, especially in the practice of the ‘historical scienc-
es of the deep past’ (e.g., Turner 2005, 2007):13  
                                                          
10 Cf. Thomas (1996: 63); Gamble (2001: 1f.) devotes the very first section of his introduction to archaeology to the issue of ‘ar-
chaeological imagination.’ 
11 Jones (2015: 324) takes up this point, arguing that the influential debates between proponents of ‘objective-explanatory’ and 
‘hermeneutic-interpretive’ archaeologies waging between the 1960s and 1980s in the English-speaking world, especially in 
Britain, must be regarded as a prime example of the lasting struggle to frame ‘imaginative reconstruction’ in maximally produc-
tive ways. The ‘scientific’ (Binford, Clarke) and the ‘hermeneutic’ stance (Hodder, Shanks, Tilley, Thomas) must thereby surely 
be place into a broader perspective, complemented for example by ‘structuralist-semiotic’ modes of framing ‘imaginative recon-
struction’ (Leroi-Gourhan, Brézillon) thriving outside of the Anglophone world. 
12 Turnbull (2017), in a short but informative review of the issue, distinguishes between four variants of underdermination (cf. 
Box 3). These variants presumably play varying roles in scientific research and are differentially controversial as to their reality, 
scope, and effects. 




In light of the arguments presented so far, I suggest that the problem of lithic knowledge has at least 
partly to be re-defined in terms of the underdetermination thesis. The key issue, as it seems, is not that 
lithic scholars are poorly equipped to interpret their findings but rather that the available evidence is 
of such a nature that in the current state of investigation it, by itself, cannot satisfactorily direct them 
to the one most adequate knowledge claim. This proposition does not imply that researchers will never 
be able to effectively decide between competing interpretations of the lithic evidence; it merely con-
tends that in the present state of affairs – given the theoretical and evidential resources currently 
available – students of lithic technology may be considerably compromised in their ability to make 
conclusive interpretive choices. We will develop this point in the next section. 
 At any rate, underdetermination is not just a ‘philosopher’s problem’ (Kitcher 2001: 36) but 
affects the heart of the scientific conduct. Not only is it presumably much more widespread than typi-
cally recognised, especially in branches of research where the supply of evidence is extremely limited, 
underdetermination is also perceptible by scientists themselves (even though they may not immediate-
ly identify it as such) and greatly matters in how arguments are drafted and enquiries develop. The 
recognition of coexisting but possibly underdetermined knowledge claims may therefore help to recov-
er some of the most persistent difficulties and interpretive conflicts that scholars face in their own 
arena of scientific practice, with Palaeolithic archaeology being no exception. Not unimportantly, ac-
knowledging underdetermination as a serious problem re-directs the attention from purely philosoph-
ical issues of knowledge to the ‘concrete’ knowledge-generating practices of scholars and particular 
scientific communities. 
 
It has long been recognised that scientific research is fundamentally shaped by social conditions; sci-
entists, just like other members of society, work and live in social worlds. They have to navigate these 
social realities and often draw their inspirations and motivations from their lifeworld experience. 
Moreover, scientific investigation itself comprises a crucial social dimension. Research is traditionally 
organised in social compartments such as ‘communities’ or smaller ‘peer groups’ and the lessons 
learned and the pieces of knowledge gathered have to be horizontally distributed within these units as 
well as transmitted to a new generation of scholars (e.g., Longino 1990; Kitcher 1993, 2001; Bird 
2010).14 Since science is inescapably practiced in social settings and depends on social processes and 
structures to be successful, the analysis of scientific knowledge should be complemented by the exami-
nation of the sociological conditions of knowledge production – by what Karl Mannheim (1936 [1929]) 
and others have coined the ‘sociology of knowledge.’ Archaeological and lithic knowledge, respectively, 
are no exceptions in this regard and should be expected to resonate with the social milieus in which 
they are advanced. 
 The significance of the social context of research lies in its ability to act as a confined supply of 
resources; it for example helps to consolidate particular research interests, filters research questions, 
and anchors discussion points. It also guarantees the relative stability of processes of inquiry and pro-
vides the place to work on problems collectively. It is because of this social potency of research pro-
cesses that practitioners can be said ‘to stand on the shoulders of giants.’ Through social structures and 
mechanisms, accomplishments and failures of research can easily be internalised so that they may 
instruct future investigations; in this way, practitioners are able to build explicitly on the efforts of 
their peers and the preceding generations of scholars. The social context of research hence also impli-
                                                          
14 I can only recommend the excellent treatment of this topic by Welbourne (1981). 
“Because historical science is often marked by degrading signals, and thus incomplete data, it 
provides excellent source material for enquiring after the nature of underdetermination and 
how scientists respond to it. For instance, the fossil record is commonly understood as ‘gap-
py’: it in no way represents a trustworthy or unbiased sample of the history of life. This is 
because the conditions required for fossilization are highly specific, and the survival of subse-
quent fossils (not to mention their eventual discovery by palaeontologists [or archaeolo-
gists]!) is highly fragile. Under such conditions, underdetermination is a major concern.” 
(Currie and Turner 2016: 43f.) 
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cates the historical dimensions of knowledge production and transfer in a given field of inquiry or a 
community of scholars. 
 All of this matters for the present examination because the social substrate of research must be 
recognised as an important reinforcer of knowledge conflicts. Scholars working in different communi-
ties or peer groups may rely on different resources to refurbish, discuss, and/or perpetuate knowledge 
and thus ultimately come up with different ways of tackling similar problems. When knowledge claims 
are generally threatened to be underdetermined by the available evidence (see supra), differences in 
the social organisation of research may therefore easily incite or solidify disagreement, controversy, 
and antagonism. Again, the effect is likely to be strongest where the supply of evidence is relatively 
scarce. 
The basic dependence of knowledge on the social format of inquiry has for instance lucidly 
been expounded by Ludwik Fleck (1979 [1935], 1936); the work of this author, often overlooked or 
underrated, provides a profitable point of departure to develop a firmer grasp on some key aspects of 
socially embedded processes of knowledge formation. According to Fleck (ibid.: 38, 40), scientific cog-
nition is best understood as a three-party relationship, the meeting point of ‘knowing subjects’ (indi-
vidual researchers), ‘collectives of thoughts’ (effective groups of researchers), and the ‘objects to be 
known’ (object-matters). The type of cognition that signifies scientific research is thus imbued with 
‘social activity’ (ibid.: 38, 42f.). Two concepts are central in Fleck’s reconstruction of the sociology of 
knowledge – ‘collectives of thought’ [Denkkollektive] and ‘styles of thought’ [Denkstile] (ibid.: 125, 
1e42). The two are coextensive (ibid.: 41). The former represent the totality of scholars that commonly 
engage in collective tasks of inquiry while the latter reflect the distinct ways of doing science and talk-
ing about research and its objects which designates these groups and sets them apart from other 
groups.15 The stylised form of cognition that, over the course of history, develops in a given collective of 
thought is never fully transparent, let alone consciously accessible to all or even most of its members 
(idem). ‘Styles of thought’ tend to rely on systems of expert terminology, often highly abstract and jar-
gon-infused, as well as on fitting rhetorical strategies, typically opaque or “disturbing” to those who are 
not part of the issuing thought collective [Stilfärbung, Stilzauber] – each ‘collective of thought’ en-
courages specific ‘habits of thought’ (ibid.: 37, 42): 
Thought collectives work primarily with the resources they have internalised and are differen-
tially susceptible to external developments. They form relatively enclosed systems of scientific opinion 
in which evidence is handled and interpreted according to the rules and norms defined by the accepted 
style(s) of reasoning. The implication is that these collective units of inquiry tend to cultivate particular 
perspectives and research orientations – a circumstance that Fleck (1979 [1935]: 30, 38) identifies as 
the ‘tenacity’ of collective viewpoints and stances of research. Collectives of thought turn out to be rela-
tively ‘stubborn’ in how they normally muster data and render them significant. This is what is often 
referred to as the inherent ‘conservatism’ or ‘orthodoxy’ of larger units of research: 
                                                          
15 For a discussion of the status and nature of ‘collective scientific knowledge,’ see also Fagan (2012). This review of the concept 
not only confirms that collectives are indeed required to produce credible scientific knowledge, it also highlights that the internal 
dynamics of social groups can really be decisive for the development of particular methodological norms of knowledge produc-
tion. 
“If we define “thought collective” as a community of persons mutually exchanging ideas or 
maintaining intellectual interaction, we will find by implication that it also provides the spe-
cial “carrier” for the historical development of any field of thought, as well as for the given 
stock of knowledge and level of culture. This we have designated thought style. The thought 
collective thus supplies the missing component. […] Cognition therefore means, primarily, to 
ascertain those results which must follow, given certain preconditions. The preconditions 
correspond to active linkages and constitute that portion of cognition belonging to the collec-
tive. The constrained results correspond to passive linkages and constitute that which is 
experienced as objective reality. The act of ascertaining is the contribution of the individual.” 




A key point is not only that thought collectives necessarily introduce ‘elements of wishful 
thinking’ (Fleck 1979 [1935]: 32) and tend to foster ‘self-fulfilling expectations’ (ibid.: 33), they crucial-
ly predefine the space of the ‘thinkable.’ The resources available to a collective unit of inquiry, includ-
ing all of its past discursive successes and failures, will – to a large extent at least – regulate what can 
count as a reasonable alternative and what is generally ‘imaginable’ as an interpretive option (ibid.: 
28). Credible alternatives to the dominant viewpoints have to be developed internally and need to 
withstand the critical scrutiny of collective standards. This condition, together with the general tenaci-
ty of knowledge production on the level of research communities, certainly amplifies the ‘problem of 
underdetermination.’ When the evidence is limited and research communities built on a different fab-
ric collide, we may have to deal with the reality of two or more opposing clusters of perfectly alterna-
tive readings of the same object-matter, suggesting that the space of interpretation itself is fundamen-
tally mutable. 
 For a long time already, archaeologists recognise that their social matrix of research is ex-
tremely heterogeneous (cf. e.g., Dennell 1990; Clark 1991a; Scarre 1999). Different ‘disciplinary tradi-
tions’ or ‘national research legacies’ often start with very different assumptions about the past and 
provide researchers with incompatible interpretive intuitions (e.g., Otte and Keeley 1990; Knüsel 1992; 
Straus 2001a; Johnson 2010: 231-233).16 Murray (2013: 22), for example, has recently concluded that 
“the ‘culture’ of archaeology, i.e. background knowledge, experience, and the givens of its practice, can 
no longer be considered to be widely shared among practitioners.” The thrust of discussions waging at 
least since the 1960s, however, had a lasting impact primarily on what we may call Holocene archae-
ologies, leaving Plio-Pleistocene archaeology including its Palaeolithic branch largely unaffected.17 This 
is rather ironic since the latter, as we have seen, offers unique challenges to practitioners and their 
quest for trustworthy knowledge of the most distant past. 
After having established the characteristics of lithic knowledge formation and some of its difficulties in 
Palaeolithic archaeology, we can now turn the attention to the French-Anglophone divide itself. This 
section pursues two interrelated goals. I will commence with a general exposition of the separation 
between French and Anglophone research endeavours and the crisis of lithic knowledge it embodies, 
before calling upon three paired case studies to illustrate that the divide is substantial enough to au-
thor strictly incompatible knowledge claims. It has to be said that the French-Anglophone divide is not 
a struggle of individual women and men, though, but rather stands for, as will be laid out, a clash of 
two evolved social structures of research rooted, among other things, in divergent disciplinary histo-
ries. Although the contemporary divide is the primary object-matter of the present investigation, its 
purpose is exemplary. I do not wish to suggest that the ongoing quarrel between French and Anglo-
                                                          
16 See also Shanks (1992: 16), Murray (1993), Coye and Hurel (2013), and Delley et al. (2017). 
17 This is not to say that there has been a lack of research on the historical and epistemological foundations of Palaeolithic ar-
chaeology, to the contrary (cf. e.g., Clark and Willermet 1997; Corbey and Roebroeks 2001; O’Connor 2007; Lippé 2007, 2012; 
Sommer 2007; Goodrum 2009, 2014; Bon 2009; de Beaune 2010, 2016; McNabb 2012a; Guillomet-Malmassari 2012; Van 
Reybrouck 2012; Bednarik 2013). The point is rather that existing work has only rarely addressed questions of cognitive diversi-
ty and has typically focussed on spelling out the characteristics of a well-defined unit of inquiry, often simply taking specific 
epistemic values and/or conceptual tenets for granted. 
“Within science, a discipline acts both through and upon its adherents (see Prior, 1994), 
organizing knowledge-producing resources in response to institutional pressures and intel-
lectual exigencies (Good, 2000) while at the same time establishing the object of inquiry for 
its members ontologically (Shepherd, 1993). Sullivan (1996) notes a further tension, in that 
scientists are expected to respect the traditions of their field but at the same time required 
to make novel contributions to it (224). He describes disciplinarity as operating via ortho-
doxies — hierarchical systems of canonical narratives, doctrines, methods, and common-
places that represent the shared vision of a field (226-229). In their work, scholars legiti-
mate themselves in the context of a discipline by “projecting an orthodox, yet progressive, 
ethos” (233), signaling knowledge and acceptance of most of a field’s paradigmatic touch-
stones while challenging a few in order to say something relevant and worthwhile. In this 
way, disciplines are able to engage in knowledge production despite a deeply conservative 
impulse that, in seeking to sustain an existing community and maintain its intellectual 
rigor, serves as a barrier to the new (Wilder, 2005).” (White 2014: 1) 
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phone research traditions constitutes the key obstacle in modern lithic studies, let alone the only one; I 
do believe, however, that learning from this prominent case – the two undoubtedly represent the per-
haps most influential poles of Palaeolithic research in the Western tradition – will help to extract more 
general lessons about the conditions of lithic knowledge production in Palaeolithic archaeology. 
In her recent review of French-U.S. relations in Palaeolithic archaeology, Perlès (2016: 231) emphati-
cally concludes: 
This statement stands for the latest episode of a long-felt dissatisfaction with the persistent segrega-
tion of French and Anglophone research endeavours (cf. Clark and Lindly 1991; Wargo 2009). Alt-
hough practitioners tend to disagree about the gravity, scope, and relevance of the divergence between 
French and Anglophone lithic approaches, there is a common sense of ‘unease’ shared by most, if not 
all, researchers concerned with understanding the lithic record of the Palaeolithic. While some believe 
the divide is really ‘absolute’ and ‘paradigmatic’ (e.g., Straus 1987, 1991, 2002b; Clark 1993, 2002; 
Monnier and Missal 2014) others have hardly become tired of highlighting that there is also much 
topical overlap and conceptual congruence to be found at the French-Anglophone interface (e.g., Au-
douze 1987; Bleed 2001; Monigal 2002: 125-127; Chazan 2014). Middle-ground stances appear to be 
surprisingly rare (cf. de la Torre and Mora 2009).18 Despite this difference in opinion and emphasis, 
the French-Anglophone divide is rarely questioned entirely and scholars usually accept it as a reality of 
practice rather than casting it as a disputed fact (cf. Tostevin 2011b, 2012: Chapter 3; McCall 2015: 69).  
The lack of consensus in terms of the stakes and the cognitive significance of the French-
Anglophone divide is arguably a result of ongoing troubles to clearly grasp its epistemological dimen-
sions. Lithic experts have, first and foremost, endeavoured to account either for the methodological 
repertoire or the theoretical landscape supposedly diagnostic of the two research formations (esp. Cha-
zan 1997; Bleed 2001; Shea 2003; Tostevin 2011a; de la Torra and Mora 2009; Perlès 2016), but hith-
erto merely scratched the surface of their anchoring conceptual spaces. To the knowledge of the au-
thor, naturally limited as it is, there exists to date not even a single in-depth study exploring the epis-
temological foundations of French-Anglophone relations in palaeolithic archaeology. Needless to say, 
such an exposition is desperately needed to break the ‘spell of style’ [Stilzauber] (sensu Fleck 1935) 
that tends to cloud the vision for the collective research endeavours one does not participate in, simply 
stipulated as the ‘other’ (see previous section). 
What we typically encounter at the French-Anglophone interface is a marked imbalance of ac-
counting for oneself and this cognitive ‘other.’ Most of the time, scholars appear to be rather familiar 
with their own research background(s), but have obvious difficulties to adequately depict or come to 
terms with the other side. The symptoms of this situation are manifold and diverse but we clearly en-
counter signs of ‘ideologised’ trench warfare, heated and emotionally charged accusations, plenty of 
mischaracterisation and ‘talking past each other,’ and even open defiance and hostility. At the same 
time, however, the divide, especially in the last couple of years, has increasingly been cloaked with 
silence and muteness. This paradox may be evidence to suggest that the relationship between French 
and Anglophone lithic practice has become an extremely sensitive topic and, even though being deeply 
troublesome, has reached some sort of historical deadlock. 
The following subsections will address some of these aspects in more detail, providing a prob-
lem-oriented review of the available literature. This will not only bring the French-Anglophone divi-
sion into clearer focus but also allows us to provide a first assessment of the more practical problems it 
creates. The exposition will show that a strong sense of ‘antagonism’ pervades the field and that schol-
ars seem to struggle tremendously with basic communicative issues – a configuration that, overall, 
suggests that we are indeed confronted with two relatively self-contained research communities. The 
                                                          
18 But see perhaps Shott (2003, 2007) and McCall (2015: 69). 
“I believe that apart from certain semantic convergences the divorce between French and 
Anglo-Saxon approaches is profound and that the divergences are, in reality, still profound 
today and in fact exist since the early days of studying lithic technology on both sides of the 
Atlantic.” (my translation [for the original French quote, see Appendix Q.4]) 
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aftermath of the ‘Binford-Bordes debate’ offers a valuable entry point into the discussion, situating the 
French-Anglophone divide on the historical plane. 
The ‘Binford-Bordes debate’ is often considered a textbook example for the interpretive conflicts creat-
ed by the lasting struggle of grasping the significance of lithic evidence and coming to terms with it 
(Binford and Binford 1966; Binford 1972, 1973; Bordes 1968, 1972; Bordes and Sonneville-Bordes 
1972; Rigaud 1978; cf. Wargo 2009); it is thought to showcase some of the ‘perennial’ problems of 
interpretation that researchers face when they embark on the quest for lithic knowledge (e.g., Monnier 
and Missal 2014). Yet the debate, centred on the issue of explaining the nature of interassemblage 
variability in the French Mousterian, also tends to be framed as a winner’s story, as a testimony of the 
‘rationalist’ impetus of science to progress and solve its problems. Ignoring for a moment that the con-
troversy remains far from being resolved, since none of the originally taken positions turned out to be 
defendable, this portrayal of the debate blurs the vision for its long-term effects on French-
Anglophone interactions. Although the dispute between Binford and Bordes, launched and cultivated 
by the former, was surely influential and marks the heyday of direct confrontation between members 
of the two research traditions, it ironically resulted only in further and this time much deeper-running 
alienation. It is this latter impact of the ‘Binford-Bordes debate’ that merits particular attention in the 
present problem context. 
 An important document of the aftermath dynamics of the debate is Binford and Sabloff’s Par-
adigms, Systematics and Archaeology (1982). In this polemic piece of scholarship, the authors argue 
that the archaeological research landscape has become fractured into two larger spheres of inquiry: a 
‘New World tradition’ and an ‘Old World tradition.’ According to Binford and Sabloff, these two tradi-
tions of continental-scale are based on two mutually exclusive conceptions of culture which, over the 
course of disciplinary history, have given shape to fundamentally distinct methodological and theoreti-
cal repertoires, echoed in different ‘observational languages’ (cf. Clark 1991b: 85). Without going into 
the highly problematic details, this perceived duality between ‘New World’ and ‘Old World’ was cer-
tainly foreshadowed by the foundational agenda of the New Archaeology and its insistence on the 
sharp division between ‘historical’ and ‘processual’ archaeologies (e.g., Sabloff and Wiley 1967; Binford 
1968a, 1972, 1982; Meltzer 1979). For early-day ‘processualists,’ the ‘Binford-Bordes debate’ assumed a 
legitimatory role and served as a focal point of reference to frame research problems more generally. 
All of this created the impression of an unbridgeable gulf between Continental European research on 
the one hand and U.S. American scholarship on the other – a vision that would later develop a life of 
its own through the work of the so called ‘Chicago cohort’19 (cf. Clark 1987, 1991b, 1993, 2002, 2006, 
2009; Clark and Lindly 1991; Clark and Willermet 1997; Straus 1987, 1991, 2002b, 2005; see infra). 
 The picture sketched by Binford and Sabloff was for the most part already anachronistic when 
it was published. Although Audouze and Leroi-Gourhan (1981) encumbered the strange ‘continental 
insularity’ of French research not later than a year before Paradigms was published, the latter still 
puts forth the conception that European archaeology can be addressed as a fairly homogenous entity, 
resting only on a small number of basic tenets. The totality of European research was pigeonholed as 
decisively ‘non-anthropological,’ resting almost exclusively on the sockets of ‘culture history.’ In hind-
sight, the fatal pitfall was perhaps to regard François Bordes as the generic prototype of French, and by 
extension European, scholarship in the field. Bordes became indeed more and more canonised as the 
embodiment of French-type Palaeolithic archaeology, not only because of the writings of Binford and 
his followers, but also because he himself (Bordes 1968: 7) at least encouraged this flattering idea (cf. 
Sackett 2014). 
All of this must be read against the background of a new emerging player in the French re-
search landscape – Leroi-Gourhan and his Parisian school. By the early 1980s, Paris had become the 
emerging centre of Palaeolithic research, at least complementing Bordeaux and increasingly setting a 
new agenda of inquiry; this agenda would drive the French tradition slowly but surely away from its 
                                                          
19 The term ‘Chicago cohort’ refers to a group of young scholars that during the 1960s, on the peak of the New Archaeology 




Bordian stakes. The main point is that the research mandate issued by Leroi-Gourhan (Sorbonne) and 
later Jacques Tixier (Nanterre) placed Palaeolithic research on a novel cognitive basis (e.g., Leroi-
Gourhan 1971, 1982, 1983a; Leroi-Gourhan et al. 1976; Tixier 1978 [2012]; Tixier et al. 1980; Pelegrin 
et al. 1988; Inizan et al. 1995 [1999]), signifying a proper turning point in French disciplinary history 
(cf. Perlès 1987, 1991a; Schlanger 1990, 2005; Karlin 1991; Geneste 1991 [2010]; Valentin 2011: 92-94, 
110-118). The fruits of this creeping revolution, already underway when Paradigms was drafted, would 
lay the foundations of what is known today as « Palethnologie » (Ethnologie préhistoire) and the 
‘technological approach’ (Technologie préhistoire) respectively (e.g., Valentin 2011: 93; Coye 2015; 
Audouze et al. 2017) – together forming the ‘double genealogy’ of the modern French tradition (sensu 
Ramírez Galicia 2016). 
 The continued preoccupation with Bordes, the central reference point of an entire research 
trajectory incited by Sally and Lewis Binford in the late 1960s,20 ensured that these critical develop-
ments were largely overlooked or marginalised on the other side of the Atlantic. This promoted the 
certainly false impression that French mainstream-research was yet of a ‘Bordian’ character. The idea, 
grosso modo, still permeated Anglophone receptions of the French tradition in the 1990s, for example 
echoed in Sackett’s (1991) defence of French ‘straight archaeology’ in the Bordian spirit. Dennell 
(1990: 555f.), in a short but informative paper on the politics of Palaeolithic archaeology, even propos-
es that the 1960s herald the ‘American takeover’ of Old World research and the decline of Continental 
European centres of inquiry such as Paris. In accordance with Villa (1991) and many others, he (1999: 
802-804) articulated the now popular viewpoint that the rise of the various ‘New’ archaeologies in 
Britain and the United States at the time (e.g., Binford and Binford 1968; Clarke 1968; Binford 1972) 
caused a sharp recession in the wider significance of the French tradition, ushering in a new age of 
‘American supremacy’ in the field (cf. Dennell 1983): 
This portrayal of recent disciplinary history, in essence shared by many Anglophone scholars until 
today, overlooks that the approaches set in motion by Leroi-Gourhan, Brézillon, and Tixier in Paris 
between the 1960s and 1990s were equally significant and similarly based on an anthropological vision 
of the past, although of course framed in a different way – as an extension of French « Ethnologie gé-
nérale ».21 
In total, the Binfordian optic has tended to reduce the French tradition to its Bordian stakes 
and stipulated the emergence of ‘processualism’ in the Anglophone world as the only proper revolution 
of the 1960s. Meanwhile, however, French scholars witnessed their very own turnover and it was not 
driven by a ‘processualistic’ impetus at all (cf. Perlès 1991a; Coudart 1999; Audouze et al. 2017). The 
marginalisation of these key developments in the Anglophone heartland clearly undermined the possi-
bilities for a serious rapprochement after the ‘Binford-Bordes debate.’22 The aftermath of the debate 
may have therefore eventually produced a much deeper rupture in the research landscape than the one 
it initially sought to address. The dynamics of the unleashed discourse indicate that the ‘Binford-
                                                          
20 Cf. Binford and Binford (1966, 1968); Binford (1972, 1973). 
21 It is a telling example that Wargo (2009), in her 160 page dissertation on the ‘Binford-Bordes debate,’ even when setting up 
the intellectual backdrop of the debate mentions Leroi-Gourhan, let alone Tixier, only in the passing. She (ibid.: 97) explicitly 
notes: “Like La Place [sic!], Brézillon, and for that matter Leroi-Gourhan, never achieved the recognition and the level of author-
ity and influence that Bordes had gained.” Other passages suggests a more balanced but still ambivalent view of the Parisian 
legacy (esp. ibid.: 118). 
22 A notable exception is the work of Margaret Conkey and her students, who paid notable attention to the œuvre of Leroi-
Gourhan (cf. Conkey 2014; Dobres 1995). However, with her research focus on gender studies, practice theory, and visual cul-
ture in the Pleistocene she was probably too much of a borderline figure to have a strong effect on the Anglophone mainstream, 
especially on scholarship which concerned itself primarily or exclusively with the study of ancient stone technology. 
“The 1960s also marked the eclipse of the French domination of palaeolithic studies by 
American ideas […]. As part and parcel of the New Archaeology, palaeolithic archaeologists 
shifted their focus from the development of cultures and their components through time to 
the behaviour of individual groups, and the interrelationships of their technology, social 
organization and environment. This in turn fostered a more closely integrated, interdiscipli-
nary approach. In British circles, this approach grew out of the Cambridge palaeoeconomic 
approach developed by Grahame Clark in the 1950s (Clark 1952), and Eric Higgs in the 
1970s (Higgs 1975). American developments were always more rooted in anthropology than 
in Europe, and owed much to the galvanizing influence of Lewis Binford in forcing attention 
away from descriptions of archaeological cultures to analyses of how their components in-
teracted with each other and their environment (see, for example Binford 1983; Binford and 




Bordes debate’ acted as a potent catalyst of divergence, leaving behind two separate discursive spaces 
with little intention or incentive of interaction. 
From the 1990s onwards, the amount of literature explicitly or implicitly dealing with the difficulty of 
French-Anglophone relations in Palaeolithic archaeology has virtually exploded (e.g., Harrold 1991, 
2002; Dibble and Debenath 1991; Sellet 1995; Chazan 1997; Tostevin 2000: 64f.). Yet, the overall pic-
ture did not change dramatically since the foundational controversies of the 1960s, and discussions 
were rarely more than alerting monologues. Like shortly after the ‘Binford-Bordes debate,’ there was 
surprisingly little reaction to the unsettling voices uttered primarily by Anglophone researchers. As 
Wargo (2009: 130) has pointed out, however, this might well have had something to do with the ‘pat-
ronising tone too often taken by American archaeologists’ when engaging with their French colleagues.  
The excursions of Geoffrey Clark and Lawrence Straus, both extant members of the ‘Chicago 
cohort,’ into the epistemology of Palaeolithic research exemplify this general attitude (e.g., Clark 1987, 
1991a, 1993, 2002, 2006, 2009; Clark and Lindly 1991; Clark and Willermet 1997; Straus 1987, 1991, 
2002b, 2005). Although their intentions were certainly honourable, namely to spark a new discussion 
about the footing of Palaeolithic knowledge, their rhetoric tended to be ‘colonial’ and their conclusions 
were too often one-sided. Their approach was characterised by a high degree of confidence and as such 
an extension of the general take on the past propagated by the New Archaeology and its associates 
some decades earlier. Harrold (2002: 29) has rightly noted that this confident attitude may easily swap 
into ‘hubris’ and is even more easily interpreted as such. The point is that these authors never really 
managed to escape from their partisan viewpoints (e.g., Clark 2002) and it is perhaps less surprising 
that they consequently never received a satisfying reply from any revered French authority. 
Clark and Straus identified a – in their opinion – disquieting and ever-growing rift between 
French and Anglophone, especially U.S. American, research into early human evolution, which they 
moulded upon some of the dualities established by Binford and Sabloff in the early 1980s. Over the 
years, they have repeatedly insisted on the need to systematically disclose, discuss, and ultimately ‘seal’ 
the most severe discrepancies threatening to tear apart the ‘science of early man’ (e.g., Straus 1987, 
2002b; Clark 1993, 2001).23 Yet their efforts faced a basic dilemma: while they wanted to call attention 
to inherent difficulties of conceptualising the deep past and devising effective cognitive resources to 
gain knowledge about it, their scholarship was born out of the adamant conviction that there can only 
be one admissible answer to every valid question; committed to the basic epistemology of the ‘New’ 
archaeologies, their vision of science and objectivity was non-negotiable (e.g., Clark 1994). As a result, 
diverging perspectives on the past could not equally be true – a realisation that drove them into the 
temptation of pinpointing and eliminating ‘pathologies of reasoning’ rather than identifying the ena-
bling qualities of inquiry. Even though they also touched upon their own ‘biases’ (Clark 1991b), they 
ultimately argued that Anglophone approaches are less ‘pathological’ (cf. Clark 2002, 2009, Straus 
2002b) – a view that has been slightly relaxed only recently (cf. Straus 2005). 
Partly because they rarely took issue with any specifics of research but concerned themselves 
with generalities, their accounts are littered by ‘stereotyping’ and more or less obvious mischaracteri-
sation (we will return to some of these aspects in Chapter 6). The important lesson is that we can only 
take issue with the French-Anglophone divide from a situated viewpoint, as Clark and Straus did, if we 
already assume that this perspective is somehow preferable. Such a strategy, however, clearly begs the 
question of whether an investigation of the divide can provide some valuable insights into scholarly 
practice, its possibilities and limits, on both sides. As long as no neutral ground is taken – at least tem-
porarily – there will not emerge any fair and productive treatment of the problem. What remains are 
only polemic pieces of partisan critique. All of this clearly suggests that the particular way in which 
Clark and Straus have construed French-Anglophone relations has, in fact, only further widened the 
gap between the two research spheres. Even though they themselves have persistently cautioned 
                                                          
23 The phrasing ‘science of early man’ is for instance explicitly used by J. Desmond Clark to refer to the multidisciplinary en-
deavour of Paleoanthropology (e.g., Clark 1986; see infra). 
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against the pitfalls of ‘talking past one another’ (Willermet and Clark 1995; Clark 2001: 39; Straus 
2002a), they ironically seem to have contributed not insubstantially to similar practices. 
Having said this, the picture of French scholarship presented by Clark, Straus, and others has 
surely influenced the general perception of French-Anglophone relations in American and British re-
search circles, foreshadowing a growing dissatisfaction and frustration with the apparent ignorance of 
the French scene, which was seemingly unwilling to take a stance against any of the raised issues (e.g., 
Tostevin 2011b: 351f.). Beginning in the early-to-mid 1990s, some of the general concerns formulated 
by scholars like Clark and Straus were nonetheless taken up by a new generation of Anglophone re-
searchers; the spotlight, however, irrevocably shifted from the more general predicaments of interac-
tion to the specific discrepancies of interpreting the lithic evidence (cf. Van Peer 1992; Dibble 1995a; 
Odell 2001: 81; Shott 2003, 2007; Pettitt 2003: 38; Brantingham and Kuhn 2004; Sandgathe 2004; 
Steenhuyse 2008: 255; Tostevin 2011b, 2012: 164; Shea 2011a: 49, 2017a: 29; McCall 2015: 69). Per-
haps partly as a latent reflex of the antecedent ‘Binford-Bordes debate,’ incompatible readings of the 
Middle Palaeolithic record in the two spheres of inquiry increasingly heated up the contention, while 
more and more critical voices were raised against the French ‘technological approach’ and its meth-
odological foundation. 
A focal point of the conflict was, and continues to be, the interpretation of Levallois technolo-
gy. The French technological vision of Levallois, especially the specific understanding championed by 
Éric Boëda (1986, 1994) and his co-workers, was from its inception met with deep scepticism in the 
Anglophone world. Van Peer’s authoritative The Levallois Reduction Strategy (1992), containing a 
devastating critique of the Boëdian notion of Levallois reduction,24 illustrates this basic sentiment (cf. 
Scott 2011: 12-15). The need to discuss the varying perspectives on Levallois resulted in a major con-
ference on the topic held in Philadelphia, where researchers from different geographic and intellectual 
backgrounds met to engage in a critical discussion about the definition and interpretation of the Leval-
lois phenomenon (Dibble and Bar-Yosef 1993, 1995). A central point of friction has always been the 
notion of ‘predetermination,’ a key ingredient of the original definition of Levallois reduction by 
French technologists, which was increasingly viewed by many leading Anglophone experts to be ines-
capably coloured in subjective judgement. This subjective element is also highlighted in the initial re-
port on the results of the Philadelphia conference: 
In the proceedings of the Philadelphia meeting, published two years later, Dibble (1995a) em-
barked on yet another attempt to ignite critical discussion – long overdue in his view – on the Levallois 
problem, launching an attack at Boëda’s (1988) earlier interpretation of the lithic assemblage from 
Biache Saint Vaast level IIA on which the latter had based his definition of ‘Levallois recurrent.’ Again, 
criticism was primarily levelled against the supposedly ‘non-objective’ and ‘non-replicable’ nature of 
the presented technological reading of the lithic evidence (cf. Steenhuyse 2008: 255; Tostevin 2011b: 
359, 2012: 95; Monnier and Missal 2014: 61). Chazan’s (1997) lead review on Levallois technology in 
the Journal of Human Evolution concords with this basic recognition, adding that Boëda’s account of 
Levallois crucially relies on ‘flashes of intuition.’  
The general opinion in the lithic specialist literature is that the French ‘technological approach’ 
tends to author overly ‘speculative’ and rather ‘idiosyncratic’ (that is, fairly ‘incomparable’) accounts of 
the available lithic data. This view is also echoed in Odell’s (2001: 81) critique on the almost ‘mystical 
ramifications’ of the chaîne opératoire approach and its problematic ‘immersivity.’ Much of this criti-
cism, however, reflects difficulties of coming to terms with explicitly ‘qualitative’ perspectives on the 
lithic material, advocated by Tixier and his students from the 1980s onwards (cf. Perlès 2016); the 
basic circumstance that many chaîne opératoire studies seem to lack a strong quantitative footing is 
simply taken to suggest that they fall short in ‘analytical rigor:’ 
                                                          
24 Cf. esp. Van Peer (1992: 5-8, 64-90). 
“Levallois has traditionally been defined as a method for predetermining flake shapes. Perhaps 
because of the subjectivity involved in assessing such predetermination, the recognition of 
Levallois products is quite variable, depending on the experience and perspectives of individu-
al researchers. The many approaches that have been applied to this problem, including repli-
cative experiments, refitting, and statistical analyses, have often produced conflicting results. 
Moreover, no criteria have been agreed on for defining industrial variants of Levallois tech-
nique.” (Dibble and Bar-Yosef 1993: 77) 
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Levallois reduction has since been modelled in a number of alternative ways by Anglophone 
researchers (e.g., Baumler 1987; Sellet 1995; Kuhn and Brantingham 2004; Sandgathe 2004; Bran-
tingham 2010; Scott 2011). Yet the general discontent with French practices of ‘technological reading’ 
boiled up again with the publication of Bar-Yosef and Van Peer’s influential The Chaîne Opératoire 
Approach in Middle Paleolithic Archaeology (2009) in Current Anthropology. Their open critique 
questions the capability of chaîne opératoire approaches to reliably reconstruct technological realities. 
The authors lament primarily what they regard as manifestations of ‘formal determination’ and ‘defini-
tional imprecision,’ in their view two highly problematic dimensions of the ‘technological approach’ 
impeding its cognitive credibility: 
As Tostevin (2011b: 351f., 2012) has noted, it is certainly surprising that this apparent clash of 
proponents of the ‘reduction sequence’ approach and advocates of the chaîne opératoire (cf. Shott 
2003; Dibble 1995a) continues to attract so little attention by the latter; not even a single high-profile 
lithic expert from a key research institution in France has reacted openly in the commentary section to 
Bar-Yosef and Van Peer’s treatise, even though some, according to Tostevin (2011b: 351f.), were appar-
ently involved in the review process. Conversely, the paper’s reception by Anglophone commentators 
was overwhelmingly positive, providing the opportunity for a number of leading figures to update or 
renew their viewpoints. The general point of view articulated in the commentary section is that the 
critique was long overdue. Notable are the remarks by Monnier (2009) and Conard (2009). The for-
mer takes Bar-Yosef and Van Peer’s discussion as further indication that chaîne opératoire approaches 
tend to conflate description and interpretation while the latter concludes that the ‘technological ap-
proach’ – qua paleopsychology – has hitherto indeed been little productive in revealing significant 
patterns of past behaviour and remains compromised by its inability to connect with general social or 
evolutionary theory. Conard’s (2009: 188f.) argumentation not only reiterates a Binfordian trope from 
the 1960s,25 it also takes up the widespread Anglophone viewpoint – canonised by Binford, Sabloff, 
                                                          
25 Binford himself (1972: 198) maintained that ‘palaeopsychology is a dangerous business’ and sought to remove all of its seeds 
in order to place archaeology on a firmer ‘scientific’ footing (cf. Trigger 2007: 401). In a highly interesting interview, Sally Bin-
ford (in Clinger 2005: 196) has reiterated this criticism in the context of the ‘Binford-Bordes debate,’ showing how deeply en-
grained this perception still is: “[…] You can make up a lot of stories about what inter-site variability means, but unless you have 
formulated hypotheses which can be tested, it’s just science fiction. Functional hypotheses, that is differences in what people 
were doing and how they were extracting energy from their environment, can be tested against independent data, but interpreta-
tion about their ideology or their spiritual life or their ethnic loyalties – we don’t find this stuff in sites. That’s all sci-fi. Paleo-
psychology is a dangerous field […]” (emphasis added). This reference to ‘science fiction’ is also echoed in a more recent enun-
ciation by Shea (2017a: 192): “Just as there is neither a quintessential French way to make a baguette nor an essentially Ameri-
can way to drive a car, different ways of making stone tools are strategies deployed by individuals under variable circumstances. 
Applying a strategic perspective to the stone tool evidence is simply applied uniformitarianism, the common theoretical touch-
stone for all natural history (Tooby and DeVore 1987). By requiring us to base our explanations on evidence for past hominin 
behavior on observations of strategic variation in human and non-human primate behavior today, uniformitarianism is a quiet 
voice reminding us of the difference between science and science fiction.” 
“There can be no question that the chaîne opératoire concept has brought a fundamentally 
new perspective to the analysis of Middle Paleolithic assemblages, and it is certainly not our 
intention to diminish the contribution of technological studies to achieve valid interpreta-
tions of human behavior in the past. We have only wanted to draw attention to a number of 
epistemological problems in an effort to reinforce the ties between the analytic means and the 
explanatory ends of archaeological inquiry and to reduce the danger of becoming trapped in 
unproductive formal determinism. Nor has it been our intention to question the epistemolog-
ical necessity of technological classification. It is instrumental to reveal patterning in the 
record and, hence, to provide us with an empirical basis for reflection on population-level 
processes. In some of its present forms, however, we perceive a degree of overformalization 
and an inability to be objectively applicable by different researchers due to lack of explicitly 
described criteria. In a way similar to the redundant typological paradigm that was employed 
in the past, the technical methods now seem to exist in isolation.” (Bar-Yosef and Van Peer 
2009: 117; original emphasis). 
 
“[…] Boëda’s reliance upon a visual reading of the cores and débitage of the [Kulna] assemblage, 
without the corroboration of cumulative and recorded observations, did not enable him to rec-
ognize trends in the débitage that were easily revealed through attribute analysis. Other advo-
cates of the chaîne opératoire approach to Paleolithic archaeology do not suffer from such a lack 
of analytical rigor, for instance Geneste (1985, 1988), Pelegrin (1990a, 1995), and scholars fortu-
nate enough to possess extensive refittings […]” (Tostevin 2000: 67; original emphasis). 
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Clark, and Straus – that French technological research operates in a ‘theoretical vacuum,’ largely unin-
formed by any relevant body of higher or middle-range theory.26 
Although Tostevin (2011b), in a more recent paper on the relationship between ‘reduction se-
quence’ and chaîne opératoire, provides a more nuanced perspective on the issue of ‘theory’ in French 
lithic inquiry, he also contends that the ‘technological approach’ remains informed by the highest and 
most abstract level of theory and clearly lacks a bridging ‘middle-range’ component. Following Shott 
(2003), he adds that the writings of Mauss and Leroi-Gourhan, acting as key sources of theoretical 
inspiration, are indeed ‘outdated’ and therefore “not without their problems” as a baseline for lithic 
research (Tostevin 2011b: 334). Even if we accept this qualification for a moment for the sake of argu-
ment,27 it is clearly suspicious that the role and nature of theoretisation supposedly characteristic for 
the French tradition are determined by reference to distinctly Anglophone concepts (Tostevin 2011a). 
The now routinely employed distinction between ‘low,’ ‘middle,’ and ‘high-level’ theory has its origins 
in the ‘processualist’ movement of the 1960s to late 1980s (e.g., Binford 1977, 1978; Schiffer 1988) and 
is tied to a rigorous separation of the ‘observational’ and ‘theoretical’ dimensions of knowledge-
production (cf. Thomas 1998), implying a particular understanding of ‘theory’ and ‘data’ not necessari-
ly shared by other research trajectories.28 
 The issue of theory has indeed become a lodestone of conceptual friction and illustrates quite 
plainly how far French and Anglophone research spheres have drifted apart. While Binford (1962) and 
others proclaimed in the 1960s that archaeology is ‘anthropology or it is nothing,’ the prehistory of 
human origins – to paraphrase Glyn Isaac’s (1989) take on the discipline – has increasingly been 
placed into a Neo-Darwinian framework, casting Plio-Pleistocene archaeology as an extension of ‘Hu-
man Evolutionary Studies’ in the distant past (cf. Sommer 2007; Goodrum 2009).29 Already Binford, 
Butzer, Clarke and other founding figures of modern Anglophone Palaeolithic archaeology put ‘ecolog-
ical theory’ centre stage, re-casting anthropology essentially as ‘ecological anthropology.’30 Yet, the big 
game changer, especially in the United States, was the formation of Paleoanthropology in the wake of 
Howell, J. Desmond Clark, and Isaac in Berkeley (Clark and Howell 1966; Butzer and Clark 2007; 
Klein 2013), redirecting the study of early hominins towards biological anthropology, primatology, and 
the life sciences more generally. Glynn Isaac’s legacy (1980, 1989) would later give way to a type of 
human origins research grounded in ecologically-oriented landscape archaeology (e.g., Potts 1988; 
Blumenshine et al. 2012),31 the investigation of primate behaviour (e.g., Toth and Schick 2009a), and, 
more recently, cognitive neuroscience (e.g., Stout 2011; Stout and Hecht 2017).  
In the United Kingdom, modern Palaeolithic archaeology tends to be an amalgamation of 
Clarke’s ‘Analytic Archaeology’ (1968, 1972a, 1977),32 the ‘Cognitive Archaeology’ school and its evolu-
tionary psychology inheritance (e.g., Mellars and Gibson 1996; Mithen 1996; Gowlett et al. 2012),33 
and Higgs-style ‘palaeoeconomics’ (e.g., Higgs 1972, 1975; Bailey 1999) – a somewhat radicalised off-
shoot of ‘Economic Anthropology’ in the wake of Grahame Clark,34 Dennell, Mellars, and Barker. Brit-
ish Palaeolithic archaeology, much stronger than its North American counterpart, is rooted in ‘Geoar-
chaeology’ and the Quaternary sciences (e.g., O’Connor 2007; McNabb 2012a), yet also owes a great 
debt to Clark and Isaac whose transfer to the United States initiated a lasting exchange between the 
                                                          
26 See also Bar-Yosef and Van Peer (2009: 114). 
27 Mauss and Leroi-Gourhan are of course only the fundamental touchstones of much broader theoretical movements and their 
ideas are constantly refined and updated (cf. e.g., Warnier 1999, 2009; Sigaut 2012). 
28 See Chapter 3 for a detailed treatment of this issue. 
29 Straus et al. (2011: 322), for example, have retrospective characterised the Binfordian research mandate in the following way: 
“[a]rchaeology was to be a laboratory for pushing the scientific study of systems for human survival back into the past, both 
recent and remote, to enable the actual analysis of cultural evolution in particular cases that should respond to general laws in 
rational behavior. In fact, Binford and colleagues wanted American archaeology to do what it had long professed, namely an-
thropology, not collection, classification, and pseudo-ethnic systematization for its own sake.” (original emphasis) 
30 Cf. Binford (1968b), Butzer (1971, 1986), and Butzer and Isaac (1975).  
31 It is often forgotten that the re-discovery of the ‘landscape’ in early human origins research was not only a consequence of the 
general reorientation of inquiry towards ecological questions. The ‘spatial turn’ of the late 1960s to 1980s was also powered by a 
symmetrical development between Clarke’s ‘Analytic Archaeology’ (1968), understood as one incarnation of the various ‘New’ 
archaeologies of the time and later reinvented as ‘Spatial Archaeology’ (Clarke 1977), and the ‘New Geography’ movement in 
Cambridge between the 1950s and 1970s (Haggett 1965, 1972; Chorley and Haggett 1967; Everson and FitzGerald 1969; cf. 
Trigger 1998: 697). The rise of ‘spatial’ and ‘geographic’ archaeologies (e.g., Hodder and Orton 1976; Orton 2000) was ultimately 
an attempt to draw together conceptual resources from anthropology, ecology, and human geography – what Isaac (1980) would 
memorably capture with his ambition of ‘casting the net wide.’ 
32 Cf. Isaac (1977c) and Hammond et al. (1979). 
33 Cf. Abramiuk (2012: 10-20) and Gamble et al. (2014: 16-24). 
34 Cf. Trigger (2007: 358-361). 
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two English-speaking countries (cf. Reid 1980: 878; Straus 2007: 163). As a result, the spectrum of 
general theory deployed in the Anglophone world strives for consistency with, and is partly predefined 
by, this basic research topography (cf. Gowlett 2010).35 In American Archaeology’s Uncertain Future, 
Geoffrey Clark (2003: 52) bears testimony to this specific orientation of inquiry: 
As Shea (2011a, 2011b, 2017) has repeatedly stressed, it has indeed become a pressing concern 
for many Anglophone scholars to contribute to the larger questionnaire emerging from the prism of 
Neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory, or at least to offer some insights which are digestible by the 
broader multidisciplinary endeavour of Paleoanthropology (Clark and Willermet 1997; Kuhn 1995, 
2004a; Schick and Toth 2001; Klein 2009; Freeman 2009). In this context, Shea (2013b: 154) made it 
particularly clear that internal complexities of flaking technologies, variously identified and described 
as ‘methods’ or ‘modalities’ by French technologists, are largely irrelevant for reconstructing the bigger 
picture of hominin evolution he and his colleagues are interested in. This critique ties in with a general 
resentment to trends of ‘complexification’ in lithic research (e.g., Bar-Yosef and Van Peer 2009: 114; 
Shea 2013a: 3, 2017:  xvii) and the perceived proclivity to fetishise – that is, ‘reify’ or ‘essentialise’ – 
technology itself (e.g., Shott 2003: 100, 2010; Tostevin 2011b: 359; Shea 2013b: 154, 2014).36 
 The French research enterprise is doubtlessly informed by a rather different body of theory. To 
paraphrase Clark, French practice ‘relies heavily on concepts and ideas derived from ethnology and 
sociology and only little on those of biological anthropology, primatology, or cognitive neuroscience.’ A 
close reading of the French literature reveals that most approaches are shaped by French cultural and 
sociological theory (e.g., Pigeot 2004; Bon 2009; Valentin 2011: 57; de Beaune 2016), the ‘anthropolo-
gy and history of techniques’ (cf. Karlin 1991; Valentin 1995; de Beaune 2000, 2011), elements from 
philosophy of technology (cf. Geneste 2010 [1991]: 420-424), structural history (e.g., Valentin 2008, 
2015; Audouze and Valentin 2010), as well as philosophy of life and cybernetics (e.g., Boëda 2005, 
2013; Chevrier 2012). The French perspective to the past is anchored in the wider discourse of the 
humanities and remains sensitive to its intellectual currents.37 This bifurcation of the theoretical land-
scape at the French-Anglophone interface suggests that ‘social’ or ‘evolutionary’ theory does not neces-
sarily refer to the same body of theory, neither is the claim justified that French research generally 
lacks contact with the two. Thus, as Scarre (1999: 160) pointed out almost two decades ago, we ‘should 
not expect French archaeological theory to be the mirror-image or mere adoption of the archaeological 
theory current in the Anglo-American world.’  
 These differences in the theoretical and, by extension, disciplinary fabric of French and Anglo-
phone Palaeolithic archaeology can be traced in the labels deployed to name and identify the repre-
sentatives of the two in the institutional circus. In the United Kingdom and the United States, the dis-
cipline tends to flag itself with terms such as Human Origins, Palaeolithic Archaeology, Human Evo-
lutionary Studies, Biosocial Anthropology,38 or Evolutionary Anthropology. French scholars, by con-
                                                          
35 The point here is not to marginalise the clearly existent differences between the types of approaches applied in the United 
States and the United Kingdom (e.g., Shott 2005), but rather to highlight that these differences are minor if compared to the 
differences apparently marking the French-Anglophone interface. The argument, in other words, is while lithic research in the 
U.K. and the U.S. is surely not identical the general level of affinity outweighs these differences when the two are confronted 
with French-type inquiry (see Chapter 4 for a demonstration). 
36 The basic point of contention here is whether past reality is best understood as a ‘discrete’ structure or as a ‘continuous’ field. 
One the one hand, it has been noted that French lithic analysts tend to study technology for the sake of technology and therefore 
‘reify’ their subject-matter. On the other hand, it has been argued that the introduction of discrete interpretive categories, such 
as reduction stages (e.g., Baumler 1983; Dibble 1987, 1995a; McPherron 1994; Shott 2010, 2017) or named industrial entities 
(e.g., Shea 2014; Monnier and Missal 2014), has prevented the recognition of continuous variability in the lithic record. For the 
British insistence on ‘continuous’ reduction, see for example Scott (2011) and Pettitt and White (2012: 272). 
37 This general divergence in the theoretical and disciplinary sources that feed into French and Anglophone research respectively 
suggest that some of the conflicts that are observable at the interface of the two actually break down to the long-standing tension 
of either orienting the study of behaviour towards the natural and life sciences or towards the humanities and sociocultural 
sciences (cf. Corbey 2005; Slingerland 2008; Slingerland and Collard 2012). 
38 The case of ‘Biosocial Anthropology’ illustrates the basic clash of epistemologies that has presumably played a key role in the 
consolidation of the French-Anglophone boundary. This branch of research takes inspiration in the work of Fox (1975) and Tiger 
(1969) and is generally associated with a broader ‘zoological turn’ (Tiger and Fox 1966, 1971) that has transformed North Ameri-
can anthropology from the 1960s onwards (cf. Corbey 2005: 134-144). This approach to anthropology seeks to, grosso modo, 
base the latter on a comparative science of human economic behaviour based on quantitative science, rational choice theory, 
Darwinian evolution, and, as Fox pointed out himself (Walter 1993: 446f.), British ‘empiricism’ and ‘utilitarianism’; it is also 
“Paleoarchaeology […] relies relatively little on concepts and models derived from social and 
cultural anthropology and much more heavily on those of biological anthropology, primatolo-
gy, and cognitive neuroscience.” 
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trast, generally regard themselves as exponents of « Préhistoire ». The latter is typically subdivided 
into umbrella approaches, consortia of inquiry, or broader research agendas – i.e., « Ethnologie pré-
histoire », « Technologie préhistoire », or « Paléohistoire » – as well as the specialised C.N.R.S. labor-
atories tied to different university structures. With regards to lithic research, the resulting opposition 
could barely be more specific. In France, lithic analysts tend to specialise themselves into particular 
types of technologies and are recognisable as « technologues » or « lithiciens » (cf. de Beaune 2016: 
58), echoing the conviction, paradigmatic for the French approach to technicity in general, that tech-
nologie constitutes an independent field of study (cf. Leroi-Gourhan 1936b) – the ‘science of (human) 
techniques’ (sensu Haudricourt 1987). In the Anglophone world, on the contrary, lithic analysis is con-
ducted by a much more heterogeneous group of scholars, specialised in a variety of different disci-
plines and subfields. 
This discrepancy in the self-recognition and intellectual background of French and Anglo-
phone research endeavours is echoed in the publication venues characteristic of the two. While edited 
volumes and research monographs continue to be equally important in both research spheres, the 
journal landscape is markedly different. Not only is the range of high-profile, peer-reviewed journals 
fed by the Anglophone system much more proliferated and diverse, its architecture is also increasingly 
modelled on the natural sciences, quantitative social sciences, and the life sciences (see Appendix 
I.3). In France, the panoply of journals is comparatively narrow and unpublished, yet often extensive 
doctoral dissertations and habilitations play a much more crucial role in the dissemination of 
knowledge and the progression of research. These differences suggest that Palaeolithic knowledge 
production is indeed framed rather differently in the two research spheres. 
 In light of this broader divarication of approaches, it is perhaps no surprise that the relation-
ship between French and Anglophone lithic inquiry continues to be difficult and that the offered cri-
tique tends to be increasingly structural. In this intellectual context, there is a strong temptation to 
wage disputes as partisan, as “win-at-all-costs ideological struggles” (Law 2015: 7). This temptation 
not only gives rise to more and more ‘aggressive polemics,’ it also encourages the construction of group 
solidarities that bind together ‘insiders’ and purge ‘outsiders’ (idem). The result is the cultivation and 
consolidation of differences between the involved communities of research, predisposing the percep-
tion of the ‘other’ in increasingly dismissive and/or hostile terms. All of this only deepens incompati-
bilities of inquiry, leading not just to a dysfunctional mode of engagement but also subverting the gen-
eral capacity of mutual understanding. There is a heightened danger of basic forms of miscommunica-
tion and ‘talking past each other.’ French-Anglophone relations in Palaeolithic archaeology currently 
seem to experience such a crisis; while Anglophone scholars display increasingly zero-tolerance to-
wards the kinds of approaches embraced by their French colleagues, the latter appear to be only little 







 Overall, this configuration clearly suggests that the French-Anglophone divide puts much 
more at stake than currently meets the eye. There is a real need to dismantle these stakes in order to 
re-enable the discourse or to at least clarify why communication, a precondition for advancing lithic 
knowledge on a ‘global’ scale, is critically hampered. Clearly, the division between French and Anglo-
                                                                                                                                                                                     
firmly rooted in the corroborative methods developed by Ayer and Popper, both of whom Fox met at the London School of Eco-
nomics. This movement, which Fox (1975, 1989) later coined ‘biosocial anthropology,’ was a deliberate turn away from the hu-
manities and qualitative social sciences: “[…] The sheer weight of evidence from the natural sciences will swamp the simple-
minded ideology of social science. Soon it will be obvious even to the most recalcitrant cultural determinist that Durkheim and 
Boas – right as they were about many things – were essentially prescientific, and that their formulae were political adaptations 
fully understandable at the time but no longer binding on a better-informed generation. By that time, however, a new social 
science will have arisen, probably directly from natural science itself.” (Fox 1989: 124). This vision of anthropological research is 
a direct affront against the cognitive orientation of French inquiry. 
“The increasingly multinational discipline of lithic analysis is currently undergoing a “culture 
contact” event between competing scientific traditions of studying the evolution of human 
behavior through the remains of stone tools. This academic culture contact has not been as 
productive as it should, as researchers advocating an American processual “reduction se-
quence” approach react with more resistance than informed engagement to the growth in 
popularity of the French “chaîne opératoire” approach among Europeans and other national-
ities around the globe. Equally, chaîne opératoire advocates have seemingly turned a deaf 
ear to requests for improvements in the epistemological rigor of their method.” (Tostevin 
2011a: 293; original emphasis) 
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phone approaches is a reality of research and we should not take it lightly. A brief review of the French 
literature will substantiate this view. 
The French response is hardly worth the designation, but we should not be mistaken that it is missing 
altogether. That the Anglophone critique, substantial as it is, somehow evaporates at the gates of the 
European mainland or is simply ignored altogether is equally unlikely. But why is there so little direct 
reaction to the issues raised by Anglophone researchers? One reason is surely that French scholars 
have long come to regard the Anglophone critique as an expression of conflicting ‘schools’ of research 
(e.g., Bon 2009: 199f.; Perlès 2016) and, consequently, tend to deal with it in rather general and less 
‘agitated’ terms; the engagement only rarely takes place in specialised articles but is typically buried 
somewhere in lengthy monographs. The purpose of taking issue with the ‘other’ is mainly to situate 
one’s own research or to discuss its epistemological point of departure. Given that French works are 
only rarely read or discussed in Anglophone research circles, this indirect response remains practically 
invisible. But there is also the firm possibility that the details of the Anglophone critique are either not 
fully understood or not taken completely seriously. Both prospects, although difficult to evaluate based 
on the literature alone,39 certainly add to the gravity of the communicative gulf established by the 
French-Anglophone divide. At any rate, the point is that if we look close enough, the French counter-
critique is equally poignant. 
 The majority of critical utterances either targets the legacy of the various ‘New’ archaeologies 
that shape Anglophone research since the 1960s or the so-called ‘Neo-Evolutionist’ school. The cri-
tique is explicitly directed at ‘Anglo-Saxon’ research and typically serves to highlight the stark antago-
nism between French and Anglophone approaches to the Palaeolithic. This tendency of lumping U.S. 
American and British research traditions into a single category and to define the latter by negative 
reference to the prevailing French perspectives indeed suggests that ‘Anglo-Saxons’ are conceptualised 
as ‘outsiders’ or at least as cognitive ‘others’; this, in turn, provides further indication that the French-
Anglophone divide is a real-world phenomenon, perceived and approached as a true cognitive barrier.  
French scholars have primarily taken issue with what they recognise as the ‘typological-
descriptive’ baseline of lithic studies in the Anglophone world (e.g., Boëda 1991, 1997)40 and the one-
sided ‘environmental’ and/or overly ‘deterministic’ perspectives tied to it (e.g., Bon 2009; Langlais 
2010). Perlès (1992: 223) has given a sharp voice to the first point by contending that 
She (ibid.: 224) adds that the Anglophone preoccupation with formal ‘hypotheses-testing’ in the hope 
to reveal the most potent explanatory factors has shrouded the view for the inherent complexities of 
lithic industrial variability: 
                                                          
39 The desideratum here would be to conduct systematic ethnographic and sociological research on the perception and under-
standing of French-Anglophone relations in Palaeolithic archaeology; this perspective obviously goes beyond the scope of the 
present study.  
40 The general discontent about ‘typological reasoning’ which prevails in the French tradition since the ‘technological turnover’ 
initiated by Tixier and his early Parisian collaborators has recently been refined into a resolute epistemological critique by Boëda 
and others. Proponents of the ‘techno-genetic’ paradigm (see Chapter 5 for a detailed exposition of this perspective) have taken 
issue with the ‘static’ conception of technical objects implied by typological and taxonomic reasoning alike. Drawing on Simon-
don’s (1958) general philosophy of technical objects, Boëda (2013: esp. 28f., 38) has launched a sharp attack on the hylomorphic 
interpretation of shape-differences in lithic artefacts (this issue will be taken up again in Chapter 6). 
“[…] [T]hese approaches are too restricted for an efficient analysis of archaeological contexts in 
which lithic industries, their variations, and their transformations result, as do all human phe-
nomena, from the interaction of multiple factors.” 
“[…] the role played by lithic industries in the so-called new approaches in archaeology has 
proved very limited. For the most part, lithic studies have remained basically descriptive in 
their nature or they have limited their role in archaeological inference because they have ap-




Another recurrent theme of contention, linked to the pending issue of ‘environmental deter-
minism,’41 is the Anglophone recourse to generalities and/or universals of behaviour transcending the 
boundaries of space and time: 
Perlès (2016: 222) makes a similar point when she concludes that 
The French tradition, in sync with interpretive ethnology, has cultivated a general scepticism 
towards all forms of ‘universalist’ reasoning, seeking to detect and, if possible, unmask ‘otherness’ in 
the archaeological records. This cognitive inclination can be traced back to the work of Leroi-Gourhan 
(1983a) who powerfully cautioned against the overly optimistic use of substantial ethnographic paral-
lels, preferring more abstract and ultimately structural invocations of anthropological insights. It is a 
classic trope of French thought to insist on the particularities of past lifestyles (cf. Perlès 2016) and to 
conceptualise the societies under study as ‘fossil’ (e.g., Bon 2009) – that is, as potentially lacking reve-
latory historical or sub-historical correlates. Approaches that rest on the presumption of significant 
past-present continuities or presuppose particular concepts of rationality and the like are therefore 
easily labelled as ‘naïve.’ They are regarded to critically underestimate the complexities of past phe-
nomena and to fall back to various forms of ‘reductionism.’ 
 The environmental perspective regularly employed by Anglophone scholars is seen with great 
caution because of the same reasons. French researchers exhibit a general resistance against ecological 
reductions not because they think the environmental context is irrelevant, but rather because they 
doubt that a direct, un-mediated link between human and natural domains can be consistently upheld 
(e.g., Boëda 2005: 46; Bon 2009: 119f.). Stressing the constraining or determinative effects of ecologi-
cal factors always risks to remove any leeway for human action and creativity – a leeway that one must 
realistically presume (cf. Valentin et al. 2005; Langlais 2010; Valentin and Bon 2012; Marchand 2014: 
109f.). This contention culminates in the straightforward rejection of any account putting primary 
explanatory weight on environmental variables. Especially approaches based on purportedly ‘mecha-
                                                          
41 See for example Livingstone’s (2012) insightful exposure of the at times ‘brute’ environmental determinism that features in 
some of the main narratives about hominisation and early human evolution in the Anglophone discourse. Livingstone (ibid.: 
583-585) refers primarily to the influential work of Vrba (1985, 1993, 2006), Potts (1996a, 1998), Finlayson (2004, 2009), and 
Stringer (2006) in order to show that modern Human Origins research is often guided by the premises of an emerging ‘neo-
environmental determinism’ (cf. Meyer and Guss 2017), exhibiting conceptual continuities with early-twentieth-century ap-
proaches. 
“Above all, demographic growth might partly explain the restructuring of social performances. 
This perception is strongly influenced by the Anglo-Saxon tradition, especially American, whose 
Neo-Evolutionist school long considered demography as one of the main drivers of the trans-
formation of human societies. [...] But among these works, numerous hold that this demograph-
ic factor is closely linked to environmental variations. Regardless of its possible connections 
with demography, the theme of environmental conditions is of great concern to Anglo-Saxon 
schools, and their influence is decisive in this domain, both in the affirmation of the importance 
of this topic and in the way it is addressed. For a long time now, many of these schools have 
articulated their intellectual approach around the search for models of a general bearing: they 
elaborate a predictive model, most often inspired by contemporary situations whose degree of 
application to the archaeological context must be measured. This method is based on the as-
sumption that universal behaviours are able to transcend temporal barriers and can be identi-
fied as such. Among these universals, the emphasis is very often put on the relation between 
humans and their environments in terms of a relatively strict determinism. In other words, the 
development of a model for exploiting the environment based on the confrontation of current 
ethnological contexts serves to interpret archaeological data, the compilation of which enables 
them to confirm – or not – a pre-established hypothesis. This intellectual orientation is ex-
pressed in particular by the New Archeology, created in the 1960s based on these principles. 
This hypothetico-deductive take is opposed to the most common approach in Europe, and par-
ticularly in France, which may be qualified as inductive: the collection of facts is supposed to 
precede the development of models, and not to respond to a preconceived idea.” (Bon 119f.; my 




[…] the divorce rests even more on methods and aims. In North America, the elaboration of in-
terpretative models always seeks, in fine, to bring to light transcultural and transchronological 
regularities, validated, if possible, on formal or quantitative models. In France, to the contrary, 
research on technical variability has been mostly tuned to demonstrating the singularity of each 
(pre)historic regional development. In addition, the hierarchization of the different parameters 




nistic’ conceptions of human-environment relations tend to be out-rightly repudiated (e.g., Perlès 
1993; Boëda et al. 2001; Boëda 2013: 87-88) – an apprehension that is directly reflected in Bon’s 
(2009: 120, 122-125) exemplary discussion of the problematic relationship between lithic technologies 
and their natural milieu. After having explored some patterns of technology-environment co-variation, 
he offers the following words of caution: 
and 
Although the connoted critique of ‘Anglo-Saxon’ approaches certainly involves a high degree of 
‘stereotyping’ and ‘caricaturising,’ the general message is clear. French scholars are dissatisfied with 
the basic picture of the past that emerges from the bulk of Anglophone research into the Palaeolithic. 
They take issue with the circumstance that Palaeolithic life is primarily portrayed in its dependency on 
external material conditions, creating an interpretive matrix in which the ‘struggle for survival’ over-
rides most other perspectives or interpretive concerns. 
 Another strand of criticism, rather explicit in content and orientation, addresses the ‘basal 
character’ of most Anglophone enunciations. Marchand (2014), after taking stock of Anglophone writ-
ings of the post-1960s, for example contends that the central message has too often been redundant 
and perhaps even tautological. He (ibid.: 103) explicitly laments the tyranny of deus ex machina ac-
counts and the latent ‘truism’ and ‘triviality’ inherent to many ‘processualist’ explanations (ibid.: 103-
111). The point of contention is whether the finding that hominin behaviour is broadly conditioned by 
its ecological framing amounts to a substantial discovery. In the view of Marchand and others, this 
question must probably be answered negatively since all organisms have to relate adaptively to their 
natural surroundings. To conclude that lithic inventories broadly reflect their environmental framing 
is to say nothing new, it is a superfluous reinforcement of something that needs to be presumed any-
ways. Marchand (2014: 103) adds that the default prioritisation of environmental constraints in ex-
planatory strategies almost automatically leads to the marginalisation of historical forces which have 
undoubtedly shaped the Palaeolithic past, and thus to an image of Palaeolithic people essentially ‘de-
void of history:’42 
The forceful denial of ‘first-mover’ conceptions, ‘selectionist’ or ‘adaptationist’ agendas, and 
the notion of human-environment ‘autoregulation’ reveals an even deeper-running offset between 
French and Anglophone modes of inquiry. The key issue is fundamentally epistemological: whether 
practitioners should look for and map ‘relationships of match’ or instead be perceptive to ‘patterns of 
mismatch.’ Since the ‘environmentalist’ perspective tends to focus exclusively on the former, it can 
easily overlook the latter. Yet evidentiary mismatches may be at least equally informative than the 
                                                          
42 French « Paléohistoire » departs from this basic point of contention. It entails a tacit critique of the fixated and immutable 
image of hunter-gatherers which is too often imported to the study of the Palaeolithic past. ‘Palaeohistorians’ insist on the fact 
that past foragers have a history of their own – a history that must be assumed to have fundamentally shaped their existence and 
development (e.g., Pigeot 2004: 255f.). Valentin (2008: 14, 15f., 20, 22-26,, 2011: 3), for example, complains about the circum-
stance that the label ‘prehistory’ almost by default encourages the view that Palaeolithic phenomena are somewhat different in 
nature from those of ‘history.’ Palaeolithic studies, according to this point of view, must emancipate themselves, they are not 
merely the ‘antechamber of prehistory’ (sensu Bon 2009; cf. Valentin 2008: 28). 
“However, a mechanical relationship between these environmental changes and changes in 
the lithic equipment should be considered with prudence.” (Bon 2009: 179; original emphasis; 
my translation [for the original French quote, see Appendix Q.5]) 
“[…] there is no one-sided equation between a type of lithic armature and a given natural envi-
ronment.” (ibid.: 182; my translation [for the original French quote, see Appendix Q.5]) 
 
“The consequence of [Binford's New Archaeology] in the study of the European Mesolithic 
during the 1980s and 1990s was – regrettably – the inevitable conclusion of all articles that 
the society was adapted to its environment and the site was located at the crossing of diverse 
ecological niches… The deformation of the principles of processual archaeology, after all oth-
erwise fruitful, finally impelled research on past hunter-gatherers without the dimension of 
history: an escalation! In fact, the notion of adaptation must not be applied without searching 
the means to demonstrate it, otherwise it leads to a stiff vision of changes [Bettinger 1987].” 




successful correlation of data, especially if we consider ‘conflict’ as an important coordinate of past 
realities.43  
 This critique has notably been put forward by Boris Valentin (1995: 791, 2008: 41) who, based 
on some basic source critical considerations, outlined the dangers of blind ‘correlationism,’ in particu-
lar when the eco-climatic context of the lithic evidence is concerned.44 His voice reflects a growing 
concern about careless strategies of pattern recognition and the tendency to assess lithic technology in 
its ‘heteronomic’ constitution. The last critique is shared by many French scholars and is epitomised by 
agenda-setting movements such as « Paléohistoire » in the wake of Valentin, Bon, Marchand and oth-
ers (cf. Valentin 2015) as well as by the ‘techno-genetic’ paradigm forged by Boëda (2005, 2013) and 
his co-workers. 
 A last but persistent antiphon to Anglophone lithic inquiry is the dismissal of overly or even 
purely quantitative approaches. This theme already features in Perlès’ comparison of French and An-
glophone perspectives on the lithic record quoted above.45 As this author has stressed again and again 
(e.g., Perlès 2016: 224f.), chaîne opératoire inquiry is based on a fundamentally ‘qualitative’ under-
standing of technology, which makes it difficult and sometimes even impossible to quantify its inferen-
tial touchstones.46 Pelegrin (2006b: 40) makes the same basic remark when he insists that 
  
 Perlès’ (2016: 255) brief discussion of Bar-Yosef and Van Peer’s (2009) critical engagement with 
chaîne opératoire methodology, a rare example of a direct response by a French scholar to a severe 
Anglophone attack, takes up the qualitative nature of French technological inquiry to deflect the raised 
charges. Perlès (2016: 255) contends that those who wish to base ‘every single interpretive proposition 
on quantitative grounds’ or even ‘on criteria generally exploitable by anybody’ miss the crucial point 
that technical understanding is necessarily rooted in referential knowledge and personal experience, 
epistemic factors impossible to equalise through or bypass by quantification of similar procedures; she 
(idem) further contends that part of the offered critique similarly applies to Anglophone approaches 
based on ‘design theory’ in the wake of Bamforth, Bleed, and others, and in addition reproduces the 
old, untenable Binfordian image of Neanderthals lacking the capacity for foresight or conceptualisa-
tion. The basic point, however, remains that an inherently qualitative approach cannot be invalidated 
by arguments that presuppose the necessity of a quantitative foundation.  
 This response showcases again how much confusion the French-Anglophone divide has appar-
ently created; it reminds us that researchers from the two camps may be guided by very different 
norms of inquiry and are therefore greatly predisposed to employ ‘double standards’ (sensu Roebroeks 
and Corbey 2001; Corbey 2005) when they critically engage with one another; the result, again, is a 
heightened risk of ‘talking past each other,’ sabotaging the prospects of knowledge exchange and effec-
tive borrowing. 
 To summarise, French lithic experts are surely not the passive victims of Anglophone criticism 
that some would have them to be. Rather, the French tradition has launched its own attack on the very 
foundations of Anglophone lithic inquiry and although this attack is somewhat less explicit and more 
difficult to pinpoint, it is equally self-assertive as its Anglophone counterpart. Despite the fact that an 
open confrontation between the two research spheres has not erupted yet, the conflict is certainly ‘hot’ 
and seems to operate on the level of research communities. However, the engagement between the two 
involved ‘collectives of thought’ appears to be rather asymmetric and the rhetoric of engagement be-
                                                          
43 The idea of ‘conflict’ is central to French attempts to overcome the picture of past hunter-gatherers as ‘noble savages,’ com-
pletely ‘fusing’ with their environments – a view considered ‘simplistic’ at best (cf. Marchand 2014: 110). From this perspective, 
it is also tempting to regard the search for human-environment equilibria as a tacit acceptance of the romantic notion of foragers 
living in harmony with nature. 
44 See also Marchand (2014: 109f.). 
45 Cf. Perlès (2016: 225). 
46 This deeply sedimented mistrust in quantitative approaches, opening up a stark contrast with Anglophone research traditions 
(e.g., Clark and Stafford 1982; Lycett and Chauhan 2010), is nicely illustrated by Plutniak (2016: 230). As Plutniak (ibid.: 46) 
outlines, the case of Catherine Perlès is particularly revealing since she initially followed some the seminars given by Benzécri, 
the author of Analyse des données (1968), in Paris and attempted several statistical examinations of lithic artefacts with his 
method, eventually abandoning the quantitative perspective because it didn’t help in discriminating hierarchised and potentially 
complementary technical relationships. In her view, the ability to detect ‘intentional facts’ seems to be generally compromised 
already by the default assumption of most quantitative-statistical approaches that the nature of the objects of study does not 
matter much (cf. Dreyfus 1975). 
“[…] for the diagnosis of knapping techniques a technical understanding of fracture based on 
systematic experiments is more effective than complex statistics.” 
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comes easily dismissive and even hostile. There is also evidence that fundamental misunderstanding 
and regular ‘talking past each other’ heat up the major axes of conflict. In the extreme, disagreement 
even serves to fuel scholarly self-recognition and helps to legitimise particular approaches, indicating 
that French and Anglophone research endeavours construct part of their identity through negative 
reference to one another. The overall pattern, therefore, is clearly consistent with a cognitive chasm.  
 All of this begs the question of how exactly lithic knowledge is produced and secured in both 
research contexts. One may also ask what the tangible consequences of the divide for particular cases 
or items of research are. The last issue will be explored in some detail in the next section. It will help us 
to understand why the divide is not just of theoretical or epistemological interest but has important 
practical ramifications, rendering it highly relevant for scholarly discussions in the field. 
 
We can learn a great deal about the nature of the conflict if we zoom in to the practical realities of re-
search and examine actual cases in which the lithic knowledge claims put forth by French and Anglo-
phone scholars appear to clash. If we wish to evaluate the status and bearing of critical disagreement at 
the French-Anglophone interface, it seems useful to pay particular attention to cases of interpretive 
discord in which the objects of study are relatively similar. By keeping the object matter as constant as 
possible, it becomes easier to chart and discuss the epistemological sources of interpretative diver-
gence. The three paired case studies that are investigated in this section have been chosen according to 
this logic: each pair deals with the same material basis – a well-defined collection of lithic artefacts – 
but hosts two largely inconsistent knowledge claims about it; the deviating interpretations are offered 
by well-respected representatives of the two clashing spheres of research. This comparative strategy 
should allow us to evaluate whether and to what extent lithic knowledge claims are underdetermined 
by the available evidence, illustrating the crisis of lithic knowledge that becomes manifest at the 
French-Anglophone boundary; it responds to a general desideratum that lies dormant in the literature 
for quite a while now (e.g., Wylie 2002: Part I), but has never really been taken up in Palaeolithic ar-
chaeology – to take serious the intricacies of case-based practices and the many difficulties of research 






 The three selected case studies represent ‘key instances’ of critical disagreement at the French-
Anglophone interface; they showcase that even a shared evidentiary baseline is often not sufficient to 
ensure broad interpretative convergence. The paired case studies centre on the lithic assemblages from 
(i) Biache Saint-Vaast level IIA; (ii) Gouzeaucourt G; and (iii) Kulna 9b, 7, 7c, 7a, and 6b, respectively 
(Tab. 1; see Appendix I.2 for a detailed exposition of the rationale guiding the selection of case stud-
ies). The first case confronts the original interpretation of the Early Middle Palaeolithic assemblage 
from Biache Saint-Vaast level IIA by Boëda (1988) with Dibble’s (1995a) re-analysis of the same as-
semblage a few years later. The second case compares McPherron’s (1994) analysis of bifacial technol-
ogy at Gouzeaucourt G with Soriano’s (2000) treatment of the same material corpus, forming a central 
part of his celebrated doctoral dissertation. In the third case, Boëda’s (1995a, 1995b) early technologi-
cal assessment of the interaction between Discoid and bifacial technologies in the Micoquian layers of 
Kulna cave is opposed to the more recent characterisation of the lithic material by Tostevin (2000, 
2012). These examples are ‘Paradigm cases’ (sensu Scholl and Rätz 2016) of their respective research 
traditions: occurrences that can be regarded as “more or less typical instances of some aspect of [the] 
science [under consideration]” (ibid.: 78). As such, they should help us to chart some of the most per-
tinent practical effects of the French-Anglophone divide, and consequently put us in a better position 
to gauge the latter’s potential bearing on the problem of lithic knowledge in the field. 
 All original studies have been published between the late 1980s and early 2000s, the only excep-
tion being Tostevin’s Seeing Lithics (2012) which, after all, is basically a revamped version of his doc-
toral research conducted in the late 1990s (Tostevin 2000). The chosen timeframe is not coincidental; 
“What is needed, we suggest, is resolutely case-based analysis of actual practice – key instances 
of exemplary practice, critical turning points, innovations, and instructive failures in the use of 
archaeological data as evidence – aimed at making explicit the norms of evidential reasoning 
that have taken shape in the context of evolving traditions of practical experience working with 
archaeological material.” (Wylie and Chapman 2015: 7) 
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it bespeaks of a critical period for the development of both research spheres, in which French re-
searchers established the ‘technological approach’ and Anglophone scholars began to gradually free 
themselves from the shackles of the ‘Binford-Bordes debate’ elaborating new perspectives on the lithic 
record. The cited studies can count as important cornerstones of these developments. They remain 
influential in their respective discourse formations, some of them assuming a status as ‘research proto-
types.’ 
 Boëda’s (1988) examination of the Biache level IIA assemblage furnished the classic definition 
of ‘Levallois recurrent’ (cf. Boëda 1994) and his technological reading of the Kulna Micoquian resulted 
in the first ‘volumetric’ definition of Discoid technology and a highly influential approach to aspects of 
functional design in bifacial tools (Boëda 1995a; 1995b), providing some new perspectives on débitage-
façonnage complementarities (cf. Boëda 1991). Soriano’s assessment of the lithic evidence from Gou-
zeaucourt G, part of a more extensive comparative study, carries on this legacy yet also reflects an in-
creasing concern with the morpho-functionality of lithic tools in the French scene, delivering an im-
portant methodological impulse for emerging stands of ‘UTF-analysis’ (e.g., Lepot 1992/1993; Boëda 
1997, 2001; Soriano 2001, 2005).  
 The Anglophone research instances played a similarly potent role. Dibble’s (1995a) re-
examination of the lithic assemblage from Biache Saint-Vaast level IIA is commonly viewed as a 
demonstration of the ‘reduction thesis,’ highlighting the proficiency of attribute analysis. McPherron’s 
(1994) comparative investigation of bifacial shape variability conveyed a basic understanding of vary-
ing reduction trajectories and their morphometric effects and may count as a forerunner of complex 
statistical applications in the field; this work remains significant also because it formulated a compel-
ling critique of cognitive readings of lithic shape differences (cf. McPherron 1999, 2000; Iovita and 
McPherron 2011) – effectively extending Dibble’s (1987) scraper reduction model to bifacial technolo-
gy. Tostevin’s (2000) study of the Late Middle Palaeolithic assemblage from Kulna was instrumental 
in coining his widely recognised ‘behavioural approach’ to lithic technology (cf. Tostevin 2011b, 2012), 
propelled by the middle-range concept of ‘taskscape visibility’ (Tostevin 2007; Premo and Tostevin 
2016). In fact, Tostevin is sometimes celebrated as the pioneering figure of the ‘better’ chaîne opé-
ratoire approach. 
 The selected cases should therefore prove useful in exploring the underdetermination thesis in 
lithic analysis. We can compare the main results of each pair and assess the degree of cognitive incom-
patibility, if any. This should allow us to determine some of central points of interpretative friction 
characterising the French-Anglophone interface in lithic research. This assessment, in turn, should 
provide us at least with some clues on the nature of theory-ladenness in both research spheres. How 
serious, then, should we take the division between French and Anglophone approaches in lithic analy-
sis? 
The juxtaposition of the main assertions respectively put forth by French and Anglophone practition-
ers in the three cases of interest demonstrates that the discord in lithic knowledge yields is rather sub-
stantial (Tab. 2). Not only is there little overlap in the contents of lithic knowledge claims, the devised 
interpretive statements are often oppositional and tend to exclude each other. The paired cases almost 
read like staged disputes in which each weighty proclamation is negated and countered by an antithet-
ical proposition through the opponent, only to be counteracted again by the initial proclaimer and so 
forth. All cases host two readings of essentially the same lithic sources emphasising completely differ-
ent features and aspects of technology and fail to establish any far-reaching common ground. 
 In the case of Biache Saint-Vaast level IIA, the authors primarily disagree on whether the as-
semblage harbours multiple, conceptually distinct reduction sequences or whether the knapping pro-
cess has to be described as generally continuous and flexible. While Boëda (1988) discriminates be-
tween five reduction schemes (‘A’-‘E’) with a specific sequential logic and implied technicality, Dibble 
(1995a) rejects the hypothesis of discrete reduction trajectories and finds that modalities of reduction 
change as a function of reduction depth. Furthermore, the former elaborates three stages of flake pro-
duction tied to uni- and bidirectional ‘Levallois recurrent’ (‘Schemes A’ and ‘B’), the two primary 
methods of reduction that he identifies; these stages supply a differential pool of primary blanks and 
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by-products. The latter, by contrast, holds that what the former recognises as uni- and bidirectional 
Levallois does not differ in any single measure (attributes, metrics); a more likely explanation – given 
the general correlation between size, cortex ratios, platform facettation, and scar-pattern – is therefore 
that core treatment was strategically adjusted during a core’s life history.  
 Whereas Dibble (1995a) concludes that blank-tool relations are only weakly developed and that 
the main blank selection factor appears to be blank-size, Boëda (1988) ascertains that the overall tech-
nical structure of Levallois reduction supports well-defined blank-tool relationships; he argues that 
blank selection is foreshadowed by the spatiotemporal organisation of the technical systems in ques-
tion and the respective blanks that occur at different stages of the knapping process. Finally, Boëda 
interprets the lithic evidence as testifying to a well-developed technical ‘know how’ (savoir faire) in-
dicative of a particular ‘technical tradition;’ Dibble, on the contrary, contends that the documented 
lithic variability is likely driven by basal (physical) reduction effects, raw material availability, and 
other eco-environmental constraints. 
 The example of Gouzeaucourt G illustrates that French and Anglophone researchers may easily 
contradict each other when they interpret variability in lithic artefact shapes and other physical varia-
bles. McPherron (1994) proposes that morphometric differences within the bifacial assemblage are 
only poorly understood by invoking distinct construction plans and rather reflect the allometric inter-
action of various shape-variables on a given reduction trajectory. His point is that certain morphomet-
ric features of the Gouzeaucourt bifaces naturally co-vary as a function of reduction depth and reduc-
tion intensity. The author concludes that bifacial reduction engenders a directed pattern of shape 
transformation, with pointed forms generally signalling less reworking of an object and rounded forms 
resulting from a more intense consumption of raw material. Soriano (2000), conversely, holds that 
bifacial shape differences, although also subject to reduction effects, are anchored in distinct schemes 
of constructing, maintaining, and handling bifacial tools. Shape is regarded as an emergent factor of 
specific technological strategies, involving particular modes of volume construction, edge rejuvenation, 
and settlement organisation. Soriano’s central claim, contrary to McPherron, is that bifaces cannot be 
sufficiently understood if analysed in isolation but need to be first placed into their larger context of 
technicity; he argues that the bifacial technology of Gouzeacourt G represents a complementary strate-
gy to the co-existing, relatively simple flaking technology – the relationship between the two is diag-
nosed to be synergistic.  
 Thus, McPherron (1994) primarily emphasises that there is no reason to believe that bifacial 
variability is tied to broader regional or chronological trends and suggests that documented patterns of 
inter-site variability are likely to reflect localised circumstances, including differential histories of site-
occupation. By contrast, Soriano (2000) explicitly places the evidence into a larger evolutionary se-
quence, suggesting that the specifics of débitage-façonnage interaction are the result of a changing 
status of bifaces from the Lower to the Middle Palaeolithic; he considers these developments as closely 
bound to more general changes in the spatiotemporal organisation of chaînes opératoires in this 
timeframe.47 Ultimately, McPherron seeks to ground the observable bifacial variability in the physical 
constraints inherent to bifacial technologies and strongly criticises overly cognitive explanations, 
whereas Soriano regards the conceptualisation of bifacial reduction within its larger technological con-
text as key; the latter further stresses that the bifaces from Gouzeaucourt G index a particular ‘tech-
nical culture.’ 
 The case of the Micoquian assemblages of Kulna cave combines some of the contentious points 
encountered in the previous two examples. First of all, the accounts of Boëda (1995a, 1995b) and Tos-
tevin (2000, 2012) reproduce the bifurcation of ‘discrete’ and ‘continuous’ readings of lithic technolo-
gy. While the former posits that Discoid technology is generally characterised by a well-defined tech-
nical rule-set bringing into existence four highly diagnostic blank-types and asserts that in the Kulna 
assemblages two distinct methods of Discoid production can be attested, the latter finds that lithic 
reduction is continuous and changes in a directed manner – from (sub-)centripetal over unidirectional 
to crossed modalities of reduction – in the course of core exploitation. This difference also becomes 
                                                          
47 The topic of bifacial mobility may represent a tacit point of convergence between the two authors since the idea that technolo-
gy is regulated by patterns of hominin movement is generally consistent with both of their reasoning. However, even though 
Soriano (2000: 349-354) explicitly discusses the issue of techno-mobility in his work, he clearly considers mobility to be sub-
jected to sociocultural choice and hence as something that presupposes conceptualisation and requires both technical and cogni-
tive anticipation. It is unlikely that McPherron (1994) would accept this viewpoint. 
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manifest in Boëda’s insistence on the presence of two separated chaînes opératoires – a finding that is 
plainly opposed by Tostevin’s characterisation of the Kulna material in terms of a single generic reduc-
tion sequence; the latter explicitly maintains that the assemblage represents a ‘palimpsest of techno-
logical options’ and consequently has to be understood as a product of the “cumulative efforts of past 
flintknappers” (Tostevin 2012: 162). The continuous and directed vision of reduction championed by 
Tostevin is in turn countered by Boëda’s exposition of Discoid technology as a self-stabilising structure 
typified by a recurrent and cyclical pattern of volume management. 
 The second major issue is that the two authors disagree on the importance of bifaciality in un-
derstanding the Micoquian technology from Kulna. Whereas Boëda (1995a, 1995b) proposes that dé-
bitage and façonnage represent two complementary systems of tool manufacturing but yield tool ma-
trices of different sizes, Tostevin (2000, 2012) sees the bifacial tool component mainly as an expres-
sion of a rather diversified tool-kit and highly reduced lithic objects in general. In fact, Tostevin at-
tempts to link this latter circumstance to factors of raw material availability and hominin mobility; 
Boëda, by contrast, argues that the high reduction potential of Discoid systems is a consequence of 
their technical logic. In the end, the former claims that Kulna technology as a whole reflects a set of 
learned behaviours designating a specific ‘technological style’ with a specific place in the Central Euro-
pean sequence of technological evolution, while the latter identifies the Kulna Micoquian as a regional 
entity of the European Late Middle Palaeolithic hosting a specific ‘know how’ (savoir faire) and ex-
ploiting merely a number of the options available to the courant technique (‘technical current’) of the 
wider Micoquian phenomenon. 
 These three cases demonstrate that a consensus is currently illusional. Even when individual 
findings seem to converge – for example the Discoid cores of Kulna which are interpreted by both 
Boëda (1995a) and Tostevin (2000, 2012) as signalling intensified lithic reduction – they are evaluated 
rather differently or are linked to disparate sets of contextual evidence. In total, the three paired cases 
of conflict suggest that the French-Anglophone divide has not just a general bearing on the vision of 
the field and the broader narratives of the Palaeolithic past it authors, but brings forth very specific 
differences in how the lithic evidence of particular sites or assemblages is handled and interpreted. 
These differences clearly warrant closer investigation. They are alarming insofar as they appear to be 
patterned – that is, similar issues surface again and again – and we currently possess only little insight 
into the basic sources that produce them. Furthermore, since the evidentiary basis does not differ 
much in the three cases, the strong polarity of interpretive outcomes may be taken to suggest that dif-
ferent interpretive standards are at work – interpretive norms that are fed by two historically grown 
yet distinct communities of research. 
 To conclude, the three case studies of lithic practice at the French-Anglophone interface point to 
a general state of affairs in which key interpretive choices remain underdetermined insofar as the lithic 
evidence presently available to practitioners, taken by itself, does not direct us to accept one viewpoint 
over its rival. Therefore, the French-Anglophone interface may be recognised as a venue at which the 
problem of lithic knowledge becomes particularly apparent; the French-Anglophone divide seems to 
embody a serious crisis of lithic knowledge production – a clash of varying ‘styles of reasoning’ (sensu 
Fleck (1979 [1935]) – that researchers are currently unable to satisfactorily address or navigate. Fur-
thermore, the direct comparison of French and Anglophone knowledge yields has made it clear that 
the gravity of the division is difficult to negate and that, in order to properly understand it, a detailed 
exposition of the interpretive standards that orientate lithic analysis in both research contexts is re-
quired; we have to develop a basic understanding of the epistemological presumptions that direct lithic 
inquiry in both research spheres and explore how these interact with the evidence presently available. 
What follows in the subsequent chapters is dedicated to this end. Yet, a few words on the issue of ‘criti-
cal practice’ seem to be in order before we can begin to unpack the divide. 
The previous section has shown that the French-Anglophone boundary not only effectuates conflicting 
lithic knowledge claims but often erects a cognitive barrier complicating communication and mutual 
criticism; mischaracterisation and ‘talking past each other’ appear to be much more widespread than 
usually assumed. They both nurture a growing frustration in the face of obvious but largely intangible 
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tension between French and Anglophone quests for lithic knowledge – fostering cognitive entrench-
ment and mutual exclusion. As noted before, this situation may easily lead to partisan disputes in 
which not negotiation but self-assertion emerges as the primary objective. The problem, then, is that 
conflicts in lithic knowledge production are likely engrossed over time and disagreement may quickly 
become a question of research ideology rather than something that is scrutinised and constantly re-
negotiated. If we wish to avoid that dogmatic tendencies assume command over the field, such ‘im-
munisation’ of viewpoints must obviously be prevented. It is therefore of critical importance that the 
dialogue between the two camps is re-enabled again.48 All of this makes clear that the French-
Anglophone divide has some important ramifications for practices of criticism in the field, especially if 
we take seriously into account that the clashing communities of lithic research may be instructed by 
fundamentally incompatible standards of knowledge formation. 
 Although we can easily agree on the fact that a ‘critical attitude’ appears to be central to the suc-
cess and advancement of almost any research enterprise, it is often overlooked that ‘being critical’ is at 
least as challenging as assembling and interpreting evidence. Each ‘problem of evidence’ is typically 
tied to an associated ‘problem of criticism.’ In the face of substantial knowledge conflicts, there is a real 
threat that criticism aims primarily at the denunciation of cognitive contenders rather than seeking to 
enable and ‘fuel’ a productive discourse. When criticism is levelled for its own sake and contending 
research communities battle for prerogatives of interpretation, critical practice may easily mutate into 
a mere ‘bashing’ of non-shared viewpoints. This tendency, in turn, can redirect criticism entirely to-
wards the ‘other,’ thereby foreclosing the need to be self-critical and to equally scrutinise like-minded 
peers. The current situation at the French-Anglophone interface gives us reason to suspect that critical 
practice in this sense may be considerably compromised. 
 As a matter of fact, even the practice of devising critical claims about rival viewpoints is not 
without preconditions. Broadly speaking, criticism can only be effective if the ‘problem of evidence’ 
that the criticised perspective initially intended to address is adequately captured; this implies that 
critical practice must respect at least some of the premises on which ‘other’ viewpoints are based. If it 
doesn’t, critical utterances may easily spawn figures of mischaracterisation and consequently miss 
their mark. The general lesson is that ‘being critical’ requires a basic understanding of the cognitive 
‘other’ and the epistemological framework from which rival knowledge claims derive. The preliminary 
survey of critical practice at the French-Anglophone boundary clearly suggests that such basic under-
standing is presently lacking. 
 Notwithstanding that we will return to the issue of ‘critical practice’ in the last chapter of this 
study – after we have explored the nature of the French-Anglophone divide in more detail – it should 
have become clear by now that the divide matters not only because it has generated a condition in 
which practitioners have great difficulties of coming to terms with divergent knowledge claims, but 
also because it potentially puts at risk critical practice in the field. The only way to help navigating and 
perhaps eventually overcoming this situation is to expose the conceptual underpinnings of French and 
Anglophone approaches as well as to analyse the pertinent sources of mischaracterisation and ‘talking 
past each other.’ A natural starting point is a survey of the main cognitive tendencies persisting in 
Western thought in order to retrieve an effective conceptual toolkit for the examination of the ‘under-
determination thesis’ of lithic knowledge at the French-Anglophone boundary. For reasons outlined in 
the next chapter, I draw on philosopher Stephen C. Pepper’s notion of ‘world hypotheses’ to develop 
this broader conceptual framework. Pepper will help us to fill the ‘underdetermination thesis’ with 
content and to sharpen our grasp for the standards of knowledge formation and criticism presumably 
guiding lithic inquiry at the French-Anglophone interface.
                                                          
48 This contention does not necessarily imply that we should strive for a ‘middle-ground’ – whatever it would look like – but 
simply reminds us that open engagement and honest interaction, critical as they must be, remain some of the essential building 
blocks of any ‘healthy’ field or discipline. 
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Before we can start exposing Stephen Pepper’s epistemological framework and to render it fruitful for 
analysing the French-Anglophone divide in lithic studies, a few comments on my motivation to draw 
on Pepper’s work are in order here. Given that Pepper’s contributions to the metaphysics of thought 
and the philosophy of science have largely been forgotten, the value of his work is not self-explanatory 
“If we desire to be undogmatic, and unexposed in the rear of our 
cognitive endeavors, we must be prepared to change our minds 
about the reliability of any evidence whatever. Facts do not guaran-
tee our hypotheses. Facts and hypotheses cooperate to guarantee 
the factuality and the truth of each other. Cognitive enterprises 
open in a field of uncriticized fact. How much of this field will re-
main unaltered as a result of critical scrutiny, one cannot risk 
stating in advance. A constant recollection of this field of uncriti-
cized fact, which quite correctly every hypothesis tries to abandon, 
is the greatest insurance against the fallacies of dogmatism.” 




(see Box 4 for a biographic note on Pepper). It has to be said, however, that this situation is in princi-
ple also no reason to not consider him. Just because he is not as routinely called upon as thinkers such 
as Kuhn, Popper, or Foucault does not mean that he musters less useful resources to understand scien-
tific practice. In this section, I will indeed argue that Pepper has unjustly been marginalised and that 
he provides a unique conceptual toolkit to make sense of science when it is complicated – that is, when 
the definition of science itself is put at stake and when multiple branches of science – e.g., the humani-
ties, social sciences, life sciences, and the natural sciences – come together within a single disciplinary 
matrix. These conditions are met especially in ‘hybrid’ disciplines – disciplines that draw on multiple 
strands and branches of science in order to interpret their object matters. Clearly, Palaeolithic archae-
ology and the various threads of lithic research it hosts reflect such complicatedness, and may even be 
regarded as a paradigmatic example of a ‘hybrid’ field. Having said this, we can start asking for the 
advantages of using Pepper rather than other available epistemologies of science. Why is Pepper useful 
in the problem-context at hand? 
The first point to be stressed is that Pepper remains one of the rare thinkers, at least to the 
knowledge of the author, who has seriously considered the totality of Western thought and presented a 
comprehensive taxonomy to capture it. In contrast to Kuhn (1996 [1972]) and Foucault (1969), for 
instance, who have come to their respective views on the problem of science and knowledge through 
an analysis of particular model-sciences – in Kuhn’s case physics, in Foucault’s case history and the 
humanities – Pepper’s panoply of metatheoretical positions is disciplinarily ‘neutral’ and consequently 
avoids the general problems tied to the model-based approach. Pepper explicitly embarks on a maxi-
mally broad survey of the dominant tendencies in speculative and metaphysical thought, and to this 
end examines in particular the history of philosophical questioning. The advantage of this perspective 
is that philosophical reflection is older than any of the specialised branches of science, and is thus 
more likely to register and anticipate the full spectrum of human ‘world-making’ strategies, inde-
pendently of their disciplinary framing. Moreover, philosophy is traditionally concerned with under-
standing the world as a whole rather than keeping itself busy with particular problems, themes, ob-
jects, or aspects of reality. It can be added that, from a systematic and historical point of view, philo-
sophical reasoning is at the roots of most of the specialised fields of inquiry that we call the ‘sciences’ 
today. It is in this sense that Pepper’s methodological manoeuvre allows us to take a step back and to 
search for structures of thought that are pre- and perhaps even trans-disciplinary. Pepper’s classifica-
tion of scientific cognition, as a consequence, promises to transcend well-cemented epistemic bounda-
ries such as the old demarcation between the humanities [Geisteswissenschaften] and the natural sci-
ences [Naturwissenschaften].49 By offering such a broad coverage, Pepper avoids self-defeat and ques-
tions of scientificity can finally be addressed on comparative grounds, rather than simply reproducing 
the heralded views of particular fields and research projects.50 
 The second point is a follow-up of the first and has to do with the specific way in which Pepper 
maps the diversity of credible scientific cognition. The contrast to Kuhn (1996 [1972]) and Foucault 
(1969), and to a certain extent also to Bachelard (1938), may serve as a foil to clarify this aspect. Both 
Kuhn, in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1996 [1972]), and Foucault, in L’Archéologie du sa-
voir (1969), put their emphasis on the ‘verticality,’ that is, the historicity of scientific knowledge devel-
opments. Both argue that the diversity of human thought is mainly a product of processes operating on 
a temporal plane. Kuhn’s ‘paradigms’ and Foucault’s notion of « épistémè » specify different kinds of 
historical a priori, which are continuously replaced in time.51 The implication is that there can only be 
one dominant ‘paradigm’ and only one dominant ‘discursive formation’ at any given moment. It is 
therefore not surprising that many approaches to science that draw on Kuhn or Foucault face difficul-
ties with making sense of intra-scientific fractures and serious intra-disciplinary conflicts. Pepper an-
ticipates this problem and lucidly brings into focus that cognitive diversity is not only a matter of his-
                                                          
49 This is at least in part a consequence of Pepper’s biography and the people he worked with during his career; it is for instance 
notable that Pepper interacted quite intensively with seminal psychologists such as Edward Tolman (learning theory, cogni-
tivism) and Kurt Koffka (Gestalt psychology) as well as the influential social theorist Georg Herbert Mead (interactionism, social 
behaviourism) (cf. Hahn 2000). 
50 This universalist aspiration is only underscored by the central role that Pepper assigns to ‘metaphors’ and metaphorical rea-
soning in general (see infra); obviously, metaphors have the ability to shape human cognition independently of the specific part 
of reality or object matter that is investigated. 
51 Foucault (1969) even invokes the idea of Zeitgeist (‘spirit of an age’) to illustrate and support his notion of historically specific 
‘discursive formations’ which replace each other as time goes by. 
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tory, but also an issue of the ‘here and now.’ He maps this diversity in its ‘horizontality’ and acknowl-
edges that different cognitive formations compete for cognitive and social supremacy at any given 
time. Needless to say, this complies much better with the present project, namely to lay bare the basic 
sources of conflict which have prompted and solidified the French-Anglophone divide in Palaeolithic 
archaeology.  
 The third point is that Pepper’s survey of cognition anticipates many, if not most, of the main 
topics of contemporary philosophy of science and, for that matter, other fields that study science.52 As 
the exposition that follows will show, this concerns issues such as: ‘theory-laden observation’; the di-
chotomy of ‘facts’ and ‘values’; the ‘prejudice structure’ of knowledge formation; the ‘disunity’ of scien-
tific knowledge; the tension between ‘explanatory’ and ‘interpretive’ science, between ‘holism’ and 
‘atomism’, and between ‘reduction’ and ‘emergence’; the difficulty to make sense of ‘part-whole’ con-
figurations; the status of ‘data,’ ‘theories,’ and scientific ‘truth’; the socio-historical framing of 
knowledge and the role of the individual therein; the ‘integration’ of disparate knowledge claims; and 
many more. Some of these issues are explicitly addressed in Pepper’s work, while others are only im-
plied or hinted at. The purpose of the present chapter is to reveal this genuine potential and to develop 
some of it in relation to the problems at hand. It should be uncontroversial to accept that this should 
help us in clarifying the cognitive stakes of the French-Anglophone divide. 
 The fourth point is that Pepper helps to retrieve some of the conceptual insights which have 
largely been lost in the aftermath of the intellectual turmoil of the Second World War. The ‘takeover’ of 
Anglophone philosophy by the Logical Positivists and Logical Empiricists and the rise of ‘analytic’ phi-
losophy in the U.S. and the U.K. only marks the apex of this development. Its consequence was that 
philosophy itself became a somewhat specialised field of inquiry, characterised by a rather narrow 
conception of scientificity. This is still the normative dilemma of modern philosophy of science, partly 
a consequence of the attempt to establish conceptual continuity with the empirical sciences. For Palae-
olithic archaeology even worse, its Anglophone practitioners have engaged mainly with the then main-
stream ‘normative project’ in philosophy of science – a project that sought to establish what science 
ought to be rather than how science, as a matter of fact, is already practiced and why.53 Pepper can 
help us to break these bonds and to get rid of the ‘prescriptive’ baggage of the debate.54 
 The fifth point is that Pepper’s exceptionally broad coverage of Western thought can likely 
contribute to our understanding of the preconditions for the ‘underdetermination’ of lithic knowledge 
(cf. Chapter 1). In some ways, this point is certainly a culmination of all other points since an adequate 
approach to general questions of knowledge underdetermination may have been compromised by 
overly one-sided understandings of knowledge and science. 
 As a sixth and last point, it is important to emphasise that Pepper has occasionally been used 
in other disciplines to examine their respective epistemological structure – for example in psychology 
(Gillespie 1982; Hayes et al. 1988; Long 1990; Karimi-Aghdam 2016; cf. Goerner 1992; Staddon 1993), 
biology (Brent 1972), economics (Daly 2000), and systems science (Overton 2007).55 The results of 
these studies are generally promising and show the potential of using Pepper for similar purposes. One 
can add what I have alluded to before: because of the unusual ‘hybridity’ of Palaeolithic research, it is 
probable that Pepper is even more fruitful to expose the latter’s structure of reasoning. I would argue 
                                                          
52 This topic is seriously under-researched (but see Reck 1982) – a situation that is perhaps unsurprising given the general ne-
glect of Pepper’s contribution at large. 
53 One may indeed argue that this was the critical moment in the history of modern Palaeolithic archaeology after which its 
Anglophone division in the wake of Binford’s New Archaeology, Clarke’s Analytical Archaeology, and Howell’s Paleoanthro-
pology on the one hand – all modelled on an image of science based on the ‘hard’ natural sciences – and French ‘prehistory’ in 
the wake of Leroi-Gourhan’s « Ethnologie préhistoire » and Tixier’s « Technologie préhistoire » on the other – modelled on an 
image of science based on the ‘soft’ sciences (humanities, history, interpretive sociology, ethnology, etc.) – became irretrievably 
disconnected. 
54 The point here is not to say that Anglophone Palaeolithic archaeology is misguided to take up the conception of science fa-
voured by the ‘normative project’; the point, again, is merely to emphasise that this already implies a very specific stance to 
science, a form of perspective-taking that is a part of the difficulty to navigate the French-Anglophone divide. To clear the view 
for the actual stakes of the divide, we must therefore also clear the view for the full spectrum of conceptions of science that can 
be seriously considered. 
55 See also Stroud (2015) for an engagement with Pepper in terms of the ‘rhetorics of criticism’ in science and aesthetics. 
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that the results obtained by the present investigation support this claim (see Chapter 6), but I leave it 
to the readers to be the judge of this.56 
 
In World Hypotheses (1942), Stephen Pepper argues that the diversity of credible trajectories of West-
ern thought can be comprehensively captured by four distinct ways of making sense of the world, all of 
which are relatively adequate in their own right (ibid.: 1).57 These ‘world hypotheses’ are surprisingly 
‘empirical’ according to Pepper and have developed out of ordinary or common-sense experience (cf. 
Pepper 1967: 1). As world hypotheses, they have been constantly refined and expanded over the course 
of the centuries and are, in their core, at least as old as philosophical speculation itself. World hypothe-
ses represent hypotheses about the world and are as such distinguished by their unrestrictedness – 
they contain statements about the structure of the world as a whole and help to organise the totality of 
the available and possible evidence (Pepper 1942: 78, 1943: 602);58 their peculiarity, moreover, lies in 
the fact that no world hypotheses can be rejected as completely irrelevant (ibid.: 1). We can thus say 
that world hypotheses encapsulate the pillars of refined cognition. 
World Hypotheses originally identified and discussed six of such world hypotheses, from 
which, however, only four were diagnosed to have withstood the scrutiny of history – with ‘animism’ 
and ‘mysticism’ failing the test of time. The remaining four – ‘formism,’ ‘mechanism,’ ‘contextualism,’ 
and ‘organicism’ – are considered the only world hypotheses to have shown great cognitive adequacy 
(Pepper 1935a: 370, 1942: 141-150). This cognitive adequacy, according to Pepper (1936: 576), renders 
them the best tools we currently possess to transform uncriticised ‘common sense’59 into ‘refined 
knowledge’ – into what Pepper (1942: 39-70) broadly identifies as scientific knowledge.60 Yet, all of the 
four world hypotheses have their respective problems and are far from ideal in making sense of the 
world – none of them is fully or perfectly adequate and all of them seem to truncate and/or marginal-
ise some critical aspects of the world (cf. Pepper 1935a: 370, 1942: Chapter VI; these relative weak-
nesses of each of the four adequate world theories are exposed in some detail in Appendix II). 
 Although a world hypothesis is constantly corroborated and tested by the evidence it makes 
available (Pepper 1967: 5; cf. Monast 1975: 95f.), its unrestricted nature concurrently renders it a nec-
essary precondition for marshalling evidence, formulating theories, and identifying or discussing prob-
lems that arise during the research process. A world hypothesis in Peppers sense is therefore some-
thing that must be formulated or accepted – at least tacitly –before any serious scientific inquiry can 
start.61 Even though world hypotheses themselves, as hypotheses, are empirical entities and as such 
maintain links to common-sense experience throughout their use-life, they are hence also ‘pre-
empirical’ insofar as they help to structure how evidence is gathered, analysed, and finally interpreted; 
they constitute elementary cognitive devices to orient any examination of fact.62 To this effect, a world 
hypothesis delineates a wider cognitive system that includes basic statements on how the world is hold 
together and thereby makes possible to systematically access this world (cf. Pepper 1942: 74). A world 
                                                          
56 This is Lakatos’ argument of ‘eating the cake.’ The argument holds that in order to judge how well a cake is made, one needs to 
eat it. By analogy, theoretical claims or frameworks literally have to be “eaten” first before their fecundity can be evaluated – 
“eaten” in the context of theories usually means “applied” or “executed.” 
57 In a later book, Concept and Quality (1967), Pepper sought to establish a fifth relatively adequate world hypothesis – ‘selectiv-
ism.’ Due to its unclear and somewhat controversial status, I will, however, limit my investigation to Pepper’s original four world 
hypotheses here (see Box 4). 
58 More specifically, this means negatively that a world hypothesis rejects no evidence from its field and positively that it seeks to 
organise the totality of evidence (Pepper 1943: 602). 
59 What Pepper names ‘common sense’ has also been termed ‘opinion,’ ‘middle-sized fact,’ ‘pre-analytical fact,’ or ‘folk-
psychological view’ to name but a few (cf. Pepper 1935a). 
60 Pepper (1942) is of course more rigorous in his account but because his differentiations do not matter much for the present 
purpose, I will not linger on them for any longer. It should be mentioned, however, that he refers to the realm of common sense 
in which uncriticised facts or evidence in the form of ‘dubitanda’ are found as the ‘roots of knowledge,’ whereas criticised facts 
come in the form either of ‘data’ or ‘danda’ and are referred to as the ‘fruits of knowledge’ (cf. ibid.: 68). 
61 This, of course, does not mean that each scholar has to consciously formulate such a world theory before she/he can begin 
her/his localised inquiry. Most of the time, world theories are only loosely attached to individuals and their role is “passive” 
rather than “active” (see infra). This also means that they are rarely made explicit during the research process although they can 
be shown to substantially guide it. I will return to this point in Chapter 6. 
62 Pepper (1942: 72-74) tries to capture this ‘structuring’ effect of world hypotheses by their capacity to “cognitively prescribe,” 
an ability that common-sense experience lacks. This ability to structurally prescribe is not to be confused with the ability to 
predict – a specific instance of the prescriptive aptitude proper to the world theory of ‘mechanism.’ 
37 
 
hypothesis understood in this way constitutes a somewhat ‘passive’ yet all-encompassing theory – a 
‘world theory’ – which can be distinguished from the more ‘active’ local theories that are explicitly 
developed, discussed, and negotiated in practiced science but remain constrained and bounded in their 
application (Pepper 1935b: 16; cf. Monast 1965: 98). 
Each world hypothesis is quite specific about the type and nature of the evidence it typically 
carves out (cf. Pepper 1942: 68). This means that the specification of observations that can serve as 
data is part of the work that a world hypothesis does (Pepper 1935a: 371, 1942: 51f., 68). Consequently, 
different world hypotheses tend to marshal different types of evidence, or at least evidence that is not 
directly comparable (cf. Monast 1975: 132).63 This clearly constitutes one of the key sources of the cog-
nitive autonomy of world theories. Each world hypothesis generally differs in how it handles and ‘di-
gests’ common-sense experience – a situation which, in turn, results in basic disparities in how the 
world is partitioned, what is brought into focus, and what is downplayed or even whitewashed. As 
Pepper (1935a: 369) puts it, world hypotheses therefore emerge as “our ultimate source for the discov-
ery of the nature of facts.”64 
In providing such general cognitive orientation, world hypotheses inevitably entail value 
judgements and favour their own view(s) of science – views that seek compatibility with the heralded 
values.65 This is the unescapable normativity of world hypotheses (cf. Efron 1980: 20).66 World hy-
potheses constitute relatively enclosed cognitive systems, in which understandings of the world, types 
of evidence, values, methods, theories, arguments, and interpretations are circularly coupled. They are 
constantly adapting to each other in order to render the world theory internally coherent. As a result, 
the conceptual framing provided by different world hypotheses will typically support unequal interpre-
tations of all of the respective dimensions of research (cf. Pepper 1935a: 367, 1942: 79f., 1967: 5).67 In 
general terms, this situation should be familiar to students of philosophy of science and may count as 
an early formulation of the inevitable value- and theory-ladenness of all scientific endeavours, later 
popularised by Kuhn (1977) and his followers.68 The ingenuity of Pepper’s World Hypotheses lies in 
the fact that it elegantly anticipates the Kuhnian idea of ‘theory-laden observation’69 and combines it 
with the core insight of hermeneutic thinking – that is, the empirically grounded prejudice structure of 
all knowledge formation – which was later systematised by Gadamer (1960) and others.70 In doing so, 
world hypotheses arise as indispensable, highly effective, yet extremely dynamic catalysts of human 
reasoning in general.  
Having said this, it is important to recognise that each wider cognitive system centred on a 
world hypothesis can easily integrate multiple ‘localised’ theoretical and epistemological positions 
while not being reducible to them; this is because world hypotheses signify meta-theoretical stand-
points that group epistemic and, by extension, scientific stances on a higher level. For instance, ‘mate-
rialism’ and ‘realism’ tend to be associated with ‘formism,’ whereas ‘naturalism,’ ‘behaviourism,’ and 
‘adaptationism’ generally gravitate towards ‘mechanism.’ Similarly, ‘interactionism,’ ‘social construc-
tionism,’ and ‘pragmatism’ tend to be associated with ‘contextualism,’ while ‘structuralism’ and many 
holistic evolutionary theories strongly gravitate towards ‘organicism.’ Already this brief sampler makes 
immediately clear why Pepper’s framework is so useful for the purpose at hand: it promises to estab-
                                                          
63 This may or may not include different ways of transferring evidence into analysable data. 
64 For Pepper (1942: 79), evidence and interpretation are thus inescapably merged in a world hypothesis: “[i]n a world theory it 
is impossible to say where pure fact ends and interpretation in fact begins. Within the theory itself the distinction is clear. The 
theory will tell you what a fact ‘is’ and what in fact is theory. But another equally reliable theory will draw the line in another 
place” (cf. also Pepper 1943: 602). 
65 This is another reason why the normative quest for the one adequate ‘method of science’ – if the hypothesis of world hypothe-
ses is correct – appears to be deeply misguided. What science is or ought to be can only be answered relative to already accepted 
world hypotheses and can hence only be objectively determined in relation to the standards established by their cognitive fram-
ing. 
66 This is effectively a rejection of the fact-value dichotomy for the separation between ‘facts’ and ‘values’ is pointless within 
world hypotheses. 
67 For a detailed exposition of the prominent although not always immediately evident role of value in Pepper’s work, see Efron 
(1980: 20). 
68 For a recent sampler of key discussions on the role of values in science, see Schurz and Carrier (2013). 
69 There is in fact reasonable ground to suspect a certain influence of Pepper on Kuhn’s formulation of the concept of the ‘para-
digm’ (cf. Efron 1980: 23). 
70 Gadamer’s (1960) original German concept for this is Vorurteilsstruktur des Wissens. 
38 
 
lish a simple taxonomy of epistemic positions without getting lost in the intricacies and details of par-
ticular theoretical stances – details that may be unimportant for comprehending the bigger picture.71 
The core of each world hypothesis is constituted by what Pepper calls ‘root metaphor.’ A root metaphor 
is both the core and origin of a world hypothesis (cf. Pepper 1935a: 365). To identify and analyse root 
metaphors enables a general understanding of how different world hypotheses operate. In general 
terms, root metaphors specify the core intuitions and features found in common-sense experience, 
around which a world hypotheses is built (Pepper 1942: 91f.). Root metaphors are the primary devices 
which carry over these core intuitions and basic insights in order to systematise and develop them, so 
that the world can be described, interpreted, and criticised in relatively reliable and adequate ways. 
This interrelationship between a world hypothesis and its root metaphor is what Pepper tries to encap-
sulate in his ‘root metaphor theory’ (cf. Pepper 1928, 1935a: 369). The theory entails a number of theo-
rems (‘maxims’) which inform about the nature of world hypotheses and prepare the ground for ana-
lysing them – an analysis that Pepper (1942: 91-96) aptly terms ‘root metaphor method.’  
Pepper’s root metaphor theory generally responds to the simple question of ‘how a world hy-
pothesis is constructed in the first place.’ This question can easily be reformulated so that it transforms 
into a historical question – in Pepper’s terms, we can ask: “how does a world hypothesis arise?” (Pep-
per 1935a: 369). While root metaphor theory tries to advance analytical and systematic statements 
about the status and functioning of varying world hypotheses, it thus also places emphasis on their 
historical development. This last point cannot be overemphasised since it allows us to grasp how world 
hypotheses may alter over time and is generally consistent with the recurrent emphasis on the ‘histo-
ricity’ of science and its ever-transforming character that pervades science studies at large.72 
 As the historical and conceptual origin of world hypotheses, root metaphors specify the condi-
tions under which ‘uncriticised’ knowledge is transferred into ‘scrutinised’ and ‘criticisable’ scientific 
knowledge. In contrast to world hypotheses themselves, which by definition are ‘global’ in scope, root 
metaphors always have a ‘local’ origin (cf. Pepper 1967: 3). They are propelled by strong common-
sense intuitions73 which derive from specific domains of observation or selected groups of facts.74 
These are then ‘cognitively digested’ by reference to the root metaphor as Pepper (1935a: 369) calls it – 
they are systematised and refined so that their analysis enables their expansion to other domains or 
parts of observation in order to elucidate them (idem).75 It is this capacity of a root metaphor to pro-
                                                          
71 What I try to investigate in the present study is whether and to what degree this seems to be the case. A brief survey of the 
available theoretical literature suggests that previous attempts to structure the landscape of archaeological thought have often 
led to unnecessary confusion by going astray in a multitude of ‘isms’ – ‘isms’ whose cognitive significance and heuristic power 
cannot be taken for granted and has rarely been demonstrated. 
72 This indicates that Pepper already recognised that science cannot escape its historicity, even though his conception of history 
stresses multi-linearity rather than uni-directionality and recasts scientific progress as a complicated and not always transparent 
process (see infra). 
73 The concept of ‘intuition,’ although not spelled-out in detail, is central to Pepper’s theory of knowledge. Intuitions in Pepper’s 
sense are assessments of the structure of reality with unparalleled immediacy; intuitions are produced in direct interaction with 
the parts of the world and hence derive from formative common-sense experiences and other observations that are deemed key 
to understand the nature of reality. They are not infallible, however, and not every intuition is as good as any other. Even though 
epistemic intuitions form the necessary starting point of developing a world theory, they always have to prove their fruitfulness 
while they are systematised and refined scientifically. Pepper’s notion of ‘intuition’ comes perhaps closest to what Gopnik and 
Schwitzgebel (1998) refer to as the interpretation of intuitions as hypotheses; accordingly, intuitive judgements are simply 
“particularly plausible hypotheses about the nature of the world” (ibid.: 78). The difference to non-intuitive judgements – the 
kinds of judgement science naturally aspires to – is simply that intuitive judgement is not based on some kind of explicit reason-
ing process which the person who makes the judgement can consciously observe (ibid.: 77). Rendering judgment-making “ob-
servable” in this sense marks the crucial transition to scientific cognition. At any rate, appeals to ‘epistemic intuitions’ are clearly 
not obscure and still permeate modern epistemological theorising. Epistemic intuitions for instance still serve to evaluate 
whether claims fall on one or another side of some significant divide in epistemology (cf. Nagel 2007). In psychology, intuitive 
cognition is now widely recognised as a foundational element of all human reasoning and decision-making (Kahneman and 
Tversky 1996; Gigerenzer 2007). The important point about intuitions in science, however, seems to be that the latter, through 
its reflexive attitude, tends to cultivate specific intuitive predispositions and to hide them in seemingly hyper-conscious process-
es of reasoning. 
74 Cf. “[…] [P]erhaps the only way, in which metaphysical hypotheses [world hypotheses] can be derived is through the analysis 
of a selected group of facts (which I call the root metaphor) and the expansion of that analysis among other facts.” (Pepper 
1935a: 365) 
75 Pepper closely converges with Nelson Goodman’s (1966) account of reflective equilibria. According to this idea, cognitive 
progress is made primarily by adjusting our local and more general theories to better match with our case-bound intuitions 
while also adjusting these intuitive judgements to better conform to our theories – this is what Goodman (ibid.: 66) refers to as 
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cess a local but persuasive common-sense understanding in such a way that reality as a whole can be 
grasped that renders it constitutive for its world hypothesis. Root metaphors, in other words, are met-
aphors that can be intuited in the ‘local’ and based on what they thereby encapsulate furnish an effec-
tive canon of conceptual resources to interpret the ‘globality’ of fact which they gradually encounter 
during their expansion.76 Eventually, it is this friction between the global aspiration of a world hypoth-
esis and its local origin that helps to explain a world hypothesis’ partial yet unavoidable inadequacy – 
domain-specific intuitions have to be ‘stretched’ and thereby to be altered in order to accommodate the 
totality and richness of reality as a whole.77  
Additionally, the constitutive tension between the ‘local’ and the ‘global’ elucidates why each 
world hypothesis maintains some traces of dogmatism (cf. Pepper 1935a: 372, 1942: 115-120). The 
initial set of ‘facts’ and common-sense experiences that define any world hypothesis’ point of depar-
ture, although of course being amendable to cognitive refinement during the development of the hy-
pothesis, are largely withdrawn from systematic scrutiny and are hence usually assumed to be ‘self-
evident’ and/or ‘indubitable’ (Pepper 1935a: 369).78 It follows that the core ‘facts’ and intuited key 
categories of a world hypothesis are largely immune to revision (cf. ibid.: 366)79 – the hypothesis 
would in fact collapse if they would be abandoned and/or substantially revised. A certain degree of 
dogmatic security is therefore a necessary ingredient of any world hypothesis. This leads us to a some-
what paradoxical situation since dogmatism, in general, appears to be detrimental to cognitive ad-
vancement because it terminates debate and critical refinement (cf. Pepper 1942: Chapter II); yet, a 
residual ‘dogmatic core,’ as we have seen, is nonetheless required for making credible sense of the 
world as a whole; dogmatism thus seems to inhibit and enable insight at the same time – a curious 
feature of Pepper’s world hypotheses theory to which I will return again to at the end of this chapter. 
 How do root metaphors give birth to their world hypothesis? The principal mechanism to do 
so is ‘metaphorical conjecture.’ The concept enables a basic understanding of how metaphors help to 
mediate the expansion of analysed facts, concepts, and categories from the context of their initial dis-
covery to other ‘foreign’ contexts. What has been learned from the initial domain of observation and its 
hypothetical explanation can in this manner be transposed and/or extrapolated into a new domain of 
observation, which in turn can be re-interpreted through the lenses of the mediating root metaphor, 
and so forth until unrestricted scope and great adequacy is reached – it is in this sense that metaphors 
use one part of experience to illuminate another (cf. Efron 1980: 22). ‘Metaphorical conjectures’ there-
by trigger a recurrent systematisation and cognitive codification of the original metaphor by testing its 
performance and monitoring its internal consistency in the face of hitherto un-encountered facts – the 
ultimate result of which is the formulation of an unrestricted hypotheses and its development (Pepper 
1942: 328). ‘Cognitive refinement’ is nothing else than the process of gradually enhancing the capacity 
of a root metaphor to corroborate the evidence it generates during such an expansion (ibid.: 75). We 
may hence speak of a ‘root metaphor’ when the hypothetical systematisation of a locally retrieved met-
aphor has resulted in a field of application that is identical with the world as a whole.  
How and to what effect such a root metaphor can be ‘enhanced’ relies entirely on the metaphor 
itself – on its metaphorical and associative space and the general proficiency of this space to devise 
concepts and categories that are able to secure and to improve the cognitive adequacy of its world hy-
pothesis – root metaphors are hence primarily developed internally. The relative strength of a root 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
the ‘dual adjustment between definition and usage’ so that the usage informs the definition and the definition guides future 
usages and/or the expansion of usage. 
76 In Pepper’s (1935a: 369) own terms, this can be understood in the following way: “[The selected facts] are cognitively digested 
and analyzed. Their structure is usually found capable of rather wide extension through uncriticized facts not at first supposed to 
be of their nature. This structure is then elevated into an hypothesis for the explanation of other uncriticised facts, as a result of 
which these become critically interpreted in terms of the root metaphor. In the course of this interpretation, the root metaphor 
itself may undergo critical analysis and refinement which reciprocally increases its range and power of interpretation. When it 
assumes unlimited range, or world-wide scope, then it is a metaphysical hypothesis, and a catalogue of its principal descriptive 
concepts is a set of metaphysical categories.” 
77 Needless to say, it is likely that something of importance is lost in this process – it is in fact likely that the core intuitions wit-
ness a gradual ‘alienation’ and thereby lose part of their initial cognitive appeal. 
78 It follows that concepts such as ‘undeniable intuition,’ ‘self-evident,’ ‘indubitable,’ and even ‘observation’ always represent 
internal categories of a given world hypothesis – they form, in other words, all part of the cognitive canon that a world hypothe-
sis delineates (cf. Pepper 1935a: 366). Consequently, they cannot be criticised by the cognitive standards effectuated by other 
world hypotheses – an issue that has important consequences for how world hypotheses may interact (see Chapter 6). Some of 
these considerations anticipate the insights of Quine (1951a) and Wittgenstein (1958), making a huge splash in philosophy of 
science after their dissemination. 
79 Cf. “The symptom of dogmatism is the refusal to permit certain materials to be doubted.” (Pepper 1935: 366) 
40 
 
metaphor lies in its ability to make successful ‘metaphorical leaps’ – that is, to adapt its conceptual 
repertoire to conflicting or hitherto undiscovered facts – for instance to a newly discovered domain of 
reality – in such a way that the mobilised world hypothesis remains intact and is further corroborat-
ed.80 To make a ‘metaphorical leap’ hence simply means to re-interpret available facts in light of the 
utilised root metaphor so that the overall degree of structural corroboration provided by the meta-
phor’s world hypothesis is increased. It is in this sense that we can hold that both the ‘shape’ and 
‘boundary’ of each cognitive landscape surrounding a world hypothesis fundamentally depend on met-
aphorical insight (cf. Mattice 2014: ix).81 
Pepper’s own stance towards metaphor is rather pragmatic; in his early work he already states: 
“[i]t is pedantic to object to metaphor. Every philosophical theory is a far-flung metaphor” (Pepper 
1928: 130). For Pepper, this role of metaphor to cognitively ‘guide’ and ‘give shape’ is not limited to 
philosophical speculation but also holds true for scientific reasoning. Science is to a large degree un-
derstood as a process of bringing metaphors to bear, to refine and systematise them, and to recursively 
test their epistemic value. This, however, does not imply that Pepper reduces science to a mere ‘lan-
guage game’ or defines it primarily as a linguistic phenomenon; to the contrary, he argues that meta-
phors, because they are initially found in intuition and therefore take stock of concrete experience, are 
able to bridge the ‘abstract terms’ on which science relies and the ‘concrete objects’ which it studies – 
metaphor, according to Pepper (ibid:: 131), can hence be recognised as a basic means to deflect thorny 
mind-matter issues. With Pepper we can say that metaphors help to ‘dapple’ the world (cf. Teller 
2004), but they do not help to construct it; the status of metaphors is thus intermediate: they regulate 
the contact between the world and any hypotheses put forth to capture the world.82 This conception is 
generally consistent with semantic field theories which hold that metaphors greatly facilitate and 
channel ‘epistemic access’ by utilising a set of given ties to form a new set of ties or extend already giv-
en sets (e.g., Feder Kittay 1987).83 Metaphors thereby establish the ‘rules of interaction’ between cogni-
tion and world. This modulating role of metaphorical reasoning is generally difficult, if not impossible, 
to question (see e.g., Lakoff and Johnson 1980a, 1980b).84 
 It is through this ‘guided’ interaction between the world and the hypothesis put forth to make 
sense of it that root metaphors furnish a specific set of structural categories – structural categories 
which define the nature of the world hypothesis they anchor.85 They are nothing else than the product 
                                                          
80 Naturally, there is no criterion available to decide a priori which root metaphors are more likely to be ‘successful’ in this re-
gard. A root metaphor can only be shown to be relatively adequate to deal with the totality of its evidence, by means of its own 
creative potential – which, again, can only be discovered in the process of its refinement. There is also no guarantee that the 
most promising root metaphors have already been found, since the relative effectiveness of a given root metaphor also depends 
on how it is cognitively harnessed by particular people. It is therefore generally possible that the cognitive value of some basic 
metaphors has not been recognised yet. 
81 For the general importance of metaphor for philosophical and, by extension, scientific thought, see also Mattice (2014: Chap-
ter 1). 
82 It needs to be said here that the reliance of a cognitive system on a single root metaphor does of course not preclude that other 
metaphors also play a role in digesting the evidence; yet, these metaphors must be ‘derived’ metaphors insofar as they are inter-
pretable through the root metaphor and can be placed without any problems in the ‘semantic field’ of the original root metaphor 
– we then can say that it is the root metaphor which links and/or holds together distinct fields of metaphorical significance 
brought into existence by its ‘derived’ metaphors. There is thus room for a hierarchy of metaphors but metaphors which are not 
interpretable through the root metaphor inevitably introduce an ‘eclecticistic’ element to the world theory in question. 
83 Similar positions have also been developed in (meta-)archaeological theory. Especially the idea that archaeological practice 
and theory are driven to a large extent by metaphorical reasoning and conjecture is not new at all (cf. Shanks 1992). It is inter-
esting to note in this context that in Experiencing the Past, Michael Shanks (1992: 42, 50, 166) explicitly utilises the same term 
– “root metaphor” – to describe different modes of archaeological engagement with the past. 
84 The role of metaphor was of course also recognised and theorised in cognitive linguistics, where, incentivised by the ‘linguistic 
turn’ which gained moment from about the 1960s onwards (cf. Rorty 1967), metaphor became widely viewed as a key mecha-
nism for grounding cognitive systems and domains and to enable the transition between them. 
85 In the context of world hypotheses only structural corroboration is thus possible. Note that this insight anticipates key argu-
ments of Quine’s seminal Two Dogmas of Empiricism (1951a), in which the latter criticised the dominant ‘analytic’ dogma of his 
“In developing a world hypothesis, the cognitive appeal must accordingly be always to the evi-
dence available, and none of this evidence should be offered as certain. There will in this way 
develop a give and take between the evidence and the categories of the hypothesis ordering the 
evidence. The more the evidence corroborates the hypothesis the more it also corroborates 
itself in the interpretation it receives through the hypothesis. The root metaphor method is the 
regular empirical method of hypothesis supported by the evidence to the degree that the evi-
dence corroborates the hypothesis and renders it relatively adequate. A world hypothesis, as we 
said earlier, differs from other empirical hypothesis only in its characteristic of being unre-
stricted in its subject matter.” (Pepper 1966: 5) 
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of analysing, systematising, and refining a root metaphor in the course of its expansion. These ‘struc-
tural categories’ consequently specify how a world hypothesis orders and corroborates its evidence (cf. 
Pepper 1942: 329). Sweeping differences between world theories can therefore profitably be under-
stood as disparities in the sets of ‘structural categories’ they mobilise. We can even say that each canon 
of ‘structural categories’ is only intelligible – in terms of its overall functioning and the interplay of 
individual categories – if interpreted through the lens of its original root metaphor. This brings us back 
to the starting point of this section and helps to clarify why an analysis of world hypotheses must be 
based on the careful exposition of root metaphors and why one cannot look at the categories in isola-
tion. 
 Having said all of this, it remains important to stress that Pepper’s root metaphor theory – 
even though it relies on ‘metaphorical conjecture’ – offers a clear rejection of the arbitrariness of root 
metaphors and their corresponding world hypotheses (cf. Efron 1980: 22). While Pepper gladly admits 
that metaphorical reasoning affords a great deal of intellectual freedom, root metaphors are always 
judged by their relative cognitive appeal and thus by the cognitive adequacy they can legislate about; 
this, in turn, is not simply a matter of convention but rather a question of interacting with the world 
and reaching high degrees of ‘structural corroboration’ as a result. Which metaphors are capable to 
provide the conceptual resources to achieve this is an open question and can only be answered empiri-
cally. The theory therefore resists falling prey to ‘relativism’ since the selection of potent – or ‘preg-
nant’ (Pepper 1935a: 132) – metaphors is key and not every metaphor is as good as any other. Pepper’s 
key manoeuvre is his insistence on selective historical forces to reveal the relative success of different 
metaphors in refining themselves and corroborating the world hypothesis they embody. This historical 
conversion of a local hypothesis into a unrestricted hypothesis of world-wide scope always effectuates 
a test for the ability of the underlying root metaphor to work towards increasing cognitive adequacy – 
even if this cognitive adequacy can only be evaluated comparatively and thus always remains ‘relative’ 
in nature (cf. Pepper 1942: 120).  
From the perspective of root metaphor theory, the history of Western intellectual thought can 
then be understood as a history of developing the relatively successful and promising metaphors – 
largely unsuccessful metaphors, by contrast, are typically discarded in the process but may re-appear 
from time to time to be tested again.86 If we seek to understand the general structure of scholarly cog-
nition we are thus well served with concentrating on the few root metaphors that have demonstrated 
this former capacity (Pepper 1942: 331, 340). This deflects the spectre of ‘relativism’ – two additional 
criteria must be satisfied when metaphors and the world meet: the motivated hypothesis must possess 
(a) the scope to capture the world as a whole (unrestrictedness) and it must maintain (b) a high degree 
of adequacy (‘structural corroboration’) (cf. Pepper 1935a: 370).87 
 According to Pepper (1942: 96-114), all of these considerations allow us to identify four max-
ims that regulate the development and cognitive refinement of world hypotheses – maxims that there-
fore capture the basic claims of Pepper’s root metaphor theory: (i) a world hypothesis is determined 
by its root metaphor; (ii) each world hypothesis is autonomous; (iii) eclecticism is confusing; and (iv) 
concepts which have lost contact with their root metaphors are empty abstractions. Maxims (iii) and 
(iv) are particularly important since they represent a plea for ‘purity’ of metaphor (cf. Pepper 1942: 98, 
104, 330). For Pepper (1928: 131f.), conceptual clarity is often obscured by the use of ‘mixed meta-
phors.’88 The reason is of course that they tend to undermine a world theory’s internal consistency and 
may easily motivate conflicting readings of the same fact (Pepper 1935a: 373). What is perhaps more 
dangerous, however, is that a mixing of metaphor typically distorts and/or dilates its reliable corrobo-
                                                                                                                                                                                     
time that synthetic sentences can always be tested empirically in isolation. In fact, what is today known as ‘Duhem-Quine-
Thesis’ forcefully maintains that individual sentences (or any other ‘atomistic’ bearers of knowledge) can never be tested eo ipso, 
but only as parts of larger ‘webs of meaning,’ e.g., of ‘theories’ and the like. 
86 For Pepper (1946: 604), some of these patterns of resurge can be explained by historically and socioculturally specific cogni-
tive interests: “[c]ultural interests, I believe, account for the emphasis placed upon certain types of thinking at certain times, and 
for the kinds of eclecticism most appealing at certain times, and even perhaps for the emergence of certain root metaphors at 
certain times, but I cannot see how they have anything to do with the corroborative powers of certain types of thought.”  
87 Pepper (1928) maintains already from early on that “[…] making the best of metaphors means selecting the most pregnant, 
that is to say, those that will stretch over the widest range of experience with the least amount of straining.” 
88 Pepper (1942: 330) explicitly opts for “rational clarity in theory and reasonable eclecticism’ in practice” and characterises the 
dangers of ‘eclecticism’ as follows: “That an eclecticism should be excluded from within world theories is obvious in the interests 
of clarity; otherwise, how can one see just where the maximum of structural corroboration lies? If a world theory partly devel-
oped in one set of categories is broken in upon by a foreign set of categories, the structure of corroboration is broken up and we 
cannot see clearly how the evidence lies. For intellectual clarity, therefore, we want our world theories pure and not eclectic.” 
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ration (cf. Pepper 1942: 341); ‘eclectic’ theories have therefore typically difficulties with upholding the 
degree of cognitive adequacy required. Maxim (ii) is, if you will, a consequence of this general difficulty 
to combine root metaphors. It not only explains why world hypotheses tend to be vastly different, but 
also provides an argument for why world hypotheses cannot be reduced to one another (cf. ibid.: 341); 
doing so would require to interpret one root metaphor in light of another, which would completely 
collapse the former’s world hypothesis and thereby eliminate all of its specifics, including its unique 
cognitive capacity (ibid.: 106).  
The interplay of all of the five maxims, finally, is capable of explaining, first of all, why system-
atic and relatively adequate attempts to make sense of the world necessarily cluster into several dis-
tinct groups – i.e. ‘schools of thought’ – and why, secondly, there are only a limited number of such 
groups (Pepper 1942: 340f.).89 The significance of this assessment lies in the acceptance of the neces-
sary horizontal diversity of all human inquiry based on strictly alternative world theories and the sim-
ultaneous repudiation of the idea that this diversity is without any shackles (cf. Pepper 1935a: 370). 
Because scientific reasoning is merely a special variant of human inquiry, it follows that science is gen-
erally subjected to the same constraints. Thus, scientific reasoning also clusters into irreducible and 
fully autonomous families of ‘world-making,’ anchored in distinct root metaphors and leading to alter-
native interpretations of the facts discovered.  
 To conclude, Pepper’s root metaphor theory rests on rather uncontroversial premises – name-
ly, that metaphor shapes scientific thought and thereby influences how we make sense of the world – 
but draws some intriguing conclusions for what this means for the overall structure and progression of 
scientific thought – implications which have, as I aim to show in this dissertation, important conse-
quences for how one can hope to navigate difficulties that arise when vastly different approaches to 
science clash in practice. Pepper’s root metaphor theory also provides some interesting and hitherto 
largely untapped opportunities to explore the interrelationship of the historical development of scien-
tific projects on the one hand and the general character of their social and cognitive landscapes on the 
other. Central to the present purpose, however, is a closer understanding of the general structure of 
Western thought and the most potent root metaphors that have been developed and refined in the 
course of its history. The following section gives a general overview of this structure and elaborates the 
‘structural categories’ of the four relatively adequate theories which have been identified up to now. 
The two general cognitive criteria to establish the significance of world hypotheses – what Pepper 
(1935a: 368) has called the “factuality of fact” or the “truth of hypothesis” – are scope and adequacy. 
Both criteria mutually support each other; they are both necessary conditions for a world hypothesis 
but become sufficient only in pair.  
‘Adequacy’ explicates the power of the hypothesis to provide satisfactory descriptions of 
matching facts or groupings thereof. Following the maxim of autonomy, what such ‘fitting’ accounts 
for and which ‘mode of fitting’ is looked for is, as Pepper says (idem), “at the discretion” of each world 
hypothesis and therefore part of the assertive claim of the hypothesis itself – nonetheless, the ‘fit’ must 
obviously be a ‘good fit’. For this reason alone, each world hypothesis brings forth distinct standards of 
knowledge evaluation, distinct methods of knowledge corroboration and therefore establishes distinct 
truth conditions – each theory, in other words, favours its own ‘theory of cognitive criticism’ (cf. Pep-
per 1942: 150). 
‘Scope’ explicates the range of consistent descriptions that the hypothesis is able to provide. In 
fact, “[t]he greater the range of consistent descriptions the greater the assurance as to the adequacy of 
                                                          
89 For Pepper (1942: 328), root metaphor theory is therefore also a tool to reduce the number of credible world hypotheses by 
means of unearthing their standards of cognition and knowledge formation. He (idem) explicitly declares: “The root metaphor 
theory is simply the recognition of the fact that there are schools of philosophy, and an attempt to get at the roots of these 
schools. We argued that the philosophic imagination is not nearly as prolific as many have believed. We showed grounds for 
believing that there are only seven or eight distinct ways in which men have seriously undertaken to build up unrestricted hy-
potheses. The appearance of a great number of different world theories arises simply from the great number of combinations 
that can be made out of the parts of seven or eight complex objects – the world hypotheses we have discussed.” 
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any given description” (Pepper 1935a: 368). ‘Scope’ thereby also theorises whether all available and 
recognised ‘facts’ are taken positively and are used to support knowledge claims or whether they are 
instead ‘explained away.’90 For world hypotheses are unrestricted hypotheses, Pepper maintains that 
no fact can be ignored by them (idem) – world hypotheses can maintain their all-encompassing status 
only if they include the entirety of available evidence into their field and seek to organise it (cf. Pepper 
1943: 602). Explaining away must therefore be understood as part of the substantial explanatory work 
that a world hypothesis does – it is part of the hypothesis’ ability to specify what is relevant in the 
world and what is not.91  
This capacity of world hypotheses to handle facts negatively leads to a situation in which 
‘scope’ often turns out to be inversely related to ‘precision.’ Optimising the ‘precision’ of a hypothesis, 
that is, amplifying the resolution of the factual interlinkages and the discriminability of facts (cf. Pep-
per 1942: 76), typically requires to explain away a lot – the chief example being ‘mechanistic’ explana-
tions which only encompass those facts which are considered to be causally related. This enters into a 
state of affairs in which cognitive resources can either be invested to develop the ‘scope’ of a hypothesis 
or its ‘precision’ (cf. idem) – al-though developing either tends to enhance a hypothesis’ capacity to 
also refine the other (ibid. 76f.).92 
 As mentioned earlier, Pepper (1942: 141, 151-314) recognises four relatively adequate world 
hypotheses: ‘formism,’ ‘mechanism,’ ‘contextualism,’ and ‘organicism.’ These theories are labelled 
rather unusually compared to the classic metaphysical positions or ‘schools of thought’ in order to 
avoid confusion, but the residual terminological affinities are deliberate and yield some wider signifi-
cance. As detailed before, each of these four world hypotheses is firmly grounded in its respective root 
metaphor and is able to gather multiple theoretical positions under its banner. Since the structural 
organisation of world hypotheses ushers a higher-level taxonomy to talk about differences in scientific 
‘world-making,’ no simple or one-to-one correlation between the classic positions and world hypothe-
ses is possible.93 World hypotheses are foremost historical entities and their links, if any, to the theo-
retical or social entities of the science of a given timeframe must be demonstrated rather than pre-
sumed. 
 The four relatively adequate world hypotheses organise themselves into two groups of two 
each (Pepper 1942: 141-150; Fig. 1). The first distinction is to be drawn between ‘analytic’ and ‘syn-
thetic’ world theories.94 This is not to say that the former group does not acknowledge synthesis and 
the latter analysis, but merely points to the fact that ‘synthesis’ and ‘analysis’ have a different status in 
two groups (cf. Pepper 1942: 142). While the first group presumes that particulars are basic and that 
the given ‘facts’ primarily consist of ‘elements’ or ‘factors,’ the second group only acknowledges the 
basic factuality of ‘complexes,’ ‘contexts,’ and/or ‘structures’ and therefore presupposes the primacy of 
wholes. For the ‘analytic’ world hypotheses, therefore, parts are basic and wholes are derived; for the 
‘synthetic’ world hypotheses, to the contrary, wholes are basic and parts are derived (idem.). This re-
verted organisational logic leads to the identification of ‘formism’ and ‘mechanism’ as ‘analytic’ world 
theories and of ‘contextualism’ and ‘organicism’ as ‘synthetic’ world theories (cf. ibid.: 146). The for-
mer set of two is predisposed to adopt variants of ‘methodological individualism,’ whereas the latter 
gravitates towards ‘methodological holism’ when analysing its evidence (see Box 5). 
                                                          
90 In general, to increase the ‘scope’ of a hypothesis of course means to find more ‘corroborative facts’ for it – that is, to increase 
the number of facts that support its claims (Pepper 1942: 76). 
91 In practice, of course, there is often no difference between specifying what is of relevance and specifying what is ‘real’ and what 
is ‘unreal’ (cf. Pepper 1942:  143f.). 
92 This outcome, however, is surely not guaranteed since the enrichment of either of the two may have some constraining effects 
on the other as we have seen – how ‘scope’ and ‘precision’ interact within a given world theory is fore and foremost a question of 
empirical examination and may well differ from research context to research context. 
93 This is one of the main advantages of using world hypotheses theory to understand the structure of particular sciences. World 
hypotheses-based taxonomy allows for a rough reorganisation of perspectives and approaches with a focus on root metaphor 
rather than theoretical contents, contents which are often opaque and difficult to evaluate with respect to their ability to deter-
mine how evidence is marshalled and interpreted. 
94 The distinction between ‘analytic’ and ‘synthetic’ is one of the recurrent spectres of contemporary philosophy. The distinction 
dates back at least to Immanuel Kant and haunts human inquiry in the West since then. Pepper’s point, however, is not to insist 
on the soundness of the distinction, but rather to show that it provides such a powerful heuristic that major threads in Western 
thinking can be profitably reconstructed based on it. The perspective taken is thus pragmatic and the surge of criticism on the 
validity of the distinction that has emerged in the later part of the 20th century must not bother us much. In fact, the conceptual 
weaknesses and inconsistencies of the four relatively adequate world theories can be interpreted as difficulties to convincingly 
navigate the ‘analytic’-‘synthetic’ divide (compare Appendix II; for some of the historical reasons for this decomposition of the 
Kantian architectonic in an ‘analytic’ and a ‘synthetic’ strand, see Friedman 2000: 145-159). 
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 The second disparity in world hypotheses is between what Pepper (1942: 142) has baptised 
‘dispersive’ and ‘integrative’ theories. Here, the polarity can be found between the members of each 
group. ‘Formism’ and ‘contextualism’ are ‘dispersive’ world theories and ‘mechanism’ and ‘organicism’ 
represent ‘integrative’ theories (idem). This designation simply amounts to the fact that “analysis is 
treated dispersively by formism and integratively by mechanism, and synthesis is treated dispersively 
by contextualism and integratively by organicism” (idem); it implies that ‘facts’ in dispersive theories, 
independently from where they originate, tend to be taken “as they come and so are left” (idem) and 
are interpreted as ‘multitudes.’ The result is the proliferation of facts. The ‘structural categories’ tied to 
these theories envision the world as only loosely held together and thus as a relatively weakly deter-
mined place (cf. ibid.: 142f.). The ‘structural categories’ of the ‘integrative’ hypotheses, by contrast, 
sketch the world as tightly held together and hence as a relatively strongly determined place (cf. ibid.: 
153). The latter leaves little leeway for ‘chance’ and emphasises the strict systematicity of worldly phe-
nomena. The implication is that ‘integrative’ world hypotheses try to develop ‘precision’ and therefore 
tend to explain away or further decompose many of the facts they discover; these theories are hence 
more than prepared to face the negativity of fact, whereas the ‘dispersive’ world theories attempt to 
develop their faculty of ‘scope’ by drawing together a broad latitude of positive evidence in the hope to 
multiply their corroborative power.  
The opposition between ‘integrativity’ and ‘dispersivity’ is therefore directly tied to the polarity 
between ‘scope’ and ‘precision’ in world hypotheses. The types of cognitive inadequacies which are 
characteristic for each of the four theories are strongly tied to this general configuration (cf. Pepper 
1942: 143; see Appendix II.2 for a detailed exploration of these inadequacies). World hypotheses that 
tend to ‘freely’ incorporate all facts and are not so much concerned with the appropriateness of these 
facts – ‘dispersive’ theories – are “chiefly threatened” to suffer in ‘precision’ while having little trouble 
with improving their ‘scope’ (ibid.: 143f.). Complementarily, world hypotheses that tend to carefully 
select their facts or to limit them a posteriori – ‘integrative’ theories – usually excel in ‘precision’ yet 
tend to lack in ‘scope’ (ibid.: 145) This overall structure of world theories has profound implications for 
how evidence can be gathered and interpreted; the ‘integrative’-‘dispersive’ polarity can hence be ex-
pected to severely affect how scholars are able to make sense of their object matters in the various the-
atres of scientific practice. 
Moreover, it can be noted that due to the natural arrangement of world hypotheses into two 
groups of two, eclecticisms are greatly encouraged precisely at the resulting junctures (cf. Pepper 1942: 
146-150). As a consequence, ‘formism’ and ‘mechanism,’ since they share an ‘analytic’ conviction, ex-
hibit a strong tendency to combine in practice (cf. ibid.: 146-148, 184f.); the same can be said for ‘con-
textualism’ and ‘organicism,’ which often seek cognitive alliance and tend to merge in practiced re-
search since they both rely on ‘synthetic’ imperatives (cf. ibid.: 147, 280).95 For the same reason, ‘ana-
lyticity’ and ‘syntheticity’ tend to exclude one another – their relationship tends to be of an ‘antithet-
ical’ nature. The members of these two groups are inclined to reject each other’s basic premises, spark-
ing mutual hostilities which may or may not be consolidated in the course of cognitive history.  
However, the relationship between ‘integrativity’ and ‘dispersivity’ is more ambiguous. Coop-
eration between these two groups is often favoured because the two appear to perfectly complement 
each other, so that ‘scope’ and ‘precision’ can be developed in parallel because both can help each oth-
er where they are weak. The consequence is a structural predisposition to join the two and to draw on 
them in pairs. This is why there generally exists a strong tendency among eclecticists to mix ‘formism’ 
with ‘mechanism’ (cf. Pepper 1942: 184f., 220) and to amalgamate ‘contextualism’ with ‘organicism’ 
(cf. e.g., ibid.: 278f., 280).96 It is more than likely, however, that these gravitational forces play out 
differently in different disciplinary settings and with respect to different scientific problems – a situa-
tion which should not obscure the view for the sensitive role of these dynamics in organising basic 
cognitive conflict and allegiance yet shows that careful case-by-case assessment is always necessary. 
Before we turn to the exposition of each world hypothesis’ detailed cognitive structure and its 
unique canon of concepts, it seems important to shortly pause and to utter a note of caution first. Not 
                                                          
95 In fact, Pepper (1942: 280) even finds it tempting to consider ‘contextualism’ and ‘organicism’ as a “species of the same theo-
ry, one being dispersive the other integrative.” 
96 Other fusions are of course also possible, although less likely, and Pepper notably discusses the option of combining ‘mecha-
nism’ and ‘contextualism’ (Pepper 1942: 147). He, however, ultimately rejects this kind of eclecticism as a viable solution, and I 
would argue that the main reason is the structural inability of scholars to satisfactorily bridge the ‘analytic’-‘synthetic’ divide. 
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all science is necessarily ‘good’ science, and the structure of world hypotheses does not change this 
situation. The perspective opened up by Pepper’s world hypotheses theory is therefore not a cheap way 
of rendering ‘bad’ science immune to critique, nor all of science for that matter. ‘Analytic’ world theo-
ries can of course do a poor job in the analysis of their parts, ‘integrative’ theories can do an insuffi-
cient job in specifying and integrating relevant facts, and so forth. Just because the scientific interpre-
tation of facts is always driven by at least one hypothesis of world-wide scope does not mean that this 
interpretation automatically does justice to the hypothesis – that is, to ‘tap’ into its full interpretive 
potential. Having said this, we can begin now with the stepwise development of the four relatively ade-
quate world theories and their distinct cognitive space. 
The root metaphor of formism is ‘similarity’ or ‘form and matter,’ depending on the variant of formism 
that is conjured (cf. Pepper 1935a, 1942: 151).97 Formism is an ‘analytic’ world theory and consequently 
considers parts as fundamental and wholes as derivative. Formists typically identify these parts as 
‘particulars,’ i.e., entities which can be distinguished from other entities on the basis of qualities, prop-
erties, traits, attributes, and other part-based characteristics (Pepper 1942: 152-154; see Box 6). These 
part features may be regarded as parts themselves. In general, ‘particulars’ and their features are said 
to populate the ‘observable’ world.98 ‘Characters’ specify the qualities of ‘particulars’ and the relation-
ships that exist between them (ibid.: 154f.). Any entity may have an infinite number of ‘characters.’ 
‘Ties’ capture the specific combinations of ‘particulars’ and ‘characters’ that can be observed in reality 
(ibid.: 155). Formism is all about mapping out parts in terms of these categories and to analyse wheth-
er and how they help to delineate wholes. The investigation of reality therefore amounts to the assess-
ment of similarities and differences among ‘particulars,’ ‘characters,’ and ‘ties.’ The kind of similarity 
that is usually looked for is the recurrence of recognisable forms (cf. Hayes et al. 1988: 99). These in-
ter-part relations are examined in terms of ‘participation,’ that is, the regular associations of ‘particu-
lars’ and part-based features (ibid.: 154, 170). Different ‘particulars’ may for example participate in 
similar ‘characters’ and varying ‘characters’ may participate in higher-level ‘regularities,’ ‘norms,’ or 
‘laws.’ This participatory structure of reality creates patterns. These patterns, conversely, are regarded 
to be informative about the deep fabric of the world and its observable phenomena. Hence, the deter-
mination of ‘laws of association,’ patterned regularities, and other pattern-generating principles con-
stitutes the prime objective of formistic analysis. ‘Attribute-analytical’ approaches and trait-based sta-
tistical analyses represent a hallmark of this cognitive endeavour. 
 As a ‘dispersive’ world theory, formism is interested in the proliferation of fact and tends to 
invest a lot into ordering the evidence which is available to it. Since formists study relationships 
among ‘particulars,’ ‘characters,’ and ‘ties,’ they effectively chart their overlap and non-overlap. Form-
ism, in other words, is often motivated by a general ‘theory of sets.’ Overlapping sets of parts and their 
features, according to formism, indicate correlated aspects of reality. Most formists also draw on the 
‘Theory of Types’ (Pepper 1942: 156-159). This theory is foremost a logical conception and states that 
“the concepts employed in the analysis of other concepts cannot themselves be included among the 
concepts analysed” (ibid.: 156). The theory systematises the formistic distinction between ‘ties’ and 
relations and helps to group ‘particulars’ in terms of similarity. A ‘type’ is nothing else than a set of 
‘particulars’ that share certain ‘characters’; ‘types’ may capture varying degrees of similarity between 
‘particulars’ and may therefore be more or less complex. When the type concept is utilised to describe 
the structure of evidence in a systematic and comprehensive way, the result is the development of ‘ty-
pologies,’ ‘taxonomies’ and ‘classifications’ (ibid.: 159-162). These are logical constructions which or-
ganise the relationship among ‘particulars,’ ‘characters,’ and ‘ties’ in terms of participation, from the 
                                                          
97 As a matter of fact, Pepper (1935, 1942) associates ‘similarity’ with what he terms ‘immanent formism’ and regards ‘form and 
matter’ as the core heuristic of what he calls ‘transcendent formism’. 
98 I am somewhat careful with the notion “observable” here since observability in world hypotheses is also judged via internal-
ised standards. Moreover, there is an extensive debate on ‘scientific observation’ and what it amounts to in philosophy of sci-
ence. The problem of direct vs. indirect observation, as well as natural observation (i.e., observation via the naked eye) vs. 
technical observation (i.e., observation that is only made possible by technological aids) are all at stake here. The problem of 
observation is typically radicalised in the historical sciences since it remains largely unclear to what effect the past can actually 
be observed (cf. e.g., Turner 2007). 
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more general to the less general. While the total sum of a given set of ‘particulars’ tends to share not a 
single ‘character,’ only a single ‘particular’ typically answers to a whole range of different ‘characters’ 
(ibid.: 160). As a general rule one can thus conclude: the fewer ‘characters’ are shared, the more gen-
eral the respective class of ‘particulars.’ Classification, i.e., the hierarchical organisation of classes, is a 
formistic key operation to determine order and the categorical interrelationships that govern reality 
(ibid.: 159f.). Classes or types supply the complex entities that formists may employ for further analy-
sis – they may themselves be recast as ‘particulars’ to be examined in terms of their participation in 
patterns. 
 The ‘Theory of Types’ motivates the explanation of less inclusive categories by more inclusive 
ones (cf. Pepper 1942: 160). A ‘class,’ in other words, may simply be explained by placing it into anoth-
er, more general ‘class.’99  The use of classification in this sense is not only heuristic but helps to delin-
eate the determinative structure of reality. Explanation thereby focusses on the ‘web of ties’; it tends to 
be externalistic and subsumptive. The formist generally believes that climbing up the ‘ladder of partic-
ipation’ is a first and necessary step towards knowledge about the operative principles of reality. De-
scribing the structure of co-variation thereby facilitates the recognition of regulatory relationships, i.e., 
which parts regulate other parts and in what way. 
 Formistic logic suggests that ‘matter’ takes specific ‘forms’ because of reasons not rooted in 
matter itself.100 ‘Form’ is ‘shaped matter’ and there must be something in the world that has given or 
imposed shape on this matter. The ancient Greek notion of ‘hylomorphism’ – i.e., that ‘form’ is differ-
ent from ‘matter’ and reality basically a configuration of the two – resonates with this conception. 
Since observable patterns are expressive of particular matter-states, there must be something essen-
tially non-observable explaining them. Plato has identified these non-observables as ‘ideal’ categories 
or eternal ideas underpinning the patterns of reality. Patterns may similarly be explained by abstract 
or invariable concepts. ‘Particulars’ can then be said to instantiate or exemplify these non-observables. 
Conversely, the respective non-observables are the precondition for the presence of specific ‘particu-
lars’ and that one can observe them under certain conditions. This conditional interpretation of ‘par-
ticulars,’ ‘characters,’ and ‘ties’ indicates that the materialisation of the observable parts of reality is 
mediated by well-defined ‘principles of exemplification’ (Pepper 1942: 163; cf. Box 6). Formism tradi-
tionally distinguishes between ‘norms’ and ‘laws’ as the relevant non-observable determinants (ibid.: 
164-166). ‘Norms’ and ‘laws’ have two characteristics: (i) they regulate the materialisation of parts and 
(ii) resist complete materialisation. They can never be fully materialised because logic forbids that they 
are identical with the objects and patterns they purportedly explain.101 ‘Laws’ are often defined as the 
principles or ‘rules’ that explain or bridge the correlated patterns of two sets of ‘particulars,’ ‘charac-
ters,’ or ‘ties.’ ‘Norms’ describe conditions of normality (i.e., trends, averages) that administer patterns 
of variability (ibid.: 164f.). 
This particular understanding of ‘norms’ and ‘laws’ forces formism to make a categorical dis-
tinction between the realm of ‘existence’ and the realm of ‘subsistence’ (Pepper 1942: 167f.; cf. Box 6). 
The realm of existence is populated by the categories of observation, that is, ‘particulars,’ ‘characters,’ 
and ‘ties.’ The realm of ‘subsistence,’ by contrast, is populated by those entities which resist complete 
materialisation but remain necessary to explain the categories of ‘existence.’ While the categories of 
‘existence’ are concrete – one may speak of ‘concrete existence’ here – the categories of ‘subsistence’ 
remain abstract. Both can be said to ‘exist,’ but in a different sense  of the word. A ‘law’ usually sub-
sists because it resists complete materialisation and is primarily defined by its form, that is, by a set of 
‘particulars’ having certain ‘characters’ participating in the ‘law’ (cf. ibid.: 176): 
                                                          
99 An implicit ‘theory of sets’ is sometimes also used to make sense of ‘laws’ or other ‘regularities.’ In ‘formism,’ these are often 
interpreted as a bridge between one set of basic particulars and another set, thereby determining the defining characters of one 
set by those of another set (cf. Pepper 1942: 177). 
100 Clearly, this tendency marks the irreversible point of divergence between ‘formism’ and ‘organicism’ since the distinction 
between ‘form’ and ‘matter’ does not allow for the possibility that change in a given object is ultimately induced by the object 
itself – a classic doctrine of ‘organicistic’ logic. The rejection of this doctrine is perhaps the strongest common denominator 
uniting the ‘analytic’ world theories under a single banner. 
101 Plato’s allegory of the cave is the prototypical example of this formistic conceptualisation: what we perceive and observe in 
reality is merely a “shadow” of more basic entities whose existence we can only infer. These are, however, the precondition for 
the “shadows” we observe. These “shadows” can further be said to reflect some aspects of the ‘ideal’ categories that “stand be-
hind” them. In order to explain the “shadows” we thus need to come to an understanding of the categories that condition the 
existence of each single “shadow.” In other words, we need to understand the ‘norms’ and ‘laws’ that regulate the occurrence of 
specific “shadows” under particular conditions. 
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Since formism seeks to ‘get to the bottom of things,’ the patterns that are created by the partic-
ipation of observable parts in non-observable ‘forms’ are ultimately to be explained by reference to at 
least one ‘subsistent’ category.102  The ‘form’ concept therefore has a double significance in formism: it 
not only describes particular matter-states (‘shaped matter’), but also the regulatory ensemble of ob-
servables and non-observables which is responsible for patterns of participation. A ‘form’ in the latter 
sense is a complex correlation between the relevant categories of explanation. In formism, different 
categories may therefore take part in different ‘forms’ at the same time and the potential interference 
of counteracting ‘laws’ and ‘norms’ must always be taken into account (Pepper 1942: 178). This con-
stant possibility of ‘interferences’ is another reason why formism remains preoccupied with isolating 
‘normal’ data-behaviour and ‘normal states’ of existence in general. 
Although formism assumes that the categories of ‘existence’ are systematically correlated with 
the categories of ‘subsistence,’ the transition between the two is always problematic and requires 
heightened epistemological attention. Because explanation consists of a ‘form,’ the relationship be-
tween ‘existence’ and ‘subsistence’ tends to conceptualised as being relatively symmetric, so that a 
substantial change in one realm seems to imply a substantial change in the other or, alternatively, in-
dicates an entirely different form. A natural way of elucidating the connection between ‘concrete’ and 
‘abstract’ reality is by invoking the concept of supervenience (cf. Davidson 1970; Kim 1984, 2002; Ba-
der 2013; McLaughlin and Bennett 2018). ‘Supervenience’ strikes a balance between correlatedness 
and categorical autonomy by asserting that different ‘levels of existence’ need to be acknowledged in 
their discreteness, but nonetheless appear to be structurally interlinked. Alterations on one ‘level of 
existence’ are therefore necessarily bound to adjustments on another level. What level is more basic 
does not matter in this regard.103 This perspective showcases the categorical looseness of formism in-
sofar as contingency and chance are granted and determinative relationships tend to be conceptualised 
in fairly generic terms. 
In formism, the problem of equifinality is less serious than in other world theories. The reason 
is that formism has no trouble with accepting that particular matter-states may exemplify different 
‘norms’ and/or ‘laws’ at the same time. Observable forms of ‘particulars,’ ‘characters,’ and ‘ties’ may 
simply be the co-production of different ‘subsistent’ categories. Nevertheless, forms still need to be 
specific to a certain degree. Only then is it possible to meaningfully discriminate between distinct 
‘laws,’ ‘norms,’ and other ‘subsistents.’ A popular strategy to mitigate this problem is to enlist a range 
of competing ‘subsistent’ categories and narrow it down by means of exclusion. This procedure typical-
ly entails an ‘abductive’ argument specifying why particular ‘subsistent’ categories are better candi-
dates of explanation (sensu Harman 1965, cf. Lipton 2001; Queiroz and Merell 2005). In general, 
formism interprets ‘equifinality’ as the problem of different forms being responsible for similar pat-
terns of participation. ‘Equifinality’ is therefore the problem of finding the relevant or matching ‘sub-
sistent’ categories. Issues of ‘equifinality’ are thus difficult to overcome by means of analysis and/or 
inference alone and formists rely on explicit non-formal argumentation here (‘This category is likely to 
be more relevant because of X and Y’). ‘Equifinality’ is generally described as multiple realisability, 
i.e., the fact that more foundational categories of existence may be realised in rather different ways in 
                                                          
102 Whether such ‘subsistent’ categories are dependent on the entities they “particularise” and if so to what degree is a lively 
debate among formistic thinkers – a debate which historically led to the separation between Platonists and Aristotelians (cf. 
Pepper 1942: 168). 
103 This is the basic difference to ‘mechanism,’ which conceptualises the link between different levels or domains of existence in 
terms of directed causality. There is thus a basic asymmetry between ‘cause’ and ‘effect.’ This is why in ‘mechanism’ the problem 
of equifinality is typically mitigated by exploiting the ‘specifity of response’ principle, for example by juxtaposing theoretical 
deductions and empirical patterns. 
“According to a Platonist, a law subsists even though it were never exemplified in concrete 
existence. An Aristotelian would be less bold, would agree that a law subsists by the definition 
of form as opposed to particular, but would declare that a law has no being outside of its ex-
emplifications. It is, however, very important to notice that in formism a law is not to be iden-
tified with a concrete existent structure. Whether Platonist nor Aristotelian, for formist a law 
is a form. This is one of the fundamental distinctions between formism and mechanism. These 
two world views contradict on this issue. And the question is whether an Aristotelian is not 
hedging so as to avoid the full import of his contradiction. If one wishes to get the sense of 
formism in clearest relief, he does better to take the view in bold Platonic terms. Later he can 
consider whether an Aristotelian can hold his more moderate position without self-
contradiction.” (Pepper 1942: 177; original emphasis) 
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the more ‘concrete’ layers of existence (cf. Kim 1992; Bickle 2016). One therefore needs to identify the 
‘principles of exemplification’ to gauge the spectrum of observable correlates of a given ‘subsistent’ 
category. Understanding the mediating principles that link ‘existence’ and ‘subsistence’ is of course a 
critical requirement to adequately interpret ‘supervenience’ (see supra). 
Since formism is centred on the determination of patterns in ‘concrete’ reality and strives to 
identify regularities and ‘normality conditions’ that drive the behaviour of parts, it lends itself to quan-
titative approaches and statistical methods. Due to its ‘dispersive’ character, it is generally susceptible 
to ‘big data’ approaches. Statistical analogy-building, for example, is also a classic formistic manoeuvre 
since such a procedure isolates ‘ideal’ features of comparative data sets, i.e., trends and averages, to 
illuminate the analysed data sets in terms of these features. ‘Analogy,’ ‘identity,’ and ‘correspondence’ 
are simply manifestations of the formistic root metaphor of ‘similarity.’ 
The guiding philosophical school of formistic reasoning is realism. The historical progenitor of 
formism, according to Pepper (1942: 141), is ‘Platonic idealism’ or ‘Aristotelian naturalism.’ Formists 
often pay particular attention to shape-based object properties – ‘morphometrics,’ for instance, may be 
viewed as the ‘perfect’ approach to assess ‘shaped matter’ – formists suspect that similarities and dif-
ferences in this domain are likely to inform us about the corresponding ‘subsistent’ features of reality. 
Formism is generally straightforward in how it operates and makes sense of what it observes. This 
conforms to the strength and epistemic appeal of the similarity metaphor. Formism is often said to be 
‘unexciting’ yet extremely ‘reliable.’ Among the four world hypotheses, formism tends to be the strong-
est believer of the explanatory power of data as such. Formism generally regards ‘existence’ as the 
gateway to ‘subsistence,’ and not the other way around. 
 
The root metaphor of mechanism is the ‘machine’ as a species of functioning (cf. Pepper 1935a, 1942: 
186). According to the mechanist, any whole can be understood as a machinery in which the parts are 
related to one another in some systematic way. Every part of the machine has a functional role to play. 
Since mechanism is an ‘analytic’ world theory and thus presumes the primacy of parts, the ‘effective’ 
parts of a larger machinery are discrete and do not change when relationship among them are formed; 
the parts, in other words, exist independently of their relationships or the wholes they propel (cf. 
Hayes et al. 1988: 99). As Hayes et al. (idem) correctly point out: “in any common-sense machine, 
some sort of force or energy is exerted or transmitted through the system to produce predictable out-
comes.” This is because the machinery is held together by some kind of mechanism specifying which 
parts effect which other parts and in what way(s) (cf. Bunge 2004, 2013). This principle can typically 
be captured by the ‘push-and-pull’ metaphor or the concept of ‘cause-and-effect.’ The point is that 
these inter-part relationships are highly specific, so that it becomes possible to foresee what a part will 
do given particular conditions. Following Bunge (2013: 590), any working machinery can therefore be 
recognised as an ordered quadruple of composition-environment-structure-mechanism. The machine 
is composed of ‘effective’ parts, operates in an environment and inaugurates its own mechanistic envi-
ronment (parts are external to other parts), possesses a specific spatiotemporal structure defining the 
role and consequence of varying parts, and is governed by at least one mechanism integrating the 
whole and defining the latter’s global functionality or effectiveness (cf. Pepper 1942: 191-195, 226). The 
working principles and organisational structure of the machine of course differ from case to case. 
 Mechanism distinguishes between ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ categories (Pepper 1942: 192f., 
201, 215-217; cf. Box 7). The ‘primary’ or ‘effective’ qualities of parts are the features, traits, and at-
tributes which are necessary to explain how a given machine works. The ‘secondary’ or ‘ineffective’ 
categories, by contrast, refer to the qualities of parts which are dispensable for grasping the workings 
of the machine. They are regarded as ‘derived’ features of the world and to be the result of the specific 
configuration of ‘primary’ categories associated with them. Mechanism seeks to describe the composi-
tional structure of reality, but unlike ‘formism,’ which often targets ‘agglomerates’ since order is not 
presumed to be categorical there, mechanism aims to isolate systems, i.e., structured configurations of 
parts. Facts are assumed to externally match because order is categorical (ibid.: 143). This is the ‘inte-
grative’ side of mechanism. The goal is to incorporate the parts of reality in order to clear the view for a 
single functional whole.  
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Mechanism often embraces implicit ‘field theories’ (cf. e.g., Martin 2003). The structure of the 
sought-after compositional entities comes into view as a ‘field of locations’ (Pepper 1942: 197-200; cf. 
Box 7). This field defines the exact spatiotemporal position of each part in the machine. The relation-
ships between parts can thus be understood as a function of the exact ‘location’ of their ‘primary’ quali-
ties (ibid.: 191). Importantly, each spatiotemporal position can only be occupied once. In mechanism, 
it is quite common to capture this ‘field of locations’ in mathematical equations and to express the 
work of parts in precise quantitative terms. The ‘primary’ qualities tied to two or more ‘locations’ are 
directly responsible for the type of ‘action’ observed between these ‘locations.’ In this way, each ma-
chine can be defined in terms of a ‘primary law’ (ibid.: 193, 207). This ‘law’ accounts for the specific 
configuration of ‘effective’ qualities in a given ‘field of locations.’ Because of the well-defined and large-
ly fixed spatiotemporal structure of such a machinery, different ‘locations’ may also be identified as 
distinct events following up on each other in a sequential manner. The respective mechanisms at play 
render this chain reaction of parts (stimulus-response principle) largely inevitable (cf. ibid.: 226f.). 
Inevitability is thus a property of relationships between ‘primary’ qualities, whereas ‘accidental’ out-
comes may be generated only by the ‘secondary’ qualities (ibid.: 196f.; cf. Box 7). Depending on the 
type of mechanism embraced, accidentality may be granted to some degree or denied altogether. 
In ‘consolidated’ variants of mechanism, the ‘field of locations’ describes a fully integrated and 
determined field structure, so that almost no discreteness is left (cf. Pepper 1942: 212-215). This notion 
of the ‘field structure’ simply expresses the mechanistic conviction that a single underlying entity fur-
nishes a highly consolidated structure of space-time particulars, so that everything in the field obeys to 
the ‘laws’ and ‘principles’ tied to this structure. The field structure consequently emerges as the only 
genuine ‘effective’ category and everything that populates it is recast as ‘secondary.’ Completely inte-
grated field structures thus define space-time singularities. They give witness to the mechanistic intui-
tion that, ultimately, only a single highly consolidated particular ‘exists’ (ibid.: 214). Causally integrat-
ed field structures shed light on the ‘geometry’ of the world (ibid.: 212). 
A key feature of mechanism is that explanation is typically equated with the ability to predict 
(see 2.6.2). For mechanists, prediction is the consequence of having pinned down the relevant ‘prima-
ry’ qualities, the ‘field of locations,’ and the ‘laws’ and ‘principles’ regulating observable ‘action’ in the 
field. Since mechanism usually explains in terms of causes, i.e., factors that regularly precede or coin-
cide with whatever is to be explained, a large part of the observable outcome is highly specific and in-
evitable. It is a necessary consequence of the configuration – or modus operandi – of the machine. The 
respective observations, in other words, turn out to be ‘unsurprising.’ Therefore, one effectively ex-
plains a feature of reality if one can show that this feature was a necessary and largely unsurprising 
outcome of the responsible machinery. Explanation therefore tends to revolve around principles of 
determination – explanation can only be ‘subsumptive’ if particulars are shown to be systematically 
linked to more general aspects of realty by means of a specific mechanism – and knowledge is secured 
by matching predictions and observations.104 Mechanists are the champions of fine-grained and mech-
anism-specific hypotheses-testing and often employ hypothetico-deductive modes of reasoning (cf. 
Hayes et al. 1988: 99).105 This not only mirrors the ‘integrative’ quality of mechanism, but also takes up 
the idea that most observable features are ‘derived’; mimicking (or re-enacting) the process of generat-
ing them in theory should consequently provide primary insight(s) into their ‘existence.’ 
Mechanism sharply distinguishes between ‘pattern’ and ‘process’ and interprets the relation-
ship between the two as a one-sided dependence (cf. Box 7). Patterns describe observable regularities, 
co-associations, and correlations, whereas processes stand for the underlying structure of reality giving 
rise to particular patterns. Similar processes, therefore, bring forth similar patterns, but similar pat-
terns do not necessarily indicate similar processes. This introduces the problem of equifinality which 
                                                          
104 Bunge (2013: 591) is very clear about this general ‘mechanistic’ orientation when he asserts: “No law, no possible mechanism; 
and no mechanism, no explanation. No wonder then that the hallmark of modern science is the search for the mechanisms 
behind the facts, rather than the mindless search for data and the statistical correlations among them. 
105 The key difference to ‘formism’ is that the latter employs hypothesis-testing to assess the structural congruity between the 
hypothesis and the empirical observations. The mobilised hypotheses therefore tend to be rather general and fairly generic. They 
reflect the ‘formistic’ search for explanatory ‘subsistent’ categories. Exact and fine-grained consequences of particular mecha-
nisms are rarely incorporated or do not constitute the main thrust of the analysis. Whereas ‘formism’ subsumes the particular 
under the general because ‘laws,’ ‘regularities,’ and ‘norms’ are seen as forms of participation, ‘mechanism’ seeks to connect 
‘primary’ qualities and to analyse their correlated ‘derivatives’; for a ‘mechanist’ a ‘law’ is not a form but a concrete structure of 
existence, i.e., the specific configuration of ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ categories in a working machinery. 
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mechanism interprets as different processes producing similar patterns (cf. Beven and Freer 2001; 
Mayhew 2015). The difficulty is thus to bridge the gap between the ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ categories 
and to effectively negotiate the problem of Appearance and Reality. Typically, ‘reality’ is only granted 
to the ‘effective’ categories of mechanism and the ‘ineffective’ categories are thought to describe mere 
‘appearances.’ Appearances are ‘derived’ in the sense that they can hardly claim independent existence. 
What one can directly observe, that is, without any technological aids, is usually a mix of ‘primary’ and 
‘secondary’ qualities, the latter often outnumbering the former. A field structure, however, is an exam-
ple of an unobservable compositional entity which needs to be postulated in order to explain the or-
ganisation and behaviour of its parts. Observability is thus often used as a proxy for the relative ‘de-
rived-ness’ of the elements of reality, the golden rule being “the easier to observe, the more derived the 
phenomenon appears to be.” 
This epistemological configuration greatly predisposes mechanism, especially in its radical 
guises, to explain away the ‘ineffective’ categories of reality and to deny their actual existence – these 
qualities are then simply viewed as epiphenomenal.106 This brings up the old issue of reduction, and 
mechanism struggles with it since its inception. If the ‘secondary’ categories turn out to be entirely 
‘ineffective’ or can be completely reduced to their correlated ‘primary’ categories, they do not explain 
anything in the world. Part of the ‘integrative’ task that a mechanist has to do is thus to discriminate 
between the ‘effective’ and ‘ineffective’ features of a machine – a task that simply amounts to the eval-
uation of explanatory relevance. Mechanism holds that a recurrent obstacle of successful explanation 
is our inability to distinguish between ‘effective’ and ‘ineffective’ categories of reality. Much of what we 
observe is much more ‘ineffective’ than we like to believe – it represents the ‘noise’ generated by a 
highly interconnected world. In general, this situation has prompted many mechanists to populate 
‘dualistic’ positions and to police categorical dichotomies such as ‘body-mind’ and ‘nature-culture’ in 
the hope to explain one category in light of the other (cf. Pepper 1942: 217-221). The central strategy is 
to externally relate these categories in order to demonstrate direct inter-category constitution or the 
‘non-reality’ of one of involved categories. The ‘mind,’ for instance, is often recast as an ‘ineffective’ 
category of physical brain states representing varying circuits of ‘active’ and ‘passive’ neurons. Differ-
ent domains of reality may similarly be analysed in terms of their status as ‘effective’ or ‘ineffective’ 
categories. The issue of Appearance and Reality generally provokes the problem of transition and 
insinuates the idea of a hierarchy of movers, with a ‘first mover’ on its foundation. As a result, mecha-
nists strongly gravitate towards ‘foundationalist’ positions (cf. Schlick 1959; Triplett 1990; Bergmann 
2004). If the world would be a chariot, mechanism would focus on the horses and proximately explain 
the movement of the chariot as a consequence of them pulling the wagon, while ultimately referring to 
a person sitting on the chariot and instructing the horses. 
A crucial precondition of mechanistic knowledge formation is the explanatory stability of the 
determinative principles and causal relationships that it seeks to unveil. These provide integration to 
an otherwise chaotic reality. Mechanism is therefore typically committed to the doctrines of ‘actual-
ism’/‘presentism’ and ‘uniformitarianism’ (cf. Hoykaas 1963; Gould 1965, 1987; Cameron 1993; Hen-
ningson 2009). Historical contingency is therefore either explained in terms of the general variability 
of patterns related to the same processes or discarded as an ‘ineffective’ category altogether; there is no 
place for ‘chance’ or even ‘sparks of eventuality’ in a the world of a ‘consolidated’ mechanist. That de-
termination is thereby increasingly conceptualised in terms of statistical effects and processes does not 
change this situation (cf. Pepper 1942: 143). Modern mechanists draw on computational methods and 
mathematical descriptions in order to tackle to ‘integrated’ nature of reality. 
 The guiding science for mechanism is mechanics or Newtonian physics. Mechanistic reasoning 
has sometimes been qualified as the thinking of the ‘experimental scientist’ (Bartlett 1958; Harris et al. 
1977: 538). Reproduction/replication is thereby just another side of ‘prediction’ and re-creating pat-
terns and original observations under laboratory conditions is both a preferred mode of corroboration 
and a promising exploratory strategy. The ‘experimental mode of reasoning,’ including the branch of 
computational modelling,107 enables the precise specification of test implications and the assessment 
                                                          
106 For the tenets of ‘epiphenomenalism,’ see e.g. Jackson (1982) and Bieri (1992). Generally speaking, an epiphenomenon is an 
entity that has been caused by another entity but itself has no causal efficacy anymore. 
107 Computational modelling may simply be defined as virtual experimentation since it recreates a systemic machinery including 
its environment, so that multiple variables can be adjusted in a virtual reality in order to assess the differential effects of these 
variables on the performance and outcome of the artificial machine. 
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of particular ‘cause-and-effect’ relationships (cf. Shadish et al. 2002); experimental approaches greatly 
facilitate the causal adjustment of the various components of reality under scrutinisation. In other 
words, experimental research helps mechanists to reconstruct the inner workings of real-world ma-
chineries by emulating them in a controlled setting. 
The leading school of philosophy for mechanism is naturalism and materialism. As Pepper 
(1942: 141) points out, the development of mechanism is historically related to the work of Descartes, 
Hume, Locke, and Reichenbach. Mechanism regularly draws from ‘behaviourism’ and ‘adaptationism’ 
and is generally consistent with ‘hard ecology’ views, classic Darwinian evolutionary theory, most of 
the behavioural sciences (including classic ethology in the wake of Lorentz and Tinbergen), sociobiolo-
gy, evolutionary economics, evolutionary psychology, and so forth.108 Mechanism is the arch-enemy of 
what it perceives as ‘naïve empiricism’ and typically counters ‘inductivism’ by insisting on the a priori 
significance of general theory. According to hard-nosed mechanists, only general theory, through its 
predictive capacity, is able to provide convincing justification for the unobservable entities of the 
world’s ‘inner structure.’ Mechanism thereby also defends the idea that the ‘context of discovery’ must 
not be conflated with the ‘context of justification’ (sensu Reichenbach 1938; cf. Nickles 2013). When 
the four world hypotheses are compared, mechanism is probably the strongest defender of the concept 
that data ought to be tailored according to theory. 
Mechanism is appealing because it provides a simple and intuitive explanation for why certain 
facts are observable in the world: they are caused by other facts, typically by more ‘basic’ ones. Accord-
ing to mechanism, the world is not only a fully determined place, but also a vertically and horizontally 
structured one. The vertical structure of reality is particularly important in mechanism since it eluci-
dates the layered logic of reality-constitution. Reality can be collapsed into a hierarchy of ‘effective’ 
and ‘ineffective’ categories – the former are basic the latter are derived.109  
The root metaphor of contextualism is the ‘ongoing act in context’ (Pepper 1935a, 1942: 232; cf. Hayes 
et al. 1988: 100) or, more appropriately, ‘situationality’ (Pepper 1945; cf. Efron 1980: 31)110. Contextu-
alists are widely known as ‘relational thinkers’ (cf. Harris et al. 1977: 538) insofar as their main targets 
of analysis are relations of various kinds (see Box 8). Contextualism seeks to explain in terms of the 
interplay between what is to be explained and its larger context. The key intuition that perpetuates the 
contextualistic project is the context-dependency or ‘relationality’ of any encountered fact. This enun-
ciation stresses the inherent fluidity and flexibility of contextual articulations, so that nothing in the 
world can be taken for granted (Pepper 1942: 233f.). Contextualists, therefore, often applaud criticism 
of a priori categories and typically doubt that such categories exist, can be known, or are valuable as-
sets in understanding reality. For contextualists, there are no “absolute truths or standards” (Harris et 
al. 1977: 539) – the only certainty is that there is no certainty (Pepper 1942: 234f., 249); any entity or 
category of reality, in other words, is assumed to fundamentally depend on other entities or categories. 
By rejecting the ‘objectivist’ and ‘absolutist’ dogma, contextualism posits that any distinguishable fea-
ture of reality assumes its significance or meaning only by virtue of its contextual framing, i.e., the 
interconnections with other features of reality that share the same context of significance. Contextual-
ism is a ‘synthetic’ world hypothesis to this effect. Parts are derived entities whose quality and exist-
ence rely entirely upon the wholes in which they occur. Moreover, since contextualistic inquiry tends to 
be ‘dispersive’ – that is, it promotes the proliferation of fact and the exploitation of the latitudinal 
margins of evidence – the same elements of reality may constitute parts of different wholes at the same 
time (cf. Harris et al. 1977: 539). Another consequence of contextualism’s ‘dispersive’ quality is that 
                                                          
108 See Bunge (2013: 590) for a list of mechanisms identified in the natural and life sciences, including Darwinian evolutionary 
biology. 
109 This general ‘stratigraphic’ vision of worldly order predisposes mechanists to embrace what Hahn (2013: 33f.) has prospec-
tively called layer-cake model of cultural realities [Schichtortenmodell] (cf. Appendix II.3: Fig. II.1). 
110 In World Hypotheses (1942), Pepper referred to ‘historic event’ as the root metaphor of ‘contextualism.’ On another occasion, 
he also spoke of ‘temporal process’ as a good candidate for the ‘contextualistic’ root metaphor (Pepper 1935a). In The Basis of 
Criticism in the Arts (1945), however, he drew attention to the concept of situation, borrowed from Otis Lee (1944), as the per-
haps more appropriate conjectural intuition (cf. Efron 1980: 31). Yet, in light of Pepper’s own writings and what the present 
author identifies as the basic logic of ‘contextualism,’ it seems that the concept of ‘situationality’ most appropriately captures 
what Peppers ‘contextualism’ actually stands for. 
52 
 
there exists, at least in principle, an unlimited supply of parts since parts are derived features of reality 
and, as such, may be ‘derived’ in many different ways (Pepper 1942: 237; cf. Hayes et al. 1988: 101).111 
The derivation of facts, parts, or categories appears as arbitrary as in no other of the four relatively 
adequate world theories (Pepper 1942: 235f.). The reason lies in the contextualistic root metaphor 
itself. Any ‘historic’ or ‘ongoing event,’ the meeting point of past and present, represents a ‘rich,’ ‘in-
trinsically complex,’ and highly ‘interconnected’ incident of life (ibid.: 233) in which the parts by defi-
nition interpenetrate, so that they remain difficult to identify, name, or isolate (cf. Box 8). In contex-
tualism, uncovering whole-specific relationships thus typically implicates to describe particular modes 
of ‘interpenetration.’ 
 The principle that nothing can be denied provides justification for ‘novelty’ and ‘change’ to 
assume categorical status, rather than being merely derivatives (Pepper 1942: 234-236; cf. Box 8). For 
this reason, no category may be assumed to register a universal feature of reality. Conversely, any con-
text potentially carries the threads of freshness insofar as it may possess ‘predominant or permeating 
structural features that other contexts lack’ (ibid.: 234). Therefore, each contextual whole potentially 
fortifies a number of idiosyncrasies which may be critical for comprehending it. ‘Particularity’ and 
‘uniqueness’ are thus typically assumed to be key features of reality. Whereas other world theories 
emphasise the world’s orderliness (i.e., straightforward distinction between categories and their sub-
categories), contextualists tend to approve the possibility for disorder, alternatives, and the ‘alien.’ As a 
result, each context can be expected to articulate some kind of ‘otherness’ or ‘alterity’ and it is this 
quality that differentiates it from other contexts. A systematisation of this consideration leads contex-
tualists to believe that the past was fundamentally different from the present; deep-history perspec-
tives further radicalise this problem of alterity.112 Contextualists are consequently sceptical of deploy-
ing direct analogies or pushing ‘actualistic’ inference too far, especially in historical research. ‘Change-
ability’ is also granted to seemingly foundational categories such as ‘rationality’ or ‘optimality’ – to the 
extent that, strictly speaking, there are no foundational categories in contextualism anymore. The the-
ory is ‘anti-foundational’ to this effect and leans towards the methodological symmetrisation of the 
various features of reality it investigates. 
 Wholes are described in terms of ‘quality’ and ‘texture’ (Pepper 1942: 235, 237f., 246-252; cf. 
Box 8). Both categories can only properly be understood in their mutual interdependency and in rela-
tion to the other contextualistic categories that make up either of them (ibid.: 236, 238). The ‘quality’ 
of a context, for instance, may be defined in terms of ‘spread’ and ‘fusion’; ‘texture,’ on the other hand, 
can be determined by referring to ‘strands’ and ‘references’ (cf. Hayes et al. 1988: 100). None of these 
categories, however, has an absolute meaning and all of them remain open to change and revision. In 
general, ‘quality’ denotes what one may term the ‘total meaning’ of a whole, while ‘texture’ designates 
the internal ‘infrastructure’ of the same, that is, the various grammatical interconnections that hold the 
whole together (cf. Pepper 1942: 238).113 The ‘quality’ of a whole, in others words, denotes the full ‘syn-
thetic’ quality of part-whole relations, insofar as the whole is substantially ‘more than the sum of its 
parts’; ‘quality’ captures this total character (idem). From a contextualistic perspective, a whole is an 
immanent feature of reality. ‘Texture’ specifies the intra-whole structure which distinguishes the whole 
from other wholes and defines its specific internal heterogeneity and organisation; it portrays the part-
interconnections representing the whole’s ‘domestic’ details (idem). The fact that ‘quality’ and ‘texture’ 
are practically indivisible – one may only say that one is more prominent or relevant in one context 
than in another – showcases the ‘cyclic’ part-whole dynamics characteristic of contextualism and the 
                                                          
111 That facts can be derived in many different ways and depend on their context, including that any number of facts may be 
‘derived’ in a given context, resonates with the ‘contextualistic’ theory of cognitive criticism centred on the notion of ‘operation-
ality.’ In ‘contextualism,’ cognitive ‘veracity’ is established rather pragmatically – by satisfying the needs and goal of a particular 
inquiry (cf. Pepper 1942: 268-278; see Section 2.6). Since explanation essentially amounts to ‘successful working,’ determining 
the effective parts out of the spectrum of possible parts is an essential part of the explanatory endeavour. Although ‘contextual-
ism’ endorses the relativism of parts, it is therefore inconsistent with ‘anything goes’ approaches. The criterion of successful 
working itself is not negotiable. 
112 In its radical interpretation, the alterity principle establishes the exact antithesis to the ‘mechanistic’ doctrines of ‘uniformi-
tarianism’ and ‘actualism.’ 
113 The example that Pepper provides here is the purposive act of writing a sentence: “[n]ow what is quality and what is texture in 
this event? Its quality is roughly its total meaning, its texture roughly the words and grammatical relations making it up. Gener-
alizing, the quality of a given event is its intuited wholeness or total character; the texture is the details and relations which make 
up that character or quality.” (Pepper 1942: 238) 
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latter’s rejection of ‘absolutisms’ of any sort. Contextualism subscribes to the doctrine that parts are 
not separable from wholes: 
Contextualism is the only world theory that takes ‘fusion’ seriously – all other theories margin-
alise it or explain it away as ‘vagueness’ (Pepper 1942: 245). ‘Fusion’ is the integration of the textural 
details of the whole; it explains why the different ingredients of a whole are so difficult to analyse sepa-
rately (cf. Hayes et al. 1988: 100). The ‘fusion’ of parts, in other words, paves the way for the ‘quality’ 
of the whole in which all parts become one (cf. Box 8). With Pepper (1942: 245f.), one may add that 
‘fusion’ exerts “an agency of qualitative simplification and organisation.” The category of ‘fusion’ also 
elucidates why contextualism tends to conceive of the boundaries of different compartments of reality 
as ‘permeable,’ ‘flexible,’ ‘expensive,’ ‘covering,’ and/or ‘overlapping’: the ‘total quality’ of reality is 
simply regarded as a ‘fusion’ of all of its anchoring elements. This inclination to regard the borders 
between different domains of reality as generally ‘blurred’ and to interpret inter-domain relationships 
through the lens of ‘interpenetration,’ ‘embeddedness,’ or ‘co-implication’ leads to the recognition of 
reality as a ‘blended,’ ‘mingled,’ and ultimately ‘messy’ place. Reality, in this view, is always inherently 
complex and the distinction between its varying parts (e.g., the ‘social,’ ‘economic,’ ‘symbolic,’ ‘cogni-
tive,’ or ‘environmental’) becomes somewhat arbitrary. Contextualism, therefore, engenders a strong 
‘anti-Cartesian’ conviction and tends to pitch ‘Cartesian’ charges against other world theories. Its vi-
sion of cultural reality conforms to Hahn’s (2013: 33f.) pound-cake model [Rührkuchenmodell] of 
world-making (cf. Appendix II.3: Fig. II.1). Again, contextualists insists that any ‘fixation,’ ‘pre-
definition,’ or ‘stipulation’ of categories and parts amounts to an epistemological declaration of bank-
ruptcy. 
 ‘Spread’ refers to the extended present of an act or a part in its wider context; it captures the 
spatiotemporal distribution of the whole’s anchoring parts and the whole’s spatial and temporal con-
sistency (cf. Box 8). An individual ‘act’ or ‘event’ in context can be said to ‘spread forward and back’ 
(Pepper 1942: 239, 242) – it is ‘ongoing.’ In contextualism, ‘spread’ grants every whole an important 
historicity insofar as its parts derive from past agencies of various sorts. But any feature of the whole – 
its effective parts, acts, or events – also point forward in time, each offering a distinct “feeling of futuri-
ty” (idem). Wholes can therefore be said to ‘develop’ in the sense that they retain their overall ‘quality,’ 
yet continuously reorganise their ‘texture’ it in space and time. A whole, accordingly, has temporal 
‘duration’ and geographic ‘reach.’ This contextualistic reading typically results in the emphasis of qual-
itative time and temporality, rather than dimensional or absolute time (cf. ibid.: 240). The reason is 
that time too is considered to describe a relational feature – put differently, each whole may possess a 
specific relationship with time. 
 The triplet ‘quality’-‘spread’-‘fusion’ clarifies why contextualism privileges qualitative ap-
proaches to the available evidence: its goal is to grasp and comprehend wholes and these are precon-
ceived as fundamentally qualitative entities, as ‘fusions’ of spatiotemporally spread out but intercon-
nected elements. ‘Quality’ in this sense implies strong emergence (cf. Hodgson 2000; Laughlin 2005; 
Chalmers 2006): wholes are expected to possess qualities and features which are not present in and 
not even necessarily implicated by the anchoring parts. Consequently, to close the gap between ‘tex-
ture’ and ‘quality’ usually requires interpretive and holistic methodologies that allow researchers to 
pinpoint wholes, ‘to discern and differentiate their specific modes and, from these, arriving at more 
general forms’ (Tomlinson 2018: 3). These “more general forms” represent nothing less than the vary-
ing ‘qualities’ of these wholes. 
 The ‘grammatical’ relations that determine the textual details of a whole can be characterised 
by two interrelated categories: ‘strands’ and ‘references’ (cf. Box 8). A whole’s ‘texture’ is made up by 
‘strands’ and these are located in a ‘context’ (Pepper 1942: 246). As Pepper himself (idem) remarks, 
discriminating between the two is difficult because the connection of the ‘strands’ determines the ‘con-
text’ and the ‘context,’ in turn, largely determines the quality and character of the ‘strands.’ This reiter-
ates the regulative idea of contextualism, that is, co-determination. Contextualistic determination 
“[…] There is no such thing as a textureless quality or a qualityless texture. It follows that 
contextualism denies that these are absolute elements. It denies that a whole is nothing but 
the sum of its parts. It even denies that a whole is a sort of added part like a clamp that holds 
together a number of blocks. A whole is something immanent in an event and is so intuited, 
intuited as the quality of that very event.” (Pepper 1942: 238) 
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tends to be ‘multilinear,’ ‘multidirectional,’ and ‘multipolar’; it emphasises the ‘co-formatting’ of parts 
with a priori flattened hierarchies.114 It is also ‘cyclic’ because parts determine other parts but are also 
determined by their whole(s). Determination is thus ‘weak’ and often ‘distributed’ but appears none-
theless to be ‘thick.’ In general, contextualism assumes radical ‘elasticity’ insofar as everything in the 
world is potentially shaped by everything else. A ‘strand’ is defined as anything that directly contrib-
utes to the quality of a ‘texture,’ while a ‘context’ is anything that indirectly contributes to it (idem). 
The general idea is that ‘strands’ constitute relevant details of a ‘texture’ but also reach out to their 
whole by resonating with a least one ‘context,’ thereby bringing some of the ‘quality’ of the whole to the 
‘texture’ (ibid.: 247). ‘Strands’ are thus the building blocks of a whole’s ‘infrastructure’ whose signifi-
cance, however, crucially depends on the whole’s ‘quality.’ An important implication of the construal is 
that there is an indefinite number of possible ‘contexts’ and contextualism is quick in delineating a 
whole range of significant ‘contexts’ and ‘sub-contexts’ (or ‘macro-‘ and ‘micro-contexts’), each bring-
ing in its own ‘quality’ and ‘texture’ (ibid.: 249). Pepper (idem) refers to this as the “sheering effect” of 
contextualistic inquiry. ‘References’ reinforce this effect since they “simply consist of the strands more 
intimately considered” (ibid.: 252; cf. Box 8); they delineate aspects or features of ‘strands’ that help 
to determine the latter’s position and role in bringing a ‘texture’ about. All of this reveals that interac-
tion is a core category of contextualism – everything in reality, including the structural categories of 
the theory themselves, are considered as products of interactive relationships. 
 As contextualism capitalises the analysis of relationships and recognises change in its most 
radical form, it takes the potential heterogeneity and difference of relations extremely serious. Contex-
tualists regularly caution against what they regard as ‘naïve correlationism’ demanding the admission 
and incorporation of other types of interconnections, some of which may contradict basic similarity 
assessments. Contextualism for example seeks to chart relationships that can be characterised as 
‘nested,’ ‘asymmetric,’ ‘transitive,’ ‘supplementary,’ ‘subsidiary,’ ‘complementary,’ ‘synergistic,’ ‘recur-
sive,’ and so forth. These relationships express constellations of ‘strands’ and ‘references’; ‘references’ 
can be instance be ‘linear,’ ‘convergent,’ and ‘instrumental,’ or they can ‘block’ each other (Pepper 
1942: ; cf. Box 8). In contextualism, similarity is merely one of many possible relationships and it 
holds no privileged position in analysis or explanation. Similarities are relevant either as a ‘conver-
gence’ of ‘strands’ and ‘references’ or as a rough approximation of the ‘quality’ or ‘texture’ of two or 
more wholes (Pepper 1942: 254; cf. Hayes et al. 1988: 101). Since contextualism accepts radical ‘novel-
ty,’ however, no two wholes can be strictly identical. This is why similarity postulates are always prob-
lematic for the contextualist. Contextualism’s relational epistemology requires the arrangement and 
sorting or various, often dissimilar relationships. Understanding the configurations of ‘strands’ and 
‘references’ in order to retrace the ‘texture’ of a whole and from there grasp its ‘quality’ is never a self-
evident undertaking. This is the point where contextualists need to ‘dis-level’ reality; they, for example, 
need to establish relational ‘prominence,’ ‘weight,’ ‘significance,’ and ‘hierarchy in order to make sense 
of the respective links between relationships. This not only presumes an interpretive import in organ-
ising relationships, but also clarifies why qualitative-rational argumentation ranks among the prima-
ry analytic operations in contextualism. 
 The root metaphor ‘situationality’ simply gives voice to the contextualistic certainty that noth-
ing can be presumed and is ‘fixable’ (cf. Pepper 1942: 235; see supra); according to contextualism, 
every fact is situational.  Each fact depends on its factual surroundings and the total orchestration of 
facts in its context(s) of significance. The concept of ‘situationality’ calls attention to this pervasive 
interconnectedness and relativity of individualisable elements; it highlights that everything is always 
framed by something else through mutual reference, reinforcement, or sometimes even through sheer 
ignorance. A ‘situation,’ according to Pepper ([1970]; cited in Efron 1980: 32) consists of a multitude 
of “purposive strands so far as they tangle and stick together” and is by virtue of the contextualistic 
categories ‘novelty’ and ‘change’ unique to this effect. Pepper’s ‘selectivism,’ which he initially pro-
posed as a fifth world hypothesis in Concept and Quality (1966), is generally consistent with this char-
acterisation and is taken here simply as a variant of the contextualistic root metaphor. The ‘purposive 
                                                          
114 Cf. “Contextualism is accordingly sometimes said to have a horizontal cosmology in contrast to other views, which have a 
vertical cosmology. There is no top or bottom to the contextualistic world. In formism or mechanism or organicism one has only 
to analyse in certain specified ways and one is bound, so it is believed, ultimately to get to the bottom of things or to the top of 
things. Contextualism justifies no such faith.” (Pepper 1942: 251) 
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act’ can be understood as a special case of contextual framing, in which ‘intentionality’ and ‘purpose-
fulness’ emerge as key qualities of a whole’s ‘texture.’ Put differently, particular configurations of 
‘strands’ and ‘references,’ especially if they turn out to be ‘instrumental,’ may reveal the directedness  
and implied intentionality in building up a whole’s ‘quality.’ 
 Due to its critical elasticity and ‘anti-foundationalism,’ contextualism is perhaps most sensitive 
among the four world theories to issues of equifinality; contextualists are generally sceptical about 
isolated observations, independent of whether they pertain to form or relationships. Because each part 
or fact and even each relationship may take part in multiple contexts and different such contexts, con-
versely, may host similar parts or relationships, only a ‘synthetic’ examination of ‘texture’ and ‘quality’ 
may shield against misinterpretation. ‘Equifinality’ is usually conveyed as ‘polyvalency,’ ‘ambiguity,’ or 
‘equivocality.’ Whereas ‘formism’ and ‘mechanism’ typically consider ‘equifinality’ as an inferential 
problem, contextualism recognises it primarily as a problem of interpretation. ‘Equifinality’ is not 
least a consequence of the ‘dispersive’ nature of contextualism, according to which an almost infinite 
number of parts may be derived from each whole – similar parts may consequently be derived from 
different wholes. 
The leading philosophical school for contextualism is pragmatism. Its historical development 
is related to the American ‘pragmatist school’ with thinkers such as Pierce, James, and Dewey, but also 
to some influential strands in European ‘philosophy of life’ and ‘existential philosophy’ with authors 
such as Bergson and Sartre. It often heavily draws on ‘phenomenology,’ ‘structuralism,’ and ‘symbolic 
interactionism.’ Within the empirical sciences, contextualism holds for example strong bastions in 
‘interpretive ethnology’ and ‘historical anthropology.’ Contextualistic inquiry is consistent with ‘soft 
ecology’ positions, and has produced various theoretical frameworks to describe and interpret interde-
pendencies and webs of relationships in lifeworld contexts. 
Contextualism is appealing because it is not easily satisfied with simple answers and because it 
recognises that anything in reality has its proper context. The theory thereby responds to the intuition 
that there is ‘more to the world then first meets the eye.’ Yet, the complexity of interpretation that it 
affords is also viewed as its most detrimental weakness. Non-contextualists typically reject contextual-
istic approaches because of their analytical complexity, often denounced as ‘cognitively confusing’ at 
best. Contextualistic investigation is regularly considered to be ‘messed up,’ decisively ‘in-transparent,’ 
‘muddled,’ and overly ‘subjective’ by its adversaries (cf. Pepper 1942: 245). Contextualists counter by 
positing that ‘simple,’ unambiguously ‘lucid,’ and overly ‘concise’ scientific expositions are suspicious 
in themselves and represent over-confident projections since we cannot presume anything about the 
world before we have encountered it, including the circumstance that the world is ‘well-ordered’ and 
governed by some kind of organisational ‘simplicity’ itself. 
The root metaphor of organicism is the ‘living being,’ ‘organic integration,’ or ‘becoming’ as processual 
individuation (Pepper 1935a, 1942: 280; cf. Box 9). The key category in organicism is time and its 
primary concern is with historicity, temporality, and evolution. Organicists in particular oppose the 
‘mechanistic’ tendency to spatialise time and to interpret its categories from the vantage point of their 
spatial correlatedness, despite the common talk of ‘spatiotemporal’ existence. The epoch-making con-
troversy between Einstein and Bergson about the relativity of time, which they both accepted, illus-
trates this clash between prototypical ‘mechanistic’ and organicistic modes of analysing time (cf. 
Canales 2015).115 Organicism is all about accepting time as a basic category and to approach everything 
                                                          
115 The clash between Bergsonian philosophy and Einsteinian physics marks a watershed event in the history of thought and 
anticipated some of the central divisions that would characterise modernity. This today largely forgotten ‘Einstein-Bergson 
debate’ can be understood as a prelude to the rise of science as the dominating intellectual force of the twenty-first century and 
the gradual decline of philosophy as an authoritative voice in society (cf. esp. Bergson 1922). Canales’ The Physicist & the Philos-
opher (2015) offers an in-depth exploration of the intellectual, social, and historical context of this fascinating and potent con-
troversy and interested readers are advised to consult his illuminating investigation. Canales (ibid.: 15; original emphasis) notes 
that “[t]he years that followed [Einstein and Bergson’s] encounter in Paris can be compared to those of the religious wars – with 
one major difference: instead of debating about how to read the Bible, thinkers across a wide variety of disciplines debated about 
how to read the complex unfolding of nature through time.” Even though Canales explicitly warns against oversimplification of 
the debate and the tendency to recast it in fixed dichotomies (ibid.: 36f.), the controversy between the “two giants” certainly 
illustrates some of the irreconcilable differences between ‘analytic’ and ‘synthetic’ thought, and especially between ‘mechanistic’ 
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else from a temporal point of view (cf. Pepper 1942: 308). Organicism, for this reason alone, furnishes 
the exact antithesis to ‘presentism’ and always theorises the extended existence of phenomena, escap-
ing the grasp of momentary observation or ‘static’ snapshots. Organicists maintain that much interpre-
tive confusion and difficulty derives from the fact that human observation is temporally limited and 
thus often misses the ‘true’ nature of whatever is observed. Pepper himself (ibid.: 280) notes that the 
‘contextualistic’ root metaphor of the ‘historic event’ offers a good approximation of organicistic rea-
soning because of its emphasis on the ongoing process; for Pepper, the difference between the two 
theories simply lies in the circumstance that organicism interprets reality ‘integratively’ and insists on 
processual ‘integration’ when phenomena navigate their temporal existence. Organicism is essentially 
a ‘contextualism’ that recognises the ‘absolute’ or ‘ideal’ (idem). The paradox is that organicism – while 
holding on to the temporal perspective – seeks to explain away time (ibid.: 280f.). The reason is that 
phenomena, according to organicists, appear to be ‘distributed’ on the temporal plane and their inte-
gration thus consequently leads to the ultimate disappearance of the temporal factor (ibid.: 281). We 
must therefore specify what has been said previously: organicism takes time seriously only as a ‘phe-
nomenal’ category, but not as an ‘explanatory’ one – explanation consists of extracting time from 
whatever is to be explained. 
 The core of the organicistic world theory is the tension between the ‘phenomenal’ and the ‘ide-
al’ (Pepper 1942: 281f.; cf. Box 9). The polarity between the two demarcates the distinct approach 
pursed by organicist to bridge the gulf between Appearance and Reality. The categorical dualism that 
comes with this approach reassures us that organicism constitutes an ‘integrative’ theory and as such 
is ‘constantly tempted to throw out facts into the unreal’ (ibid.: 145). The die-hard organicist believes 
that the ‘phenomenal’ or ‘progressive’ categories of reality are somewhat ‘illusionary’ and do not delin-
eate concrete existence in the strict sense (ibid.: 282); they are, however, required to trace the corre-
sponding ‘ideal’ categories and can thus not completely be abandoned (ibid.: 145). At the very least, the 
‘progressive’ categories serve therefore an instrumental purpose. Organicism seeks to ‘get to the top of 
things’ and its goal is to integrate the ‘progressive’ categories in such a way that the ‘ideal’ they point to 
can come clearly into view. Organicism furnishes a ‘synthetic’ perspective to the evidence and the 
wholes it endeavours to describe and explain are thought to be prima facie withdrawn from direct 
observation. These wholes are regarded to be internally heterogeneous and difficult to pinpoint be-
cause of this. According to organicism, any phenomenal aspect of reality is underpinned by one or 
more ‘concealed’ organic process(es) which realise one or more ‘organic structures’; the totality of an 
‘organic structure,’ in turn, is nothing but the achievement of the ‘progressive’ categories striving to-
wards their ‘ideal.’ Consequently, the organicist simply believes that any careful scrutinisation of reali-
ty reveals its underlying organic processes and that the associated organic wholes can be illuminated 
by, first, noting the successive ‘steps’ they pass through and, second, expounding the principal struc-
tural features which are realised in the process (ibid.: 281). Organic processes are therefore always 
‘directed’ and ‘irreversible’ – organicists typically embrace a teleological perspective (cf. Hayes et al. 
1988: 100). A proper understanding of the target processes does not only explain the phenomena un-
der consideration, but also elucidates the general logic that guides the succession of and interrelation 
between the ‘progressive’ categories (cf. idem). It is through this mutual ‘implicatedness’ that organi-
cism hopes to disclose the ‘ideal’ – even though each organicist knows that the ‘absolute’ can never 
fully be grasped because of its ‘ideal’ nature.116 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
and ‘organicistic’ interpretations of time. Whereas Einstein famously proclaimed that the time of the philosophers ‘does not 
exist’ (cf. ibid.: 15, 19), Bergson insisted on the fact that science can never hope to deliver a complete account of time since the 
latter entails aspects which cannot be entirely grasped by numbers or captured by instruments and mathematical formulae alone 
(ibid.: 10). For Bergson and his followers, time – epitomised in the concept of duration (durée) – involves irreducible qualita-
tive aspects (ibid.: 24). Bergson’s theory of time made space for memories, premonitions, expectations, and anticipations, while 
Einstein’s theory of relativity focussed on ‘objective’ events and a theoretical understanding in which humans are principally 
dispensable. Einstein stressed the duality between physical and psychological time (object-subject dichotomy) (ibid.: 5f.), be-
lieved in the unity of the universe and the existence of immutable laws, and searched for consistency and simplicity. Bergson, in 
contrast, promoted an ‘anti-absolutist’ perspective in which relationality was foregrounded and radical change predicated; his 
universe is characterised by never-ending novelty and creativity – a view encapsulated in his notion of the élan vital (ibid.: 7). 
This Bergsonian point of departure naturally capitalises inconsistency and complexity (ibid.: 21). Einstein, however, sought to 
discriminate his theory from all sorts of cultural or artistic relativisms (ibid.: 33). Bergson, on the contrary, deliberately em-
braced a relativistic approach and maintained that determining time remains a complex operation ‘necessitating the assessment 
of the overall meaning of a moment or event’ (cf. ibid.: 36). Both thinkers accepted the centrality of time yet conceptualised its 
role in understanding the world in fundamentally opposing ways. 
116 Cf. Appendix II.2 for a more detailed discussion. 
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 There are three basic ‘progressive’ categories of organicism (cf. Box 9). The first category 
comprises what organicists identify as ‘fragments of reality’ (Pepper 1942: 290f.). These ‘fragments’ 
are the bounded units of observation, what the organicist would recognise as the ‘appearances’ of reali-
ty; these are necessarily ‘incomplete,’ ‘isolated,’ and ‘scattered’ and seduce the analyst to underrate the 
world’s processual interconnectedness. For the organicist, engaging with the ‘fragments’ is both dan-
gerous and necessary at the same time. It is dangerous because one might lose sight for what trans-
cends the ‘fragments’ yet conditions their existence, namely wholes held together by organic processes; 
to engage intimately with the ‘fragments,’ however, proves necessary because they are the only reliable 
evidence for what organic processes aim for. ‘Fragments of reality’ are negatively defined: they ‘acquire 
significance according to the degree of integration not achieved’ (ibid.: 290). They represent, in other 
words, the material for integration – the target of organic integration. For this reason, ‘fragments’ can 
never be defined absolutely, but gain importance relative to integrations already achieved (idem). This 
point is important since it explains the inherent complexity of organicistic inquiry in which ‘fragments’ 
need to be integrated in order to clear the view for new ‘fragments’ to be integrated, and so forth. The 
result is a dynamic and potentially deeply nested interplay between parts and wholes. The concept of 
the ‘fragment’ thereby indicates that the parts are not arbitrary, but remain defined by their ‘effective-
ness’ in facilitating integration. This conception bespeaks of the ‘integrative’ nature of organicistic 
thought. A ‘fragment’ is a component of reality that ‘has no relevance away from the whole it is a part 
of, and once embedded in that whole it contributes to the totality without any separate status or mean-
ing’ (Harris et al. 1977: 538). The ‘fragments’ have the status of puzzle pieces; the crux of organicism is 
that the theory maintains that in order to know the pieces one must also develop a grasp of the total 
puzzle. This conception leads organicists to reject the idea of prediction since neither wholes nor parts 
unambiguously point to each other; rather, they co-determine one another in intricate ways and these 
ways can only be diagnosed in retrospect. For the organicist, the world consists of complex constella-
tions of parts governed by implicit principles of unification (cf. idem). 
 The second ‘progressive’ category is represented by the organic ‘nexus’ (Pepper 1942: 291f.). 
‘Nexuses’ specify the positive faculty of the ‘fragments.’ Each ‘fragment’ contains the internal propensi-
ty for completion, and it is this propensity that defines the possibility and potentiality to join different 
‘fragments’ on the way towards organic integration. Thus, ‘nexuses’ delineate the space of positive 
interaction with other ‘fragments.’ According to Pepper (ibid.: 291), it is through their ‘internal drive’ 
towards integration that ‘fragments’ reveal the existence of organising ‘nexuses.’ As he contends 
(idem), organicists do not believe that facts are ‘organised from without;’ rather, facts are thought to 
“organise themselves.” The structural category of the organic ‘nexus’ carries the tension between the 
‘possible’ and the ‘actual.’ Both poles are co-constitutive because in order to know the actual, one 
needs to analyse the ‘possible’ and search for meeting points between ‘nexuses.’ The organic ‘nexus’ is 
thus a relational category and it practically makes no sense to speak of an isolated organic ‘nexus.’  The 
meeting point of different ‘nexuses’ can be conceptualised as a convergence or overlay between spaces 
of possibility. It is in this way that ‘fragments’ can be said to suggest their whole. ‘Nexuses’ are the me-
diating factors connecting parts and wholes. It is characteristic of organicism to approach actuality 
from the perspective of possibilities and potentialities – no other theory takes these aspects as serious-
ly as organicism. The progressive triplet ‘fragments’-‘nexuses’-‘integration’ presupposes that particular 
constellations of ‘fragments’ and ‘nexuses’ can only be integrated in one particular fashion – they can 
only form a single organic whole. This is what is variously referred to as the fixed nature of wholes in 
organicism (cf. Harris et al. 1977: 538). Only then is it conceivable, for example, to meaningfully state 
that some pieces of the intricate organic puzzle are ‘missing’; in the same manner as the parts suggest 
what is possible, the whole must be able to suggest what is lacking. The possible connections between 
the ‘fragments’ are invariant because organicism regards the world as a highly determinate place: 
“Newton‘s great insight was the transparency of vision which perceived the implications of the 
data as they were. Had he seen less clearly or tampered with the materials, the synthesis would 
not have been made: that is, not through him; but it would inevitably have been made soon. 
This inevitability of connections among fragments, this implication of wholeness contained in 
them, is what the organicist means by nexus. Every fragment, appearance, datum, fact, he 
believes, has nexuses. These are immediately discoverable in observation, he thinks, to anyone 
who looks for them. But better evidence still, perhaps, is the signs of their presence and action 




The third ‘progressive’ category is ‘contradiction’ or ‘conflict’ (Pepper 1942: 292-294). Accord-
ing to organicism, the world is made up by many counteracting forces and perceptual heterogeneity is 
regarded to be a genuine feature of the realm of ‘appearances.’ ‘Conflict’ among ‘fragments’ accounts 
for the circumstance that not all ‘nexuses’ are compatible and organic integration requires overcoming 
obstacles. There is a certain categorical ‘resistance’ to integration, at least when reality is approached 
from a static, momentary perspective. In other words, a basic imbalance between phenomenal catego-
ries is viewed to be the precondition for organic, time-consuming integration. For instance, ‘fragments’ 
that do not match initially may be transformed over the course of time so that they can finally be inte-
grated. That “nexuses reach out from fragments like tentacles and encounter contradictions for the 
fragments” (ibid.: 292) thus reflects the organicistic certainty that there can only be one way of “puz-
zling” the ‘fragments’ together. The important point is that organicism thereby engenders an ‘anti-
correlationist’ attitude: what appears to be inconsistent at first may become consistent at another point 
in time.117 Understanding the nature of conflict, counteraction, and tension is therefore necessary to 
understand ‘wholeness’; the latter is simply recognised as the outcome of a process surmounting or 
removing any remaining ‘contradictions’ among the ‘fragments of reality.’118 
Crucially, ‘conflict’ is thus also considered a key feature of many inter-whole relationships. Or-
ganic wholes, according to organicists, represent nothing less than higher-level ‘fragments’ currently 
resisting integration. This conceptualisation is key since it justifies the recognition of domain-specific 
behaviours and rules of development unique to prospective wholes. The organic process that facilitates 
the ‘coalescence’ of these quasi-autonomous wholes establishing an organic ‘super-whole’ is typically a 
lengthy and ‘adversarial’ movement – each whole promotes its own ‘agenda’ and integration conse-
quently becomes a question of coordination. As a result, organicism often prioritises the perspective of 
the longue durée and insists on radical differences in how entities travel through time. For organicists, 
integration turns out to have been inevitable in retrospect, but the path towards it is always “stony” 
and resembles a drama full of tragedy (cf. ibid.: 293). In this view, reality consists of a continuous 
movement between ‘thesis’ and ‘antithesis,’ both co-implying yet also exerting hostility towards each 
other (idem). Organic ‘synthesis,’ as Pepper (idem) notes, consist of the higher-level acknowledgement 
of the respective claims of each ‘fragment.’ Unsurprisingly, organicistic approaches thus regularly de-
ploy ‘dialectical’ methodologies.119 
Because the “fragments cannot be regimented or restricted in number” nor is “the order of 
contradictions predetermined” (Pepper 1942: 295), organicists recognise the determinate nature of the 
outcome of organic processes, which is regarded to have always been implicit in the structure of ‘frag-
                                                          
117 The rejection of what Quentin Meillassoux (2008 [2006]) has baptised correlationism is not identical with this ‘anti-
correlationist’ attitude. Meillassoux’s After finitude represents a potent critique of what, in the wake of Kant, has come to be 
known as the dogma that the external world cannot be known outside of its relationship with knowing subjects. Meillassoux 
(ibid.: Chapter 1, esp. 4) attacks this notion and argues that thought can actually discriminate between the ‘phenomenal’ – which 
always contains the input of subjects – and the ‘absolute’ which is subject-independent. Tentatively, After finitude can thus 
nonetheless be interpreted as a radical incarnation of ‘organicism’ insofar as its author rejects the ‘analytic’ insistence on the 
necessity of natural laws and of correlation as an methodological point of departure, but similarly repudiates the ‘contextualis-
tic,’ especially hermeneutic, tendency to regard the human subject an ineluctable factor of knowledge formation. After finitude 
presents an attempt to salvage the organicistic ‘ideal’ and with it the ‘dual’ constitution of the world, without falling into ‘mecha-
nistic’ necessities. This becomes most obvious when Meillassoux (ibid.: esp. Chapter 3) suggests an ‘object-orientated’ ontology 
to grasp the fabric of reality. This ontology stresses object-alterity and the particularity and specificity of subject-independent 
objects, classic themes of refined ‘organicistic’ thought (see infra). With Pepper (1942: 303), we can say that this Meillassouxian 
possibility to grasp the ‘absolute’ stems from the fact that ‘organicism,’ in theory, allows one to recognise the claims of the facts 
themselves, otherwise the ‘fragments’ simply resist their resolution (see infra). 
118 This constitutes a major difference between ‘organicism’ and all other world theories, especially ‘formism’ and ‘mechanism.’ 
For the latter, parts that do not ‘match’ or ‘correlate’ are typically regarded to reflect non-compositional relationships, that is, 
relationships that do not matter much for inferring or explaining wholes. ‘Contradiction’ and ‘conflict’ demarcate the terrain of 
negative knowledge for these theories; the field of positive knowledge, by contrast, only depends on them as it defined by con-
flict-free relationships. 
119 Dialectics is sometimes opposed to the ‘scientific method’ (cf. Dybicz and Pyles 2011) and clearly draws on a different episte-
mological basis. Dialectic thought has its roots in Continental European philosophy and is still widely applied in some branches 
of the humanities and social sciences. It plays almost no role in Anglo-American philosophy, especially its ‘analytic’ outposts. 
Popper’s (1945, 1968) recurrent criticism of dialectics illustrates this situation. Popper (1968: 312) specifically lamented the 
dialectic willingness to ‘put up’ with contradictions, that is, to acknowledge their role as positive elements of knowledge (see also 
Bunge 1981, 2012: 84f. for a critique on dialectics; for the debate between Popper and Adorno on the status of dialectics, see Law 
2015: 178). The European legacy of dialectic-critical thought is for example apprehended in Sartre’s Critique de la raison dialec-
tique (1960). Quite symptomatically, Scruton (1985: 186) – a conservative Anglophone philosopher – has accused Sartre’s Cri-
tique to reveal a “total rejection of the rules of intellectual inquiry.” From the foregoing, it should be apparent that this accusa-
tion is short-sighted at best and overlooks the simple fact that there is no single set of rules for intellectual inquiry, but at least 
four different cognitive frameworks delivering such orientation. 
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ments,’ yet assert the particularity of the taken pathway. At the extreme, organicists maintain that 
evolution, or any other developmental process, follows a universal pattern (e.g., growth-consolidation-
decline), but this pattern is realised in a myriad of different ways. In contrast to ‘contextualism,’ which 
interprets particularity as context-specificity, organicism thus re-casts particularity as the specificity of 
developmental trajectories. Notions such as ‘cyclicity,’ ‘rhythmicity,’ and ‘modus of change’ conse-
quently anchor many organicistic approaches.120 From this perspective, ‘alterity’ and ‘otherness’ 
emerge as potential features of long-term evolutionary pathways. Having said this, organicists may 
grant the possibility of epistemic anticipation, but only with regards to the general patterns of evolu-
tion. The specific trajectories themselves, by contrast, can never be predicted – they always have to be 
retrodicted and diagnosed.121 Since organicism acknowledges change and conflict as the status quo of 
reality, the theory further shifts the burden of argument and explanation: change and contradictions 
can be assumed, while stability and stasis need to be explained (cf. Hayes et al. 1988: 100). This con-
figuration is decisive since it remains largely incompatible with the ‘mechanistic’ proclivity to search 
for ‘equilibrium conditions.’ 
Most organicists are ‘stage-theorists’ and this has to do with the specific link between the ‘pro-
gressive’ categories and the ‘organic whole’ they lead to. To recall, the ‘organic whole’ is nothing but 
the resolution of all relevant ‘fragments of reality’ in a coherent, yet typically extended system (cf. Box 
9). Since ‘integration’ is conceived of as processual itself, the line of progression moves from one level 
to the next (Pepper 1942: 298): some ‘fragments’ become partially integrated and thereby form new 
‘fragments’ which, in turn, may gradually be consolidated with both old and new ‘fragments,’ and so 
forth. This process is punctuated: gradual change culminates in qualitative steps of re-organisation. 
Each of these ‘steps’ or ‘stages’ increases the overall degree of inclusiveness, determinateness, and 
organicity of the whole under construction (ibid.: 298f.). The ‘ideal’ at which the process aims but nev-
er fully reaches is consequently characterised by the eradication of any trail of ‘fragmentariness’ since 
each systemic element then ultimately implies any other element and one cannot talk consistently 
about ‘fragments’ anymore.122 In this vein, organic processes foster the gradual emergence of new lev-
els of integration; ‘novelty’ – a ‘contextualistic’ category – is thus re-interpreted processually. For the 
organicist, gradualism and novelty are only contradictory categories if one adopts an overly static per-
spective on reality or relies on an untenable bivalent logic. In actual fact, however, the two can be con-
sidered to co-condition each other and to represent complementary extremities of the world. 
The ‘ideal’ categories of organicism are simply the features of the ‘organic whole’ rendering it 
an outcome of aspiring the ‘absolute’ (cf. Pepper 1942: 304), that is, concrete and full-blown organici-
ty. The ‘ideal’ categories methodologically threaten the ‘progressive’ categories since their purpose is to 
show that the ‘progressive’ categories are ultimately features of the realm of mere ‘appearances’ (idem; 
see supra). The whole point of organicistic inquiry is to pinpoint and resolve them since otherwise the 
‘ideal’ remains hidden and is ultimately unknowable – to this effect, organicistic inquiry is itself cumu-
lative and processual. The three ‘ideal’ categories of organicism are ‘implicitness,’ ‘transcendence,’ and 
‘economy’ (cf. ibid.: 304-308; cf. Box 9). 
                                                          
120 The very idea that (evolutionary) change follows a certain ‘rhythm’ is anti-mechanistic and a classic ‘organicistic’ figure of 
thought. The classics of this line of reasoning are, for instance, Bachelard (1932, 1936), Klages (1934; cf. Müller 2007), and, 
more recently, Lefebvre (1968, 1991, 2004) – all subscribing to a form of ‘rhythm analysis.’ It is notable that ‘organicism’ also 
hosts a range of theories that seek to consolidate radical developmental novelty with the idea of incremental evolutionary 
change. In palaeontology for example, a noteworthy but largely forgotten figure in this regard was Otto Schindewolf (1950) who 
advocated a theory of ‘mutationism’ (cf. also Allen 1969; Bowler 1978) – an approach that is often also referred to as ‘typostro-
phism’ (cf. Reif 1986: 117-120). A modern interpretation of this theory would hold that long-term evolution entails the possibility 
of the sudden emergence of new levels of organisation that are, strictly speaking, not predictable from their evolutionary starting 
conditions, yet are fully intelligible in retrospect (see the entry for ‘strong emergence’ in Box 9). More generally speaking, all of 
these views of evolution stress the ‘creative’ element of evolutionary processes. 
121 This is why ‘organicism’ and ‘mechanism’ disagree so blatantly on almost every issue – even though, ironically, both represent 
‘integrative’ theories. For ‘mechanism,’ explanation and prediction are so intimately connected that an ‘organicistic’ explanation 
– which rejects the idea of detailed prediction – effectively amounts to no explanation at all. For ‘organicism,’ conversely, ‘mech-
anism’ fundamentally misconstrues the relationship between universality and particularity and overemphasises the importance 
of predictive faculties. 
122 Complete ‘organicity’ constitutes a dead end for organic processes. A condition in which each system-element implies any 
other leads to system-states in which the alteration or modification of their elements either changes the entire system or de-
stroys it altogether (cf. Pepper 1942: 300). The organicist may interpret this theoretical end point as the natural point of break-
down of a given evolutionary trajectory. According to organicism, the termination of an entire evolutionary trajectory, in other 




‘Implicitness’ refers to the fact that after discovering the organic whole, all ‘fragments’ can be 
shown to have always been a detail of this whole, occupying a well-defined spatiotemporal place in it, 
so that their apparent ‘fragmentariness’ turns out to be, strictly speaking, an error or illusion (Pepper 
1942: 304). The mistake consists in the prima facie acceptance of discreteness where there was in fact 
an initially ‘concealed’ processual unity. Reciprocally, the whole can then be shown to have always be 
organised by its ‘fragments.’  In other words, to recognise the ‘implicitness’ of a ‘fragment’ means to 
understand where it ‘belongs’ to (ibid.: 305). The goal of organicistic inquiry is therefore to arrange 
‘fragments’ in such a way that their nexuses connect and each fragment’s proper place can be grasped. 
‘Transcendence’ is merely the other side of ‘implicitness.’ The whole can be said to transcend its inter-
nal contradictions rendering them ‘appearances’ too (idem). As soon as the whole is achieved, any 
contradictions either vanish completely (idem) or can be shown to be local contradictions only where-
as the whole retains global unity. The general point that emerges from this is that the ‘texture’ of ‘con-
textualism’ (see previous sub-section) is itself subjected to change and transformation and a whole is 
thus typically invested with multiple ‘textures,’ each associated with a particular level of organic inte-
gration. 
‘Economy’ pertains to organicistic interpretation insofar as each ‘fragment,’ although de-
bunked as an ‘appearance,’ is nonetheless saved so that “nothing is lost in the absolute” (Pepper 1942: 
306). Organicism is ‘anti-reductionist’ to this effect and endeavours to acknowledge reality of many 
layers of structural complexity (cf. Box 9).123  Pepper (idem) remarks that “[n]othing positive is lost, 
and all contradictions vanish in the realisation of how these facts are connected.” ‘Economy,’ i.e., the 
preservation of all initial observations, is important in organicism because the theory seeks to respect 
reality on its own terms – as it ‘comes to us.’124 The category of ‘economy’ gives rise to the organicistic 
credo of ‘unity in diversity’ and accounts for organicistic unification – that is, finding a whole-
substitute for a group of distinct and at first sight counteracting parts. It represents nothing else than 
the refinement of the regulative idea that ‘fragments organise themselves’: 
In general, many organicists adopt ‘orthogenetic’ or ‘autogenetic’ perspectives on evolution 
and tend to reject the tenet of ‘heteronomy’ (cf. e.g., Varela 1979; Grehan and Ainsworth 1985; Csányi 
and Kampis 1985; Jonas 2001; Levit and Olsson 2006). Their justification is the supposed prevalence 
of ‘conflict’ and ‘contradiction’ and the conviction that the processes delineating organic wholes install 
critical whole-particularities and ‘object-specificities.’ ‘Orthogenesis’ is the idea that the evolution of 
wholes is guided by intrinsic forces, but contrary to common belief these forces are not mysterious at 
all;125 positing such forces simply takes up the idea that wholes possess the capacity for self-regulation, 
self-organisation (autopoiesis), self-assembly, and, ultimately, self-determination (cf. Juarrero 1999; 
Deacon 2016). From a moderate point of view, this idea breaks down to the (much less controversial) 
assertion that the evolution of wholes is mediated by the (changing) structure of the respective wholes 
(cf. e.g., DeLanda 2015: 19).126 This assertion, in turn, merely states that evolution can only ‘select,’ 
                                                          
123 The analytical focus of ‘organicism’ is organisation rather than composition: “[…] [w]e cannot explain organisms mechanisti-
cally because their organised forms are contingent, not necessary […]. Whereas a machine can be explained by analysing it into 
its parts, to explain an organism we need to grasp it as a unified whole that reciprocally determines the form and combination of 
every one of its parts” (Thompson 2007: 132, 136). 
124 Pepper (1942: 303) is correct to identify this is as a major strength of ‘organicism.’ The only way to meet this argument (that 
evidence has to be allowed to criticise itself) is to “deny the legitimacy of the organicistic critique of evidence”, and this is very 
difficult in the face of the cumulative corroborations of the evidence itself (idem). Pepper (ibid.: 304) goes on to assert that “for 
all other theories, their internal contradictions only confirm the organicist’s critique of evidence, and he would be triumphant if 
a basic contradiction did not break out in his own theory.” 
125 See for example Deacon’s (2011) proposal of ‘causality’ in terms of his complementary concepts of ‘orthograde’ (internal 
causation) and ‘contragrade’ (external causation). 
126 DeLanda (2015), for example, offers a demystified” approach to the ‘actual’ and the ‘virtual’ as complementary poles of reality. 
In classic ‘organicistic’ fashion, the ‘actual’ is thought to describe a state of ‘being’ observable in a given moment, whereas the 
‘virtual’ designates the tendencies and capacities of particular matter configurations to change their ‘being’  – ‘virtual’ is this 
recast as a category of ‘becoming,’ opening what DeLanda terms a ‘possibility space.’ For an intuitive explanation of the ‘virtual’ 
in terms of tendencies and capacities, see ibid.: 19f.  
“[…] The real strength in [the organicistic] argument comes from [the] analysis of evidence and 
the cumulative force of this analysis. A datum is a fragment with a nexus which leads to a con-
tradiction that is resolved by an integration. This process comes spontaneously out of the frag-
ment as the very activity of the nexus. Evidence progressively criticises itself and exhibits its 
own degree of reliability and points of itself to the ultimate structural organization of the world.” 
(Pepper 1942: 303). 
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‘foster,’ or ‘develop’ what is already in place. ‘Autogenesis’ is often used to refer to emergent evolution, 
that is, the possibility that synergetic and other whole-internal relationships bring forth novel whole-
level properties in the course of evolution (e.g., Huttunen 2012).127 At the extreme, both perspectives 
reject externalist accounts of evolution (including ‘selectionist’ and ‘adaptationist’ explanations), which 
in the view of many organicists effectively overlook the importance of the developmental claims and 
potentialities of varying wholes. Both ‘orthogenetic’ and ‘autogenetic’ interpretations typically recog-
nise evolutionary path-dependencies and dynamic feed-back effects altering or reinforcing pre-existing 
pathways. Organicism, to the extent of no other world theory, acknowledges the ontological autonomy 
of wholes – it explains in terms of the unfolding nature of whatever is to be explained.128 The key for 
explanation, in other words, resides in the phenomena to be explained themselves.129 The employment 
of terms such as ‘individuation’ or ‘concretisation’ bespeaks of this processual and integrative logic of 
organicistic world-making. 
 The prototypical organicistic account of evolution is grounded in ‘dynamic systems theory’ in 
the wake of Ludwig von Bertalanffy (1950, 1973) and Gregory Bateson (1972, 1979), among others – 
organicism promotes ‘systems thinking’ (cf. Harris et al. 1977: 538). This thinking is dynamic because 
systems are not conceptualised as ‘fixed’ or ‘static’ entities, but as plastic configurations that develop 
and re-configure themselves (or are re-arranged) over the course of their life-history. Systemic devel-
opments, in this view, typically lead through a number of successive system-states before an ‘ideal’ 
state is reached – which, of course, rarely happens in reality. ‘Systems’ are not seen as atemporal, ab-
stract skeletons, but rather as quasi-living, organic structures. This interpretation of ‘systems’ is differ-
ent from ‘mechanistic’ readings where systems integrate the entirety of parts within a single quasi-
atemporal field; the ‘mechanistic’ system has spatial and temporal coordinates but no temporality 
itself. Organicism, by contrast, sharply distinguishes between the ‘being’ or ‘existence’ of a whole – 
terms that simply describe the condition and state of a whole at a given temporal unit of observation – 
and the ‘genesis’ or ‘becoming’ of the same whole – the process that leads in a directed manner 
through a number of such conditions/states and thereby connects them. The ‘life-metaphor’ is strictly 
metaphorical here: organicism happily admits that not all wholes are ‘alive’ in the same sense. The 
theory exhibits a critical openness to all forms and kinds of ‘living’; these different ‘ways of living,’ in 
turn, make room for much existential and developmental ‘alterity’ – the prime type of ‘otherness’ that 
organicists are sensitive for. 
 As a consequence of all of this, organicism seeks to shield its representatives from two differ-
ent variants of equifinality: on the level of ‘being,’ ‘equifinality’ comes close to ‘contextualitistic’ poly-
valency and concerns the circumstance that similar ‘fragments’ may occupy different spatiotemporal 
positions in an organic structure; on the level of ‘becoming,’ ‘equifinality’ comes close to the ‘mechanis-
tic’ reading of the same by professing that similar parts or part-configurations may be the generated at 
different stages of the developmental chain. While the former pertains to particular system-states, the 
latter bears on the total evolution of a system. The distinction between these senses of ‘equifinality’ is 
                                                          
127 In Incomplete Nature, Deacon (2011) discriminates between three nested levels of dynamic systemic organisation which he 
terms ‘homeodynamics,’ ‘morphodynamics,’ and ‘teleodynamics’ respectively. ‘Autogenesis’ primarily occurs in ‘teleodynamic’ 
systems and refers to the fact that these systems typically trend towards synergetic self-stabilisation; the road towards a stable 
system-state thereby depends on previous system-states. This is what Deacon refers to as ‘reciprocal catalysis’ and self-catalytic 
functions are indeed critical to most ‘autogenetic’ accounts. 
128 ‘Organicism’ and ‘mechanism’ trend towards opposing extremes here: whereas ‘organicists’ usually gravitate towards the idea 
that wholes are, to a large extent at least, self-movers, ‘mechanists,’ at least representatives of ‘consolidated’ variants of the 
theory, regularly presume that the world contains entities that serve as “movers” and such that ‘are moved’ and that an ultimate 
explanation requires to specify first-mover(s). This juxtaposition of ‘self-mover’ and ‘first-mover’ elucidates much of the inter-
pretive friction between the two ‘integrative’ world theories. 
129 It may be helpful to distinguish here between ‘inner structure’ as a category of ‘mechanism’ (and to a certain degree of ‘form-
ism’) and ‘deep structure’ as a category of ‘organicism.’ While the concept of ‘inner structure’ conjures an ontological dependen-
cy, that is, the circumstance that most worldly entities need to be explained by more basic, yet distinct entities, proponents of 
‘deep structure’ regard this construal as an unnecessary complication of factuality bespeaking of a problematic interpretive leap. 
Advocates of ‘deep structure’ typically hold that most worldly entities have to be explained by illuminating their existential and 
developmental logic, i.e., by revealing the co-constraining nature of the entities’ various layers of organisation – the paradigm 
here is ontological auto-nomy. ‘Inner structure’ propositions thus focus on the structure of the world at large and promote the 
investigation of external relatedness, whereas ‘deep structure’ assertions concentrate on the structure of particular ob-
jects/phenomena and the examination of internal relatedness. Ultimately, this is the main difference between ‘getting to the 
bottom of things’ (‘mechanism’/’formism’) and ‘getting to the top of things’ (‘organicism’). From the perspective of the practice 
of research, the analysis of ‘deep structure’ is often facilitated by the ‘ideal-type method’ (cf. Gerhard 2001) and, consequently, 
makes regular use of idealisation and abstraction as interpretive operations. Needless to say, this predisposition provides some 




crucial for many organicistic approaches and further contributes to the perceived complexity of organ-
icistic reasoning. 
The guiding schools of thought for organicism are objective idealism, process philosophy, and 
some branches of philosophy of life. As Pepper himself (1942: 141f.) posits, organicism’s historical 
progenitors are ‘German’ and ‘British idealism’ with type-scholars such as Hegel, Schelling, Bosanquet, 
and Bradley. Arguably, this list has to be extended to acknowledge the influence of eminent figures 
such as von Uexküll, Whitehead, and Bergson, and of intellectual movements such as French ‘vitalism’ 
and ‘spiritualism.’130 Organicism has further roots in non-positivistic branches of natural philosophy 
and notably draws on ‘semiotics,’ ‘phenomenology,’ ‘structuralism,’ ‘dialectic materialism’ (‘Marxism’), 
and ‘post-anthropological philosophy.’ The latter represents a coalescence of various influential 
strands in French philosophy which – via Canguilhem, Bachelard, Souriau, Simondon, Deleuze, and 
others – have contributed to the proliferation of radical ontological theorising in the wake of Descola, 
Latour, and Stengers. This relatively recent current of thought emphasises radical differences in how 
distinct kinds of phenomena behave in time. Another associated ideational source for organicism is 
‘cybernetics’ in the wake of Wiener, von Bertalanffy, von Neumann, von Foerster, and Bateson, to 
name only some of the key players.131 Similarly, the legacy of French socio-ethnology in the wake of 
Durkheim, Mauss, and Testart – exemplified by the concept of « morphologie sociale » – has pro-
foundly shaped some organicistic concepts and ideas.132  
Organicism naturally promotes ‘holistic’ theories of evolution, often grounded in ‘non-gene-
centric’ perspectives, tends to retain ‘Neo-Lamarckian’ elements, and stresses the need to endorse the 
‘creative’ moment of evolutionary processes – processes that are regarded to be only imperfectly cap-
tured by the dominant ‘Neo-Darwinian’ paradigm.133 Organicistic theories of evolution typically do not 
foreground ‘competition,’ which organicism takes for granted (as an exemplification of ‘conflict’ and 
‘contradiciton’), but instead place primary emphasis on cooperation and the horizontal coordination 
among the objects of evolution. Partly for these reasons, organicism turns out to be rather insignificant 
for modern evolutionary biology and the life sciences at large. Most of these disciplines perpetuate 
‘mechanistic’ understandings of both evolution and life (cf. Allen 2005). 
 Organicism is appealing because it responds to the intuition that objects, when they travel 
through time, transform in a rule-based, i.e., non-randomised manner, and that later stages of this 
transformation can be explained by earlier stages. In addition, organicistic explanations are economic 
in an important sense: they have great potential for unification which is often regarded to be an im-
portant explanatory virtue (cf. e.g., Kitcher 1981; Schurz 1999). Complementarily, organicism promises 
to reveal and describe kinds of relationships that are otherwise quickly overlooked – mainly structure-
giving linkages that are ‘distributed’ on the temporal plane but nonetheless appear to modulate the 
‘genesis’ of observable phenomena (i.e., emergent properties, developmental schemata, and domain-
specific rule-sets).  
Yet, organicistic thought is often seen as potentially self-contradictory in its attempt to resolve 
the relationship between the ‘absolute’ and its ‘fragments’ (cf. Pepper 1942: 314). Moreover, ‘non-
organicists’ typically reject what they perceive as organicism’s latent ‘essentialism.’ Organicism is also 
often regarded to be inconsistent with modern evolutionary theory, in particular Darwinian evolution 
as it has been formulated after the ‘Modern-’ and ‘Extended Synthesis.’ Organcistic evolution, as we 
have seen, is often imbued with Bergsonian ‘creativity;’ this Bergsonian impetus entails the idea that 
time is qualitative and subjective (i.e., object-specific) in non-trivial ways – a view that clashes with 
the ‘dimensional’ interpretation of time favoured by both ‘formism’ and ‘mechanism.’ In fact, organi-
cism’s specific treatment of time is one of the central reasons why it is often so fiercely combatted. The 
organicistic conception of time, for instance, threatens to undermine the ‘actualistic’ conviction that 
the present provides a viable frame of reference for knowing both past and future: in the view of organ-
icists, the present can never be ‘more than a sampler of the present order.’ Another reason why organi-
                                                          
130 Some of these cognitive trends are now being amalgamated under the label ‘panpsychism’ (cf. e.g., Skrbina 2005; Goff et al. 
2017). 
131 See Johnson (2014) for the specific and highly systematic discourse on ‘cybernetics’ in French intellectual culture. 
132 Cf. e.g., Barberies (2003) and Dunn (2016: 11-31). 
133 A recent example of this genre of approaches is Corning’s Holistic Darwinism: Synergy, Cybernetics, and the Bioeconomics 
of Evolution (2005). This alternative perspective on evolution is explicitly presented as an attack on ‘Neo-Darwinism’ and high-
lights the ‘multi-level nature’ of evolution, ‘group selection,’ ‘symbiosis,’ ‘cooperation,’ ‘developmental dynamics,’ ‘genotype-
phenotype interdependencies,’ ‘hierarchy theory,’ ‘systems biology,’ and ‘autocatalysis’ (cf. ibid.: 1-7). 
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cism is looked upon sceptically is because it fosters theories of directed evolution clashing with the 
received view that evolutionary processes are non-directed.134 ‘Non-organicists’ regularly lament or-
ganicism’s supposed inability to deflect what is known as the ‘teleological fallacy.’ 
The general exposition of the structure of the four relatively adequate world hypotheses has already 
demonstrated that they organise themselves into two groups of two. The elucidation has shown that 
important affinities and trade-offs between these hypotheses are observable and that these can be clar-
ified relative to the structural polarities ‘analytic’-‘synthetic’ and ‘dispersive’-‘integrative.’ I have sug-
gested that the first polarity is typically interpreted ‘antithetically,’ whereas the second polarity tends 
to support cognitive complementarity fostering eclectic tendencies. As we have seen, from this general 
architecture of world hypotheses it follows that there should be a strong trend for ‘formism’ and 
‘mechanism’ to mingle, to borrow from each other, and to share similar discursive spaces; and the 
same should apply for ‘contextualism’ and ‘organicism.’ What I will show in this section is that from 
this general organisation of world theories four other interpretive polarities result: (i) the gap between 
Appearance and Reality; (ii) the rift between ‘externalism’ and ‘internalism’; (iii) the clash between 
‘dialectic-dialogical’ and ‘formal-logical’ schemes of argumentation; and (iv) the disparity between 
‘qualitative-conceptual’ and ‘quantitative-statistical’ strategies of data visualisation. I argue that these 
polarities help illuminating some of the more tangible research consequences of world hypotheses – 
consequences which clearly leave their mark on lithic research in Palaeolithic archaeology and should 
prove useful for understanding the stakes of the French-Anglophone divide. 
 The problem of Appearance and Reality is only acknowledged by the ‘integrative’ world theo-
ries since only these are primarily concerned with advancing ‘precision’ and thus constantly strive to 
explain away or unify the facts they register (cf. Pepper 1942: 145). The mere idea that there is a ‘phe-
nomenal’ layer of reality that only shows the surface of what actually is embodies a prototypical convic-
tion of world hypotheses that champion strong determinacy – ‘mechanism’ and ‘organicism.’ To nego-
tiate the ‘appearance’-‘reality’ gap is a structural feature only of world theories that conceive of ‘order’ 
as categorical. These ‘integrative’ theories regard the directly perceivable layers of reality as potential-
ly ‘misleading;’ in their own words, they are interested primarily in how the world truly is rather than 
how it is perceived.135 Although adherents of this view openly debate how one can precede from what 
merely ‘appears’ to be to what actually ‘is,’ they would generally agree that there must be ‘more’ to the 
world than can be experienced – there must be something, in other words, that explains why one per-
ceives what one perceives.136  
The ‘appearance’-‘reality’ gap has its origin in this general scepticism about the cognitive value 
of unfiltered direct perception, which is proper to the ‘integrative’ theories. Its systematisation typical-
ly leads to the distinction between ‘observables’ and ‘unobservables’ and the latter’s theorisation and 
characterisation.137 Because ‘integrative’ world theories presume that ‘reality’ is not easily accessible 
and therefore conceive of it as partly ‘unobservable’ or at least as ‘difficult-to-observe,’ they face great 
                                                          
134 It has to be stressed here, however, that this issue is often confused in popular culture and popular science alike. The ‘teleo-
logical’ inclination of ‘organicism’ (see supra) must not be confused with the idea that evolution is necessarily goal-directed, let 
alone that this goal is pre-fixed or pre-determined in any way. Organicism is merely inclined to posit that evolution creates 
‘directed’ pathways of becoming – a much less controversial claim. This ‘directedness’ of evolution is to be distinguished from 
‘goal-directed’ evolution. Organicistic evolution, in other words, can be ‘directed’ without being ‘goal-directed’; organicistic 
‘teleology’ is often misrepresented by ‘non-organicists’ to this particular effect. 
135 The point here is that this distinction is systematised and consequentially developed only in the ‘integrative’ theories; in 
‘contextualism,’ for example, the distinction between ‘appearance’ and ‘reality’ makes only little sense since the question is not 
what is ‘real’ and what is not, but rather what are the relevant contexts of reality that arrange and give shape to reality in its 
totality. 
136 The distinction between ‘reality’ and ‘appearance’ can therefore lead to ‘objectivist’ or ‘subjectivist’ systematisations: the 
‘objectivist’ interpretation claims that perception is constituted by structural features of the outside world which exist inde-
pendently of the subjects perceiving them; the ‘subjectivist’ reading posits that perception is brought into existence by structural 
features of the perceiving subjects and can therefore never reach out entirely to an outside subject-independent world. Needless 
to say, in practice we often encounter a mixture of both positions but in specific articulations. ‘Mechanists,’ for example, would 
typically defend the ‘objectivist’ reading and content that some perception is indeed ‘subjective’ and researchers must therefore 
strive to identify and eliminate such ‘biases’ – as one can easily see, this entire talk makes only sense if one accepts the ‘reality’-
‘appearance’ gap as a structural feature of the world. 
137 A classic example for a ‘mechanistic’ conception of key ‘unobservables’ is ‘atoms.’ 
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difficulties of convincing each other about the most promising ‘unobservables.’ This core question – 
what makes up ‘reality’ – is therefore a structural divider among ‘integrative’ world theories; they 
combat and reject each other mainly because of this question. Whereas ‘mechanists’ tend to believe 
that all phenomena are caused or constituted by the core features of the world’s ‘inner structure,’ ‘or-
ganicists’ typically hold that there can be no such structure independently of the phenomena under 
consideration; according to them, it is the ‘deep structure’ of the phenomena themselves which conse-
quently helps to explain their ‘appearances.’138 This issue is largely irresolvable. Shared ‘integrativity’ 
therefore turns out to be a locus of conceptual disparity rather than solidarity. 
‘Dispersive’ world theories, conversely, are not committed to the idea that the world can be 
broken down into ‘appearance’ and ‘reality;’ they are not so much interested in providing ultimate and 
ideally singular reasons for why certain phenomena can be found in the world, but rather try to take 
these phenomena seriously and to understand how the totality of facts is organised in relation to them. 
The recourse to something beyond the ‘phenomenal’ world thus appears almost ‘mystical’ to them – 
this is even true for ‘formistic’ theories since their category of ‘subsistence’ denotes, strictly speaking, 
merely the ‘flip side’ of what is defined as ‘existence,’ the point is not, therefore, to reduce ‘existence’ to 
‘subsistence.’139 The ‘dispersive’ theories combat each other with similar stubbornness as the ‘integra-
tive’ theories but their conflict is about how to tackle and not to get lost in the latitudinal richness of 
evidence. Shared ‘dispersivity’ hence also tends to be a locus of conceptual divergence rather than con-
vergence. 
The second polarity is between ‘internalism’ and ‘externalism,’ understood as regulative ideas 
of knowledge formation.140 This polarity is another result of how evidence tends to be marshalled and 
explained by the four relatively adequate world hypotheses. It turns out that ‘formism’ and ‘mecha-
nism’ enact a gravitational pull towards interpretive ‘externalism,’ whereas ‘contextualism’ and ‘organ-
icism’ generally favour interpretive ‘internalism.’ The division hence reproduces the ‘analytic’-
‘synthetic’ antagonism but is not an inevitable consequence of it. On a general level, however, the po-
larity is indeed foreshadowed by the fact that ‘analytic’ theories carve out parts and analyse their com-
position, which in practice usually means to study how parts are externally related. ‘Synthetic’ theories 
concentrate on the delineation of wholes and analyse the effects of the latter on the constitution of 
parts, which typically implies that parts need to be examined in terms of their framing through other 
parts of the same whole (i.e., the whole is studied in terms of its internal relatedness). This contrast is 
important and resonates with the types of cognitive criticism promoted by the two groups of world 
theories (see infra). 
In ‘formism,’ facts are classified and arranged according to ‘characters,’ ‘traits’ and/or ‘types’ 
before they are ultimately examined in light of other classes of ‘characters,’ ‘traits’ and/or ‘types;’ 
providing an explanatory account thus typically means to invoke one or more part-categories of the 
world that are external to the category under consideration but share relevant features with it.141 
‘Mechanistic’ world theories generally radicalise this ‘externalist’ strategy of explanation by wrestling 
with the ‘problem of transition.’ This problem is, as we have seen, a consequence of ‘mechanism’s’ 
dualistic architecture made up by its ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ categories. Since the ‘primary’ catego-
ries are typically identified as the features of the world that ‘constitute’ or ‘cause’ the features of the 
world encapsulated by the ‘secondary’ categories, ‘mechanism’ also tends to explain by means of a 
categorical ‘else.’ This becomes perhaps clearest when the theory compartmentalises reality into dif-
                                                          
138 This is the irony of ‘integrative’ world hypotheses: even though they agree that the ‘phenomenal’ can be misleading and that 
unobservables are the key for understanding the world, they treat each other with hostility because of that; the fact that they 
have to face such unobservables and to specify them regularly leads the two theories to heavily disagree on what the relevant 
unobservables are. 
139 In fact, the whole point is precisely that ‘subsistence’ cannot be reduced without loss to the realm of ‘concrete existence’ – 
according to ‘formism,’ whatever subsists cannot fully be particularised. 
140 I am adopting a rather unconventional understanding of the polarity between ‘internalism’ and ‘externalism’ here. Usually 
these terms are employed to indicate whether knowledge is thought to depend primarily on factors internal or external to the 
knowing subject (cf. Pappas 2017). In contrast, I am not concerned with subjects, but with the entities/phenomena to be ex-
plained or understood. Interpretive ‘internalism,’ then, is the view that in order to elucidate any such entity, one needs to relate 
its parts to some aspects external to the entity; interpretive ‘externalism,’ by contrast, would posit that understanding the entity 
mainly depends on our ability to reconstruct how the entity is internally constructed.  
141 Needless to say, ‘externalism’ here is often interpreted according to the ‘theory of sets’ and therefore not always involves a 
transition from one object of analysis to another one – a characteristic of a particular woman might for example indeed by ex-
plained by another characteristic of the same woman. The problem of transition – defining for ‘mechanism’ – is a non-problem 
in ‘formism’ but the general explanatory strategy of the latter is nevertheless ‘externalist.’ 
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ferent layers or domains; the ‘chains of causality’ which are then typically conjured to derive the char-
acteristics of each layer or domain from another layer or domain give a strong voice to this general 
predisposition – a predisposition which is already echoed in the basic ‘push-and-pull’ intuition of 
‘mechanism.’ 
‘Contextualists,’ conversely, try to internally relate the facts they hope to explain by arranging 
them into their wider context; each fact is made sense of by determining its position relative to the 
‘quality’ and ‘texture’ of its context. Since each context remains peerless insofar as the categories of 
‘novelty’ and ‘change’ apply, ‘contextualistic’ theories cannot, by definition, externally relate different 
contexts to expound them; ‘contextualism’ therefore relies primarily on identifying and mapping con-
text-internal relationships, especially ‘interpenetrations’ – and only these are considered the key bear-
ers of refined knowledge. ‘Organicism,’ by entrusting much of its explanatory work to the conception of 
self-moving spatiotemporal structures, naturally mirrors the same ‘internalist’ preoccupation. Alt-
hough ‘organicistic’ theories are also fed by a dualistic structure of categories, both the ‘progressive’ 
and ‘ideal’ categories reference the same object matter, a unified structural whole distributed in time 
and space – the identification and interpretation of the ‘progressive’ categories in light of the ‘ideal’ 
categories, and vice versa, thus helps to order isolated facts internally, to connect them ‘genetically’ 
(temporally), and to discard those that cannot be considered internal to the phenomenon in question – 
a classic ‘internalist’ manoeuvre. 
The third polarity concerns the commonly favoured mode of argumentation. A distinction is to 
be made here between two grand families of argument: ‘dialectic-dialogical’ and ‘formal-logical’ modes 
of argumentation. This distinction not only touches upon the type of argument considered to be useful 
in order to advance inquiry or to reject knowledge claims, but also on how these arguments are to be 
related and mobilised. It obviously cannot be overrated how important argumentation in science is. If 
differences in world theory commitment can be shown to animate basic differences in how scientific 
arguments are construed, the actual consequences for varying realities of research and their fruits of 
knowledge can be expected to be tremendous. Generally speaking, the two basic views of argument 
that are relevant here broadly map onto the dichotomy between ‘analytic’ and ‘synthetic’ world theo-
ries and appear to be the result of how the respective theories police part-whole relations.142 
The first view, drawing on a ‘dialectic-dialogical’ notion of argument, regards argumentation 
as an ‘intricate,’ ‘complex,’ and ‘multi-layered’ exchange of pros and cons for evaluating a given state of 
affairs (cf. Stutt and Shennan 1990: 768). This view explicitly opposes the idea that argument is noth-
ing more than a “one-shot demonstration that settles the questions once and for all” (cf. Blair and 
Johnson 1987: 51). Stutt and Shennan (1990) have called this stance ‘interactionist’ since nothing is 
regarded to be ‘fixed’ or ‘secure.’ Arguments are essentially shifting discursive formations, constantly 
in need of revision and re-adjustment. The structure of argument-making and -progression is thus 
typically ‘multi-stranded’ and even ‘multi-directional,’ often appears to be ‘cyclical,’ and tends to take 
‘conversational’ shape.143 This also means that insight is not only generated by argumentative out-
comes, but emerges from the ‘dialogical’ process of argumentation itself.144 The archetype for this type 
of argument are the Platonic Dialogues.  
The second view, drawing on a ‘formal-logical’ notion of argument, envisions argumentation 
mainly as a ‘structured body of propositions’ with predefined rule-sets for how to precede from one 
step to the next; this essentially conforms to what Stutt and Shennan (1990: 768) have called the ‘pre-
scriptive’ stance of argument. This stance tends to rely on the formalised languages of symbolic logic 
and mathematics as structure-giving elements – argument is primarily defined as ‘logic in use’ (cf. 
Toulmin 1958). Therefore, argument ought to be a maximally ‘transparent’ and unidirectional process, 
in which the premises and the operations to elevate the premises into a hypothesis that can be plainly 
accepted or rejected are clearly laid out.145 The regulative idea is that of the automaton – given a de-
fined rule set and a specified argumentative input, the argumentative conclusion should be a some-
                                                          
142 For archaeology, readers are referred to Stutt and Shennan’s treatment of the topic in The Nature of Archaeological Argu-
ments (1990). 
143 This does not mean that argument is necessarily ‘circular’ in the logical sense, as some of its opponents want to have it. 
144 This implies, in other words, that one cannot tell before one delves into an argument which aspect of the argumentation will 
be most illuminating – in fact, the main point is that the result of the argument might be rather un-sensational, but part of the 
exchange leading to this point may be extremely illuminating.  
145 They are indeed often explicitly defined at the start of inquiry – this can translate into the organisational structure of a study, 
so that there is a specific section devoted to this task. 
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what ‘automatic’ outcome.146 Argument strives to be as ‘demonstrative’ as possible and is primarily 
oriented towards its achievements. The archetype for this mode of argumentation is the modus ponens 
– argument is typically modelled on ‘syllogistic’ reasoning. 
Pepper’s world hypotheses theory enables us to explain why it is so difficult, if not impossible, 
to combine these two visions of argument. The reason seems to be that the two grand families of ar-
gument are well-adapted to respond to the preconceived structure of the world advocated by the ‘ana-
lytic’ and ‘synthetic’ world theories: ‘formal-logical’ modes of argument take it for granted that the 
world is an ‘incremental’ and ‘compositional’ entity and therefore ought to be studied as such; ‘dialec-
tic-dialogical’ modes of argument, by contrast, tackle the world primarily as a ‘configurational’ entity 
equipped with a residual ‘wholeness’ never to be fully resolved in its parts and therefore to be studied 
as such. This is another example for how structuring the totality of evidence feeds into the normativity 
of inquiry. It is at least not surprising from this perspective that ‘formism’ and ‘mechanism’ share the 
same general conception of argument, and that ‘contextualism’ and ‘organicism’ do the same. We will 
see in the next section that these modes of argumentation also neatly articulate with the promoted 
theories of ‘cognitive criticism’ (conditions of truth). 
The fourth polarity brings into focus a somewhat peculiar domain of scientific cognition – ‘vis-
ualisation.’ In general terms, all research of course faces the basic problem of ‘making visible’ what it 
finds, proposes, and/or ponders upon. Apart from strictly ‘textual’ strategies of explicating knowledge 
contents, scientific inquiry can also draw on ‘pictorial’ strategies of explication. These are cognitive 
instruments in their own right and can be used to bolster knowledge claims, to persuade peers of their 
significance, and/or to motivate entirely novel interpretations – non-textual visualisation thus certain-
ly play an important role in the rhetorics of science. It is more than likely that there is a give and take 
between certain ‘textual’ strategies and certain ‘pictorial’ strategies in processes of knowledge for-
mation.147 Moreover, the images and pictures mobilised during research should reflect the needs and 
strengths of the guiding world theories. How each world theory organises its evidence and cognitively 
‘digests’ it is therefore expected to have a strong bearing on the types of visualisation it promotes and 
develops.148 
The visual needs and potentials of the four relatively adequate world hypotheses can be theo-
rised relative to the primary structural polarities ‘analytic’-‘synthetic’ and ‘dispersive’-‘integrative.’ The 
resulting visual signatures are not surprising given what has already been said before. For the divide 
between ‘analytic’ and ‘synthetic’ theories it is again the differential emphasis on parts and wholes that 
turns out to be cognitively decisive. Whereas the ‘analytic’ theories – ‘formism’ and ‘mechanism’ – 
focus on depicting parts and how they compare to other parts, the ‘synthetic’ theories – ‘contextualism’ 
and ‘organicism’ – attempt to visually ‘mould’ the wholes they seek to reconstruct and understand. 
‘Synthetic’ visualisation entails the specification of which parts belong to which wholes and in what 
way(s). The former, in comparison, encourages the mobilisation of visual techniques of ‘atomistic’ 
pattern-recognition and correlative comparison. Quantitative graphs with two or more axes of juxtapo-
sition are consequently a hallmark of ‘analytic’ visualisation. ‘Synthetic’ visualisation strategies, by 
contrast, generally tend to focus on the more qualitative aspects of part-whole articulations; the imag-
es and graphs they encourage favour more ‘abstract’ and ‘conceptual’ depictions – the visualised links 
between parts and between parts and wholes are often of an ‘idealised’ and highly ‘orchestrated’ na-
ture. Thus, ‘schematic’ reasoning, often supported by ideal-typical practices of making visible, is ex-
pected to form a hallmark of ‘synthetic’ visualisation. 
The differences between ‘dispersive’ and ‘integrative’ theories are slightly more subtle. ‘Disper-
sive’ visualisation strategies seem to gravitate towards two extremes: either they motivate a in compar-
ison to ‘integrative’ strategies disproportionally high number of graphs, tables, and/or drawings, or 
                                                          
146 In the view of many proponents of ‘formal-logical’ argumentation, this is why this mode supports an ‘objectivist’ conception 
of science. The idea is that arguments are only convincing, firstly, if their authority can be uphold independently of the subjects 
who advance them and, secondly, if they can be safely and reliably reproduced by different subjects. What is interesting about 
this is that ‘mechanists’ will have natural advantage here because they can simply draw on their root metaphor to refine the 
directed and quasi-automatic enchainment of arguments to reach the inevitable conclusion.   
147 We can therefore say that each ‘style of reasoning’ includes one or more ‘style of visualisation;’ whether and how these (also in 
numerical terms) relate to one another, however, remains an open question and can only be answered empirically, by examining 
their relationship in concrete case studies. 
148 If correct, this would be a good example for the enabling propensity of world hypotheses, their ability to literally render the 
world portrayable in particular ways. 
67 
 
they try to condense the richness of their account into a single exceptionally ‘dense’ or ‘complicated’ 
diagram which illustrates how different facts and categories of reality relate to each other. The goal of 
these depictions is to visually ‘secure’ this richness rather than to break it down or to resolve it. ‘Inte-
grative’ visualisation also gravitates towards ‘essentialisation’ and ‘reduction’ in order to highlight 
those features which are seen as key to explain the examined phenomena. These ‘condensed’ graphs 
typically emphasise directionalities of determination – a classic example is a flowchart. Another regu-
lar symptom of ‘integrativity’ in visual cognition is ‘generalisation,’ which typically results in rather 
generic representations of items and processes, with only minimal resemblance to the actual objects of 
study (e.g., artefacts). 
World hypotheses involve propositions about how to corroborate – that is, to confirm, validate, and/or 
reject – dispositional knowledge claims (Pepper 1942: 150). Since world hypotheses are unrestricted 
hypotheses about the world, criteria for scientific ‘validity,’ ‘truth,’ and ‘plausibility’ turn out to be a 
part of the hypotheses themselves. In fact, world hypotheses tend to be somewhat dogmatic in how 
they criticise and secure the knowledge they advance. Because world hypotheses are strictly autono-
mous, it follows that each hypothesis is obligated to a particular conception of truth – each theory 
supports its own ‘theory of cognitive criticism’ (ibid.: 149). In other words: each of the theories solves 
the problem of corroborating knowledge claims differently and in relation to its own categorical archi-
tecture. The theory of cognitive criticism respectively supported is hence an upshot of the accepted 
root metaphor and specifies how cognitive adequacy can be maintained and monitored. From the per-
spective of Pepper’s world hypotheses theory, it is thus no surprise that ‘truth’ and ‘knowledge corrob-
oration’ remain to be perennial problems for philosophy and science alike; these question can simply 
not be decided upon without pre-casting the world into coherent and relatively adequate world hy-
potheses. Accordingly, the ‘classic’ theories of truth are simply reflections of the cognitive tendencies 
defined by the most potent world theories. 
 The specific theory of cognitive criticism vindicated by each world theory is hence a prominent 
marker of the theory and its cognitive peculiarity. In Pepper’s (1942: 150) own words, “the logic of each 
[world] theory […] follows from its theory of truth.” It is for this reason that problems of scientific ‘ve-
racity’ and ‘certainty’ deserve special attention here. Diverging conceptions of truth allow us to retrace 
diverging conceptions of ‘objectivity’ and thereby help to clarify that each theory is generally capable of 
enacting ‘intersubjective’ standards of knowledge corroboration. Each theory nonetheless seeks to 
ensure the relative objectivity of its claims according to its own terms; ‘non-objectivity’ allegations by 
other theories are therefore typically normatively incrusted and merely confirm that world theories 
tend to be built on diverging notions of ‘objectivity.’149 This interlocking of concepts of ‘truth’ and ‘ob-
jectivity’ also elucidates why even definitions of ‘argument’ and/or ‘data’ usually differ between world 
theories. We can in fact say that different theories of cognitive criticism depend on different ways of 
devising data and constructing arguments in order to safeguard the cognitive value of their world hy-
potheses. 
 In what follows, I will shortly expose the four general theories of truth that correspond to the 
four relatively adequate world theories. I will concentrate on the relative differences between these 
theories in order to clarify their cognitive significance; these differences have a direct bearing on how 
empirical evidence can be handled, how data is generally interpreted, and what types of knowledge 
claims are typically supported. The exposition will help to derive a clearer understanding of the cogni-
tive distinctiveness of each of the four world hypotheses. I begin with the ‘analytic’ theories and show 
that ‘formism’ relies on a correspondence theory of truth, whereas ‘mechanism’ places its confidence in 
a causal-adjustment theory of truth; I then turn to the ‘synthetic’ theories and demonstrate that ‘con-
textualism’ harbours an operational theory of truth, whereas ‘organicism’ turns out to be the prime 
advocate of a coherence theory of truth. The point is not so much that proponents of the different 
world theories are forced to accept the appropriate theories of cognitive criticism, but rather that they 
                                                          
149 It cannot be overemphasised here that objectivity, as a consequence, also belongs to the ‘internal’ categories of world hypoth-
eses can therefore not be invoked to reject any other competing hypothesis. 
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will be naturally attracted by these theories if they wish to advance and refine their cognitive enter-
prise.150 
The basic principle of knowledge corroboration in formism is correspondence and formists, as a con-
sequence, strongly gravitate towards correspondence theories of truth (cf. e.g., Fumerton 2002). These 
theories generally posit that in order to secure scientific veracity one must ensure that knowledge 
claims correspond to the facts in the world that they address (cf. Sher 2013). This, of course, is an ar-
chaic idea in philosophy. A classic formulation can for example be found in the work of Bertrand Rus-
sell (1971 [1912]: 129) who advocated the notion that “[…] a belief is true when there is a corresponding 
fact and is false if there is no corresponding fact.” The basic intuition is that there ought to be a struc-
tural similarity between the knowledge claim and its facts – an intuition that derives from the formistic 
root metaphor of ‘similarity’ (cf. Pepper 1942: 180). The crux of correspondence conceptions of truth is 
to determine what the relevant type of similarity is and how the relation of correspondence between 
knowledge and facts can be guaranteed (e.g., David 1994).  
This leads to a distinction between ‘truthmakers’ and ‘truthbearers:’ the former define the 
linkage between knowledge claims and the facts they concern, while the latter specify the features of 
the world which can legislate about the weight and cognitive significance of these relations (cf. e.g., 
Armstrong 2004; Marian 2016). The truthbearers of correspondence theories are parts of the world – 
what formism identifies as ‘particulars,’ ‘characters,’ and/or ‘ties’ (cf. Box 6) – and these, in turn, have 
variously been signified as facts, traits, attributes, states of affaires, conditions, situations, events, ob-
jects, sequences of objects, sets, properties and/or tropes (Marian 2016). Acclaimed formistic truth-
makers that establish how these truthbearers ought to compare to knowledge claims are for example 
conformity, congruence, agreement, accordance, copying, picturing, signification, representation, ref-
erence and/or satisfaction (idem). To find the most pregnant truthbearers and their most promising 
truthmakers keeps formism busy and constitutes an ongoing area of debate and refinement. What 
cannot be disputed by formists, however, is that scientific truth essentially consists of a bipartite rela-
tion and it is this relation that needs to be evaluated in order to judge knowledge claims.  
That this bivalent relation is interpreted through the root metaphor of ‘similarity’ has im-
portant consequences for how the ‘veracity’ of knowledge candidates can practically be assessed. The 
basic strategy of comparing truthbearers with knowledge claims and to analyse the relation between 
the two through the lens of the envisaged truthmakers predisposes this theory of cognitive criticism to 
scrutinise the relative strength of correspondence relations, which, in turn, lends credence to method-
ological procedures which enable an ‘analytic’ assessment of degrees of (dis-)similarity (cf. Pepper 
1942: 180f.); this greatly animates correspondence theories of truth to make use of quantitative-
statistical methods to reliably measure ‘truth-making’ and to compare its strength across competing 
knowledge claims. This is the meaning of operational hypothesis-testing in formism – it is nothing less 
than an attempt to establish the relative (dis-)similarity between the hypothesis and the facts it covers. 
As a general corroborative strategy, it also explains why formists often ground their examination of 
evidence on continuous variables – continuous variables help to analyse similarity and correlation and 
hence to untangle ‘truth-making’ correspondences. 
Another consequence of the bipartite nature of knowledge corroboration in formism is that 
knowledge claims tend to be ‘descriptive.’ A hypothesis said to be ‘valid’ or ‘applicable’ is a hypothesis 
whose assertive content resembles what it talks about. As Pepper (1942: 181) himself admits: “[…] we 
may very simply define truth as the degree of similarity which a description has to its object of refer-
ence.” Formistic explanations therefore often aim to reproduce the factual characteristics of their ob-
ject matter (idem). This typically requires the transfer of evidence into an independent data format, so 
that the form-based characteristics – ‘characters’ and ‘ties’ – of the examined parts can be more effec-
tively analysed, compared, and described. The construction of ‘classes’ and/or ‘types’ and their locali-
                                                          
150 We can therefore say that cognitive inadequacies may arise when scholars indulge into a cognitive project defined by a world 
theory but deploy an inconsistent theory of ‘cognitive criticism’ to advance it. The resulting inconsistencies threaten to collapse 
the accepted world hypotheses and thereby endanger the ‘adequacy’ of its knowledge claims. Nonetheless, practiced science may 
be stuffed with cognitive confusions of this sort. 
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sation in patterns may thus already count as a good description. In this way, correspondence can effec-
tively be monitored by analysing the participation of truthbearers in the ‘relations’ defined by the 
truthmakers – e.g., ‘regularities,’ ‘norms,’ and/or ‘laws’ – so that searching for correlations and co-
variations emerges as a key operation in formistic knowledge corroboration;151 taxonomies, systemat-
ics, and form-based typologies are important cognitive instruments precisely because they facilitate 
the organisation of the totality of evidence, which is often a crucial precondition to check for factual 
correspondence(s). The resulting groups, sets, and/or clusters of facts can then simply be compared to 
the available knowledge claims in order to determine whether there is a structural match or not. 
Since formism prioritises the analysis of ‘participation’ – that is, how its truthbearers contrib-
ute to patterns – ‘induction’ tends to be the central method of cognitive criticism. According to Pepper 
(1942: 182), formists typically recognise two types of induction: (i) inductions that yield descriptions of 
‘empirical uniformities,’ and (ii) inductions that yield descriptions of ‘laws.’ The former concern pat-
terns in ‘concrete reality’ that do not exist by necessity – patterns which are contingent but nonetheless 
reliable truth indicators. The second type concerns patterns that are necessary – patterns that exem-
plify a general ‘law.’ This general discrimination leads to the formistic distinction between ‘historic’ 
and ‘scientific’ –between historic truth and scientific truth (ibid.: 182f.).152 Hence, empirical uniformi-
ties are typically identified as being merely of historical significance; yet, in the spirit of formism’s 
inherent ‘dispersivity,’ they are nevertheless regarded to be ‘real’ and informative about the world. 
Having said this, since empirical uniformities derive from contingent facts, they are often considered 
to be sources of ‘half-truths.’ According to formistic logic, notwithstanding, the cumulative force of 
these ‘half-truths’ allows for the approximation of scientific truth and the necessary structure of the 
world in the long run (ibid.: 183f.). This ‘graduation’ of varying truth values is anticipated by the work 
of Francis Bacon, who conceptualised science as an ongoing process of climbing the ladder of 
knowledge: starting from all of the available facts, one would first have to reach the ‘middle-principles’ 
before ultimately proceeding to the highest and ‘purest’ ones (cf. Carrier 2016: 16). The interesting 
issue here is that formism apparently has to counterbalance the relative ‘sameness’ of its evidence – a 
result of its ‘dispersivity’ – with a pronounced hierarchy of knowledge.153 
The basic principle of knowledge corroboration in mechanism is causal-adjustment; mechanists, 
therefore, are typically proponents of what Pepper (1942: 228) terms ‘causal-adjustment theory of 
truth.’ The key concept of the theory is ‘causality’ broadly defined, i.e. including weaker principles of 
determination such as ‘constitution’ (cf. Williamson 2011). More generally, causality is interpreted as a 
determinative process distinguished by its ‘specifity of response’ (ibid.: 226).154 There must always be a 
reason for why a particular phenomenon or behaviour can be observed – that is, there must be some-
                                                          
151 We can adopt Nancy Cartwright’s (2004) differentiation between two types of scientifically relevant laws here: ‘laws of associ-
ation’ and ‘causal laws.’ The former are defined by what Pepper would call ‘participation.’ Moreover, these ‘laws’ are causally 
neutral – although this doesn’t mean that the authors who advance them reject causality as an important principle to shape 
reality – and typically tell us how often and under which conditions the quantities and qualities of parts are ‘co-associated’ (ibid.: 
419). Following Cartwright (idem), one might say that ‘laws of association,’ in contrast to ‘causal laws,’ mainly target the struc-
ture of co-occurrence(s) itself and try to capture this structure, but they rarely provide a comprehensive account of what ‘makes 
it happen.’ The ‘laws’ of ‘formism’ can thus be said to primarily consist of such ‘laws of association.’ 
152 The important point here is that ‘formism’ requires both historic and scientific truth in order to picture the world comprehen-
sively and adequately; the two types of knowledge thus complement each other, even though they may of course interfere at 
times. This is why the rejection of historic truth as a basis for science threatens to collapse the theory, and often marks the tran-
sition to ‘mechanism’ and its causal-adjustment theory of truth (see infra). The perhaps best example from the younger history 
of archaeology for such a process is the well-known critique of Lewis Binford and his followers on what they perceived as Ameri-
can ‘Historical’ Archaeology – a type of archaeology they wanted to supplant with their own ‘New’ Archaeology, built on more 
robust ‘scientific’ foundations (cf. Binford and Sabloff 1982; Clark 2002: Table 1). The rhetoric and conceptual importance of 
Binford’s (1968) distinction between ‘history’ and ‘science’ is a clear indication for his attack on formistic logic and his determi-
nation to usher a more ‘mechanistic’ type of research in American archaeology (cf. Trigger 2007: 400f.). 
153 We will see in the following that this is a trade-off proper to ‘formism’ and that the other credible world theories make other 
‘deals’ in this regard. [‘sameness of evidence’ simply means that there is no structural incentive for the theory to rank and/or 
weight its evidence before processing it] 
154 The principle of ‘cause-and-effect’ has been systematised by David Hume [1711-1776] (‘theory of regularity’) and was subse-
quently refined by John Stuart Mill [1806-1873], who proposed three cognitive strategies to avoid falling prey to causal fallacies 
(cf. Carrier 2006: 27-35). 
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thing in the world which has ‘triggered’ it.155 Any grounds offered, moreover, must be specific enough 
to apply to what one seeks to explain (e.g., Clark 1963).156 For causal theories of truth this requirement 
of ‘specifity’ ushers an important response to the so-called ‘Gettier problem,’ according to which 
knowledge about the world is constantly threatened to be only accidentally true (cf. Sturgeon 1992);157 
this general difficulty prompts us to reconsider how knowledge can be secured and thereby shifts the 
attention to the relevance of the offered explanations.158 In order to avoid the ‘Gettier problem,’ causal 
theories typically assert that knowledge claims are only approvable if one can demonstrate that a claim 
specifies the result(s) of the relevant causal connections which necessarily make it true. The concept of 
necessity is central here for it counters the possibility that knowledge becomes a mere question of 
‘lucky guessing’ (cf. Pritchard 2015).159 A now classic version of such a causal account of knowing has 
been offered by Alvin Goldman (1976: 361, original emphasis) who pioneered the idea that “[a] neces-
sary condition of S’s knowing p is that [her/]his believing p be connected with p by a causal chain.”160 
This notion of temporally well-structured ‘chains of causation’ is commonplace in mechanism and 
serves to devise the structure of reality (cf. Pepper 1942: 227);161 it also incentivises mechanists to 
acknowledge a ladder of causality and to reject the ‘formistic’ ladder of knowledge as a symptom of 
superficial insight. 
 The ‘specifity of response’ principle, grounded in the mechanistic intuition of ‘integrative’ ne-
cessity,162 gives rise to the recognition that ‘prediction’ must be a part of explanation itself. Prediction 
is cognitively esteemed because of the way causality is interpreted in mechanism – namely, as a con-
solidated field structure acting in highly specific and largely inevitable ways. It is for this reason that 
mechanism’s causal adjustment-theory regards cognitive anticipation as a key epistemic virtue. Al-
ready Moritz Schlick (1932/33: 44) apodeictically noted: “[w]hat every scientist seeks, and seeks alone, 
are […] the rules which govern the connection of experiences, and by which alone they can be predict-
ed.” For mechanists, prediction is the most promising tool to unveil the hidden structure of reality and 
to pass the world of ‘appearances.’ Since one cannot observe the fabric of reality directly, one can only 
hypothetically devise it and compare its consequences with what one can, after all, observe directly. 
The analysis of these necessary consequences requires accepting some notion of ‘causal laws’ (sensu 
Cartwright 2004).163  
As a note of caution, however, it is important to realise that mechanists are not the only ones 
who regard ‘prediction’ as a central aim of science; in ‘formism,’ too, the concept plays a certain role, 
but the ability to predict – i.e., to formulate theories and hypotheses entailing (logically or otherwise) 
                                                          
155 The very idea that there are ‘triggering’ and ‘non-triggering’ facts is proper to ‘mechanism’ and, in ‘consolidated’ variants of 
the theory, typically leads to the identification of ‘first movers’ and causal ‘singularities.’ 
156 For more recent theories of causation which, to varying degrees, reflect conceptions of ‘veracity’ and ‘truth’ in practiced sci-
ence, see e.g., Bigelow and Pargetter (1990), Heathcote (1989), Krajewski (1997), and Chakravartty (2005).  
157 The ‘Gettier problem’ was initially introduced to reveal an important weakness of traditional definitions of knowledge as 
‘justified true belief.’ The problem illustrates that ‘justification’ and ‘truth’ are not sufficient to render a belief an item of 
knowledge; since a belief might be justified and true at the same time but only accidentally so, we need to ask how the belief was 
formed and whether it explains what it concerns (cf. Gettier 1963). This has provoked the issue of epistemic ‘relevancy:’ a belief 
can only be true if and only if the assertive claims it contains are relevant for the explanation of the contents of the belief. Causal 
theories of truth are consequently theories of knowledge which identify causality as the key ‘relevance-maker,’ some even hold it 
is the only reliable one that is available. 
158 In ‘mechanistic’ theories of cognitive criticism, a key concern is therefore to ensure that knowledge claims are warranted; and 
this, according to many ‘mechanists,’ can only be assured when some basic causal principles are invoked to show that the exist-
ence of the phenomena under consideration inevitably follows from them (cf. Pepper 1943: 363). 
159 ‘Casual necessity’ has variously been defined by ‘mechanists.’ Brian Skyrms (1980), for example, tries to capture the concept 
with his notion of ‘invariance,’ which he asserts to be a basic feature of a causally structured world. 
160 Although not specifically termed ‘causal,’ this general principle of determinative adjustment is consistent with Karl Popper’s 
(1968) notion of ‘conditional scientific predictions,’ which he identified as characteristic for the natural sciences and their suc-
cess. 
161 The concept of a ‘causal chain’ hence implies the ‘mechanistic’ theory of time, according to which time is to be regarded as an 
‘objective’ and thus viewer-independent feature of the world; time is seen as relatively uniform (even though temporal relativity 
is of course granted under special conditions), well-ordered, and sequential. The classic view is that causes have to precede their 
effects although feedback effects are sometimes possible (these feedback effects are generally difficult to explain for ‘mecha-
nists’). 
162 This is simply to say that mechanism of determination must have the capacity to make a difference in reality – this is what 
Jon Williamson (2011: 422) identifies as the classic ‘difference-making theories’ of causality. 
163 This is the perennial trouble of the ‘empiricist’ tradition in philosophy of science. Although ‘logical empiricists’ were generally 
sceptical about the idea that there is a hidden structure underneath the experiential surface of reality and tried to escape from its 
grip by an ‘operationalist’ manoeuvre – they argued that terms such as ‘gene’ or ‘atom’ merely help us to pick up complex pat-
terns in reality –  they could never uphold their agenda consistently, partly because of their insistence on ‘prediction’ and partly 
because of their sharp distinction between ‘theory’ and ‘observation’ in science (e.g., Hempel 1958, 1965; Oppenheim and 
Hempel 1948; cf. Godfrey-Smith 2003: 36f.). 
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certain observable regularities they were not originally concerned with – is tied there to quasi eternal 
principles of association – the faculty to ‘predict’ stems from the ‘formistic’ discovery of ‘laws of associ-
ation’ (see 2.6.1). The world is considered of such an order that certain features turn out to be correlat-
ed and it is through the extrapolation of these patterned co-occurrences that ‘formists’ predict new 
patterns in similar or analogous constellations. Predictability, in this view, simply follows from the 
empirical determination of dependencies between observable phenonema.164 Therefore, ‘formistic’ 
prediction is often about structural features of the world.165 In mechanism, conversely, prediction 
makes use of the ‘causal laws’ outlined above. A key difference to ‘formistic’ prediction is that assertive 
novelty, an often-claimed necessary feature of valuable predictions, cannot be taken lightly by mecha-
nists. Mechanistic prediction targets specific relationships that cannot be overly generalised, and that 
are certainly not ‘eternal’ in some relevant sense (cf. Pepper 1942: 220).166 This notion of prediction is 
not grounded in empirical regularities per se, but rather exploits the circumstance that observable 
configurations of reality are affected by well-defined mechanism(s) in knowable ways. These ‘effects’ 
must not have been observed before, as long as one has understood the general principles of determi-
nation embodied by the mechanism(s) in question and the behaviour of the parts that make up the 
configuration. The mechanistic inevitability of outcomes is not an inevitability of forms but an inevita-
bility of direct or indirect action between parts. 
 We should recall here that mechanism rests on a dualistic structure of categories and that this 
polarity motivates much of the work the theory does. The prime objective is to provide an account that 
links the ‘effective’ with the ‘ineffective’ categories, ‘unobservables’ with ‘observables,’ ‘theory’ with 
‘observation,’ and so forth.167 Cognitive criticism in mechanism is therefore often mediated by cogni-
tive instruments whose ‘validity’ and ‘efficacy’ are thought to be independent of experience or percep-
tion – for the latter are seen with general scepticism and are accused of being delusional.168 Mechan-
sim thus typically works in consort with ‘deductive logic’ or mathematical proof (i.e., systems of axio-
misation) to model the specificity of determination. ‘Deductivism’ is a preferred tool because it pre-
serves truth by necessity; this means that the conclusions of deductive inference can be guaranteed if 
only the premises are valid. In mechanism, knowledge about the world is therefore typically secured by 
successfully deducing the exact constellation of observable facts from one’s initial premises. The of-
fered explanations are ‘basic’ in this sense – they target processes of determination concerning the 
‘primary categories’ of reality. To establish truth in mechanism requires the specification of constitu-
tive grounds for something to ‘happen in the world’ (cf. Salmon 1984; Woodward 2003). 
 It seems only consequential that mechanists favour strict hypotheses testing as a corroborative 
method; a hallmark of their mode of hypothetical reasoning is that the test conditions and empirical 
correlates are defined as granular and as exact as possible (the definition, in other words, reflects an 
attempt to develop ‘precision’ and typically includes the discrimination of relevant and irrelevant fea-
                                                          
164 This notion of ‘prediction’ was for example accepted by Hume and many, if not most, ‘logical empiricists’ (cf. Barrett and 
Stanford 2006: 587). 
165 A well-known example of a defence of this view is Carnap’s The Logical Structure of the World (1967). 
166 Pepper (1942: 220) clearly sees that over-stretched ‘repetition’ of cosmic geometric threatens to bring down ‘mechanism’ and 
to turn it into ‘formism.’ Ever repeating configurations and correlations would simply call for an explanatory category of ‘sub-
sistence.’ Radical repetition must therefore by avoided in ‘mechanism’ and this typically happens by acknowledging some sense 
of ‘boundedness’ separating varying ‘fields of causality’ (which, by the way, sometimes pushes ‘mechanism’ close the ‘contextual-
ism’). In the context of ‘mechanistic’ Gestalt theory, Pepper explicitly (idem) notes: “[…] [t]he formistic threat to mechanism of a 
catalogue of elementary mental atoms which are identically repeated in multitudes of complex mental states is obvious enough. 
What are these atoms but the very immanent forms which formism is built up from? […] The difficulty can be avoided only be 
conceiving of the great machine as a highly structured field that never literally repeats itself in any details and that here, there, 
and elsewhere exhibits emergent qualities which are also never repeated in detail.” 
167 The distinction between ‘observational’ and ‘theoretical’ language in ‘logical positivism’ provides a telling example here (cf. 
Godfrey-Smith 2003: 28); the distinction can be interpreted as an extension of the categorical difference between ‘primary’ and 
‘secondary’ qualities in ‘mechanism.’ ‘Red’ for instance belongs to the ‘observational’ part of language and describes a ‘second-
ary’ quality of the world, whereas ‘electron’ belongs to the ‘theoretical part of language and describes a ‘primary’ quality of the 
world. In order to advance science, one ought to analyse this distinction and make use of it. This is another example that shows 
that the ‘empiricist’ tradition in philosophy could often not resist the ‘mechanistic’ attraction.  
168 Here lies the specificity of ‘mechanism’ and its mode of cognitive criticism; its theory of truth is inconsistent with unchained 
empiricism. Empirical facts, according to ‘mechanists,’ cannot be taken at face value and their cognitive status is always double-
edged; this is why one cannot simply compare facts with knowledge claims and thereby establish scientific truth. Yet, ‘mecha-
nists’ do not deny that empirical evidence is the only reliable road to knowledge. Cognitive criticism in ‘mechanism’ therefore 
mirrors the theory’s conceptual duality and seeks to satisfy two epistemic needs at once: first, to acknowledge what can empiri-
cally be observed; and secondly, to recognise that observation needs to be calibrated by non-empirical means. The specification 
of causal structures and their empirical consequences is a non-empirical task, while the assessment of these consequences 
through observation is obviously empirical. 
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tures in the world). Many mechanists, moreover, gravitate towards hypothetico-deductive strategies of 
cognitive criticism (cf. Hempel 1966)169 and try to feed them with invariant causal principles and po-
tent considerations from general theory. Alternatively, mechanists attempt to pre-cast the systemic 
structure of whatever they wish to examine in causal terms (cf. Pepper 1942: 228) – a practice that 
often results in process- or flowcharts and lays bare the hypothesised links of determination between 
various parts, so that their causal enchainment can be closely investigated and tested.170 Mechanistic 
theories of truth hence generally rely on a convincing operationalisation of two key assumptions: first, 
that test conditions and empirical consequences can be formulated in such a way that one can ensure 
their discriminatory power; and secondly, that hypotheses can generally be tested in isolation.171 In 
order to achieve this, mechanism tends to introduce and develop specific and often quite elaborate 
‘theories of testability.’172  
 Mechanism’s theory of truth typically paves the way for ‘nominalism’ (Pepper 1942: 226).173 
Many mechanists are nominalists insofar as they deny that there is room for transcendental entities in 
the world, or at least for entities that exist outside of space-time locations.174 Mechanism’s ‘nominal-
istic turn’ is hence an expression of its general scepticism about the types of universals that ‘formism’ 
advocates and defends – in particular ‘subsistent’ universals. For mechanists, the acceptance of such 
universals brings us far too close to the ideational world of Platonism, where an ever-changing reality 
of forms is juxtaposed with its ‘eternal’ counterpart. Mechanism’s attraction for nominalism is there-
fore simply rooted in its determination to overcome the ‘existence’-‘reality’ opposition that prevails in 
‘formism’ and to reinterpret the form-matter relationship through its own categories (cf. idem); some 
mechanists are thereby prepared to accept that forms are nothing less than an actualisation of particu-
lar matrices of material forces – a trail of reasoning which greatly motivates ‘materialism’ or ‘physical-
ism’ (cf. e.g., Ney 2009). 
 Another important ramification of mechanism’s conception of truth is that correlation can no 
longer be regarded as a potential truthmaker – it can at best hint towards scientific truth. In mecha-
nism, correlation hence becomes no more than a means to grasp relationships between the ‘effective’ 
                                                          
169 It should be noted that some aspects of Carl Hempel’s (1965) ‘covering-law’ conception of explanation are consistent with 
‘formistic’ modes of knowledge corroboration, in particular with the idea that participation in laws should be a reliable truth-
indicator. From this perspective, Hempel’s ‘covering-law’ conception can be interpreted as formalisation of ‘formistic’ principles 
by means of deductive logic. 
170 This tendency easily gives way to ‘externalist’ strategies of explanation (see supra). ‘Causal-adjustment’ then simply compris-
es of distinguishing between phenomena and their environment and to demonstrate that the former was an expected conse-
quence of the causal connections between the phenomenon and its environment (cf. Pepper 1942: 228). As Pepper (ibid.: 230f.) 
emphasises, this strategy often leads to a relapse into the similarity criterion of ‘formism’ and illustrates how difficult it is for 
‘mechanism’ to bridge the ‘observable’-‘unobservable’ gap. 
171 This relates back to the ‘specifity of response’ principle. A constant threat for knowledge corroboration in ‘mechanism’ is 
illusionary or inconclusive testing. ‘Mechanism,’ in other words, needs to make sure that negative or positive test-results remain 
unequivocal. This is more difficult than it appears to be. For instance, a rejected hypothesis might simply tell that part of the 
premises of the original research question that motivated the hypothesis were flawed; an accepted hypothesis, similarly, might 
simply tell that the discriminatory power the hypothesis was not sufficient. This is known as the problem of ‘holistic testing’ (cf. 
Feigl 1943; Quine 1951a) it follows that ‘mechanism’ has to ensure that the responses it envisions and analyses are specific 
enough to circumvent this problem. 
172 Such specific ‘theories of testability’ are not necessary in ‘formism’ since this theory interprets ‘testing’ in terms of its root 
metaphor of ‘similarity;’ to test a knowledge claim there simply means to analyse its structural similarity between the proposed 
knowledge claim and the facts in the world it concerns. 
173 The theory of nominalism, in its original scholastic formulation, holds that general terms and abstract concepts are no more 
than ‘word utterances’ and can have no independent existence (cf. Feibleman 1962). As we have seen, this is also the reading of 
the ‘empiricist’ tradition in American philosophy and has motivated its distinction between ‘observational’ and ‘theoretical’ 
terms (see supra). Everything that is real, according to this theory, must be grounded in some concrete ‘particular(s).’ Ockham’s 
Razor can be interpreted as a pragmatic manoeuvre to secure nominalism in truth-finding and is often introduced in the guise of 
‘parsimony’ considerations (cf. Sober 2015: Chapter 5). Having said this, there are at least two varieties of nominalism to be 
distinguished and ‘mechanists’ have not always found it necessary to embrace both of them: nominalists may reject either ‘ab-
stract objects’ or ‘universals’ (cf. Rodriguez-Pereyra 2016). The first version denies the existence of Platonic ‘ideas’ or what some 
researchers identify as ‘non-spatiotemporal’ or ‘causally inert’ objects; the second version denies universals insofar as they are 
defined as existing outside of space and time or as occupying more than one place in the ‘field of locations.’ The first variety is 
more important in the types of ‘mechanism’ that are relevant for Palaeolithic archaeology and is commonly embraced there to 
counter ‘conceptualistic’ and/or ‘organicistic’ interpretations of past realities. Although many ‘mechanists’ try to be ‘scientific 
realists,’ the ‘consolidated’ variant of the theory would collapse, or at least relapse into ‘formism,’ if all of its consequences were 
embraced. 
174 Since the ‘field of locations’ belongs to the ‘primary’ categories of ‘mechanism’ and since especially ‘consolidated’ variants of 
the theory tend to recast it as an integrated spatiotemporal field structure, ‘mechanism’ cannot except the existence of some-
thing beyond or outside of this structure. The attempt to integrate everything that exists into a single consolidated spatiotem-
poral field inevitably introduces reductionism(s). 
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and ‘ineffective’ categories, and to investigate their regular co-occurrence;175 alternatively, it can be 
used to tackle the problem of ‘equifinality’ or to track down similar causes acting upon different as-
pects of reality. Correlation can thus never be an explanation itself, but instead always requires further 
explanation.176 This is because contrary to ‘formism’ correlation in mechanism is opposed to causation, 
and the relation between the two is always problematic and rarely symmetric (cf. Pepper 1942: 230) – 
the types of explanatory regularities mechanism is looking for, in other words, may contain but do not 
exhaust themselves in ‘laws of association’ (sensu Cartwright 2004). 
The cognitive criterion for truth in contextualism is workability.177 This conception undermines bona 
fide and/or overly ‘substantive’ definitions of truth and knowledge (cf. Annis 1978).178 Since truth is 
interpreted through the contextualistic root metaphor, what scientific truth amounts to turns out to be 
context-dependent itself.179 Many contextualistis, in fact, consider it likely that there is no such thing in 
the world as universal truth conditions. What Pepper (1942: 268) dubs the ‘operational theory of truth’ 
expresses this general conviction. The notion of ‘operationality’ gives thereby credit to the contextual-
istic belief that concepts such as ‘truth,’ ‘veracity,’ ‘certainty,’ and/or ‘knowledge’ are primarily the 
result of an inquiry and, consequently, cannot be defined independently of this inquiry. A key intuition 
here – consistent with the structural categories of ‘novelty’ and ‘change’ – is the ‘mutability’ of truth.180 
It is for this reason that contextualism sometimes gives a voice to ‘deflationist’ tendencies of cognitive 
criticism; another consequence is that contextualists typically place much more corroborative weight 
on ‘assertability’ or ‘acceptability’ as cognitive criteria than on ‘certitude’ or ‘reliability.’ The idea that 
knowledge can be certain is often rejected as self-contradictory. 
 Operational theories of truth author relatively modest standards of epistemic excellence and 
consider knowledge simply to be a product of successful, persuasive, and/or neoteric inquiry. A 
knowledge claim can be said to be ‘admissible’ if the inquiry that yielded it did overcome all interroga-
tive obstacles. According to contextualism, the surmounting of interpretive problems clears the path 
for a consistent description of the context defined by the inquiry.181 ‘Assertable’ knowledge is therefore 
knowledge that originates from the removal of all relevant knowledge barriers such as interpretive 
inconsistencies and/or blocked ‘strands’ or ‘references’ (Pepper 1942: 269; cf. Box 8). Since contextu-
alists tend to focus on relations and relationalities in the accounts they provide, inquiry typically de-
mands to find a way of organising the totality of the observed relations so that the resulting whole 
makes sense, that is, can come into view in its ‘wholeness’ (qua its ‘quality’ and ‘texture’). The ‘harmo-
nisation’ of context-internal relations is a cognitive strategy to secure this ‘wholeness,’ but the ‘hier-
archisation’ and/or ‘dichotomisation’ of relations is at least equally important.182 Because contextual-
                                                          
175 This effectively engenders a test for whether these co-occurrences can be predicted or not; if they can be predicted, ‘mecha-
nists’ have some reasonable ground to belief that some causal principles are involved. 
176 This is obviously the source of much conceptual confusion and ‘mechanism’ must uphold the categorical distinction between 
‘correlation’ and ‘causation’ to be consistent and to make adequate use of its proper root metaphor (see Appendix II). 
177 ‘Workability’ as a cognitive criterion is broadly understood here. Pepper (1942: 270-279) distinguishes three ways of inter-
preting ‘successful working,’ only one of which is defined by workability sensu stricto. We will return to this issue below. 
178 ‘Contextualism,’ in other words, remains sceptical about theories which attempt to secure the ‘inertness’ of truth and recast it 
as a feature of reality; this scepticism is only consequential since the ‘contextualistic’ theory is sceptical about ‘inertness’ and 
‘staticness’ in general (cf. e.g., James 1914: 200; see infra). 
179 Explicating and analysing the truth-context itself, has thus historically been a major concern for many ‘contextualists.’ A well-
known example is Charles Sanders Pierce’s (1901) ‘semiotic’ theory of truth, according to which knowledge and human thought 
in general has to be understood within the context of sign relations. A ‘sign’ is thereby in classic ‘contextualistic’ terms: not as an 
‘absolute,’ but as a relational and non-essential entity. 
180 The ‘mutability’ theorem has caused many troubles for ‘contextualism’ and its status and bearing are therefore controversially 
debated (cf. e.g., Putnam 1981: 55; Rorty 1998: 2). More recently, the ‘mutability’ theorem of truth has been modified into a 
general principle of ‘conceptual relativity’ that supports the idea of a multiplicity of concurrent ‘conceptual schemes’ (e.g., Da-
vidson 1973). 
181 Consistency in contextualism is the quality of being relatively uniform – if we take writing an essay as an example, consisten-
cy is when the overall style and content of the essay turn out to be relatively uniform. Consistency must thereby be distinguished 
from ‘coherence,’ which is a category of truth fully developed only in ‘organicism.’ 
182 This is a locus of crucial difference between ‘contextualism’ and ‘mechanism’ for the latter seeks to determine a maximally 
limited set of causally highly effective features in order to explain, and typically insists on strict directionalities. ‘Contextualism’ 
counters this picture of the world by invoking multiple but in isolation only weakly determinative features, which effect all other 
features of the same context. One may therefore say that determination appears to be contextually distributed and can only be 
pointed at after the contribution of each part to the whole has been established. ‘Contextualism’ therefore possesses was William 
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ism seizes ‘articulations’ of facts and relations and because the latter, as a consequence, are usually 
regarded to be multi-directionally effective, meaning can also be extracted by eliminating interpretive 
difficulties through ‘dialectic’ logic. The context of explanation is therefore typically defined in ex-
tremely dynamic terms.183 
 Contextualism also subscribes to a ‘processual’ view of knowledge formation and corrobora-
tion.184 The reason is of course that inquiry is defined contextually and often turns out to be a collective 
endeavour that is temporally ongoing – inquiry, in other words, has ‘spread’ itself.185 The basic idea is 
that knowledge arises when knowledge claims manage to withstand prolonged inquiry and criticism. 
Contextualism thereby recognises that the removal of cognitive obstacles by one scholar in one re-
search context is most likely insufficient to guarantee the strict ‘assertability’ of the resulting proposi-
tions. Individuals might have overlooked critical cognitive barriers and/or downplayed serious incon-
sistencies; other difficulties might have been truncated by the definition of the study context itself, and 
so forth. Moreover, some inquiries may not be completely successful in removing all sources of epis-
temic obstruction, but may nevertheless furnish readings that are ‘more workable’ than those previ-
ously offered. When contextualism talks about inquiry, it hence typically pluralises it and renders it a 
time-consuming communal enterprise.186 Individual knowledge claims in contextualism therefore turn 
out to be generally ‘incomplete’ and ‘provisional’ – knowledge, as a consequence, tends to be concep-
tualised as a steady approximation of truth.187 
  Since contextualism’s operational theory of truth preserves the former’s ‘synthetic’ commit-
ment, the assessment of the cognitive status of contextualistic knowledge claims is subjected to the 
principles of holism. This means that ‘testing’ or ‘verification’ must also be holistic.188 Since nothing 
can be said with absolute certainty in contextualism, the discovery of interpretive problems during 
inquiry always threatens to tear down the entirety of the provided account, including its driving as-
sumptions, classificatory decisions, terminology, and so forth. Cognitive criticism in contextualism is 
therefore forced to accept an ‘all-or-nothing’ logic; either all cognitive obstacles can be overcome or the 
inquiry must begin anew and potentially from scratch – this also implies that researchers have to con-
stantly test out new interpretive angles and to tinker with new ways of framing their research in order 
to make sure that no difficulties have been omitted and that no alternative account can bring forth a 
description that works even better (cf. Pepper 1942: 269). Truth in this sense is only when global intel-
ligibility and contextual understanding have been reached – that is, when all references have been 
‘satisfied’ (ibid.: 268) The latter requires the specification of the place and role of each research item 
relative to its context and an exposition of how each of these items shapes other items and is shaped by 
other items.189 This general conception of knowledge corroboration has been embraced by a number of 
classic writers, most of which have been working in the ‘pragmatist’ tradition. It finds its expression for 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
James (1914: 54f.) calls the general “attitude of looking away from first things, principles, ‘categories,’ supposed necessities; and 
of looking towards last things, fruits, consequences, facts.”  
183 This interrogation yields the idea that truth itself must be amendable to the inherent dynamism of scientific questioning. 
184 This preoccupation expresses the anti-‘Cartesian’ attitude of ‘contextualistic’ conceptions of cognitive criticism – an attitude 
that is particularly hostile towards ‘mechanistic’ approaches to truth. 
185 For many ‘pragmatists,’ this has laid the ground for an explicitly ‘genetic theory of truth’ (cf. e.g., James 1914: 65f.). [the 
designation ‘genetic’ refers to ‘genesis’ here and means something along the lines of ‘developmental history’] 
186 We can say that truth-getting essentially becomes a ‘purposive act’ (sensu Pepper 1966) and ‘knowledge’ is therefore never 
merely ‘obtained’ but always made. ‘Contextualism’ acknowledges the active and inescapable role of the knower in processes of 
knowledge formation. ‘Hermeneutic’ theories of cognitive criticism take up this basic recognition – that the knowing subject 
cannot be eliminated from the context of knowing (e.g., Olesen 2013). Hermeneutics is hence nothing less than the systematic 
attempt to carry through the ‘contextualistic’ root metaphor and to analyse the ‘situatedness’ of all human knowledge as well as 
to make use of it, that is, to turn it into a cognitive virtue. The ‘hermeneutic’ concept of a historical horizon anchoring all human 
knowing is perhaps the most obvious reflection of this conception (cf. Hörisch 2010: 156f.). The core tenet of this approach to 
knowledge, accordingly, is the rejection of subject-object ontologies. For the French branch of recent ‘hermeneutic’ thought, see 
Ricoeur (1965, 2004); for the German branch, see Gadamer (1960), Habermas (1968, 1981), Apel (1979), and Oevermann 
(2001); for the Anglo-American branch, see Taylor (1971) and Geertz (1973). Foucault’s (1969,1972) ‘discourse theory’ 
[Diskurstheorie] is also ‘contextualistic’ insofar as it examines how human knowledge production is necessarily embedded in 
and regulated by specific but historically plastic ‘discursive formations.’ 
187 ‘Contextualism’ does not generally differ here from ‘formism’ although the two of course disagree about the precise reasons 
and causes for this state of affairs. Generally speaking, the ‘approximative’ view of truth is anticipated by a world theory’s ‘dis-
persive’ character and its resulting preoccupation with organising rather than integrating its evidence. 
188 This implies ‘meaning holism’ as it has for example been embraced by the ‘later’ Wittgenstein (1958) in his language philoso-
phy (compare e.g., the notion of ‘language games’). The meaning of individual words, according to this view, can only be deter-
mined by understanding their functionality in a wider sentence and language environment. This is a ‘soft’ ecology view of lan-
guage and similar ‘soft’ ecology accounts are offered by ‘contextualists’ on almost all fronts of scientific research. 
189 It is this capacity of ‘contextualism’ to provide a dense and experience-near ‘connectivist’ account of our perceptual compe-
tences that is often seen as its main cognitive achievement (e.g., Henderson 1994: 647). 
75 
 
example in the well-known Pierceian slogan that ‘truth is the end of inquiry’ or in William James’ 
(1914: 222) proclamation that “truth is satisfactory to believe.”190 
 The interpretation of truth through the lens of contextualism’s operational theory leads to 
three distinct strands of knowledge corroboration. Pepper (1942: 270-279) suggests that these original 
ways of going about the problem of contextualistic knowledge-capturing are (i) ‘successful working’ 
sensu stricto, (ii) ‘hypothetical verification,’ and (iii) ‘qualitative confirmation.’ The first strand directly 
captures the initial intuition of ‘contextualism’ and recasts corroboration as a question of immediate 
epistemic utility (ibid.: 271); this utility concerns the factual findings themselves and does not rely on 
explicit hypothesis formulation (ibid.: 272). Obviously, epistemic utility in this sense can only be as-
sessed relationally and often requires retrospective judgement. The second strand is what Pepper re-
fers to as ‘direct verification’ by means of hypotheses formation. It represents a complexification of the 
first strand but hypotheses formation remains dependent on interpretation (cf. ibid.: 273f.).191 The 
third strand, finally, stresses the importance of a ‘thickened’ account of whatever one wishes to under-
stand, so that verification consists in carrying through both the ‘quality’ and ‘texture’ of the target of 
interpretation (ibid.: 275-278).192 This often translates into a call for interpretive richness and tends 
further to complicate the stream of inquiry. 
 Although contextualists are well aware of the fact that they produce ‘situated’ knowledge and 
that each interpretive context might be unique itself, they can nonetheless legitimately mobilise their 
interpretive experience – that is, the insights they have gained from earlier inquiries – to make in-
formed speculative leaps to reach out to new contexts of inquiry (cf. Pepper 1942: 278). These leaps, 
however, may never usher the final word and rather have the status of pre-analytical hypotheses which 
help to narrow down the range of promising entry points of inquiry; their function is to define the be-
ginning of a new inquiry, not the end of it.193 Interpretive experience may also serve to intuit promising 
strategies for effectively organising the totality of evidence and to come up with suitable tactics to 
avoid the kinds of interpretive trouble previously encountered. This, together with the recognition that 
truth is always ‘processual’ and ‘historical,’ leads many contextualists to regard first-hand and object-
specific experience as a necessary precondition for successful and reliable knowledge formation.194 
The basic principle of knowledge corroboration in organicism is systematic coherence and most organ-
icists are indeed coherence theorists of truth (Pepper 1942: 310; cf. Joachim 1907: 76).195 Coherence as 
a cognitive criterion of scientific ‘validity’ gives voice to two interrelated pillars of organicistic thought: 
first, as a goal it signals that the world is accessible only in its fragmented, chaotic, and heterogeneous 
constitution (‘disintegration’); secondly, as a method it signals that the proper nature of worldly phe-
nomena can only be grasped if it is shown that this heterogeneity turns out to be productive and can be 
arranged into coherent sub-sets (‘integration’). For organicists, this account of truth is only incon-
                                                          
190 In Pragmatism: a new name for some old ways to think, James (1914: 58) adds that “[…] ideas (which themselves are but 
parts of our experience) become true just in so far as they help us to get into satisfactory relation with other parts of our experi-
ence, to summarise them and get about among them by conceptual short-cuts instead of following the interminable succession 
of particular phenomena; any idea that will carry us prosperously from one part of our experience to any other part, linking 
things satisfactorily, working securely, simplifying, saving labor […].” 
191 This dependency is critical since it distinguishes verification in ‘contextualism’ from verificationism in ‘formism’ or ‘mecha-
nism’ where the construction of an explicit and maximally transparent hypothesis is principally independent from the analysis of 
evidence (cf. Ayer 1936; Popper 1968). The formulation of testable hypotheses is sometimes regarded as a ‘psychological’ busi-
ness there, strictly distinct from empirical examination. Verification in ‘contextualism’ seeks to overcome this mind-world duali-
ty. Hypothesis in ‘contextualism’ is imbricated into analysis and turns out to be a means to ‘blaze’ the cognitive trail. 
192 The resulting interpretive accounts tend to be detailed but qualitative. It follows that interpretive accounts speaking about 
different objects in the world are difficult to compare; comparison is therefore rather generalised and mainly confronts the 
‘quality’ of the examined wholes. 
193 This issue of reaching out to new interpretive contexts and to effectively relate different contexts of inquiry provides the 
ground for one of the major internal difficulties of the theory (see Appendix II.2 for a detailed exposition). Nonetheless, this is 
one of the ways in which ‘contextualists’ may mobilise prior knowledge to make sense of new contexts and to employ corrobora-
tive strategies of ‘hypothetical verification.’ 
194 Unfortunately, this often wages ‘ad hominem’ arguments and favours tacit appeals to authority. 
195 Classic coherentist accounts of knowledge such as BonJour’s The Coherence Theory of Empirical Knowledge (1976) and The 
Structure of Empirical Knowledge (1985) stress their anti-foundational attitude as well as their intent to strengthen the authori-
ty of empirical facts (e.g., Elgin 2005). [It has to be noted, however, that BonJour subsequently turned to foundationalist view-
points again.] A central motivation of this position is to circumvent problematic mind-world dichotomisations (cf. Whitehead 
1929; Young 2016). 
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sistent as long as we conceive of reality as a static (and hence atemporal) entity. The key to the under-
standing of organicism’s proper theory of truth is therefore its conception of time and temporality 
(ibid.: 311f.). The simplest and perhaps most effective way of making use of coherence as a criterion of 
cognitive criticism is to delineate phenomena as they travel through time and to analyse their itineries 
(e.g., Thompson 2007: Chapter 7).196 Cognitive ‘veracity’ can be reached if this analysis yields a coher-
ent account of the observed temporal behaviour(s) (e.g., Bergson 1907; Simondon 1958).197 When or-
ganicists contend that something is ‘coherent,’ they hence typically mean to say that its temporal be-
haviour ‘makes sense.’198 Coherence in organicism is consistency plus: it places emphasis on locality 
and order.199 If we want to say that something is ‘true,’ this something must occupy a difference-
making place in extended spatiotemporal reality – it must be ‘bounded’ and ‘effective’ – and has to 
demonstrate organisational cohesion.200 Knowledge, according to coherence theories, is thus typically 
to be defined as the orderly consistency of a local set of truthbearers (e.g., Bradley 1914; Young 1995, 
2001; cf. Pepper 1942: 310).201  
It cannot be stressed enough that the detection and delineation of ‘effective’ local sets, that is, 
sets of facts which turn out to be arrangeable in an orderly consistent manner, is already a large part of 
the work that an organicist has to do. Not all possible sets of fact can be ordered in such a manner and 
it is in this way that organicism remains responsive to the ‘objectivity’ of fact. To show that coherence 
among a sub-set of facts can be reached therefore amounts to nothing less than a demonstration that 
the sub-set has explanatory significance.202 This is precisely how organicism typically carves out and 
defines its wholes – as ‘effective’ (but temporally extended) sub-sets of facts. The corroborative proce-
dure that organicism imposes on its advocates is therefore always ‘dialectical’ in its core: it consists of a 
constant reconciliatory movement between the selected parts and their reconstructed wholes in order 
to ascertain the cognitive significance of them both (cf. Pepper 1942: 312).203 In order to secure scien-
tific truth, organicism sets forth to isolate a meaningful assembly of ‘fragments of reality’ and to verify 
its meaningfulness by resolving these fragments into temporally structured wholes without substantial 
loss – how the fragments can be resolved is thereby a question of their ‘nexuses’ (idem; cf. Box 9). 
This corroborative strategy of organicism leads to the temporalisation of truth (Pepper 1942: 
311, 313). By temporalising truth, organicism provides substantial grounds for the idea that the ‘here 
and now’ can only be an imperfect standard of truth since the present is itself only a fragment in time 
                                                          
196 This conception is deeply sedimented in French intellectualism and is reflected in the writings of Canguilhem (1977), Badiou 
(1988) Derrida (1967, 1993), and Simondon (1964, 2014) – the problem of truth is in fact often described there as the historical 
tension between the ‘objective’ or ‘concrete’ and the ‘ideal’ in the world, which, in turn, has given credence to the notion of a 
‘history of truth’ (histoire de la vérité) (cf. Balibar 2002). 
197 This can be seen as a radical re-interpretation of the ‘contextualistic’ finding that contexts have ‘spread.’ A key difference, 
however, is that ‘organicism’ introduces a weighty asymmetry – an asymmetry that ‘contextualism’ is not ready to accept. This 
asymmetry consists in the conception that time legislates over space and is therefore primary to the latter. The temporal ‘spread’ 
of a phenomenon, in other words, is typically larger and more decisive than its spatial ‘spread’ – the former therefore typically 
conditions the latter. We can say that ‘organicism’ is mainly concerned with the analysis of the consequences of this configura-
tion. 
198 This marks a break with ‘contextualism’ insofar as the categories of ‘novelty’ and ‘change’ are re-interpreted sequentially (i.e. 
as ‘stages’), but as ‘connectors’ rather than as ‘separators.’ While ‘contextualism’ aims to provide a rich account of a whole’s 
spatiotemporal situatedness, ‘organicism’ tries to explain how different whole’s follow up on each other so that their succession 
makes sense and reveals their integratedness (which is to say that in reality, we are dealing with merely a single but ever-
transforming whole). 
199 Pepper (1942: 310) tries to capture this specific ‘organicistic’ preoccupation with coherence in the following way: “[i]n other 
views coherence may be treated as a gauge of truth but not as its essential nature. In fact, in other views than contextualism 
coherence is ordinarily confused with consistency, which is, as we know, but the formal shadow of coherence. For consistency is 
mere formal non-contradiction whereas coherence is the positive organic relatedness of material facts.” 
200 ‘Difference-making’ simply refers to the capacity of the local set to enable an understanding of the part of reality it concerns, 
which otherwise would be inconceivable. 
201 It has to be admitted that there is a tendency, especially in ‘analytic’ philosophy, to distinguish between ‘theories of truth’ and 
‘theories of epistemic justification.’ While the former specify what renders a statement true, the latter try to establish when an 
assertion is justified – the two issues often go apart. As a result, some scholars have adopted different views in the two domains, 
for example the previously mentioned BonJour (1985) who accepts ‘coherentism’ in the domain of justification but not when it 
comes to the theory of truth. The crucial point is that these cases must not concern us here because the very distinction between 
these domains is motivated by an ‘analytic’ conviction in Pepper’s sense – ‘organicists’ would not accept such a compartemental-
isation of issues of corroboration and the ‘organicistic’ world theory, consequently, is grounded in a global variant of ‘coherent-
ism.’ 
202 One can say in this way that the phenomenon is ‘conceivable’ and ‘conceivability’ can indeed be seen as a preliminary truth-
indicator in ‘organicism’ (cf. Joachim 1906: 66) – a whole that is ‘conceivable’ is sometimes referred to as a ‘significant whole’ 
(ibid.: 68, 76). 
203 This is the ‘thesis-antithesis-synthesis’ structure of all ‘organicistic’ explanations. 
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(ibid.: 308; cf. e.g., Copleston 1994 [1974]: 188).204 ‘Truth’ and ‘knowledge,’ in other words, can only 
be recovered if extended time scales are taken into account – in the extreme, organicists regard it 
hence as entirely pointless to talk about truth in an isolated given moment of time and view it instead 
as a property of the longue durée.205 This involves the idea that ‘conflict’ and ‘contradiction,’ although 
they belong to the categorical architecture of organicism and are therefore presumed to reflect a struc-
tural characteristic of all reality, only persist in the moment or when time is ‘mangled’ and ‘mutilated’ 
(cf. esp. Bergson 1922); to ascertain coherency thus simply means to show that ‘conflict’ and ‘contra-
diction’ disappear when we shift our temporal perspective in proper ways.206 This is the signification of 
‘integration’ in organicism – the theory stresses the possibility and ultimate inevitability of integration 
but insists on the fact that such integration takes time.207 
Organicistic knowledge corroboration consequently rests on the ability of scholars to elucidate 
how the ‘progressive’ categories of a phenomenon irreversibly remove the remaining structural coun-
teractions and make progressively room for the ‘ideal’ categories to fulfil themselves.208 Knowledge is 
only conclusive if the gap between ‘progressive’ and ‘ideal’ categories is closed, so that the two cannot 
be told apart anymore (cf. ibid.: 314).209  
 The general character of coherence-based knowledge results from the organicistic root meta-
phor of the living being as a unity that ‘breathes,’ ‘struggles,’ ‘develops,’ ‘learns,’ and ‘adapts.’210 This 
picture culminates in the view that truth and knowledge can never be evaluated based on a single con-
densed proposition or a limited number thereof,211 for there is nothing in the world that could be said 
to render such a proposition ‘true.’212 Instead, the ‘credibility’ of an interpretive account must be 
gauged by apprehending it as an organic whole with many vital parts itself.213 These parts are typically 
identified as propositions and sub-propositions, arguments, descriptions, and other instrumental fea-
tures of the analysis (cf. Joachim 1906: 37); organicism seeks to show that these organically stick to-
gether and form a perfectly interdependent whole.214 The truth conditions of assertive propositions are 
therefore mainly to be found in other propositions (cf. e.g., Williams 1980). It follows that a knowledge 
claim is definable as a coherent bundle of many such propositions215 – coherence, in other words, 
comes into view as the character of a structured mesh of propositions exhibiting a sound organisation-
                                                          
204 This realisation has led many ‘organicists’ to propose that the ‘present’ is merely an illusion, created by the limitation of 
human temporal existence and perception; in reality, what we call the ‘present’ is always pregnant with the future and also en-
compasses the totality of its effective past. Henri Bergson’s (1907) interpretation of time as duration provides a classic example 
here. 
205 Needless to say, this conception is terribly at odds with the ‘uniformitarian’ agenda of mechanism and the ‘eternalist-
universalist’ preoccupation of ‘formism.’ 
206 From the perspective of ‘contextualism’ one may say that ‘conflict’ and ‘contradiction’ are thereby shown to be part of the 
‘texture’ of a temporal phenomenon rather than being characteristic of its ‘quality.’ Of course, heterogeneity thereby not simply 
‘disappears’ or ‘vanishes’ but is rather shown to be ordered in such a way that it enables the ‘homogenisation’ and ‘crystallisa-
tion’ of the whole. 
207 Typically, this is simply done by showing how the initial conflicting set of propositions is gradually integrated into a relatively 
coherent set. 
208 Strictly speaking, ‘coherence’ is itself an ‘ideal’ category and can thus never fully be realised, so that knowledge corroboration 
attempts to approximate it; this is another reason why it may be wiser to speak about ‘consistency plus’ here. 
209 It is very likely that that this condition can in principle never be reached because it would force the theory to resolve its own 
structural footing which, in turn, would lead to the theory’s ultimate collapse (see Appendix II.2 for a detailed exposition of 
this difficulty). The consequence is that ‘organicism’ can only author inconclusive knowledge and must accept that it works 
towards a goal which it can probably never reach. This, of course, is not necessarily a problem and may in fact explain why scien-
tific inquiry will never become dispensable, but it implies that ‘organicisitc’ knowledge claims can only be judged in light of other 
competing ‘organicisitc’ knowledge claims – in terms of their relative capacity to close the gap between the ‘progressive’ and 
‘ideal’ categories of a phenomenon. 
210 Cf. Bergson (1907) and Canguilhem (1969) as life-theoretical prototypes (cf. e.g., Exteberria 2018 for a useful overview of 
these and similar ‘organicistic’ tropes in philosophy). 
211 The term ‘proposition’ is not used in a technical sense here but simply refers to whatever might be a possible bearer of truth – 
what these are typically differs between ‘organicists;’ in fact – as we see below – to identification of relevant truthbearers is part 
of the work that the theory does. 
212 For the specific view of ‘information’ which is tied to this approach, see e.g., Barthélémy (2015: 32-37). 
213 The ‘organcisitic’ whole is therefore a ‘living whole’ which is highly dynamic and may continuously transform, but in a self-
contained manner (cf. Joachim 1907: 80) – this is the contrast to be drawn to a ‘contextualistic’ whole which is also structured 
but not necessarily in temporally coherent fashion. 
214 Knowledge claims are hence interpreted as irreducibly complex living systems can only be judged in their systematicity and 
self-sustainability. 
215 This conception, almost by definition, predisposes ‘organicism’ to host highly complex knowledge claims which themselves 
are only intelligible in their propositional and argumentative structure. The resulting type of knowledge is often difficult to 
comprehend for the ‘analytic’ world theories since they are conditioned to simple and directly testable ‘atomistic’ statements. 
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al logic.216 Harold Joachim (1906: 76) has given a now classic voice to this general conception: “[t]ruth 
in its essential nature is that systematic coherence which is the character of a significant whole.” Many 
coherentists would indeed posit that any given belief is true if and only if it is part of a coherent sys-
tem of beliefs (cf. Blanshard 1939; Cornelius 1972).217 Organicistic ‘beliefs’ are thus typically interpre-
tive verdicts about a fact – with Pepper (1942: 308), we can say that “[e]very fragment [of reality] is a 
judgement referring to a fact, the reference being represented by the nexus” (emphasis added).218 
 Just like in ‘contextualism,’ knowledge corroboration in organicism is generally ‘internalistic.’ 
The strategy, to recall, is to show that the internal heterogeneity of the individuated whole – a tempo-
rally extended phenomenon – is a heterogeneity among its parts that makes sense if the whole is ex-
amined in its ‘development,’ ‘genesis,’ ‘growth,’ evolutionary ‘differentiation,’ and/or ‘integration’ 
(Pepper 1942: 312f.). Since coherence stresses ‘locality’ – organicists seek to map localised wholes – it 
also rejects notions of strong ‘catholicity’ in knowledge corroboration.219 Knowledge claims have to 
take stock of domain- and object-specificities – that is, they have to address how ‘modes of being’ in-
teract with ‘modes of becoming’ (e.g., Souriau 2009 [1942]; Simondon 1958; cf. Latour 2011).220 More 
often than not, organicistic explanations consist precisely in demonstrating how object-specific capaci-
ties, potentials, and behaviours lead to specific realisations of more general or even universal devel-
opmental trajectories. This reading of the evidence lends support to the idea that time itself is object-
specific, so that object-specific temporalities can be invoked to understand how different objects be-
have in time (e.g., Deleuze 1966, 1968; cf. Smith 2013).221 Inherent organisational complexities of the 
examined objects can then be viewed as factors that enable insight rather than block it. Moreover, the 
focus on the object-specificity of behaviours, tendencies, capacities, potentialities, and so forth re-
quires organicists to embark on extensive and often intricate argumentative journeys. Quite regularly, 
therefore, qualitative argumentation and general considerations about structural constraints and pos-
sibilities (‘nexuses’) emerge as the key instruments to secure the ‘organic’ coherency of assertive 
statements.222 
This chapter has shown that Pepper’s map of cognitive tendencies provides a readily usable and ex-
tremely valuable tool to better understand general differences in how scholars harness evidence and 
                                                          
216 This notion of ‘logic’ indeed often features central in ‘organicistic’ accounts; it gives a general voice to the intuition of organi-
cally inter-related parts that resonate with the whole. That these relations exhibit a certain ‘logic’ is another way of saying that 
they make sense in an ‘orderly consistent’ manner. The cognitive appeal to ‘logic’ is hence structural (it has nothing to do with 
formal or symbolic logic as it is used by the ‘analytic’ theories) and often synonymous to appealing to ‘coherence’ (cf. e.g., Bal-
andier 1974). 
217 ‘Organicistic’ truth is therefore often localised as a property of what Quine and Ullian (1978) have famously termed the ‘Web 
of Beliefs.’ 
218 In the eyes of the ‘analytic’ world theories, such talk is seen as rather ‘esoteric’ since these theories typically deny the rele-
vance (and sometimes even existence) of object-intrinsic potentialities as shapers of reality. 
219 It has to be said, however, that ‘organicism’ clearly accepts universal rules and somewhat generalisable patterns of develop-
ment (the theory is anti-‘nominalistic’ in this sense). Yet, ‘organicism’ suggests that the respective ‘rule sets’ or ‘patterns’ are 
realised in object-specific ways and can typically only be shown to apply in retrospect – they can, in other words, be ‘diagnosed’ 
but not strictly predicted; prediction of developmental patterns is in fact only possible in a very general sense, without stipulat-
ing specific behaviours or if-then clauses. In contrast to ‘mechanism,’ ‘organicism’ is primarily concerned with the ‘inertias’ of its 
objects and focuses on how universal principles drag specific objects or phenomena, not how they propel them. 
220 The classic reading is that a single ‘mode of becoming’ tied to a given object-specific evolutionary lineage gives rise to a multi-
plicity of different ‘modes of being.’ In fact, ‘organicism’ would interpret a unique ‘contextualistic’ situationality as one such 
‘mode of being,’ as a spatiotemporally specific manifestation of a more general ‘mode of becoming.’ However, the numerical and 
logical relationship between ‘modes of becoming’ and ‘modes of being’ cannot be determined a priori and ‘organicists’ would 
generally content that these a precisely the kinds of empirical questions we would have to ask in order to advance of knowledge 
about the world. 
221 This is another reason why truth in ‘organicism’ cannot be pinned down in time and why the ‘mechanistic’ conception of a 
‘field of locations’ existing independently of particulars (i.e. material objects) makes no sense in ‘organicistic’ world theories; 
‘organicism’ instead supports time-‘subjectivism’ insofar as we can say that each object-specific developmental trajectory inau-
gurates its own specific ‘field of locations.’ ‘Organicism’ is the world theory that is most radical in openly advocating extreme 
spatiotemporal relativity (something which is ironic given that Einstein’s theory of relativity is typically interpreted in ‘mecha-
nistic’ terms). 
222 The attentive reader will realise that qualitative ‘argumentation’ rather than argumentative ‘data matching’ emerges as the 
modus demonstrandum here. We will come back to this issue in Chapter 3, but it can already be said that the difference is ex-
tremely important for characterising the tension between ‘analytic’ and ‘synthetic’ world hypotheses. A key aspect is that ‘argu-
ments’ serve a different purpose in ‘synthetic’ theories because they need to ensure ‘consistency’ or ‘coherence,’ which often 
requires a cognitive appeal to general principles of human rationality (this is exactly why these theories often appear to be 
overly ‘rationalistic’ to the ‘analytic’ world theories). 
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make sense of the world. Pepper convincingly elucidates that Western intellectual history has hitherto 
produced four larger families of thought which delineate relatively adequate world theories – ‘form-
ism,’ ‘mechanism,’ ‘contextualism,’ and ‘organicism.’ Each of these world theories is cognitively potent 
in its own right, but relies on a unique conceptual architecture and a specific theory of cognitive criti-
cism. This means that these theories not only differ in how they generate and interpret evidence but 
also in how they make sure that their knowledge claims are resilient. The illumination of the intimate 
interdependence of a world theory’s structural categories and its theory of truth is a major revenue of 
Pepper’s metatheoretical perspective on the human systematic cognition.  
The strict autonomy of world hypotheses which arises from this configuration makes it clear 
that the four relatively adequate world theories vary on almost all levels of inquiry and are not reduci-
ble to one another. Moreover, each of the theories is only adequate to the effect that no other world 
theory has shown greater cognitive adequacy yet. The latter implies that all four world theories are 
defective to a certain extent and face serious internal inconsistencies. ‘Formism,’ ‘mechanism,’ ‘contex-
tualism,’ and ‘organicism’ are therefore equally successful and equally fallible in rendering the world 
intelligible. It follows that one cannot retreat from the plurality of modes of thought to be taken seri-
ously, and there is no ground for discarding any of them. 
 The scientific enterprise is of course no exception and remains conditioned by the same struc-
tural characteristics; science is simply a highly systematised, critical, and refined mode of mobilising 
world theories – a view that en passant helps to counteract the ‘sacralisation’ of science as an almost 
supra-human endeavour. From this perspective, the actual diversity of scientific approaches appears to 
be a symptom of employing different world theories and combining them in various ways. Moreover, 
the mere notion of ‘science’ becomes hollow if not defined in relation to a world theory. Concepts of 
scientificity consequently rise and fall with the relative cognitive adequacy of their world theories. This 
not only defuses the ‘demarcation problem,’ but also establishes a more nuanced understanding of 
cognitive diversity in scientific research; it allows us to appreciate relativity without falling prey to 
unconstrained relativism.  
As the chapter has shown in some detail, although there may be a vast number of irreducible 
world theories not all of them are necessary trustworthy. Cognitive adequacy is a non-arbitrary feature 
only of the most promising theories, those which have shown great reliability and the capacity to refine 
themselves by withstanding cognitive scrutiny throughout Western intellectual history – ‘formism,’ 
‘mechanism,’ ‘contextualism,’ and ‘organicism.’ This non-accidental diversity of different modes of 
‘world-making’ brings into view the ‘disunity of science’ and puts the notion of scientific pluralism on 
a new metatheoretical footing. Major divergences in scientific theory and practice should consequently 
become re-interpretable in light of Pepper’s world hypotheses theory – such epistemological divisions 
should be reconstructable by referring to Pepper’s conceptual vocabulary. 
An important consequence of this view on the nature of science is that ‘disciplines,’ ‘fields,’ and 
other kinds of research consortia are not necessarily homogenous entities. The relationship between 
Pepper’s world theories and the social and epistemological contexts of scientific practice – e.g., what 
has variously been termed as ‘research programmes’ (sensu Lakatos 1970) or ‘research traditions’ (sen-
su Laudan 1977) – is far from straightforward.223 Quite often, in fact, the boundaries between different 
modes of ‘world-making’ and the borders of scientific disciplines stand oblique to each other. Discipli-
nary frameworks tend to host a multitude of world hypotheses and this, in turn, can be considered an 
important motor of lively debate and mutual criticism (cf. e.g., Gillespie 1982; Hayes et al. 1988; Daley 
2000; Karimi-Aghdam 2016). Yet, scientific disciplines also tend to seize and occasionally even ‘mo-
nopolise’ particular modes of ‘world-making’ – this is what is sometimes tagged as the ‘received view’ 
in a discipline. These trends typically propel critical sociological and historical dynamics that strongly 
influence the overall character of different scientific endeavours. Disciplinary and intra-disciplinary 
diversification can thus probably be much better understood as an expression of world theory negotia-
tion (see e.g., Harrell 1982) – in other words, distinct socio-cognitive sub-units of research – i.e., what 
                                                          
223 Although I cannot discuss this problem in much detail here, there are some more obvious possibilities to link the two. In the 
case of Lakatosian ‘research programmes,’ for example, it is possible to make use of the distinction between a research pro-
gramme’s hard core – that is, its basic and most essential ideas – and its protective belt – that is, its less fundamental and more 
‘operative’ ideas typically used to apply the ‘core’ to actual phenomena. In the case of ‘research programmes,’ we would hence 
need to isolate the ‘hard core’ if we wish to lay bare basic aspects of ‘world-making’ as described by Pepper’s world hypotheses. 
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Ludwik Fleck (1979 [1935]) termed Denkgemeinschaften – might ultimately be powered by vastly dis-
tinct world hypotheses and different eclectic tendencies. 
From this vantage point, it is also much easier to retrace why and how different disciplines can 
relate to one another in constructive and beneficial ways; mapping the dynamics of how world theories 
inform scientific approaches in the various contexts of science may thus help to elucidate how the ‘in-
terdisciplinary landscape’ of science is organised and has developed through time.224 The intimate 
interplay between axes of epistemic and normative orientation established by the four relatively ade-
quate world theories plays an important role in this. The general epistemic and normative anchoring 
provided by world theories pre-structures the research landscape and predefines potential partners, 
‘cognate’ fields or disciplines, and/or antagonistic formations of research. For instance, co-evolution 
and ideational exchange between different disciplines or research traditions is much more likely to 
occur within a broadly shared framework of ‘world-making.’ Needless to say, the charted structural 
affinities and trade-offs between the four relatively adequate world hypotheses constitute crucial loci of 
epistemic convergence and divergence in this regard. It follows that disciplinary interactions and 
transdisciplinary theoretical developments are likely to be explorable with the toolkit mustered by 
Pepper’s world hypotheses theory; this could potentially result in new ‘topological maps’ of various 
research endeavours. It should even be possible to investigate, at least tentatively, whether and how 
various disciplines have contributed to the cognitive advancement of the four main root metaphors: 
‘similarity,’ ‘cause-and-effect,’ ‘situationality,’ and ‘being alive.’ 
All of these insights can be drawn upon to better understand what is at stake when disparate 
approaches invariably clash in scientific practice. The following chapters try to do precisely this. They 
represent an attempt to re-organise the diversity of approaches to the lithic evidence that are encoun-
tered when French and Anglophone research in Palaeolithic archaeology is taken into account. I will 
use the concepts and categories developed in the present chapter to throw new light on the nature of 
plurality exposed by the French-Anglophone divide. Although I will surely make mistakes, the reader 
is trusted to recognise the larger merits of my undertaking. We will begin with an exposition of the 
general structure of the French-Anglophone divide in lithic analysis before turning to the bearing of 





                                                          
224 The term ‘interdisciplinary landscape’ refers both to mutualistic interdisciplinary cooperation and to unilateral conceptual 
import dynamics. The ‘interdisciplinary landscape’ of science thereby defines how likely it is that different disciplines, fields, or 
sub-fields productive engage with one another and borrow or share their cognitive resources. Concepts such as ‘cognate’ 
fields/disciplines become comprehensible only if this ‘interdisciplinary landscape’ of science is understood. Co-evolutionary 




What can we learn from Pepper’s construal of Western thought about the nature of the French-
Anglophone divide? Most importantly, it allows us to recognise that irreconcilable lithic knowledge 
claims may have their origin in incompatible yet equally pregnant world hypotheses. The circumstance 
that French and Anglophone researchers regularly produce divergent interpretations of the lithic evi-
dence can then be taken as an indication that their polarised readings are powered by different world 
theories or combinations thereof. This, in turn, suggests that the kinds of underdetermination we en-
counter at the French-Anglophone interface practically prohibit the independent selection of a particu-
lar world theory perspective. Clearly, this proposition deserves assessment.  
“When a conception permeates a thought collective strongly enough, so that it 
penetrates as far as everyday life and idiom and has become a viewpoint in the 
literal sense of the word, any contradiction appears unthinkable and unimagina-
ble […] The same difficulty arises even today if such concepts as existence, reality, 
and truth are used in an absolute sense.” 
– Ludwik Fleck (1979 [1935]: 28) 
 
“Cognition therefore means, primarily, to ascertain those results which must 
follow, given certain preconditions. The preconditions correspond to active link-
ages and constitute that portion of cognition belonging to the collective. The con-
strained results correspond to passive linkages and constitute that which is expe-
rienced as objective reality. The act of ascertaining is the contribution of the indi-
vidual.” 






We have also learned that the general structure of credible Western cognition generally pre-
disposes scholars to either adopt an ‘analytic’ or ‘synthetic’ logic of world-making. Because French and 
Anglophone lithic research seem to uphold disparate discursive spaces and because there is a general 
interest of cultivating interpretive tension while still nurturing cognitive complementarity, the ‘analyt-
ic’-‘synthetic’ polarity is thus expected to be a stronger organisational factor than, say, the ‘dispersive’-
‘integrative’ opposition among world theories. The resulting cognitive dynamics, mainly regulated by 
the ‘analytic’-‘synthetic’ divide, would pre-structure the cognitive space that the two research tradi-
tions can fill. For these reasons, it has merit to approach the French-Anglophone divide in lithic in-
quiry as a clash of ‘analytic’ and ‘synthetic’ modes of cognition. Pepper’s reconstruction of Western 
cognition, in other words, provides us with plausible arguments to surmise that the bifurcation of the 
lithic research landscape into French and Anglophone approaches is closely related to mutually exclu-
sive world theory underpinnings. It furnishes a well-defined hypothesis that can be tested against the 
realities of lithic practice.  
The hypothesis that the French-Anglophone divide represents a particular instance of the ‘ana-
lytic’-‘synthetic’ thought-polarity comprises two additional expectations. We should not only be able to 
break down the variability of practice between the two research spheres, but also shed new light on the 
nature of their internal variability. If the ‘analytic’-‘synthetic’ polarity accounts for some general fea-
tures of the divide, some of the pertinent internal dynamics of French and Anglophone lithic research 
should be explainable in terms of the trade-offs between the two attributed pairs of world theories: 
French lithic approaches should rely on ‘contextualistic’ and ‘organicistic’ ways of marshalling the evi-
dence; Anglophone inquiry, by contrast, should be characterised by ‘formistic’ and ‘mechanistic’ re-
gimes of handling the evidence. This hypothesis, however, does not suggest that French and Anglo-
phone approaches are necessarily successful in pursuing their cognitive ideal, nor does it imply that all 
practitioners will always be guided by ‘pure’ world hypotheses incarnations – we are, after all, dealing 
with cognitive orientations here. The hypothesised structural organisation of the French-Anglophone 
divide is outlined in Figure 2. 
 Importantly, this novel perspective on the French-Anglophone divide offers not merely a re-
description of well-known differences, but clears the view for their cognitive significance. If the divide 
is the result of different world hypotheses at work, this would elucidate both its status and its stakes, 
enabling a more productive discussion of how it can successfully be navigated or bridged. Moreover, if 
the divide turns out to be powered by world theory dynamics, this would highlight the central role of 
research communities – or ‘collectives of thought’ – in lithic knowledge production, for only these are 
capable of developing and refining world hypotheses (see Chapters 2 and 6). Therefore, hypothesising 
that the French-Anglophone divide is generated by divergent world theory regimes involves an argu-
ment about the socio-historical nature of the divergence. The divide would then signify a true chasm of 
research communities occupying barely overlapping discursive spaces and cultivating their own cogni-
tive tenacities (see Chapter 1). The divide, if reconstructed along these lines, would also come into view 
as a product of dissimilar historical efforts of rendering the available evidence intelligible. Through 
this prism, the clearly distinct historical trajectories of the two research spheres can be re-interpreted 
as an attempt to refine different sets of root metaphors (see Chapter 2), again suggesting that the epis-
temological grounds for lithic research have drifted apart. 
 The remainder of this chapter explores the first part of this hypothesis; it asks whether the 
general structure of the French-Anglophone divide can fruitfully be illuminated by drawing on Pep-
per’s distinction between ‘analytic’ and ‘synthetic’ modes of world-making. I will refer to a number of 
case studies and discuss some key topics to examine this question. The analysis will remain rather 
general since the demonstration that the difficult relationship between French and Anglophone ap-
proaches in lithic research is created by a conflict between different species of world theories can only 
be the first step. The chapter is consequently a prelude of what follows. It seeks to chart the general 
organisation of the divide in order to legitimise a finer-grained analysis of its constitutive elements or 
building blocks. In other words, we first have to understand the basic logic of the divide before we can 
grasp the dynamics that guide particular cases of research within the two spheres. If the hypothesis is 
supported by the available evidence, this would not only shed new light on the nature of the relation-
ship between French and Anglophone research traditions, but also substantiate the reality and episte-
mological weight of the division. 
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Can the general structure of the French-Anglophone divide be clarified by reference to the cognitive 
dichotomy between ‘analytic’ and ‘synthetic’ modes of reasoning? And if so, how exactly is the dichot-
omy implicated in lithic practice on both sides? In what way, precisely, does it structure the divide and 
sustains epistemological friction? In order to answer these kinds of questions, we need to recall that 
‘analytic’ and ‘synthetic’ research are difficult to reconcile because they conceptualise the role and sta-
tus of ‘parts’ and ‘wholes’ in an oppositional manner; they, in other words, reject each other’s basic 
standards of knowledge formation and criticism. From an ‘analytic’ perspective, parts are seen as the 
primary building blocks of reality and wholes as composed or derived entities, inferable from part-
configurations. From the vantage point of ‘synthetic’ inquiry, wholes instead legislate over their parts 
and are thus considered a necessary precondition for the respective parts to occur in reality – wholes 
are ‘more than the sum of their parts’ in some relevant sense. As a consequence, ‘analytic’ approaches 
typically rely on corroborative strategies in which parts are mapped onto hypothesised wholes in order 
to evaluate whether the two ‘match’ or ‘follow’ from each other; ‘synthetic’ approaches, by contrast, 
tend to promote corroborative criteria that emphasise the whole-qualities of the advanced knowledge 
claims.225 In the context of the French-Anglophone divide, we therefore need to examine what the re-
spective parts and wholes in lithic research are and what their function in the research process is. This 
task is not as easy as one may assume and requires a careful investigation of some basic features of 
French and Anglophone lithic inquiry. 
 I will start with a basic examination of how lithic assemblages are usually recorded and stud-
ied. What is the role of individual artefacts? And which type of information is gathered in order to re-
construct the assemblage-totality? I will then move to more general aspects of lithic research; the anal-
ysis will concentrate on the general quality of applied research designs and the adopted patterns of 
inference. What is the rationale that guides the architecture of lithic research? What is the general 
strategy of inference? This investigation leads me to the problematic relationship between theory and 
data. What can generally count as data in French and Anglophone lithic research? What is the status of 
theory and how does it relate to data-analysis? Is the distinction even significant? In a third step, we 
will explore whether, and if so, how ‘analytic’ and ‘synthetic’ research orientations are reflected in 
French and Anglophone visualisation practices. What is the nature and role of lithic imagery? Do 
French and Anglophone scholars adopt similar visual strategies or do they instead rely on distinct ‘im-
age-worlds’ in order to interpret their evidence? In the last step, I will discuss two concrete case stud-
ies in order to illustrate how the ‘analytic’-‘synthetic’ divide affects the basic character of the lithic dis-
course and empirical research. It is explored whether, and if so, how the divide is implicated in the 
treatment of lithic variability and the interpretation of technological complexity. In total, the exposi-
tion should provide a general introduction to the epistemological relevance of the ‘analytic’-‘synthetic’ 
polarity in lithic knowledge production. It will set the scene for a more detailed investigation of lithic 
practice in both research spheres reported in Chapters 4 and 5. 
In the practice of lithic analysis, the difficult relationship between ‘analytic’ and ‘synthetic’ cognition 
can be expected to result in at least four sites of interpretive friction. These concern (i) the kinds and 
types of data which are to be retrieved from the source material; (ii) the localisation of the relevant 
bearers of information; (iii) the relevant unit(s) of analysis; and (iv) the preferred direction of infer-
ence. The example of recording lithic assemblages – a necessary precondition of analysing and inter-
preting the respective artefacts – illustrates some notable effects of policing these conceptual coordi-
nates in a divergent manner. It is important to note that the differential handling of these four sites 
affects lithic inquiry already at the stage of processing the source material, before any proper method-
guided data-analysis can be conducted. The resulting differences in the logic of research are bound to 
often poorly theorised, because taken-for granted, yet crucial practices of extracting information from 
the lithic assemblages under study. These practices respond to the question of how one can transform 
                                                          
225 See Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion. 
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the artefactual evidence into a data-format that can be reliably digested in order to assess the general 
character of a given assemblage, ideally answering particular research questions. The key aspects of 
this process are so basic and so deeply ingrained that they are rarely explained in detail in the litera-
ture. The reason is of course that data construction is typically thought to respond directly to the cho-
sen methodologies. In reality, however, preparing the lithic data and selecting the appropriate meth-
od(s) to investigate them are often not clearly separable. Both co-implicate each other and to ask which 
of them is primary is to ask the old chicken-or-egg question.226 The basic kinds of information that are 
gathered from the lithic material constrain and respond to methodological needs at the same time. It is 
for this reason that an investigation of basic recording practices in lithic research is clearly warranted, 
promising some interesting insights into the nature of lithic inquiry on both sides of the divide. 
 What is the basic strategy of recording an assemblage in French and Anglophone lithic re-
search? The straightforward answer is that Anglophone scholars tend to adopt a ‘piece-by-piece’ mode 
of recording, whereas French technologists typically favour an ‘assemblage-based’ strategy. But what 
does this mean exactly? It means that in Anglophone lithic research the relevant information is located 
in lithic ‘parts,’ which are defined as objects – individual lithic artefacts themselves – or parts of ob-
jects. The result is that the analysis is generally ‘object-centred,’ either transferring objects directly into 
discrete variables or documenting their parts as ‘traits,’ ‘attributes,’ and ‘features’ (e.g., Dibble 1995a: 
103; Sackett 1999: 115; Armagan 2003: Appendix A, B [271-284]; Shea 2013: Appendix 2 [335-
345]).227 When Anglophone researchers speak about recording the whole of an assemblage, they nor-
mally mean to record every single piece individually (cf. Clarke 1968: 187; Binford and Binford 
1966).228 Of course, a size-threshold is sometimes introduced for practical reasons, but the present 
micro-débitage is typically not ignored. The important point is that the informational value of a lithic 
artefact is conceptually independent from the quality of the assemblage-totality:  
The reason is that the quality of the assemblage-totality is believed to be the result of the (accumulat-
ed) character of its parts. The assemblage is primarily recognised as a compositional entity – as a ‘de-
rived’ feature of reality. This conception is directly reflected in the dominant practices of assemblage 
screening. The ‘object-centred’ approach does not rely on visual or physical inter-artefact confronta-
tions. The typical procedure is to unpack a single artefact, inspect and document its features, perhaps 
assign it to a general class of objects, and then pack it away again.229 This approach emphasises analyt-
ical redundancy – all objects are checked for the same traits and attributes – and the comparability of 
individual artefacts and recorded characteristics:230  
                                                          
226 An important reason for the co-implication of data construction and the choice of research methodology is historical. Within 
a given research community, the two dimensions of inquiry are expected to develop in tandem and to adapt to each other in the 
course of disciplinary history. Because practices of data construction are ‘inherited’ to the same degree as, say, preferences for 
particular types of research methods, it becomes practically impossible to determine which of the two dictates the other. A more 
plausible scenario is that different research traditions coordinate their possibilities of data construction and their pool of pre-
ferred types of methodologies, so that the two can effectively support each other. 
227 This procedure is typically implied by the various trait- and type-lists provided in method sections or in extended appendices: 
they detail the kinds of artefact-level characteristics that are recorded and outline how they have been recorded (cf. e.g., Henry 
1995: Appendices 8.1-8.17 [196-214]; Monigal 2002: 143-199; Scott 2011: Appendix; Tostevin 2012: 120-137 [esp. 120]; Byrd 
2013: Wenban-Smith 2017a, 2017b; McPherron et al. 2018: 118-121). 
228 Historically important studies that have paved the way for an ‘object-centred’ approach to the lithic evidence in the Anglo-
phone world are Spaulding (1953) and Sackett (1966). 
229 One may say that the confrontation of features and objects is already part of data-analysis. It is therefore not required at the 
data construction stage of lithic inquiry. 
230 Consequently, the recording process itself does not depend on the size or completeness of the studied assemblages. 
“Study of the artefact collection initially involved going through each artefact in turn, check-
ing and recording its provenance, and recording the range of data identified at the outset as 
relevant for analysis.” (Wenban-Smith 2017b: 325). 
“The data of the discipline is the information observed about the attributes of these arte-
facts. […] The total information from these sensory spheres of activity feed observations 
about all these attributes into the third sphere of synthesis and fit the best model or 
hypothesis to the observations for further testing. […] Briefly, it is imperative to realise 
that ‘perceived facts’ or attributes are necessarily facts or attributes selected from a vast 
range possessed by every simple artefact. We may choose to perceive length, breadth, 
thickness and weight of a handaxe but we may not choose to perceive or to be aware of 
its chemical composition, its temperature, radioactivity, elasticity, refractive index and 
so on.” (Clarke 1968: 14f.) 
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In French technological research, by contrast, the relationship between ‘parts’ and ‘wholes’ is 
extremely dynamic. An isolated recording of individual lithic artefacts and their characteristics, with-
out having established the assemblage-context first, is highly uncommon, some would certainly say 
unthinkable. The reason is that the signification of parts cannot be established without having grasped 
some whole-qualities. This is perhaps most clearly reflected in the widely-adopted habit of spreading 
the entirety of the studied assemblage on table boards for visual cross-reference and direct physical 
confrontation (e.g., Tixier 1978, 1988; Villa et al. 2005: Fig 5; Soriano et al. 2007, 2015).231 In practice, 
this horizontal exposition of the artefact-totality is also used to pre-arrange and pre-sort the assem-
blage into potentially meaningful sub-groups (e.g., technical, functional, typological, mineralogical). 
This logic of research incentivises scholars to find effective groupings of artefacts before they actually 
decide which lithic features and characteristics they wish to document in detail, if any. The point is 
that each lithic artefact has an informational value only in terms of its relatedness to other artefacts. 
This condition already anticipates that the same artefact characteristics can have a fundamentally dif-
ferent bearing in different assemblage-contexts (cf. esp. Perlès 1992: 243, Note 22).232 Whether and 
how they should be recorded is therefore ultimately decided by the ‘whole,’ and may thus differ from 
assemblage to assemblage.  
It must be emphasised that this process of assemblage exposition, artefact sorting, and con-
stant re-grouping appears to be a necessary precondition of lithic analysis in the French tradition.233 It 
not only indicates that the determination of significant wholes and sub-wholes is an essential building 
block of French technological inquiry, but also makes clear that ‘parts’ cannot stand for themselves.234 
Primarily recorded are technical relationships and artefact-group interactions rather than discrete 
attributes, measures, or traits.235 The informational value of an assemblage is therefore regarded to 
reside in the ‘whole’ of the assemblage rather than in its ‘parts.’ The assemblage, qua technological 
entity, is viewed to be ‘more than the sum of its parts.’ Lithic recording is not only a pre-analytical 
practice, it also furnishes some critical pre-understandings of assemblage-level qualities.236 
An important consequence of this difference is that in French scholarship describing an as-
semblage does not necessarily imply to describe all of the associated artefacts. A complete description 
rather entails the adequate characterisation of the assemblage’s ‘wholeness,’ specifying the place of as 
many individual artefacts as possible.237 French technological research thus typically adopts an ‘as-
semblage-centred’ approach to the lithic evidence. Its mode of inquiry is holistic, lithic recording being 
                                                          
231 Note that this information is often deeply hidden somewhere in method sections, footnotes, or figure captions; it is often not 
even explicitly mentioned because it has become such a commonplace practice among French lithic experts. It is thus perhaps 
especially telling that Paola Villa, originally trained in the United States, began emphasising this dimension of chaîne opératoire 
analysis when she started working intensively with French technologists: “[…] An efficient technological analysis requires that 
all pieces be taken out of their separate packets, marked with square and level and/or catalogue number and spread out to speed 
up the process of grouping in discrete categories while also checking for consistency in classification” (Villa et al. 2005: captions 
Fig. 5). 
232 See the first part of Chapter 5 for a detailed discussion. 
233 It is for this reason that the practice of ‘living and sitting with’ both a visually and physically exposed lithic assemblage for 
days or even months is such a crucial process in French technological research. 
234 See especially Valentin (1995: Annexes [1-19]), where the author develops a specific vocabulary to tackle the problem of de-
scribing and interpreting whole-level characteristics; the latter are not directly observable, if you will, in individual artefacts. In 
the case of Valentin, these characteristics have to do with the volumetric management of core matrices (see esp. idem: Fig. 6). 
The various modes of ‘volumetric management’ always implicate multiple different artefacts and there is no direct artefact-level 
correlate for them. 
235 The circumstance that the confrontation with other artefacts is a primary operation in French lithic recording leads to the 
somewhat paradoxical situation that artefacts themselves, although they clearly constitute assemblage-parts, need to be ob-
served in their ‘wholeness,’ only then can they be meaningfully juxtaposed with other artefacts. The reduction of artefacts to 
mere numbers and attributes is generally inconsistent with this requirement. Tixier (2012 [1978]: 122), for example, notes that 
“[…] perception – whereby sight plays the dominant role – and near simultaneous overall identification lead to a comprehen-
sive, a sometimes syncretic, understanding. The overall identification is altogether faster if the observer has a long practice or 
experience of the dialogue which takes place between a prehistorian and flint, which consists of the semi-unconscious register-
ing of a multitude of visual images and tactual sensations” (original italics changed to underlining). The key point is that the 
‘tactual’ and ‘visual’ Gestalt of a lithic piece is indispensable information itself. 
236 Needless to say, Anglophone researchers sometimes also spread their material on a table board. The point, however, is not 
whether they do it or not, but whether this practice makes a difference in how they record and interpret the evidence. An exam-
ple is raw material units whose determination often requires the ‘horizontal examination’ of the artefact-totality. Yet, this exam-
ination typically effects only a single attribute, namely an individual artefact’s raw material association. The rest of the recorded 
traits and attributes remains independent of this examination. One can add that there is a recent trend to assign raw material 
categories on the basis of clusters of raw material traits – a symptomatic ‘analytic’ manoeuvre which does not require any inter-
artefact confrontation. 




no exception. This also holds true for the somewhat special case of technological tool analysis – now 
commonly referred to as ‘UTF-analysis’ (cf. Boëda 1997, 2001). Although UTF-analysis is not always 
based on an ‘assemblage-centred’ approach and primarily examines individual tool-infrastructures, it 
is clearly ‘synthetic’ in orientation. As a special case of chaîne opératoire inquiry, UTF-analysis opera-
tionalises individual lithic tools (e.g., bifaces or Quina scrapers) as ‘micro-wholes’ and examines their 
parts accordingly.238 The latter are typically understood as functional units ensuring the performance 
of the tool-totality. Having said this, such tool-wholes are usually placed into even larger wholes, so 
that they effectively constitute ‘sub-wholes’ which can further be related to other wholes within the 
wider assemblage-context (e.g., production systems) (cf. Lepot 1992/1993: Planche 87; Soriano 2000; 
Bourguignon 1997; Boëda et al. 2013). The inclination therefore remains deeply holistic. Moreover, 
this configuration has some notable implications for how object-samples are drawn. Typically, the 
strategy is not to draw a randomised sample; instead, scholars tend to pre-establish meaningful ‘sub-
wholes’ and draw the sample in accordance to them (e.g., Soriano 2000). Thus, even sampling, strictly 
speaking, presupposes a ‘synthetic’ take on lithic assemblages and is an interpretive operation. The 
example of UTF-analysis also highlights again that part-whole relationships are negotiated in a highly 
dynamic manner. 
 The mode of recording that prevails in the Anglophone research sphere, as we have seen, is 
overwhelmingly atomistic. The guiding idea is that the lithic world is made up by a number of small 
but well-defined parts whose configuration provides primary insight into this world. It is through a 
more reliable understanding of these parts that scholars hope to pave the way for robust lithic 
knowledge. The French approach is counterposed to this conception. French technologists tend to 
assume that an adequate grasp of lithic wholes will lead to a more reliable understanding of their parts, 
and not the other way around. We will see in the next section that this difference has an important 
bearing on inference-making and the nature of the adopted research designs. All of this clearly con-
firms that the basic treatment of lithic assemblages is guided by fundamentally different research im-
peratives. 
 This general disparity between French and Anglophone approaches leads to starkly opposed 
conceptualisations of the data-world interface (Tab. 3). I will continue to explore these vectors of con-
ceptual incompatibility throughout the remainder of this study. The two basic modes of handling lithic 
data, however, are a direct consequence of the ‘analytic’-‘synthetic’ divide and deserve some clarifica-
tion here. Because Anglophone modes of handling the evidence seem to be atomistic, the standards for 
describing and reporting individual lithic artefacts are held as constant as possible. The criteria of re-
cording, in other words, turn out to be largely pre-defined, and the documentation of a lithic piece is a 
question of adequately applying these criteria. We can therefore say that Anglophone lithic inquiry, for 
the most part, appears to be rooted in a democratic conception of evidence, supporting relatively flat 
data-landscapes and rather generic categories of analysis. A potential consequence of this configura-
tion is that the reportable number of independent artefact features is naturally limited, and possibly 
rather small. ‘Analytic’ lithic research thus tends to continuously play with more or less the same at-
tributes and traits, and discusses the status of dependent and independent data.  
This ‘equality premise’ clashes with the French position, which is fed by a more heterogeneous 
conception of lithic evidence (e.g., Tixier 1987 [2012]: 129; Soressi and Geneste 2011: 338-340, 
342).239 We have already seen that lithic parts are not necessarily treated equally there and some parts 
may not even be measured or properly recorded at all (see supra). When different assemblages are 
compared, the same object-characteristics do not always possess the same informational value. The 
French approach thus focuses from the beginning on the identification of evidential asymmetries and 
hierarchies (cf. Langlais 2010: 39; Perlès 2016: 232).240 These have to be newly discovered in each 
assemblage, and cannot simply be inferred from the analysis of generic lithic data.241 The reason is that 
                                                          
238 A detailed account of UTF-analysis and its epistemological background is provided in the second part of Chapter 5. 
239 As we will see later, the clash between these two conceptions of evidence is a major source of epistemic friction and explains 
why ‘objectivity’ is such a contested notion. For Anglophone scholars, ‘objectivity’ is primarily secured through evidential equali-
ty, while in the French tradition it is safeguarded by argumentation and the assessment of intelligibility (both featuring more 
prominently in later stages of the research process) (see infra; Chapters 4 and 5).  
240 Cf. Plutniak (2015: 46f.). 
241 ‘Analytic’ research can of course also take into account class, trait, and attribute hierarchies but these are typically constructed 
according to some general rationale (e.g., ‘set-theory’ or the ‘Theory of Types’; see Chapter 2). This rationale is applied to all 
87 
 
these hierarchies and non-similarity relationships are thought to be modulated by the assemblage-
whole, and consequently cannot be detected by a strictly ‘object-centred’ approach. They are not so 
much ‘outcomes’ of individual object-characteristics, but the inevitable result of particular wholes ad-
ministering particular parts. We will return to this issue in Chapter 5. 
 Importantly, only the Anglophone conception of evidence relies on a ‘predefined input grid,’ be 
it a generalised spreadsheet or a complex database (cf. e.g., Monigal 2002: Table 6-2; McPherron et al. 
2018: 118).242 The grid specifies what needs to be recorded and ensures that all examined artefacts are 
treated as equally as possible (or according to pre-defined rule-sets of an ‘if x then y’ type). Anglophone 
researchers typically invest a lot of time and space into providing a full list of the criteria they use and 
try to provide a general rationale which legitimises these criteria. French technologists, conversely, do 
in principle not depend on such input grids. Practically, however, they often use them. The critical 
point is that a grid, according French research logic, can only be constructed if one has already under-
stood what is important in the assemblage and what can be shown by reference to particular artefact-
characteristics. Input grids, therefore, tend to be technology- or assemblage-specific. Soressi and Gen-
este (2011: 340), for instance, also point out that in chaîne opératoire analysis “[…] a grid cannot be 
established before an initial global observation of the assemblage has been made; this is usually done 
with the assemblage organized on tables […].” Input grids are therefore often used to explore highly 
specific consequences of particular whole-qualities, but French researchers remain generally sceptical 
about the explorative value of generalised spreadsheets and databases in establishing these qualities. 
Again, the reason is that their vision of lithic inquiry is ‘synthetic’ rather than ‘analytic.’ 
What follows from all of this is that the artefacts themselves seem to play a differential role in 
French and Anglophone knowledge formation. From an Anglophone vantage point, lithic artefacts 
constitute the primary units of inquiry; they hold the totality of information required to set up a proper 
analysis, and they define both the starting point and the limits of an investigation. Artefacts can be 
data in themselves – as types, classes, or other categories – or they contain the relevant features, at-
tributes, and traits to be transformed into continuous and discrete data points. It should be rather 
obvious that this conception of evidence lends itself to quantitative inquiry.243 The result is that the 
evidential value of a lithic artefact is, grosso modo, determined by the nature of the same artefact. In 
French technological research, lithic artefacts may become data in more varied and less standardised 
ways. They assume the highest evidential value, however, if put into perspective by other artefacts, for 
example through grouping, sorting, or other forms of meaningful juxtaposition. The critical infor-
mation about lithic assemblages, in other words, is carved out ‘between’ the lithic parts, not within 
them. This also means that key technological information always transcends the physical limits of the 
artefacts it concerns. Data, therefore, typically implicate multiple artefacts or entire configurations of 
such artefacts.244 The artefacts themselves are only informative if they can successfully be calibrated 
against their assemblage-context. The result is that the evidential value of a lithic artefact is, grosso 
modo, determined by the assemblage in which it occurs (all other co-occurring artefacts).245  
We are tempted to conclude that French lithic experts appear to underestimate the cognitive 
value of artefact-level features, whereas Anglophone scholars tend to undervalue assemblage-level 
characteristics. The French approach, on a general plane, is grounded in an ‘emergentist’ reading of 
the evidence insofar as it postulates qualities that are not fully reducible to the qualities of individual 
artefacts.246 Anglophone modes of inquiry, by contrast, are ‘reductionist’ in orientation; they primarily 
seek to record the cumulative signatures of lithic parts and assume that assemblage-level qualities, if 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
lithic artefacts with the same rigour. Even hierarchies are therefore established ‘democratically’ (cf. e.g., Clarke 1968: 188, Fig. 
40). 
242 For a prototypical example of a generalised lithic spreadsheet, see Garrard and Byrd (2013: Appendices C-H [402-410]). 
243 See Shennan (1997 [1988]) for an introduction. Most quantitative strategies rely on a ‘bottom-up’ approach to the evidence, 
locating data primarily in object-characteristics. 
244 French technologists seek to identify and describe ‘techniques,’ ‘technical processes,’ and other phenomena that concern 
more than a single artefact. Therefore, the data that is required to analyse them must point to the relatedness of artefacts rather 
than speak of their ‘self-sufficient’ qualities. Lithic data in French technological research consequently always reaches out to 
multiple co-occurring artefacts; the data that is carved out from an artefact must somehow implicate other artefacts. 
245 Conceptually, this comes close to asserting that lithic artefacts form part of a wider artefact-ecology and that their technical 
role or function can only be elucidated only by understanding this ecology. 
246 For insightful introductions to ‘emergentism,’ see Kauffman (1993) and Chalmers (2006). 
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they exist at all, can be directly deduced from artefact-level qualities.247 This discrepancy has, without 
any question, considerable implications for the architecture of the divide and should have a strong 
impact on the potential findings and cognitive achievements of lithic analysis on both sides. 
All of this demonstrates that the French-Anglophone divide seems to implicate a clash of ‘syn-
thetic’ and ‘analytic’ modes of handling the lithic evidence on the most basic level. What is ultimately 
put at stake is, first, whether lithic parts can be said to fully explain their wholes or rather the other 
way around; and, secondly, whether lithic wholes have accessible characteristics that illuminate their 
parts in ways that they themselves cannot. The first issue is for example touched upon by ‘reduction 
sequence’ approaches which seek to model the ‘stream of reduction’ (sensu Henry 1989b) directly 
through dimensional artefact-level variations. The second issue plays an important role for instance in 
the definition of any given « système technique », which is typically considered ‘more’ than an amal-
gamation of the artefacts it hosts (e.g., Geneste 1991; Valentin 1995: 25). The ‘analytic’-‘synthetic’ po-
larity is therefore likely a major driver of conflict between Anglophone research, grounded in various 
kinds of ‘attribute analysis’ and ‘dimensional analysis,’248 and French chaîne opératoire studies, rooted 
in a ‘synthetic’ reading of the evidence.  
The exposition has also indicated that a distinction between ‘recording,’ ‘analysis,’ and ‘inter-
pretation’ is crucial for ‘analytic’ lithic research, whereas the boundaries between the three tend to be 
blurred by ‘synthetic’ approaches. For example, the examination suggests that Anglophone lithic in-
quiry records lithic objects by taking into account attribute-analytical demands. At this stage, however, 
the procedure is still purely descriptive. It is only with explicitly interpretive approaches – such as 
‘reduction sequence’ (i.e., McPherron 1994; Dibble 1995b; Shott 2003, 2005b) or the ‘Organization of 
Technology’ (i.e., Kelly 1988; Nelson 1991; Carr and Bradburry 2011; McCall 2015: 93-95), sometimes 
grouped together as ‘behavioural-strategic’ (Shea 2013: 13f.) – that interpretation enters the arena of 
inquiry. This clearly seems to differ in the French case, where recording poses many interpretive chal-
lenges and requires scholars to move beyond what is immediately given through individual artefacts. 
Chaîne opératoire inquiry (i.e., Tixier 1980; Geneste 1985; Boëda 1986; Pelegrin et al. 1988; Pelegrin 
1990; Inizan et al. 1995), as it seems, is already holistic in the sense of integrating key operations of 
data-construction and data-analysis into a single conceptual framework.249 At any event, this is clearly 
an issue that needs to be clarified and part of the next section is dedicated to it. The issue puts the 
spotlight on questions of research design and the structural rules of argumentation and inference in 
lithic research. 
What are the effects, if any, of the ‘analytic’-‘synthetic’ divide on general aspects of research design and 
inference-making? This question concerns foremost the mode in which uncriticised observation is 
transformed into criticised knowledge claims. It also touches upon the direction of inference and has 
implications for the role of rationalisation and argumentation in the lithic research process. All of 
these questions, as Pepper elucidates (cf. Chapter 2), can only be answered with recourse to cognitive 
values, showing that ‘analytic’ and ‘synthetic’ inquiry support different normative theories of science. 
This is perhaps best reflected in the overall character of reasoning tied to either of the two. As clarified 
in the previous chapter, ‘analytic’ approaches commonly subscribe to ‘formal-logical’ modes of reason-
ing and argument, whereas ‘synthetic’ approaches tend to adopt ‘dialectic-dialogical’ modalities of the 
same. This distinction has important consequences for the structure of inference-making, a feature of 
lithic research that can be examined in some detail with the help of case studies. 
                                                          
247 Some may counter that Anglophone research also musters assemblage-level qualities, most notably indices or other aggregate 
variables (i.e., the classic values ‘IL,’ ‘IF,’ ‘IFs,’ and ‘Ilam’). While this observation is correct, these measures remain fully reduci-
ble to the artefacts in questions, meaning that they are directly inferable if one knows only the qualities of the individual arte-
facts on the basis of which they were constructed. 
248 See Ahler (1975) and Henry (1989b). 
249 This may mean that chaîne opératoire analysis relies on a logic of research, according to which a distinction between ‘record-
ing,’ ‘analysis,’ and ‘interpretation’ plays a less important, perhaps even marginal role. In fact, this would not be particularly 
surprising given that chaîne opératoire approaches are likely underpinned by a ‘synthetic’ research paradigm (see supra). Dis-
tinguishing between ‘recording,’ ‘analysis,’ and ‘interpretation’ is, after all, a typical ‘analytic’ manoeuvre, assuming the research 
processes itself is analysable by well-defined parts. Because this assumption is not necessarily shared by ‘synthetic’ approaches, 
the research process may have a radically different character there (see the next section for an in-depth investigation). 
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 ‘Analytic’ cognition of the ‘formal-logical’ type organises research processes in such a way that 
the results seem to follow inevitably and ‘automatically’ from the data-input, given the accepted struc-
tural rules of cognition. This species of cognition is heavily driven by explicit methodologies which 
ensure the seamless digestion of evidence and control the pattern of reasoning. ‘Analytic’ inference 
therefore typically involves a high degree of formalisation, insists on maximally transparent deduc-
tions, and emphasises the directedness of inquiry. Argumentation primarily serves to guarantee that 
the transition from one stage of reasoning to another is really compulsory. The general structure of 
inference and argumentation is therefore well-defined and each operation, including argument, has a 
preordained function. 
‘Synthetic’ cognition of the ‘dialectic-dialogical’ type, by contrast, is a more open-ended and 
multi-stranded endeavour; it rejects the idea of a fixed and somewhat stable structure of cognition. 
The solutions to cognitive problems are thought to be problem-specific and no general cognitive for-
mulae can therefore be established. Inference in ‘synthetic’ research is always a struggle and multi-
directional. The progression of reasoning is less rigorous and the evaluation of arguments is less 
straightforward since each argument needs to be evaluated contextually. This puts an even heavier 
burden on rationalisation and argumentation because only they can ensure that the cognitive con-
structions withstand further scrutiny.250 The general structure of inference is therefore extremely flex-
ible and favours more complex patterns of reasoning. Analysis and argumentation become a question 
of cross-adjustment – to arrange all parts in such a way that they satisfy their whole(s). Reasoning is 
less guided by formal-logical models and is conceptualised as multi-layered exchange of pros and cons. 
In Méthode pour l’étude des outillages lithiques, Tixier (2012 [1978]: 122) himself notes that there is a 
“dialogue which takes place between a prehistorian and flint.” According to the ‘synthetic’ standpoint, 
it is this dialogue which delivers insights that can be carried over into robust lithic knowledge claims. 
These general differences may already explain some of the recurrent kinds of criticism which 
are observable at the French-Anglophone interface (see Chapter 1). Given the outlined polarities, it is, 
for instance, no surprise that French lithic inquiry is often stigmatised as overly ‘subjective,’ ‘in-
tractable,’ and ‘non-reproducible.’ Anglophone approaches, on the other hand, are unsurprisingly per-
ceived as ‘corset-like’ and as giving voice to a ‘tyranny of procedure,’ in which methods often legislate 
over empirical data. Taking up again the insights from the previous chapter, this configuration is likely 
the result of a differential understanding of key conceptual coordinates such as ‘objectivity’ and ‘ra-
tionality,’ and may indicate that ‘method’ does a differential work in the two larger research frame-
works, being designed to secure vastly different epistemological qualities. 
The same differences, moreover, can clearly be recovered if we delve deeper into the three cas-
es of interpretive conflict introduced in the second part of Chapter 1 (Biache Saint-Vaast IIA, Gou-
zeaucourt G, Micoquian layers of Kulna). A closer look into the adopted patterns of reasoning, the in-
teraction between the construction of hypotheses and the mobilisation of data and methods, as well as 
the general progression of argument, including the logic of connecting different findings, confirms that 
the respective French authors (Boëda, Soriano) adhere to a ‘synthetic’ architecture of thought, whereas 
the involved Anglophone scholars (Dibble, McPherron, Tostevin) closely follow ‘analytic’ schemes of 
reasoning.  
The latter group has authored highly-ordered, simplicity-favouring structures of inference, ex-
hibiting a high-degree of inferential and argumentative redundancy (Fig. 3; see Appendix III.1 for 
additional reconstructions and an explanation of the rationale guiding the conceptual analysis). The 
basic character of this pattern is that the analysis follows a semi-automated algorithm, resulting in a 
high degree of structural similarity between the approaches. Tostevin’s (2012) comparative study of 
the Kulna lithic material slightly deviates from this pattern, but only with regards to the complexity 
and scope of analysis.251 The reconstructed architectures of analysis clearly situate Anglophone lithic 
inquiry within a spectrum of approaches deploying ‘inductive’ and ‘deductive’ modes of reasoning in 
order to test explicitly formulated hypotheses. Even though both Dibble’s (1995a) and McPherron’s 
                                                          
250 Cf. esp. Perlès (2016: 225).  
251 This finding only corroborates that the internal variability of ‘analytic’ lithic approaches should not be underestimated. In 
fact, Tostevin’s (2012) more complex ‘tree of analysis’ (see Appendix III.1: Figure III.3) indicates that his investigation 
actively pursues the proliferation of fact and, accordingly, ‘goes wide’ in data-collection and -analysis. Together with a compara-
tively ‘defused’ hypothesis-testing approach and the generality of the finally offered explanations, this suggests that Tostevin’s 
study responds to a broadly ‘formistic’ logic.  
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(1994) investigations are governed by a ‘hypothetico-deductive’ structure of reasoning, all three studies 
exhibit some degree of mixture between ‘inductive’ and ‘deductive’ inference-types. The key point is 
that the analysis is generally well-focused and directed, and that the evidence passes through a number 
of pre-defined stages of analysis before a knowledge claim is formulated. As a result, constructing the 
general theoretical framework from which the hypotheses are derived as well as specifying their test-
implications structurally precede empirical data evaluation (cf. Clark 1991a). Basically, the ‘rational’ 
side of research, general theorisation and hypothesis-building, is well-separated from the ‘empirical’ 
task of data-analysis.252 This bifurcation results in a well-ordered structure of inference, in which dif-
ferent operations serve their purpose within a specific, but largely generic chronological sequence (cf. 
Hill 1972).  
Conceptualising rationalisation as a ‘pre-empirical’ procedure is important since it leads to a 
distinct character of arguments depending on whether they are used to develop theory and hypotheses 
or whether they serve to assess the degree of support the latter experience by the data. The evaluation 
of the actual ‘match’ between hypotheses and data is highly standardised, rooted in formal-logical cal-
culus, and in all three cases heavily relies on statistical methods – it becomes a cognitive ‘routine’:  
In general, the specific research designs and patterns of inference embraced by the Anglo-
phone lithic researchers are clearly of an ‘analytic’ type. The structural exposition of reasoning reveals 
that they are either ‘Hempelian’ and therefore strongly influenced by the ‘covering-law’ model of scien-
tific explanation (cf. e.g., Salmon 1967)253 or at least subscribe to the basic principles of ‘verification-
ism’ and ‘falsificationism.’254 The distinction between ‘empirical’ and ‘theoretical’ operations thereby 
regulates the progression and logic of inference.255 Because lithic inquiry in these cases is really hy-
pothesis-driven, the structure of reasoning is that of a ‘fork.’ Typically, this means that a number of 
competing hypotheses is first outlined and then compared independently against the data. This strate-
gy authors multiple individualised and largely self-contained pathways of inference, which only in the 
final stages of analysis contribute to the formation of knowledge claims. Again, this pattern is genuine-
ly ‘analytic’ since different hypotheses or domains of inquiry (e.g., ‘knapping domains’ in the case of 
Tostevin’s study) make up the ‘parts’ of the analysis which, through individual interrogation, allow for 
a synthesis of parts that clears the view for the ‘whole.’ In this scenario, the whole is nothing else then 
the outcome of analysis.  
However, in a strictly hypothesis-testing approach, each hypothesis itself also defines a possi-
ble whole; the analysis simply checks whether the whole actually follows from the recorded parts (i.e., 
                                                          
252 This separation closely follows the ‘two context’ conception of science advocated by Reichenbach (1938) and many other 
Logical Empiricists, but also by Popper (1965). The basic assumption of this distinction is that there exists a general logic of 
scientific justification, but no such general logic of scientific discovery. Accordingly, the logic of science becomes congruent with 
the ‘scientific method.’ Differentiating between the ‘context of discovery’ and the ‘context of justification’ typically implies to 
regard the construction of hypotheses and theories as creative acts which are by definition idiosyncratic and somewhat ‘psycho-
logical.’ This view, now deeply entrenched in many branches of science, conceives of the ‘context of discovery’ as an exogenous 
factor in scientific practice (cf. Nickles 2013). 
253 The perhaps most important account of the ‘covering-law’ model of explanation was provided by Hempel and Oppenheim 
(1948; see also Hempel 1942, 1945, 1965). This model of explanation takes up the idea that explanation requires one to show 
how the explanation derives in a logical argument. The ‘covering-law’ model adds that the premises of that logical argument 
must entail at least a single well-confirmed law or regularity of nature (cf. Godfrey-Smith 2003: 191). These must make a sub-
stantial contribution to the argument. Part of the motivation to introduce this model of explanation was to allow for the possibil-
ity of good ‘inductive’ arguments. In general, ‘covering-law’ explanations explain by showing that the explanandum (whatever is 
to be explained) was to be expected, that is, was no ‘surprise,’ given our knowledge about the basic regularities of nature. 
254 See Ayer (1936) for an influential theory of ‘verification,’ and Popper (1965, 1968) for an influential account of ‘falsification.’ 
Note that these accounts are ‘analytic’ insofar as the process of corroboration targets observational parts and compares them 
against the ‘theoretical expectations’ of a hypothesis (conceived of as the whole to ‘end up with’). The corroborative procedure is 
hypothesis-driven and each hypothesis is considered to be testable independently. 
255 Note that this is precisely the concept of scientificity that was deliberately adopted and fiercely defended by Lewis Binford 
(1972, 1977, 1982) and the New Archaeology from the 1960s onwards (Spaulding 1968; Watson et al. 1984; cf. Trigger 2003: 9). 
The general ‘mechanistic’ orientation that the conceptual distinction between ‘observational’ and ‘theoretical’ implies is dis-
cussed in Chapter 2. 
 
“[…] the word analytical […] refers to the more general philosophical principle of using formal 
empirical observations in the building and testing of hypotheses. “Formal” in this instance 
refers to the use of quantitative data (be it categorical, ordinal or metric), to assess in a detailed 
manner the relationship (or otherwise) between a set of empirical phenomena and a particular 
model or hypothesis derived from theory or observation, the assumptions and predictions of 
which are made explicit. Such an approach can be contrasted with those of description and 
narrative.” (Lycett and Chauhan 2010b: 3; original emphasis) 
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the available evidence) or not. Another facet of the same research logic is that a bigger problem, for 
example the reconstruction of lithic reduction dynamics, is broken down into a number of sub-
problems, each investigated separately. This strategy is employed in all three Anglophone cases. It 
reveals a compositional structure of reasoning and shows that the ‘compartmentalisation’ of cognitive 
problems is an Anglophone hallmark. The basic strategy is ‘anti-holistic’ and presupposes the primacy 
of parts. ‘Epistemological atomism’ or ‘methodological individualism’ (see Chapter 2) are some of the 
common symptoms of this ‘analytic’ mode of lithic cognition. Binford’s (2015 [1972]: 111) account of 
data-explication, for instance, provides a useful illustration here:256 
Although Tostevin’s (2000, 2012) examination of the Late Middle Palaeolithic layers of Kulna 
cave, as noted earlier, seems to deviate from the generally deductive mode of inference employed by 
Dibble and McPherron, it nevertheless subscribes to explicit hypothesis testing, the primacy of theory 
in the construction of the research framework, and the maximally rigid evaluation of logically distinct 
relationships between ‘theoretical’ claims and ‘empirical’ evidence. A central goal, just like in the other 
two Anglophone cases, is to maximise inferential transparency. This is not only ensured through the 
grosso modo linear and well-defined structure of inference itself, but also through the application of 
highly standardised (statistical) procedures to compare expectations and findings. Inferential trans-
parency is valued because it promises to assure a basic ‘objectivity’ of research, which, again, is 
thought to be indispensable for guaranteeing the ‘replicability’ and ‘subject-independency’ of infer-
ences and conclusion (cf. Binford 1982; Marwick 2017). We will come back to the issue of subjects later 
in this section. What is perhaps most important is the structural rigidity exhibited by this approach. 
This rigidity leads to a high degree of operational redundancy, with different types of evidence handled 
in broadly similar terms.  
Tostevin’s Seeing Lithics (2012), just like McPherron’s (1994) examination of bifacial shape-
variability, further demonstrates that comparability among assemblages is primarily ensured by treat-
ing them similarly.257 The resulting highly uniform analytical procedure facilitates one-to-one juxtapo-
sitions and makes sure that the exact same type of information is available for all of the studied assem-
blages. This, of course, clearly attests to an ‘analytic’ research orientation since the direct (i.e., un-
mediated) comparison of assemblage-parts in order to assess questions of similarity and difference on 
the level of assemblage-wholes only makes sense in an ‘analytic’ framework of inquiry. Since parts, 
from a ‘synthetic’ perspective, cannot stand for themselves, they also cannot be compared directly 
without knowing what their position, role, or function in a ‘whole’ is. At any rate, the epistemological 
‘principle of equality,’ already encountered on the level of data-construction, seems to also apply to 
general questions of research design. 
A final, yet important characteristic of the three Anglophone cases is that an explicit interpre-
tation of findings is only offered after formal hypothesis-testing. All examined patterns of reasoning 
therefore evince a three-part structure, with a clear separation between theorisation and construction 
of hypotheses, primary data-analysis, and final data-interpretation.258 The three parts are held togeth-
er by a methodological framework. Typically, this general logic of inquiry is already signalled by the 
succession of headings and subheading that structure the papers, chapters, or books in which lithic 
research is reported. After outlining the general debate and the relevant research questions, these 
commonly describe the theoretical background of the taken approach and then introduce the method-
ology that is thought to help answering the research questions given the theoretical enumerations. 
                                                          
256 Note that the mere distinction between ‘exploration,’ ‘explication,’ and ‘explanation’ as suggested by Binford (1972b: 110) 
already indicates an ‘analytic’ approach. The well-differentiated role of these analytic ‘activities’ and their well-defined position 
within the sequence of reasoning supports this conclusion. 
257 This level of structural formalisation is of key importance for the nature of employed argumentative strategies. Only if highly 
formalised patterns of reasoning are employed is it possible to assess and criticise each single finding in the same way. The same 
basic arguments can then be mobilised again and again to inform the final conclusions. Therefore, structural and operational 
redundancy in this sense typically foreshadow argumentative and inferential redundancy. In the extreme case, examinations of 
this type appear to be driven by a ‘cognitive machinery’ whose results are inevitable and leave little leeway for interpretive crea-
tivity. Of course, it is precisely this general quality of scientific cognition that is deemed to be most ‘reliable’ by adepts of ‘analyt-
ic’ thought.   
258 Cf. e.g., Clarke (1972b). 
“Explication generally refers to some systematic description of observations. In this the ar-
chaeologist faces the task of breaking down a whole into parts, generally with the aim of elu-
cidating its componential make-up, and the interrelationships among its components.” 
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Only then is the data introduced and analysed according to the selected methodology. The results are 
presented in a ‘result’ section. This section is usually kept separate from a ‘conclusions’ section in 
which the respective findings are placed into the larger debate and reflected upon in light of the chosen 
theoretical perspective. This general structure has in fact already become the norm in many of the 
field’s leading peer-review journals, and has numerously been reiterated by various FAQs of ‘how to 
write a scientific paper.’ It can be found, for instance, in the guidelines of journals such as the Journal 
of Human Evolution, the Journal of Archaeological Science, and PLoS ONE. These are clearly ‘analyt-
ic’ journals, responding to the standards of inquiry which have been cultivated in the Anglophone re-
search sphere. 
In total, it is thus perhaps no surprise that Anglophone researchers increasingly identify them-
selves as analytic scholars (cf. Shennan 2004).259 This general orientation of research was of course 
already addressed by David Clarke’s epochal Analytical Archaeology (1968) and actively propagated 
by leading ‘New’ Archaeologists such as Lewis Binford. Within the same breadth, one could also men-
tion the contributions of Glynn Isaac (1989) and many others. More recent Anglophone volumes that 
address theory and method in lithic research, for example New Perspectives on Old Stones: Analytical 
Approaches to Palaeolithic Technologies (Lycett and Chauhan 2010a), follow the same research tra-
jectory.260 In this light, it is probably uncontroversial to suppose that the vast majority of Anglophone 
scholars tends to conduct ‘analytic’ lithic research. 
How does this compare to the examined French cases of lithic inquiry? Perhaps most im-
portantly, there is no standardisation of the research process itself. Modes of argumentation and the 
followed pathways of inquiry, as a consequence, differ dramatically between the three cases. The main 
reason is that basic operations of inference are thought to be case-sensitive. Although the applied ter-
minology and concepts are broadly shared, the way in which they are brought to bear varies. This sug-
gests that the evidence itself exercises a much greater impact on how lithic inquiry is precisely done, 
including its direction and progression. A close inspection of the three French case studies (i.e., Boëda 
1988, 1995a; Soriano 2000) in terms of research design and structure of inference further demonstrate 
that they violate key principles of ‘analytic’ thought, blurring the boundaries between some of the cate-
gorical distinctions that structure the research process there. The French cases, for instance, reject the 
structural and logical separation between ‘rationalisation’ and ‘empirical corroboration’ – the old 
Reichenbachian polarity between the ‘context of discovery’ and the ‘context of justification’ which has 
become a hallmark of ‘analytic’ inquiry (see supra). A tangible consequence of this repudiation is that 
a procedural and research-logical differentiation between hypothesis-construction and hypothesis-
testing is no longer regarded to be effective. Rather than being independent operations that follow up 
on each other in a pre-defined temporal sequence, both form complementary parts of the process of 
data-analysis. Even hypothesis-construction therefore relies on a direct contact with the lithic evi-
dence.  
Boëda’s (1988) approach to the lithic material from Biache Saint-Vaast level IIA illustrates this 
general condition. Here, the process of inference becomes manifest as a cyclic structure. We can iden-
tify multiple cycles and sub-cycles of hypothesis-formation, -evaluation, -rejection, and -re-
formulation, and these cycles are clearly embedded in primary data-analysis.261 This process, as the 
comparison with the other French cases demonstrates, lacks structural formalisation. The analysis is 
driven not so much by formal-logical reasoning or inferential statistics, but is powered by qualitative 
arguments that seek to establish an interpretive ‘dialogue’ with the source material and between differ-
ent parts of the source material (e.g., Boëda et al. 2013a: 194). The arguments are fashioned in such a 
way that they can be answered relationally, that is, with regards to other artefacts or already estab-
lished assemblage-level findings supporting or disapproving particular readings. The result is a multi-
linear configuration of reasoning.  
                                                          
259 See also Lycett and Shennan (2018). 
260 See esp. Gowlett (2010) and O’Brien (2010) in the same volume. 
261 Many French scholars have characterised their approach as relying on an ‘inductive method’ (e.g., Tixier 2012 [1978]: 125; 
Bon 2009: 120). As I try to show here, however, this is only adequate insofar as French technological research departs from the 
lithic facts and only from there develops theories and hypothesis. The procedure is not really ‘inductive’ in the strict sense be-
cause the inferential core is not so much based on formal or informal logic, but rather on interpretation (see infra). For clear 




In contrast to their ‘analytic’ counterparts, however, the resulting strands of analysis – indi-
vidual cycles and sub-cycles – are critically dependent on one another. Their role is to focus and guide 
the analysis, not to deliver self-sufficient findings. These strands, in other words, have no independent 
say, but only through interaction, protrusion, and overlap with other strands provide insights into the 
lithic assemblage; they cross-configure each other in what they can contribute to the process of 
knowledge formation. The structure of reasoning, therefore, is generally elastic. There is a constant 
argumentative and inferential ‘back and forth’ between the constitutive elements of an individual cycle 
of reasoning, but also between all of the relevant cycles themselves. The analysis is holistic to this ef-
fect; no individualised strand of inquiry has significance without being responsive to the totality of 
significant strands. This is the ‘synthetic’ quality of Boëda’s approach. The ‘wholeness’ of the account 
exercises authority over the ‘partness’ of localised findings and assertions. 
An important consequence of this logic of analysis is that there is no ‘natural’ or ‘logical’ point 
of inferential departure. Where one starts the investigation – that is, what one studies first and what 
considerations one decides to throw into the mix first – does not really matter much. The reason is 
that anything which is said or argued needs to meet the standards of the whole, and this whole consists 
of the coming together of all parts. French lithic inquiry therefore comes into view again as a constant 
and highly dynamic cross-adjustment of parts and wholes. The point is that there is no necessity to 
start with the examination of a particular object class or to present individual findings in a particular 
order because they all need to be adapted to each other anyways. As a result, inferential pathways tend 
to be extremely heterogeneous and generally depend on the quality of the assemblage-whole. Some 
scholars chose to open up the investigation with an assessment of the core-technology, some opt for an 
assessment of the débitage first, and others, although this is more rarely encountered, start with a 
discussion of the toolkit.262 The main reason for why there is a sequence at all is that one cannot, prac-
tically speaking, present all of these aspects at the same time. Much of the actual multi-linearity of 
reasoning that underlies French technological inquiry is masked by the constraints of producing a 
readable and legible paper. 
These elucidations suggest that an important structural difference between ‘analytic’ and ‘syn-
thetic’ reasoning at the French-Anglophone boundary is that the former shelters structural uniformity 
and cherishes general argumentative rule-sets, whereas the latter makes room for much more struc-
tural diversity and incentivises scholars to creatively devise case-specific arguments.263 I would con-
tend that this polarity leads to a critical trade-off: the Anglophone research structure, because of its 
separation between handling ‘theory’ and ‘data,’ encourages practitioners to diversify their theoretical 
repertoires and develop them independently; in the French case, creative diversification takes primari-
ly place within data-analysis itself, leaving ‘theory’ behind as a somewhat problematic and mostly im-
plicit dimension of research. We will return to these issues in the next section. 
The cyclic structure of inference that seems to characterise French lithic inquiry is perhaps 
best reflected in the reconstruction of core-blank technologies. Again, Boëda’s (1988) analysis of 
Biache-Saint Vaast IIA is a useful example here. In order to understand the signification of core varia-
bility, he examines the ‘stigmas’ of the cores and compares their spatiotemporal organisation with the 
technical features of the blank-population.264 The goal is to determine groups of cores and groups of 
blanks which endow each other with meaning, and thus define a technological unit. The clue of this 
                                                          
262 In practice, French practitioners often start the investigation with a detailed treatment of cores. This, however, has no struc-
tural or epistemological reasons, but simply responds to the fact that there is an asymmetry between cores and their flaking 
products. There are always multiple débitage products that ‘belong’ to a single core. This situation renders cores potentially 
richer in referencing other lithic objects in the assemblage; they are more pregnant in implicating other artefacts. This is why it 
is typically practical to begin with an analysis of cores rather than other types of lithic objects. In fact, however, this reasoning 
only underlines that there can be no ‘natural’ entry point of analysis. If cores are only chosen because of the many other artefacts 
they reference, this simply shows that no single artefact, not even cores, can be discussed in isolation and that it really doesn’t 
matter where one starts – simply because one always has to discuss all lithic artefacts in light of their entire assemblage-context. 
263 According to a ‘synthetic’ understanding of science, heterogeneity tends to be regarded as an ‘epistemic virtue.’ It is usually 
highly valued among practitioners. For example, argumentative and inferential ‘originality,’ ‘sophistication,’ and/or ‘elegance’ 
typically carry positive connotations and scholars seek to realise them through their work. While ‘analytic’ approaches typically 
try to secure an epistemic ‘democracy’ by treating lithic objects in a similar fashion, ‘synthetic’ approaches instead value epis-
temic heterogeneity because it gives voice to the ‘democratic freedom’ of plural readings. In fact, analytical heterogeneity – the 
antithesis of epistemic rigidity and uniformity – can be viewed as a precondition for general intellectual creativity that is not 
restricted to methodological or theoretical innovation alone. The ‘synthetic’ understanding of scholarly ‘ingenuity’ is likely root-
ed is this valorisation. 
264 To be perfectly clear, the mobilisation of the term ‘stigma’ is not at all idiosyncratic here (cf. e.g. Inizan 1995: 25, 29, 34-36, 
59, 73, etc.). 
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analysis is that the artefact features and their combination encountered in one artefact-domain are 
calibrated against the features in the other domain in order to isolate patterns of co-constitution. Only 
if most characteristics in the two artefact-domains can be shown to co-constrain each other – that is, to 
make sense in light of each other – can it be concluded that the two domains are also technologically 
related. This analysis also entails the necessity to show that the determined relationships help to re-
solve the entirety of the present lithic artefacts in a meaningful way.  
Already the term ‘stigma’ implies this mutualistic logic of analysis. Technical ‘stigmas,’ in the 
sense of Boëda and others, are not just individual traits that leave a physical mark on their lithic ob-
jects. Stigmas are relational units of identification and generally refer to configurations of entities. A 
stigma on an object therefore already implies other objects. Goffman (1963, 1974), for example, who 
provided one of the most influential characterisations of the concept to date, defines a ‘stigma’ as the 
status of a person as assigned to that person by other persons in that person’s social field. Processes of 
‘stigmatisation,’ according to Goffman, are therefore sociologically significant. They tell us something 
about the position of the person in her/his social field. Analogously, technical stigmas tell us some-
thing about the status of a technical object as assigned by other objects in that object’s technological 
field. The ‘technological field’ thereby simply refers to the technical ‘sub-whole’ to which the stigma-
tised object contributes (i.e., a particular core-blank technology, a technical structure, a technical sys-
tem). An analysis of technical stigmas, conversely, allows one to determine which other lithic objects in 
the assemblage are relevant for the explanation of the stigmatised object.265 We can conclude that a 
technical stigma, according to Boëda, is technologically significant; stigmas are qualities that refer-
ence other qualities and thus always encapsulate ‘more-than-the-stigmatised-artefact.’ Stigmas, in 
other words, ‘reach out’ to the assemblage context. The mobilisation of the notion of a technical ‘stig-
ma’ is consequently indicative of the anti-atomistic orientation of French lithic analysis.266 It clearly 
testifies to a ‘synthetic’ approach to the lithic evidence.  
Boëda’s (1988) reconstruction of the various core reduction methods, including unidirectional 
and bidirectional ‘Levallois recurrent’ (Schéma A, B), is therefore comprehensible as a continuous 
inferential movement ‘back and forth’ between varying lithic parts and their potential lithic wholes, in 
the process of which both are mutually adjusted to each other until global intelligibility is reached. This 
pattern of reasoning is ‘dialectical’ at its core. It clarifies what it means to ‘bring the lithic artefacts into 
dialogue.’ We may then also better understand why the process of reasoning itself tends to be of a ‘dia-
logical’ nature. The interrogation of, say, a core leads to an initial interpretation, which suggests a set 
of possibly related artefacts; the interrogation of this set, in turn, may confirm the initial interpretation 
or, more likely, leads to new interpretive perspectives on the core. It may of course also lead to a re-
adjustment of the initial interpretation. Typically, the initial confrontation of potentially meaningful 
artefact-subsets of an assemblage leads to new strands of investigations pertaining to all subsets, often 
resulting in a reshuffling of at least some of these sets.267 In the extreme, re-adjusting an interpretive 
claim therefore requires one to also adjust all connected assertive claims. This inferential cyclicality, 
which is open-ended, results in a basic condition of holistic testing.268 Interpretations cannot be evalu-
ated individually, but rise and fall as a function of the total set of currently held interpretations. To 
‘test’ a single inference thus always means to test the entirety of current inferences. If intelligibility 
cannot be reached, the inquiry must start anew. It should be clear that a publication conveys on the 
final and ultimately successful pathway of reasoning. 
                                                          
265 The concept of a ‘technical stigma’ therefore already expresses the aspiration to arrange lithic assemblages, understood as 
‘wholes,’ into various ‘sub-wholes’ in order to illuminate the role and status of each single lithic artefact therein. 
266 The point is that a ‘technical stigma’ defined in this way usually implicates technical relationships which are not based merely 
on (dis-)similarity. Rather, the sought-for relationships – those that can be defined as technical in the strict sense – are typically 
based on complementarity and transience. A ‘transient tie’ describes a technical relationship between two or more lithic objects 
or processes involving no direct interaction, but some ‘intermediator(s).’ Such indirect relationships are generally difficult to 
track by ‘analytic’ inquiry, especially if the guiding root metaphor is ‘similarity.’ 
267 This interpretive ‘sorting’ includes the possibility of rejecting the explanatory relevance of particular groups of artefacts for 
other groups of artefacts, and vice versa. 
268 ‘Methodological holism’ has been prominently defended by thinkers such as Pierre Duhem and Willard O. Quine. In episte-
mological terms, the key idea is that the whole of a theory or an entire set of propositions is the smallest unit of confirmation. 
Quine (1951b: 42) even posited that “[t]he unit of empirical signification is the whole of science.” An important consequence of 
this view is that a failed prediction does not necessarily refute the hypothesis on which it was based. The point is that the con-
firmation of a hypothesis always depends on more general background information and the relationship of the hypothesis to 
other hypotheses. In holistic modes of inquiry, therefore, a hypothesis typically loses both its status as the smallest unit of con-
firmation and its epistemological independence. 
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We have already seen that the general character of ‘synthetic’ cognition is open-ended and that 
‘synthetic’ modes of argumentation typically embrace the lurking incompleteness of their knowledge 
claims. This, again, is linked to the cyclic nature of inquiry and its weakly defined structure and direc-
tionality. Because argumentation and rationalisation are ‘dialogical’ and serve primarily to connect 
disparate pieces of knowledge, they cannot settle a problem once and forever. In ‘synthetic’ science, 
whole-part dynamics are always puzzling, delivering a vision of scientificity that emphasises ongoing 
effort rather than the fruits of knowledge. It can be argued that this general cognitive orientation is 
directly reflected in a ‘rhetoric of provisional results.’ This rhetoric not only rejects ultimate answers to 
thorny questions,269 but also motivates a practice in which preliminary syntheses are flagged by de-
nominations such as « essai » (‘essay’) and « jalon » (‘milestone’). These terms are used to name 
books, chapters, and papers, and thus denote a central mode of reporting the interconnection of cer-
tain findings. They are rather omnipresent in the French expert literature, especially in more recent 
instantiations (cf. e.g., Leroi-Gourhan and Brézillon 1972; Schmider 1988; Pigeot et al. 1991; Valentin 
2008a: 47; Mevel 2017: 253ff.). In Anglophone research, by contrast, such terms tend to be shunned 
because of their undesired ‘narrative’ connotations (cf. Binford 1968c: 11; Lycett and Chauhan 2010b: 
3 [op. cit.]; Shea 2013a: 295).270 
We have also seen that French lithic inquiry is really the product of an interpretative tradition 
of stone artefact analysis. ‘Interpretation’ is thereby not just a question of giving a final verdict after 
data-analysis has been conducted, but plays a role on almost all stages and levels of the research pro-
cess. Each ‘act’ of re-organising one’s judgements after a cycle of inter-artefact confrontation has been 
passed through involves at least a single interpretive decision. In practice, this often blurs the second 
stronghold of ‘analytic’ rigidity: the structural distinction between ‘observation’ and ‘interpretation.’271 
Furthermore, interpretation is a key operation since it helps to bridge parts and wholes and to navigate 
through the unsteady cycle of inference.272 This ‘dialectic-dialogical’ pattern of reasoning supports a 
hermeneutic logic of inquiry,273 in which the emphasis clearly lies on ‘understanding’ [Verstehen] ra-
ther than ‘explanation’ [Erklären] (cf. e.g., Von Wright 1971; Schurz 1988; Corbey 2005: 122-134). 
‘Understanding,’ as defined here, can be recognised as a species of knowledge which centres on ‘piec-
ing together disparate pieces of knowledge’ (e.g., de Regt and Dieks 2005; de Regt 2009; Gijsbers 
                                                          
269 A clear symptom of this ‘open-endedness’ of inquiry is the presence of many explicitly formulated questions within the inter-
pretative part of research. An example is Marchand’s (2014) attempt to bring together various lines of investigation in order to 
understand the historical trajectory from the Late Palaeolithic to the Neolithic in Brittany. His account is extremely ‘thick’ and 
puts forth many unanswered questions while trying to connect the various pieces of evidence he has collected. 
270 Even though such small details should perhaps not be over-interpreted, they show that French attempts to endow a historical 
sense to apriori isolated observations often leads to quasi-narrative procedures (e.g., Valentin 2008a; Bon 2009), imposing a 
certain ‘textuality’ onto the palaeo-archaeological record (cf. de Beaune 2016: Chapitre VIII, 279-282). I would not go so far as to 
infer that this already exposes a tacit reliance on the idea of ‘material culture as text,’ but it certainly transports a hermeneutic 
undertone. It at least seems to be no coincidence that ‘textuality’ has been a key term for many French post-structuralists (as 
they are labelled in the Anglophone world; for a critique of the term from a French perspective, see Angermuller 2015). Pro-
pelled by what is sometimes called the ‘linguistic turn,’ these scholars began to re-conceptualise texts in the most abstract sense 
as by necessity incomplete entities. A text in this sense is always partially ‘hidden.’ This incompleteness was then regarded as the 
main obstacle for ‘understanding,’ therefore requiring specific interpretive procedures to be successful. Narration is one such 
procedure of holistically making sense of textual incompleteness. For French « Paléohistoire », the analogy seems particularly 
striking since the Palaeolithic record also presents itself as an inherently fragmentary and ‘dis-membered’ object of study. 
271 Admittedly, the key point here is not only how ‘synthetic’ science makes sense of the distinction between ‘observation’ and 
‘interpretation,’ but also what can count as either of the two. Pepper (1942: 48) clearly anticipates this problem. According to 
Pepper (ibid.: 100), what can count as ‘pure’ fact may vary dramatically among  world theories. It is therefore likely that some of 
the ‘pure’ facts of French technological research are regarded as ‘highly interpreted facts’ by Anglophone analysts. Although 
Pepper (ibid.: 51) notes that within world hypotheses ‘data’ are typically refined in such a way that their  ‘purity’ can be defend-
ed, they nonetheless tend to be ‘loaded with interpretation.’ We will return to this issue in Chapter 6. 
272 Valentin (2005: 148), for instance, explicitly calls for a more ‘interpretive ambition’ in devising artefact typologies. These 
typologies are not just required to say something substantial about the lithic objects themselves, but have to ‘restore the place of 
the facts in the respective technical system.’ These ‘interpretive typologies,’ in other words, have to serve the technical wholes 
under consideration. For a detailed discussion of the role of typologisation in French technological research, see the first part of 
Chapter 5. 
273 In the context of hermeneutic understanding, the cyclic structure of inference is mirrored by what is widely known as the 
hermeneutic circle (cf. Bolten 1985). With Norris (2005), one can say that the latter is concerned with “the fact that comprehen-
sion can only come about through a tacit foreknowledge that alerts us to salient features of the [objects of study] which would 
otherwise escape notice. Yet it is also the case that every [object of study] (and every reading of it) in some way manages to pass 
beyond the ‘horizon of intelligibility’ that makes up this background of foregone interpretative assumptions. The debate is joined 
between those (like Gadamer) who think of understanding in terms of a dialogue or ongoing cultural conversation, and those – 
Habermas among them – who wish to maintain a more independent role for the exercise of critical thought.” Hermeneutic 
reasoning, accordingly, typically bespeaks of a mode of argumentation that I have characterised as ‘dialectic-dialogical’ (see 
Chapter 2 for a discussion of hermeneutics and general ‘synthetic’ argumentation). 
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2013) rather than proceeding from a well-defined set of premises to the conclusions in a controlled, 
directed, and broadly pre-conceived formal-logical manner (e.g., Trout 2007).274  
All of this suggests that French lithic inquiry, in contrast to the vast majority of Anglophone 
lithic research, is neither governed by ‘deductive’ nor by strictly ‘inductive’ modes of reasoning – both 
of these species of cognition are ‘analytic’ insofar as they presuppose that parts are the primary units of 
analysis and, after careful examination and comparison with other parts, directly result in the sought-
after wholes. Instead, French approaches seem to be based on a cognitive strategy in which the coordi-
nation of parts and wholes is essential. In this strategy, overarching directions or generic patterns of 
inference cannot be predicated. The lithic evidence tends to be handled ‘bottom-up’ and ‘top-down’ at 
the same time: French technologists analyse lithic parts in order to grasp possible wholes and whole-
characteristics, but they similarly examine whole-qualities in order to better understand the significa-
tion of parts. Nonetheless, the primary points of reference are always whole-categories since they ulti-
mately legislate over the interpretation of the lithic parts. The result is a ‘looping’ quality of reasoning 
in which the level of analysis constantly shifts between parts and wholes, both being subjected to an 
ongoing process of re-definition and mutual adjustment. We may therefore perhaps more adequately 
term this mode of reasoning ‘transductive.’275 
Altogether, the examination of the three pairs of assemblage-based case studies in terms of re-
search design and structure of inference has demonstrated that the ‘analytic’-‘synthetic’ polarity plays 
an important role in organising the French-Anglophone divide. It seems clear that French lithic in-
quiry is founded on broadly ‘synthetic’ premises, whereas Anglophone lithic research is imbued with 
an ‘analytic’ understanding of science. The identified structures and morphologies of lithic reasoning, 
but also the nature and role of the mobilised arguments support this view. Some of these differences 
appear to resonate with the classic distinction between ‘explanation-based’ and ‘understanding-based’ 
projects of research. This is certainly interesting since French and Anglophone approaches, for this 
reason alone, may then be differentially capable to harness the cognitive resources of particular cog-
nate disciplines. The very definition of a ‘cognate’ discipline may in fact vary because of it.  276 This, in 
turn, might at least partly explain why Anglophone research endeavours are often strongly influenced 
by the natural and life sciences, whereas French technological research tends to draw more heavily on 
the interpretive branches of the humanities and social sciences277. This split, moreover, seems to partly 
run in parallel with the well-recognised separation between ‘analytic’ and ‘Continental’ strands of phi-
losophy and their corresponding conceptions of scientificity (cf. e.g., Friedman 2000; Levy 2003; 
Chase and Reynolds 2010). The ‘parting of ways’ between French and Anglophone lithic inquiry is 
therefore likely to reflect the relative position of the two in the wider landscape of Western intellectual-
ity. 
Lastly, the distinction between ‘analytic’ and ‘synthetic’ science, but even more so the conflict 
between ‘explanation-based’ and ‘understanding-based’ approaches, implies a deep-running discord of 
the status of the human subject in the quest for lithic knowledge. We have already touched upon this 
issue in the context of ‘uniformity’-‘heterogeneity’ trade-offs pertaining to the structure and logic of 
reasoning at the French-Anglophone interface. While ‘analytic’ research in the ‘explanatory’ mode 
usually promotes an ‘objectivist’ conception of lithic knowledge and thus seeks to eliminate or at least 
minimise the human factor, ‘synthetic’ approaches in the ‘understanding’ mode tend to crucially rely 
on human judgement and interpretation. The latter consciously exploit the ineluctable ‘horizon’ of 
human subjectivity in order to grasp the complexity of lithic realities.278 The implied view of science 
emphasises the irreducibility of human involvement in processes of inquiry, re-casting the human 
                                                          
274 Proponents of ‘nomothetic’ conceptions of science, those who want to give an ‘objectivist’ account of scientificity, have typical-
ly conceived of ‘understanding’ and ‘intelligibility’ in rather pragmatic terms, potentially varying from person to person and 
context to context. This status that is of course at odds with the ‘universalist’ aspiration of ‘objective’ research in these circles 
(see e.g., Hempel 1965: 413, 425f.). 
275 See Appendix III.2 for a schematic comparison of ‘transductive’ and ‘inductive’-‘deductive’ modes of reasoning. 
276 A detailed account of the relevant extra-disciplinary resources in French and Anglophone lithic research will be given in 
Chapters 4 and 5. 
277 See e.g. Betti (1962) for a classic attempt to ground all of the humanities [Geisteswissenschaften] in hermeneutic method and 
reasoning. Classic hermeneutic perspectives have been provided by Habermas, Ricoeur (for philosophy), Weber, Oevermann 
(for sociology), Geertz (for interpretive ethnology), Dilthey, and Rickert (for historiography and history). For a more general 
discussion including the potential role of the ‘hermeneutic mode of reasoning’ in ‘synthetic’ inference and corroboration, see 
Chapter 2. 
278 For a conceptual account of this inclination, see de Regt (2014: 379). 
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factor as an enabling condition of knowledge production. Each researcher’s subjective background of 
knowledge – her/his ‘hermeneutic horizon’ – is considered an interpretive asset rather than something 
that potentially hinders insight. Understanding, in this view, critically depends on various forms of 
pre-understanding.  
The perhaps most obvious example in French lithic inquiry is the role of knapping experience 
and the importance of knowledge about fracture mechanics, including an understanding of general 
principles of convexity management (cf. Pelegrin 2006b: 40; Perlès 2016: 225).279 These axes of pre-
understanding are indispensable for evaluating how wholes and parts co-constrain each other and 
what the possible consequences of particular knapping operations are. The point is that these pre-
understandings guide the entire process of reasoning and potentially inform each interpretive claim. 
‘Synthetic’ approaches are much more susceptible and open to individual lithic expertise than their 
‘analytic’ counterparts.280 In the Anglophone case scholarly expertise of course also plays a role, but it 
is typically important in the context of mastering particular analytic tools (i.e., various computer pro-
grammes), specific methodologies (i.e., statistical procedures and tests), and in the construction of 
testable hypotheses from well-selected bodies of general theory. 
The Anglophone position reflects the proclivity to safeguard the subject-neutrality of lithic 
analysis and interpretation. The human subject is typically regarded as a knowledge-distorting factor, 
only accentuating the problem of lithic knowledge by adding another layer of artificial interpretive 
variability. The standardisation and ‘automatisation’ of inferential procedures and argumentative fig-
ures has consequently to be understood as an attempt to render lithic knowledge claims as independ-
ent as possible from individual and at best variable scholarly judgements. The Anglophone stance to-
wards the treatment of lithic evidence can thus be characterised as broadly ‘etic.’ French technological 
research, by contrast, is often regarded to provide a level of understanding that can be qualified as 
‘emic’ in the broadest sense (cf. esp. Pigeot 2005).281 An important consequence of this configuration is 
that Anglophone scholarship widely promotes computer-aided applications and robotic facilities in 
order to study lithic technology in maximally ‘human-devoid’ fashion (cf. e.g., Clarke 1968: Chapter 13; 
Dibble and McPherron 1988; McPherron and Dibble 2002; Dibble and Rezek 2009; Brantingham 
2010),282 whereas the French research tradition encourages its representatives to cultivate their per-
sonal qualities of inquiry, for instance object-matter experience as well as argumentative and interpre-
tive skill (see supra).283 That these differences help to make sense of the French-Anglophone divide at 
least supports the idea that the conflict between the two parties is related to basic difficulties of navi-
gating the ‘analytic’-‘synthetic’ boundary. 
If there is anything we can learn from Pepper’s enunciations of Western thought, it is probably that 
‘theory’ can come in many guises. Just as there is conflict among world hypotheses about what can 
legitimately identified as ‘pure’ fact or even ‘data’ (cf. Pepper 1942: 51-59, 63-70), theoretical enter-
prises may vary vastly between them. Theoretical work in science does at least not only concern 
‘grand-theories,’ grounded in more or less well-founded regularities, but theory, for instance, plays an 
equally important role in the miniscule comprehension of historical events – although the latter is 
                                                          
279 Personal and qualitative lithic experimentation is a core practice in the French tradition and there is a huge body of literature 
that reflects this condition (cf. e.g., Tixier 1978 [2012]; Roche and Tixier 1982; Binder and Pelegrin 1983; Boëda and Pelegrin 
1983).We will see in Chapter 5 that one can add a certain subject-based quality of being ‘skillful’ in reading lithic artefact and 
assemblages (frz. lecture); typically, this entails experience and proficiency in practices of physical and ‘mental refitting’. Gen-
eral dimensions of experience with the source material, for instance knowledge about similar and different assemblages, are 
similarly important. 
280 Cf. Appendix III.2: Fig. III.4: A. 
281 For the distinction between ‘etic’ and ‘emic,’ see esp. Harris (1968: 571f., 575-578). For an explicit critique on ‘emic’ tenden-
cies in French Palaeolithic archaeology, see for example Boissinot (2011: 299-301) and Tostevin (2011b: 354f.). 
282 See also Binford and Binford (1968) and the well-developed branch of Anglophone simulation-driven research (e.g., Grove 
2008; Barton and Riel-Salvatore 2014; Premo and Tostevin 2016). It is notable, and appears not at all to be coincidental, that 
such simulation-driven research is virtually absent in the French scene, it is even unclear how such inquiry would contribute to 
the current lithic discourse(s) there. 
283 A telling example of the central role of first-hand experience in French lithic analysis is Boëda’s recent book Techno-logique & 
Technologie. Une Paléohistoire des objets lithiques tranchants (2013), in which the author seems to deliberately rely only on 
those lithic assemblages which he himself has studied and/or at least examined in some detail to construct his arguments and 
develop his general narrative.  
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often discredited as ‘atheoretical.’ Theories cannot only be found in “explicit explanatory systems of 
propositions but also in analytical, interpretive, methodological, and argumentative choices” (Abend 
2006: 6). The question is therefore not whether theoretical activity is an essential part of lithic re-
search, but rather what the status and role of theory in different epistemological endeavours is. Pep-
per’s expositions call our attention to the basic fact that all facets of research, including the most prim-
itive categories such as ‘theory’ and ‘data,’ are subjected to world-theory interpretation. The point is 
that these epistemological footholds are variables in themselves, their character depending on the type 
of world hypothesis that motivates them. This section asks whether French and Anglophone theory-
use in lithic research actually differs, and whether the kinds of theories brought to bear relate dissimi-
larly to the available evidence and to other pieces of theory. If there is a general difference, it should 
reflect some of the pertinent features of the ‘analytic’-‘synthetic’ divide among world theories. 
 In the Anglophone lithic discourse, ‘theory’ plays an extremely important role. Theory-
building is an explicit, independent, and well-delineated area of scholarly activity (cf. e.g., Binford 
1964, 1977; Binford and Binford 1968; Clark 2002).284 Theory seems to serve two primary purposes: 
first, it organises and systematises the general repertoire of ideas and understandings about the world 
in order to facilitate the extraction of testable and highly specific propositions (i.e., hypotheses); sec-
ond, theory is an important tool of explanation and it is hoped that empirical findings can be illumi-
nated by linking them effectively to theoretical insights. The two are obviously complementary. The 
general lesson, consistent with the previous section, is that practices of ‘theorisation’ are exogenous to 
practices of empirical data-analysis; they are the logical entry point of an investigation and motivate 
the formulation of particular research questions as well as the collection of specific kinds of data. Data 
without theory are typically seen as rather ‘hollow’ and ‘meaningless.’ Some authors would certainly go 
as far as to argue that data cannot even exist without a theoretical underpinning (e.g., Clark 2001: 
139). This epistemological primacy of theory-making and the dependence of data on theory is a classi-
cal tenet of ‘analytic’ modes of investigation. ‘Analytic’ research thereby acknowledges the ‘theory-
laden’ nature of most of the available data. 
 Because ‘theory’ is at the centre stage of the Anglophone research enterprise, scholars have 
developed a rich and diversified taxonomy of theories, acknowledging that different types of theory 
have a different function in the research process. ‘General’ theory, for instance, specifies general prin-
ciples of nature, general relationships between two or more variables, or law-like behavioural disposi-
tions which may have led to the observable patterns in the archaeological record. ‘High-level’ theory is 
sometimes also used to designate this species of theory. ‘Low-level’ theories, by contrast, have a differ-
ent role in the reasoning process. Rather than guiding the explanatory endeavour, they tend to provide 
the needed clues of how to prepare and connect disparate pieces of evidence in order to render them 
interpretable. The most attention, however, is typically paid to ‘middle-level’ theories since they are 
thought to connect the strictly observational realm with the domain of potentially explanatory ‘high-
level’ or ‘general’ theories.285 The striking impact of Binford’s (1977, 1978, 2001) ‘Middle-Range-
Theory’ (MRT)286 programme on the development of Anglophone research in Palaeolithic archaeology 
provides a telling example of this general logic of theory-use.287 The key task of ‘theories of a middle 
range’ is to provide independent guidelines – e.g., the specification of relevant observable variables 
and their interrelationships – on how one can reach out from a ‘static’ record to a ‘dynamic’ past (cf. 
Shott 1998). The important point is that the call for MRT spawned a separate branch of research, 
highlighting the central role of theory-building in shaping the entirety of the Anglophone research 
architecture:288 
                                                          
284 See esp. Tostevin (2012: 27-41) for a useful summary of important axes of lithic theorisation in current American archaeolo-
gy. 
285 See Bernbeck (1997: 65-84) for a useful summary. 
286 The basic concept of MRT, although never acknowledge by Binford (1983a: 19, Note 5), is borrowed from sociologist Robert 
Merton (1949). See Raab and Goodyear (1984) and Shott (1998). 
287 Schiffer’s (1972, 1976, 1983) ‘behavioural formation theory’ falls of course into the same category. 
288 This is the birthplace of Anglophone ‘ethnoarchaeology’ as a frame of reference for archaeological reasoning (Yellen 1977; 
Binford 1978; McCall 2012; cf. Trigger 2007: 399). It is important to recognise that this specific understanding of ‘ethnoarchae-
ology’ is strictly opposed to the French idea of ‘prehistoric ethnography’ (Ethnologie préhistoire or Palethnologie), which seeks 
to maintain a high degree of interpretative intimacy with the archaeological facts and focuses on the description of ‘quotidian’ 
particularities (e.g., Leroi-Gourhan 1971; Leroi-Gourhan and Brézillon 1972). For a more recent sceptical voice against ethnoar-
chaeological theory-building and ‘analogising,’ see Perlès and Vanhaeren (2012). 
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This highly differentiated theory-scape and the critical role of MRT-research therein further 
underlines that the structural principles of knowledge corroboration are clearly ‘analytic.’ With Pepper 
(see Chapter 2), we can say that the respective theories of truth mobilised to evaluate and criticise rea-
soning are based on ‘correspondence’ or ‘causal-logical necessity.’289 Again, the goal is to compare the 
‘observational’ with the ‘theoretical,’ and to climb up various levels of theory if needed. This compari-
son between ‘data’ and ‘theory’ proceeds either in terms of analogy or similarity. Clarke (1972a: 643), 
for instance, tried to capture this basic strategy by noting that “[h]ypotheses are developed to relate 
observed properties to one another by means of a structural concept.” It is equally reflected in Bin-
ford’s (2015 [1972]: 110f.) insistence on the importance of first ‘describing similarities and differences’ 
in archaeological parts and then ‘explaining them by means of theory-informed hypotheses.’ The cate-
gorical distinction between ‘theory,’ ‘hypothesis,’ and ‘data,’ characteristic of science in the ‘analytic’ 
mode (see the previous Section), is therefore clearly a hallmark of Anglophone approaches. 
The result of this research logic is a layered framework of inquiry, describable in terms of a 
‘superstructure-substructure’ configuration. Dennell’s (1983) juxtaposition of the traditional Continen-
tal European research configuration, which he describes as essentially ‘culture-historic’ and non-
layered, with the “new” layered architecture of research he and his Anglophone colleagues are working 
with exemplifies this condition (Fig. 5). Only the latter supports well-defined levels or scales of in-
quiry and the discrimination between ‘general’ and more ‘specialised’ bodies of theory. It should be 
recalled here that much of the ‘anthropological’ re-orientation that Anglophone Palaeolithic research 
experienced from the 1960s on was motivated by the tantalising prospects of bringing to bear general 
theory and to learn more about the invariables of past human behaviour (e.g., Binford 1962, 1965; 
Yellen 1977). This ties in with conceptualising ‘knowledge,’ ‘findings,’ or ‘facts’ in layers (e.g., Potts 
1988: 297-300) and representing the process of knowledge production as a ‘ladder of inference’ 
(Hawkes 1954) with different aspects of past behaviour being differentially challenging to reconstruct 
(cf. Clark 1952, 1989; Clarke 1968: Fig. 49).290 Together with the mobilisation of well-delineated levels 
of theory (cf. Schiffer 1988; Tostevin 2011b: 353f.), all of this reflects a conception of worldly-order 
emphasising verticality and hierarchy. This, in turn, nicely captures the already outlined epistemolog-
ical trade-off between data-conception and world-conception which characterises Anglophone in-
quiry.291 
The recurrent call for ‘model-building’ that prevails in Anglophone research circles (e.g., 
Clarke 1972a, 1977; Hammond et al. 1979; Lycett and Chauhan 2010b: 8-12) is a comparable attempt 
to close the gap between the theoretical and observational dimensions of research. Models can be un-
derstood as conceptual devices that break down a piece of theory into its most basic elements and op-
erationalise it with regards to specific test-conditions and the kind of evidence the case provides. By 
“making a series of simplifying – but precise and explicit – assumptions, such that parameter values 
taken from empirical data can be compared for goodness-of-fit against those precisely laid out as-
sumptions” (Lycett and Chauhan 2010b: 10), models help relating theories to data. Alternatively, mod-
els may assist in theory-building since they enable the direct assessment of particular theoretical as-
sumptions or sets of assumptions in terms of their archaeological consequences. Model-building is 
then an independent operation that can inform theory-building. In any case, the very notion of a mod-
                                                          
289 Cf. e.g. “Clearly if we can isolate causal relationships between things, and if we can understand such relationships in terms of 
more general principles of necessity, such as the theories of mechanics or some other basic science, then we have a strong war-
rant for the inference of the cause from the observed effects. We would be building a strong theoretically informed bridge be-
tween properties of the contemporary archaeological record and characteristics of the dynamic past” (Binford 1981b: 26). 
290 There are two dimensions to this: first, the old Baconian idea of the ‘pyramid of knowledge’ and ‘levels of intellect’ provides 
the prototypical example of the ‘formistic’ conception that knowledge about the world is typically gained in different qualities – 
that there is a ladder of knowledge (see Chapter 2); second, ‘mechanism’ introduces layers of ‘facts’ or ‘insights’ in order to 
account for the differential relevance of information for answering particular research questions (idem). Because such questions 
are specified with the help of orientating theories, the world is rendered a hierarchical place with different layers of information 
only being significant for solving certain problems. 
291 See again Tab. 3. 
“The conclusion should be clear: Middle-range research, with particular emphasis of theory 
building, is crucial to the further development of archaeology. We cannot “know” the past with-
out it, and we cannot evaluate our ideas about the past and why it was the way it appears to 
have been without means of monitoring the conditions or variables believed to be important. 




el is already ‘analytic’ since a model’s purpose is always to evaluate whether or not particular combina-
tions of parts given particular conditions could have produced the sought-for whole(s).292 The use of 
computer-based ‘simulations’ serves a similar purpose. Quite often, simulation is simply a method to 
explore the properties of a model when traditional analytic methods are not available or if one wants to 
explore more complex problems that require the modulation of multiple parameters (cf. Grüne-Yanoff 
and Weirich 2010: 21-26). The implementation of both formal-mathematical models and computer-
driven simulations is therefore a testimony of ‘analytic’ thought (Aldenderfer 1981, 1991). The fact that 
both play an important role in current Palaeolithic research in the Anglophone world,293 but are virtu-
ally lacking within mainstream Palaeolithic archaeology in France suggests that the ‘analytic’-
‘synthetic’ separation is of some significance here:294 
This important role of ‘theory’ in Anglophone research makes it in principle possible that 
scholars can concentrate almost exclusively on theoretical inquiry and try to advance the theoretical 
discourse rather than doing a lot of fieldwork or primary data-analysis – periodicals such as the Jour-
nal of Archaeological Method and Theory testify to this situation.295  The same research configuration 
also explains why secondary data – that is, data collected from the literature – may be as important as 
primary data and continues to delineate a lively field of scholarly activity and debate.296 Because theo-
retical matters are negotiated explicitly and are widely recognised as crucial for the development of the 
field, practitioners tend to specialise relative to taken-for-granted ‘theory’-‘data’ dichotomies and to 
devise expert areas of inquiry mirroring these dichotomies. Overviews of Anglophone, especially U.S. 
American Palaeolithic archaeology are therefore often organised according to theoretical orientations 
(cf. Clark 2008: 54-59). Ecological theorists (e.g., Butzer 1982; Kelly 1988; Torrence 1989c; Kuhn 
1995; Shea 2011b, 2017a) are for example contrasted with reduction theorists (e.g., Dibble 1987, 1995b; 
Henry 1989b; McPherron 1994; Iovita 2008; Olszewski 2016), cognitive theorists (e.g., Gowlett 1984; 
Mithen 1996; Stout 2011; Wynn and Coolidge 2016), design theorists (Bleed 1986; Bousman 1993; 
Bamforth and Bleed 1997), style theorists (e.g., Sackett 1973; Wobst 1977), formation theorists (e.g., 
Isaac 1967; Binford 1979; Toth 1985; Bunn and Kroll 1986; Stern 1993, 2008), or scholars working 
within the confines of Neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory (e.g., Dunnell 1989; Lyman and O’Brien 
2000; Shennan 2002; Kuhn 2004a) – to name but a few of the relevant theoretical orientations pro-
pelling Anglophone lithic inquiry. The diversification of approaches relative to ‘high-level’ theories is 
sometimes described with the concept of ‘paradigms’ (e.g., Clarke 1972b: 1.1, 1.16).297 A paradigm in 
this sense defines a general theoretical inclination, pre-organising the rich theory-scape in order to 
narrow down the range of operational theories that may be selected in the context of a particular re-
                                                          
292 Model-use is also ‘analytic’ in terms of its truth-conditions. Clarke himself (1972b: 1) notes that “[t]he relation between the 
model and the observations modelled may in general be said to be one of analogy, or in the case of logical and mathematical 
models more usually one of isomorphism […].” Again, some to be specified analogy or similarity relationships (isomorphism is 
a special case of similarity) are exploited to corroborate knowledge claims that derive from model-based approaches. See Chap-
ter 2 for an exposition of the ‘formistic’ and ‘mechanistic’ theories of cognitive criticism underlying this mode of corroboration. 
293 Recent examples of simulation-based research in the Anglophone world are Mithen (1990), Steele (1994), Shennan (2001), 
Powell et al. (2009), Romanowska (2015), and Barton and Riel-Salvatore (2016). 
294 Compare, for example, the mentioned simulation-authors in Lake (2014) for a rough indication. 
295 The work of Clive Gamble (1986, 1998, 1999, 2007) exemplifies a broadly theory-oriented career. Gamble’s theoretical con-
tributions have framed many discussions in the field and sparked often-controversial debates. Although his views were regularly 
met with criticism and scepticism, they certainly shaped the Anglophone discourse – if only as a contrastive foil. The more 
recent cooperation between Clive Gamble, John Gowlett, and evolutionary psychologist Robin Dunbar has resulted in the inte-
gration of some of the most important strands of British Palaeolithic archaeology under the umbrella of the ‘social brain theory’ 
(cf. Gamble et al. 2011, 2014; Gowlett et al. 2012). 
296 The re-assessment of the classic question of interassemblage variability in the Western European Mousterian by Szmidt 
(2003) offers a prototypical example of the productive usage of secondary data in Anglophone lithic research. 
297 See also Isaac (1972b: 193, Note 1). 
“What is a model? Models are pieces of machinery that relate observations to theoretical ideas, 
they may be used for many different purposes and they vary widely in the form of machinery 
they employ, the class of observations they focus upon and the manner in which they relate the 
observations to the theory or hypothesis. It is therefore more appropriate to describe models 
than to attempt a hopelessly broad or a pointlessly narrow definition for them. Models are 
often partial representations, which simplify the complex observations by the selective elimina-
tion of detail incidental to the purpose of the model. The model may thus isolate the essential 
factors and interrelationships which together largely account for the variability of interest in 
the observations; in this way the model may even share a similarity in formal structure with the 
observations.” (Clarke 1972b: 1) 
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search problem. A research ‘paradigm’ sits at the summit of the epistemological pyra -mid, reinforcing 
the layered character of theorisation in wider Anglophone research.298 
 This overwhelmingly ‘analytic’ signature of theory-mobilisation is met by a much more ambiv-
alent use of ‘theory’ in the French research context. It has to be said from the start, however, that theo-
retical considerations have always played a role in directing French inquiry – even within Bordian 
‘straight archaeology’ (sensu Sackett 1991). In the context of lithic analysis, this is for example well-
illustrated by Geneste’s (2010 [1991]: 420-429) extensive discussion of the various theoretical currents 
and thinkers that have contributed to the conceptual orientation of the chaîne opératoire approach. 
He mentions primarily the ‘History and Anthropology of Techniques’ including what in France is 
called « Technologie culturelle », philosophy of technology, cybernetics, and general systems theory.299 
Similar theoretical discussions can for instance be found in Bon (2009: Chapitre IV, 223-240), who 
draws on ethnology and sociology, and Valentin (2008a: Chapitre 1), who examines in detail the rela-
tionship between history and prehistory and tries to reinvigorate Furet’s (1975) vision of ‘problem-
history.’ Yet, the way in which theory is debated and made use of in these works clearly suggests that 
‘theorisation’ is not regarded as an analytical operation in the narrow sense of the word. Theoretical 
considerations mostly remain in the ‘background’ and are rarely formalised or made overly explicit in 
terms of their consequences.300 This utilisation of theory as ‘background theory’ serves to guide and 
orientate analysis, contextualisation, and interpretation – it is neither explicitly tied to the logic of 
discovery, nor is theory regarded to have a distinct explanatory value. Moreover, theory is typically 
‘historicised’ in France and considered to be intimately bound to the evolved disciplinary fabric of Pal-
aeolithic archaeology (e.g., Audouze et al. 2018).301 Theory is therefore to a much lesser degree nego-
tiable independently of broader intellectual developments.302 
 In her recent review of the French technological approach, Perlès (2016: 231f.) also stressed 
that theories are usually mobilised implicitly by practitioners and that the latter typically feel no need 
of ‘labelling their approach, theory, or method.’ The first aspect is illustrated by the case of Leroi-
Gourhan – the « Patron » of the Parisian research trajectory – whose major works Évolution et tech-
niques (1943/1945) and Le geste et la parole (1964/1965) are characterised by a practice of implicit 
reference-making (e.g., Martinelli 1988; Sigaut 2010; Delage 2017: 164). This practice, putting forth a 
radical form of ‘intertextuality’ (sensu Genette 1982), deals with a broad range of theoretical sources, 
often in somewhat idiosyncratic ways, without citing or mentioning the respective authors or primary 
works.303 Audouze (2002: 292), for instance, notes that Leroi-Gourhan’s thought was “like an octopus, 
sending tentacles in many directions, but all ultimately connected.” The point is that theorisation is 
often considered a rather ‘mundane’ and perhaps even ‘un-exciting’ undertaking, which naturally takes 
opportunity of its wider intellectual context without elaborating too much on this context. Influential 
theoretical perspectives do not need to be named or addressed specifically since they belong to every-
body’s broader ‘horizon of knowing.’ Explicitly dealing with them would un-necessarily complicate the 
train of thought, often hindering the readability of scholarly productions. This becomes especially ap-
parent in the œuvre of the ‘Early’ Leroi-Gourhan, which is rather complicated in its conceptual struc-
ture and benefits from many different, but often prima facie non-connected ideas.  
Another reason for this rather ‘intangible’ mode of theorisation is that theory is developed ‘on 
the way,’ that is, in the process of dealing with a particular problem, rather than beforehand (cf. Au-
douze 1999). Theories are regarded to be useful only if they help to illuminate particular problem-
                                                          
298 An interesting consequence of this research configuration is that intergenerational theory change is often modelled in terms 
of a Kuhnian change of paradigms, the implication being that disciplinary advancement suddenly depends on theoretical novel-
ty and the ability of a new generation of scholars to contribute something substantial to the theoretical discourse. 
299 For similar points, see e.g. Julien (1992), Schlanger (2004), Perlès (1991a, 2016), and Audouze et al. (2018). 
300 See Cleuziou et al. (1991) for an illuminating discussion of the apparent ‘atheoreticality’ of French prehistoric archaeology. 
301 See Olivier (1999: 99) for a similar argument which, however, differs in its details from the perspective outlined here. 
302 It may be possible to argue here that ‘theory-building’ is therefore less of an individual task but concerns the research com-
munity as a whole. Accordingly, the guiding, one could say ‘founding,’ theories of the discipline are incrementally built up by 
multiple generations. If this reading is appropriate, it would show that even theory-building follows a ‘synthetic’ logic in France 
and really concerns the whole of the research process rather than its effective parts (i.e., individual scholars). 
303 This mode of referring to the wider intellectual sphere is typically intertwined with a particular mode of scholarly self-
enactment. Tendencies of ‘intertextuality’ seem to be particularly strong if ‘erudition’ is considered a cognitive virtue and when 
scholars identify themselves as intellectuals. Arguably, intellectuality is of a much lesser importance in the Anglophone research 
enterprise, which tends to emphasise the ‘scientific’ qualities of researchers rather than their intellectualism.  
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contexts – the concept of a ‘general theory’ has little meaning here.304 This suggests that ‘theory,’ for 
the most part, cannot stand for itself. It is useful not because of its essential content, but because of its 
possible relationships to other theories and the interpretive perspective it provides on particular sets of 
evidence.305 Theory, therefore, is in principle not treated differently than data. 
 The second aspect – the question of ‘naming practices’ – is linked to the logic of specialisation 
and disciplinary persuasion in France. Practitioners indeed do not seem to identify themselves and 
what they do in terms of ‘theory-related’ labels. They, for instance, define their place in the research 
community by referring to long-standing or developing umbrella approaches specifying certain ‘agen-
das,’ ‘visions,’ or ‘ambitions’ of research (cf. Ramírez Galicia 2016). Examples are « Ethnologie préhis-
toire» or « Palethnologie », « Technologie préhistoire », and « Paléohistoire ». The important point is 
that these approaches are defined by a certain theoretical matrix and adopting them implies also to 
adopt the corresponding theoretical orientation. Because these umbrella approaches are essentially 
historical entities, the theoretical matrix that comes with them is a product of particular disciplinary 
traditions. This again suggests that the French conception of ‘theory-making’ is grounded in the idea 
that ongoing research and theoretical inquiry inseparably go together, i.e., co-enable each other. Theo-
risation is therefore certainly not regarded to be primary, nor to be a distinct arena of scholarly en-
gagement. Moreover, rather than specialising relative to theoretical positions, lithic practitioners usu-
ally specialise relative to well-attested differences in the stone artefact record: researchers usually con-
sider themselves experts in Magdalenian, Solutrean, Aurignacian, Mousterian, or Acheulean lithic 
technology; they may equally specialise into broader periods such as the Lower, Middle, or Upper Pal-
aeolithic and in particular kinds of technology (i.e., façonnage, débitage). This again signals that mat-
ters of theorisation are subordinate to perceived differences in the object-matter at hand. 
 A particular detail of implicit theory-mobilisation may be of importance here. As for example 
illustrated by Valentin’s (2011: 56-59) short discussion of concepts of ‘culture,’ ‘tradition,’ and ‘cur-
rents of culture’ (courants culturels), individual terms such as ‘gesture,’ ‘technique,’ ‘habitus,’ and ‘so-
cial morphology’ actually stand for larger theoretical discourses in which they continue to have a spe-
cific meaning.306 They are, in other words, pars pro toto and reflect more general theoretical insights. 
This is quite critical because it demonstrates the ‘synthetic’ take on theory that prevails in the French 
tradition. It also confirms Coudart’s (1999) suspicion that instead of speaking of ‘theory-building,’ we 
should probably talk about conceptual work in the French context. This prima facie somewhat subtle 
difference in fact explains what theoretical activity in French lithic research amounts to. Above all, 
theorisation refers to the development and refinement of interpretive concepts that help interrogating 
the primary lithic evidence.307 The classic contributions which continue to define the theoretical foun-
dations of lithic inquiry such as Inizan (1976), Perlès (1980), Pigeot (1983), and Pelegrin (1995) coined 
at least one important research concept. Conceptualisation is also the key operation when scholars 
develop new ways of describing and interpreting the modalities of core management (e.g., Ploux 1988; 
Valentin 1995: Annexes). A more recent example of a similar practice is the conceptual distinction 
between ‘integrative’ and ‘additive’ structures of core exploitation (Boëda 2013: 89-102).308 All of this 
clearly indicates that the construction and implementation of interpretive concepts geared towards the 
specific problems of lithic analysis proves to be one of the most potent loci of theoretical innovation in 
current French lithic research. Theorisation is considered a conceptual business embedded in data-
analysis. It supports meticulous and highly-differentiated terminological systems in order to facilitate 
empirical research. Theoretical work therefore always resonates with the ‘whole of the research pro-
cess, it does not contain or define that whole.’ 
 We can conclude from this that ‘theory’ is really handled ‘synthetically’ in French technological 
research. The various practices of bringing it to bear generally question whether any meaningful dis-
                                                          
304 Note that the rejection of ‘general theorising’ is also the consequence of an initial research focus on ‘how-questions’ rather 
than why- or what-questions (e.g., Tixier 2012 [1978]). 
305 Cf. “As Guille-Escuret recalls, Leroi-Gourhan was such a prodigious professor because, in his approach, observation and 
theory were associated in an insoluble whole. Each served to correct and consolidate the other as the work progressed (Guille-
Escuret, 1994, p. 10).” (Audouze 2002: 298) 
306 The term chaîne opératoire is no exception here. 
307 To be more specific: most of the time, these interpretive concepts help to delineate and characterise ‘sub-wholes’ in the inves-
tigated lithic assemblages (see infra and Chapter 5 for a more detailed discussion). 
308 A complementary but not entirely alternative distinction is between the ‘partial’ and ‘total configuration’ of a core matrix 
(e.g., Carmignani et al. 2017: Fig. 16). For a detailed discussion of these concepts within the context of the ‘techno-genetic’ ap-
proach, see the second part of Chapter 5. 
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tinction between ‘theory’ and ‘data’ can realistically be made. Rather than embracing theory as a dis-
tinct field of inquiry, French scholars tend to engage in conceptual activity to alter their ‘exposure’ to 
the lithic evidence. This already implies a somewhat dialectic relationship between the ‘theoretical’ and 
‘observational’ aspects of research. At the same time, the link between more general pieces of theory 
and explanations of the evidence is much ‘looser.’309 This is because the primary role of theory is to put 
lithic observations into perspective and because scholars typically agree that no simple or one-to-one 
relationship between theory and data exists. Neither theory nor data can therefore legislate over each 
other. Theory therefore typically serves an interpretive ‘crutch’ and becomes just another vehicle of 
argumentation and, potentially, narrative enrichment.310 Because theory seems to be subjugated to 
interpretive ends rather than the other way around, theoretical considerations are typically ‘weaker’ 
than in most Anglophone research contexts. Yet, they are often much ‘thicker.’ This is because theory 
rarely comes in the singular and there is little concern for theoretical purity. This adds to the already 
raised issue of implicit theory-use in the French scene. 
On a general level, one can therefore agree with Tostevin (2011b), who has recently noted: 
The comparative examination of French and Anglophone theory-use indeed shows that ‘theo-
ry’ serves a vastly different purpose in both research contexts. Not only are the ‘theoretical’ and ‘empir-
ical’ domains of research unequally articulated in both cases, the way how theory is understood and 
conceptualised fundamentally differs. This divergence reproduces Pepper’s epistemological division 
between ‘analytic’ and ‘synthetic’ modes of thought. The crucial point, therefore, is not only that 
French and Anglophone practitioners typically call upon dissimilar bodies of theory, but that they 
would mobilise even the same body in different ways.311 An ‘analytic’ understanding of theory, charac-
teristic of Anglophone lithic research, emphasises the role of theory as a well-defined part of the re-
search process and calls for a precise formal analysis of theories themselves, whereas a ‘synthetic’ 
grasp of theory, found in large parts of the French scene, leads to the recognition that theory is always 
transgressive and has to be developed in close dialogue with specific sets of evidence. The ‘synthetic’ 
view rejects the idea that practices of theorisation can be separated from the overarching logic and 
trajectory of specific lithic inquiries. All of this strongly indicates that French and Anglophone lithic 
approaches are fuelled by different kinds of world hypotheses and that the ‘analytic’-‘synthetic’ distinc-
tion plays an organisational role in this. 
Chapter 2 has taught us that empirical research can profit tremendously from visualisation and that 
different strategies of ‘making visible’ are likely to be deployed by varying research programmes. Gen-
erally speaking, pictures and images are non-textual elements of inquiry that not merely ‘result’ from 
the interrogation of evidence, but can actively contribute to the process of reasoning and knowledge 
formation (cf. e.g., Lynch and Woolgar 1990; Rheinberger 1992; Topper 1996; Bredekamp et al. 
2008).312 Tactics and strategies of scientific visualisation aid scholars in handling the available data – 
                                                          
309 Leroi-Gourhan’s general scepticism towards the direct use of analogies – anthropological or otherwise – illustrates this point 
(cf. Valentin 2015: 176). Taking up this point, Cleuziou et al. (1991) contend that “[t]he major weakness of French archaeology in 
this respect is that the scepticism expressed – by Leroi-Gourhan, for example – concerning the construction of cultural models 
or the notion of culture itself, leads to the use of notions which are even more dangerous because they are implicit.” 
310 An example of this ‘argumentative function’ of theory is provided by Renard and Ducasse (2015). Their approach to mobility 
and techno-economy is discussed in detail in the first part of Chapter 5. 
311 The recognition that different standards of theory underpin French and Anglophone Palaeolithic archaeology also defuses the 
allegation of ‘atheoreticality’ which has regularly been brought forward by a number of U.S. American practitioners (e.g., Binford 
and Sabloff 1982; Straus 1987, 1991; Clark and Lindly 1991; Clark 1993, 2001; Conard 2009; cf. Wargo 2009: 110, 114-119). 
312 For a general discussion of the increasingly evident ‘more-than-representational’ status of scientific imagery, see Daston 
(2014). 
“One reason for the absence of a discussion of the theoretical differences between the [French 
and Anglophone] approaches in the present debate is the fact that the explicit espousal of 
high-level theory is considerably different in each context (Bleed 2001). Archaeological theory 
is not conceived of exactly the same way by proponents of the two approaches. This frequently 
results in explicit statements of theoretical orientation by American reduction sequence pro-
ponents and implicit orientations within methodological discussions by chaîne opératoire 
proponents.” (ibid.: 353; original emphasis) 
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they can guide interpretations, mediate cognitive operations such as ‘analogy-building’ or ‘metaphor-
exploration,’ and provide independent arguments for or against whatever claim one wishes to defend. 
Rendering research problems or specific data-configurations ‘visible’ is therefore often equally im-
portant as, say, conducting a statistical test (e.g., Latour 1986; Daston 2008; Suchman 2014). After all, 
many of the research operations that are now commonly used in Palaeolithic archaeology have a visual 
component and the manipulation of visual evidence becomes an increasingly important domain of 
scholarly activity (e.g., Magnani 2014).313 Some scientific publishers, for example, have already begun 
to promote the employment of ‘graphical abstracts.’314 Any analysis of scientific practice should there-
fore not only focus on the latter’s structural and ‘written’ aspects, but also take into consideration the 
unique ‘rhetoric of images’: 
Images are important footholds of reasoning because they are considered to enable an ‘imme-
diate’ access to the phenomena under consideration, as well as to enshrine a ‘tangible objectivity’ of 
knowing that words can never hope to match (cf. Daston and Galison 1992). Visualisations may indeed 
say ‘more than thousand words’ and often appear to satisfy, by means of their clarity and visualisability 
[Anschaulichkeit] enhancing capacities,315 the old ideal of ‘direct scientific observation’ (Daston 2008). 
Because of these qualities, scientific imagery can provide a shortcut to the key message of the scholarly 
production(s) in question and greatly facilitates the identification of peers and other like-minded prac-
titioners. To put it simple: similar ‘image worlds’ typically indicate that scholars work on broadly simi-
lar problems, utilise similar methods, and share some basic or at least cognate assumptions (cf. Lynch 
and Woolgar 1988; Bueno 2012, 2016).316 This last point is of particular importance in an age in which 
scientific knowledge seems to be disseminated at ever-accelerating speeds and the full range of schol-
arly outputs has become almost unmonitorable. All of these aspects can be exploited in order to ana-
lyse the specific role of images in a given research context. Are particular approaches distinguished by 
particular types of images? Do different research communities cultivate disparate sets of images or 
incompatible modes of image-use? And if so, can these help us in understanding the logic of research 
regulating the interpretation of evidence in these contexts? 
 This section will explore the ‘visual signature’ of French and Anglophone lithic approaches. 
The investigation thereby mainly focuses on the assemblage-based case studies introduced in Chapter 
1, yet also takes into account some more general features of lithic visuality in both research spheres. 
The central question is whether there is a substantial difference in the logic of image-use when French 
and Anglophone lithic approaches are compared, and if so, whether this difference can be accounted 
for by the conflict between ‘analytic’ and ‘synthetic’ world hypotheses. Lithic practice appears to be 
particularly well-suited to answer these questions since there is a long-standing tradition of drawing 
and photographing stone artefacts or organising them in diagrams (e.g., Dauvois 1976; Laurent 1985; 
Addington 1986; Martingell and Saville 1988; Adkins and Adkins 1989). The importance of visualising 
both objects and data in lithic research is only increasing as we speak and recent years have witnessed 
a vast surge of new technologies for processing, manipulating, and representing various kinds of visual 
information. Shott (2014), for instance, even argues that the field is currently undergoing a true ‘visual 
revolution.’ A Pepperian perspective should help us to better understand the general role of these im-
                                                          
313 For discussions of the role of visualisation in wider archaeology, see Shelley (1996) and Kavanagh (2007). 
314 See for example the special entry on ‘graphical abstracts’ on the Elsevier webpage: “A Graphical Abstract is a single, concise, 
pictorial and visual summary of the main findings of the article. This could either be the concluding figure from the article or a 
figure that is specially designed for the purpose, which captures the content of the article for readers at a single glance.” (web-
text accessed on the 7th of July 2018) 
315 Cf. e.g., de Regt (2014: 378). 
316 It may therefore be argued that scientific imagery, in a perhaps unique manner, makes explicit what otherwise remains sedi-
mented in the opacity of textual discourse. 
“After some twenty years of remarkable work on visualization in science, it is now astonishing 
to recall how blind historians of science once were to anything but words: scientific texts were 
purely textual; when we came to an image (a drawing, a graph, a table, a diagram, a photo-
graph, it was all one), we just flipped the page. Illustrations in history of science monographs, 
insofar as there were any, consisted almost exclusively of portraits of past scientific luminaries. 
Pick up almost any recent book or article in the field now and it is likely to be peppered with 
images, many of which are as essential as the well-chosen quotation is to making the author’s 
point. Images have come into their own as a source for the history of science, even if we are 
still learning how to interpret them and to emancipate ourselves from text-centered analogies 




ages in lithic knowledge production.317 Moreover, the results can be expected to complement the previ-
ous findings of this chapter and, if necessary, serve as a corrective measure. 
 With Lopes (2009: 6), we can distinguish between three axes of pictorial practice, along which 
lithic imagery is expected to vary. The first is the deployed image-type, with drawings, schematisa-
tions, pictorial diagrams, photographs, tables, or graphs being examples of different kinds of lithic 
images.318 The second is the imaging task, which is the purpose of the image broadly conceived – the 
question here is for instance whether the image is used to illustrate an argument, present data, per-
form an inference, specify hypotheses, or conduct some sort of proof. The third axe is the image con-
text or ‘context of use.’ This dimension of scientific imagery is the disciplinary, topical, and/or ‘work-
ing’ context of individual visualisations. It is linked to broader questions about the role and function of 
particular media (e.g., research monographs, field reports, specialised journals) as well as to the design 
and focus of a specific study (e.g., highly focussed, comparative, synoptic, mono-specific). The three 
axes of image-use are often interconnected (cf. Gooding 2004: 551-555) and to understand the respec-
tive relationships can be imperative in order to expound different modes of visualisation. Methodolog-
ically, keeping constant the ‘image context’ enables a more effective comparison of visualisation prac-
tices between distinct research communities, even though it has to be said that both research design 
and focus of inquiry are often variables in themselves when such research communities are contrasted 
(see previous Section). It is therefore usually unpractical to fixate the ‘image context.’ A more promis-
ing strategy, especially for the present purpose, is to compare the overall character of image-use, which 
is simply a function of all three aspects of visualisation. By examining the spectrum of ‘image-types’ 
and ‘imaging tasks’ in a given ‘image context,’ it should be possible to extract the general logic of em-
ploying lithic imagery. It is this logic that can then be compared. 
 Because images, as argued before, can to a certain extent ‘speak for themselves,’ it is also pos-
sible to investigate what an image silently presumes about its object matter. This opens up some im-
portant angles of interrogation. How do lithic images conceive of part-whole relations in whatever they 
visualise? Do they primarily show parts or wholes? What are the relevant parts and the effective 
wholes in the images, if any? And what can this tell us about what is considered to be lithic data in the 
first place? All of these questions resonate with basic features of Pepper’s epistemology and examining 
them should therefore help us assessing whether image-use at the French-Anglophone interface re-
produces ‘analytic’-‘synthetic’ antagonisms. Drawing on Pepper, we can even ask more specific ques-
tions, for example whether the ‘imaging task’ is completed by putting the spotlight on ‘particulars,’ 
‘characters,’ ‘classes,’ ‘types,’ ‘relations,’ ‘qualities,’ ‘fragments,’ or ‘nexuses.’319 Since these categories 
have specific world theory implications, we can gain some additional and potentially complementary 
insights about the French-Anglophone divide. I will begin with a quantitative examination of the lithic 
imagery employed in the three pairs of assemblage-based case studies.320 
 Table 4 captures the generalised ‘visual signature’ of the lithic approaches in the three paired 
case studies. The first striking difference is that French scholars seem to pay much more attention to 
representing lithic artefacts themselves than their Anglophone colleagues and tend to mobilise a varie-
ty of abstract pictorial schemas or interpretive diagrams. The latter type of imagery is completely miss-
ing in the examined Anglophone cases.321 The Anglophone approaches, by contrast, rely more heavily 
on different tables and quantitative-statistical graphs. The degree of standardisation across the em-
ployed tables is fairly high. This contrasts with the relatively low level of inter-table standardisation in 
the French cases, where table design and table content appear to be somewhat idiosyncratic. Further-
more, the comparison of image-use reveals that in the respective French studies lithic artefact depic-
tions always feature prominently in the principal part of data-analysis, whereas the positioning of such 
                                                          
317 In particular, approaching lithic images through Pepper’s lens would help in accomplishing Lopes’ (2009: 5) two central 
tasks, to “understand imaging as a type of representation with distinctive capabilities (by contrast, in particular, with language” 
and to “understand the diversification of different kinds of images across different scientific contexts.” 
318 One may argue that tables, some diagrams, and most graphs are not really images. Quite often, they at least do not depict 
lithic objects, but rather summarise aspects of data-analysis. However, the here adopted perspective on lithic visualisation is 
fairly pragmatic and ‘inclusive’ (the sum of non-textual elements in a scientific production; see supra), also because the analysis 
is guided by the informed suspicion that the importance of depicting the lithic objects themselves may vary greatly in French and 
Anglophone approaches. 
319 See Chapter 2 for an explanation of these structural categories. 
320 For a general description of these three cases of interpretive conflict, see Chapter 1 (esp. second part of Section 1.2). 
321 As we will see below, abstract diagrammatical reasoning is not completely absent in the Anglophone world, but tends to serve 
different purposes than similar image-types in French technological inquiry. 
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image-types, if they are present at all, is more variable in the Anglophone examples. Compelling is also 
the opposition between the virtual non-existence of technical symbology to supplement artefact repre-
sentations in the Anglophone research context and the relatively strong reliance on similar pictorial 
elements in the French cases. It is certainly interesting that such a clear disparity in image-use be-
comes already apparent on a general level of analysis, suggesting that the logic of research producing 
them is indeed vastly different. But how can these differences be explained? What do they indicate and 
how do they interact with what we have already learned? 
 The differential status of artefact representations in French and Anglophone lithic research 
may be significant for a number of reasons. Most importantly, it suggests that the informational value 
of lithic objects is perceived unequally. The central issue is the role of objects in constructing the ar-
gument and in guiding the course of reasoning. In the Anglophone cases, images of lithic artefacts are 
either entirely lacking – as in the case of McPherron (1994) – or confined to the introductory section 
or a supplementary part (i.e., appendix, addendum, electronic supplement) – as in the case of Dibble 
(1995a) and Tostevin (2000, 2012). Artefact drawings, in other words, only feature ‘outside’ of the 
data-driven core sections of the analysis.322 This, in turn, suggests that object visualisations have little 
to contribute to the actual processes of reasoning determining the interpretive results of the studies in 
question. Lithic object visualisation appear to serve an ‘illustrative’ rather than ‘demonstrative’ pur-
pose. In Dibble’s (1995a) study of the material from Biache-Saint-Vaast IIA, detailed artefact drawings 
help introducing the site and giving the reader a general overview of the kinds of artefacts found there. 
In Tostevin’s (2012) study of the Kulna layer 7 assemblage, there is not a single in-text reference to the 
artefact illustrations provided in the appendix, indicating that they are largely dispensable for the ad-
vanced knowledge claims and are provided mainly to satisfy the curiosity of those who care what the 
actual artefacts look like. It is not far-fetched to attest a ‘documentary’ function of the respective arte-
fact-images here – they are intended to provide a ‘visual record’ of the assemblage. In both cases, arte-
fact visualisations depict ‘types,’ ‘classes,’ or ‘particulars.’ The fact that all of these depictions, although 
of course being technical drawings, emphasise the ‘realism’ of the lithic objects and lack additional 
aspects of encoded visual information, affirms the mostly illustrational purpose of object imagery in 
the Anglophone case studies (Fig. 5). 
 All of this provokes the question of ‘data.’ Are lithic artefacts considered lithic data at all? The 
visual evidence at least suggests that this question must be answered in the negative. The representa-
tion of lithic objects points to a conception of artefacts as evidence rather than primary data. The idea 
would be that lithic objects of course possess informational value – they are evidence for something – 
but in order to become ‘data’ the information they register needs to be transposed into an adequate 
data-format. It is only in this format that ‘evidence’ is turned into ‘data.’ With Pepper, we can under-
stand this process as the transformation of uncriticised observation into reliable scientific ‘fact.’ The 
circumstance that lithic object representations hardly play a role in the ‘context of justification’ hence 
indicates that ‘data’ is typically provided in another visual format. This format is tables and quantita-
tive-statistical graphs. We can therefore assert that the ‘imaging task’ of object-images is non-
analytical. They do not specify any hypothesis, nor do they present data in the strict sense or catalyse 
any proof or inference. Instead, this is overtaken by the tables and graphs that showcase the lithic data, 
typically in numeric or digit form, and perform inferential statistics in order to provide the needed 
arguments, often by means of some kind of ‘pattern visualisation.’ The ‘data’ – whether provided as 
‘continuous’ or ‘discrete’ variables – is always data about parts. It concerns object-particulars but also 
‘traits,’ ‘attributes,’ or ‘ties’ (i.e., indices and other relationships between traits and attributes).323 The 
general logic of image-use is therefore clearly ‘analytic.’ It is also evident that data-construction as 
reflected in imaging practices responds to requirements of quantification. Since the depiction of lithic 
objects is always ineluctably ‘qualitative,’ it may thus not be surprising that this ‘image-type’ only plays 
a marginal role in the examined Anglophone cases of lithic analysis. 
 In the French cases, the situation is somewhat different. Lithic object representations are cen-
tral argumentative devices. Not only can they be found throughout the entire paper, some of the ‘tex-
                                                          
322 See also, for example, Yellen et al. (2005: Appendix C [Figures 4-33]). 
323 Especially in Dibble’s (1995a) study, lithic artefacts are grouped together in a relatively ‘loose’ manner. There is either no 
apparent selection of artefacts except for the fact that they, as individuals, instantiate a set of predefined and supposedly diag-
nostic classes of Mousterian artefacts, or artefact-groupings are based on broadly shared morphological characteristics or at-
tributes (ibid.: Fig. 7.4-7.7). Object-images therefore clearly represent ‘particulars’ or ‘types.’ 
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tual’ arguments are simply not comprehensible without referring to the corresponding figures. This 
suggests that showing objects is at least as important as talking about them. Many arguments have a 
textual and an ‘object-visualisation’ side to them, and both are indispensable to the construction and 
persuasiveness of the argument. The relationship between text and image is not only complementary 
and mutually reinforcing, but also of a dialectical nature. In order to retract an argument, even the 
reader sometimes has to move back and forth between the relevant written and pictorial parts. Both 
aspects of reasoning therefore seem to form an inextricable ‘whole’: 
The important point, however, is that individual artefacts are no longer considered as evi-
dence, but assume a status as data. Why is this the case? Boëda’s (1988: 199-202) reconstruction of 
the relationship between different reduction stages and Levallois products may serve as an illustration 
here. The author uses schematic images to specify why and how particular core configurations and 
particular blank configurations inter-constraint each other (ibid.: Fig. 18.15-18.17; Fig. 6).324 The ‘im-
aging task’ of these images is to outline and ‘explore’ local hypotheses and possibilities of core-blank 
interaction under specific technical conditions. The associated textual train of thought develops the 
rational arguments that link particular groups of artefacts to the outlined technical relationships. The 
object-images that group artefact which are interpreted to belong to the same context of lithic reduc-
tion (cf. ibid.: Fig. 18.18-18.20) are then presented on distinct panels in order to establish that the de-
rived expectations are confirmed by the data. The ‘imaging task’ of these depictions is both ‘inferential’ 
and ‘demonstrative.’ The visualised lithic artefacts are data in themselves – they are shown to convince 
the reader that the suggested reading of the evidence makes sense. 
 A whole range of pictorial features support this view. The perhaps most significant aspect is 
the evident search for a ‘visual match’ between two or more lithic artefacts that are believed to bring 
forth each other, for instance specific cores and their associated blanks.325 This ‘visual match’ is then 
further analysed in order to assess whether or not the technical and morphological characteristics of 
the involved lithic objects explain each other. A key point emerges from this: the corresponding logic of 
image-use affirms that individual artefact-features are always examined in terms of how they contrib-
ute to the ‘wholeness’ of the artefact insofar as this wholeness can be related to other artefact-wholes. 
The resulting ‘synthetic’ interpretation of lithic objects forbids a full reduction to ‘atomistic’ data-
formats and partly explains why the status of numerically encoded information becomes ambivalent at 
best (see infra). Primary lithic data, in other words, must always be artefact-wholes and not their 
parts. Another side of this ‘synthetic’ orientation is the organisation of lithic objects into meaningful 
technical groupings. These groupings – and this iterates some of the points made in earlier sections – 
do not just establish (dis)similarities and correlative relationships among artefact-parts. Rather, the 
‘imaging task’ of these object panels is to place individual artefact-wholes into larger technical wholes 
which, in turn, are rendered significant through their technical relations with other technical wholes. 
The respective imaging practice therefore typically involves considerations about morpho-technical 
complementarities and the assessment of transitive linkages.326 Strictly speaking, these object-images 
do not represent ‘particulars,’ but seek to capture ‘relations,’ ‘contexts,’ ‘qualities,’ and ‘nexuses.’ The 
question is always how parts reach out to their significant whole(s). Parts are therefore usually pars 
pro toto and the ultimate goal of visualisation is to render the corresponding whole(s) intelligible – 
object-images provide visual insight.327  
                                                          
324 ‘Inter-constraining’ here simply means that specific core configurations have particular blank consequences, and specific 
blank removals have particular consequences for the resulting core configuration. In order to relate cores and blanks technologi-
cally, one has to take both directions of technical amendment simultaneously into consideration. 
325 As we will see in the first part of Chapter 5, practices of visually matching lithic artefacts generally resonate with the idea of « 
lecture » and the ‘mental refitting’ approach which continue to occupy a central place in French technological research.  
326 A ‘transitive’ tie is an indirect relationship between two or more entities which entails at least one other, intermediating 
entity. 
327 For an important discussion of ‘visual abduction’ in archaeology, certainly relevant in this context, see Shelley (1996). 
“Drawings should not be considered as a prop for words and definitions, but as a genuine 
informative technological writing, and this is what we have attempted […]. Far from being 
mere reproductions of stone artefacts, the drawings and diagrams presented here were con-
ceived at the same time as the text and can even substitute for it, the symbols used being 
equivalent to a terminology. If a clear sentence is better than a vague generic term, an accu-
rate technical drawing can usefully replace a vague description.” (Inizan et al. 1999 [1995]: 17) 
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A general symptom of this mode of image-use is the increased selectivity of object representa-
tions and the heightened mobilisation of technical symbology. The first aspect results in the reduced 
realism of object-images, emphasising only technical features which are important to drive home the 
argument. The second aspect is reflected in the trend to enrich the provided pictorial information by 
introducing technical symbols to record different technical operations, or by colour-coding and pat-
tern-coding artefact surfaces in order to indicate differential surface treatments and surface func-
tions.328 Both aspects are especially evident in the work of Boëda (1988: esp. Fig. 18.3-18.6) and So-
riano (2000: esp. Fig. 108, 111-112, 114-115, 126-134, Annexe 2 [Fig. 138]). Practices of symbolic coding 
clearly exemplify a domain of lithic research in which considerable pictorial innovation has been made 
in recent years (cf. e.g., Inizan et al. 1995: 106-127; Nicoud 2011; Chevrier 2012: Annexe 3.1-3.5; Fig. 
7).329 
 Given these findings, a closer look at the role of tables and quantitative graphs in French lithic 
inquiry is warranted. What is their purpose and how do they relate to object-images? I will use Boëda’s 
(1988) study as an illustration again. The first point to note is that the few quantitative graphs that this 
study features represent a follow up of the qualitative examination of the main core reduction 
schemes. This positioning is not at all coincidental. The ‘imaging task’ that they perform, namely to 
quantify metric values of cores, is dependent on the preceding technological analysis (cf. ibid.: Fig. 
18.13-18.14). Quantified are simply the categories that have been established before (Schémas A-C, 
Indifférencié). In contrast to the Anglophone case studies in which quantification is clearly a primary 
operation, quantitative analysis is secondary and serves to investigate category-internal dynamics, as 
well as the quantitative effects, if any, of these categories.330 The design and content of tables follow a 
similar logic. Here also the goal is to analyse and cross-tabulate the distribution of ‘synthetic,’ that is, 
already established whole-categories in order to learn something about their interconnectedness (cf. 
ibid.: Tabl. 18.I-18.V [Table 5 sic!]), for example to provide insight into the ‘infrastructural’ details of a 
given technical system.331 This operation is diagnostic rather than prognostic; it proceeds from wholes 
to parts and not the other way around. Therefore, most non-object visualisations presuppose whole-
categories. The respective graphs and tables demonstrate that the significance of parts is determined 
by their place in a whole – a classic tenet of ‘synthetic’ thought. 
This configuration of visual practice may also explain why there is so much heterogeneity in 
terms of using different graphs, tables, and object representations in French technological research. 
The images called upon vary because they have to express different arguments and different kinds of 
technical relationships depending on the assemblage-level context in question. In other words, to high-
light the relevant technological relationships may require to summon different ‘image-types’ and to 
adapt them specifically to the argumentative and inferential demands of particular contexts of inquiry. 
 The last aspect of French visual practice that requires some attention is the deployment of 
relatively abstract diagrams and schemas – in particular because this ‘image-type’ is often completely 
missing in Anglophone scholarly productions. The ‘synthetic’ quality of this type of imagery is immedi-
ately evident. The ‘imaging task’ is to visualise the technological functioning of a lithic whole in ques-
tion. The respective images may for example specify the volumetric ‘working principles’ of a prepared 
Levallois core (Boëda 1988: Fig. 18.1) or bifacial shaping (Boëda 1995a: Figure 1-4), how a core is 
transformed in terms of its morphology and surface configuration as a function of particular blank 
                                                          
328 This type of additional, symbolically encoded visio-technical information seems to be very rare in the Anglophone lithic liter-
ature. Even simple technical arrows indicating the direction of removals are sometimes missing, especially when plain débitage 
or tools are concerned (cf. e.g., Shea 2013a, 2017a; Stutz and Nilsson Stutz 2017: Fig. 32.2). This exclusive focus on artefact 
outline suggests that the images serve a purpose other than showcasing these features or that these features are generally not 
regarded to capture important information – it again indicates that object imagery primarily serves dispensable, ‘illustrative’ 
purposes. 
329 But see Dauvois (1976: 129-139). Already Dauvois (idem), the father of the schéma diacritique, speaks of “dynamic and struc-
tural drawings.”  His vision of drawing is thus already ‘synthetic.’ Drawing a lithic object always implies to interpret the object in 
the light of its parts and its parts in the light of the object’s ‘wholeness.’ A ‘dynamic and structural drawing’ captures the insights 
gained through this process.  Note also that devising a schéma diacritique essentially requires to visualise the target object. 
Some form of visualisation is therefore indispensible for this type of technological inquiry. 
330 In a more recent paper, Boëda et al. (2014: 955) explicitly note: “[…] [t]he underlying and more significant question concerns 
the concept of cobbles – their form and volume, and the ways in which natural features of the raw material may have been in-
corporated in reduction sequences leading to tool production. This is essentially a qualitative question that requires technologi-
cal and technical analysis that cannot be reduced to simple numbers and graphs.” 
331 This notion of ‘infrastructure,’ certainly central to some strands of ‘synthetic’ technological thought in France, will be explored 
in more detail in the first part of Chapter 5. 
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detachments (cf. Boëda 1988: Fig. 18.2), or how different reduction stages are orchestrated and what 
kind of lithic products each of them supplies (cf. ibid.: Fig. 18.22).332 These visualisations involve a 
certain degree of abstraction and idealisation and seek to capture the systemic articulation of various 
technological elements. This can result in hybrid images where idealised exploitation schemes are jux-
taposed with object-particulars in order to demonstrate that the latter form a unified technical whole 
(cf. Soriano 2000: Fig. 99-100); it can equally result in complex diagrams, often also hybrid in charac-
ter, which specify the system-level relationships between different lithic artefacts and their features 
(Fig. 8).333 More abstract and ‘diagrammatical’ images may for instance represent the relationship 
between different lithic production systems within an assemblage without comprising any iconic com-
ponent (cf. Boëda 1995a: Figure 20).334 All of these images depict something that cannot directly be 
observed in the examined assemblages. There exists no spatiotemporal physical object that corre-
sponds to them. We have to conclude that they are purely conceptual images. The fact that they play 
such an important role in all of the three case studies thus further supports the claim that French tech-
nological research can be understood as a conceptual practice.335 The goal of conceptual images is to 
provide conceptual ‘understanding.’ 
 It has to be said, however, that ‘diagrammatic reasoning’ –that is, the understanding of con-
cepts and idea by means of visual devices (e.g., Kulpa 1994; Anderson et al. 2002) – is not completely 
foreign to Anglophone approaches. Already Clarke’s Analytical Archaeology (1968) musters a whole 
range of abstract diagrams and Shennan’s Quantifying Archaeology (1997 [1988]) also includes such 
imagery. Yet, the difference is that these images are theoretical entities in the sense of ‘theory’ speci-
fied in the previous section. They serve a rather different purpose than the conceptual images found in 
the French discourse. Their ‘imaging task’ is to formalise and simplify theory-derived expectations 
(e.g., Clarke 1972b: Fig. 1.4, Figs. 1.9-1.11, Fig. 1.17; Ambrose and Lorenz 1990: Fig. 1.1, 1.2) or to pro-
vide an overview of the various causal or otherwise constitutive relationships that hold together differ-
ent domains of reality (e.g., Binford 1980:  Figure 1, 3; Rolland and Dibble 1990: Fig. 13; Nelson 1991: 
Figure 2.1; Jochim 1992: Figure 1; Hoffecker 2002: Fig. 1.6; Steenhuyse 2007: Fig. 1.1). Theoretical 
quantitative-statistical images represent ‘ideal’ patterns and data-behaviours against which empirical 
findings can be compared. Theoretical images of worldly-order typically legitimise correlative thinking 
and the explanation of certain phenomena (e.g., lithic technology) in terms of other phenomena (e.g., 
climate change).336 Alternatively, abstract imagery may serve to explain measuring procedures; it may 
also be deployed in experimental lithic research in order to describe the study design or the specific 
causal-determinative factors investigated. In all of these cases, however, diagrammatic reasoning 
serves or prepares empirical data-analysis, it is almost never an active part of this analysis.337 Moreo-
ver, these images almost always ‘theorise’ parts and their configurations, co-variations, and transfor-
mations – their goal is ‘explanatory.’ 
How images are produced is no less informative. Automated image-production by specialised 
expert software, for instance, seems to be a hallmark of Anglophone lithic practice (e.g., Braun and 
Harris 2001), especially when complex statistical procedures are employed or a geometric morpho-
metrics approach is followed (cf. Shott and Trail 2010; Archer et al. 2017; McPherron 2018). An im-
portant aspect of this imagery is that the distance between data-input and data-visualisation is fairly 
small.338 The visualisation typically follows by necessity from the data-input. All of this is thought to 
secure an ‘objectivist’ analysis of the evidence (cf. McPherron 1991; Lycett and Cramon-Taubadel 
                                                          
332 This, conversely, also means that this ‘synthetic’ imagery serves to specify which parts of the assemblage are relevant for the 
reconstruction of particular sub-wholes such as tool-systems, reduction systems, and various significant artefact-groupings. 
Thus, the lithic wholes determine explanatory ‘relevance,’ not the parts. 
333 ‘Hybrid’ here simply means that drawings, photographs, and/or more conceptual diagrams and schemas are combined within 
a single image. 
334 See also Boëda et al. (1990), Geneste et al. (1997), and Bourguignon et al. (2004) for the utilisation of similar ‘image-types’ 
with broadly similar ‘imaging tasks.’ 
335  See the previous section for a similar point. 
336 If systemic ‘imaging tasks’ are chosen, the outlined systems typically specify external relationships, not so much the internal 
configuration of lithic technology. 
337 Certain types of ‘digraphs’ which are sometimes used to analyse lithic reduction trajectories (e.g., Kuhn [2014] 1995: Fig. 4.11) 
may be an exception here since they appear to ‘summarise’ empirical findings. I will address this issue in the second part of 
Chapter 5, when various versions of the ‘reduction thesis’ are scrutinised. 
338 This is because the software produces imagery based on mathematical formulae, calculi, or other principals of transposition, 
so that the relationship between the input and the output is well-defined. 
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2013),339 even though some subsequent visual manipulation may nonetheless be necessary in order to 
render the image intelligible. The increasing use of 3D-rendering technology to display lithic objects is 
another case of a quasi-automated practice of visualisation (e.g., Bleed et al. 2017). But as Magnani 
(2014: 285) for example readily admits, the resulting images, for the most part at least, serve illustra-
tive purposes and provide a precise ‘visual record’ of the objects in question. In the case of geometric-
morphometrics imagery, a similar point can be made. These images, strictly speaking, do not specify 
primary data since this data is also provided in digits and other numerical measures.340 In the French 
case, pictorial diagrams and even artefact-plates are also increasingly constructed with the help of 
graphic applications. But this process appears to be comparatively non-automated. Instead, the pro-
cess of constructing images, depending on their pictorial and interpretive complexity, typically in-
volves tinkering with different arrangements and pictorial elements until a satisfying image-
composition has been established.341 This image-making practice leaves room for personal idiosyncra-
sies, but also epitomises the ‘synthetic’ need to adapt visualisations to specific assemblage require-
ments. French lithic scholarship, especially the latest generation of researchers, indeed often puts 
much effort into designing lithic imagery. The latest monographs in the CTHS series exemplify this 
trend342 – the pictorial investment they embody at times even rivals text-writing. 
This increasing significance of the ‘rhetoric of images’ in French lithic inquiry is also echoed by 
a recent controversy between Sylvain Soriano and Ludovic Slimak about supposedly ‘aestheticised’ 
lithic object-imagery and its seductive potential (Soriano 2010; for the response, see Slimak 2010). The 
debate certainly indicates that the persuasive power of lithic imagery cannot be taken lightly anymore. 
Grégor Marchand (2017: 10), for example, has recently also evoked the epistemological importance of 
‘imaging practices’ in Palaeolithic knowledge production: 
Taken together, the evidence clearly suggests that the visualisation of objects, concepts, and 
data constitutes a key practice in lithic research. The detailed examination of visualisation trends in 
French and Anglophone approaches has thereby established that image-practice follows a vastly dif-
ferent logic in the two camps. While lithic image-use in the latter is guided by ‘analytic’ imperatives, 
the construction and implementation of imagery in the former serves to facilitate a ‘synthetic’ under-
standing of lithic technology. The revealed differences reproduce many of the fault lines between the 
two research spheres that have been identified and discussed in the previous sections, confirming that 
we are dealing with a robust and coherent pattern. One can thus conclude that the difficulties of bridg-
ing the French-Anglophone divide are likely related to the complications of negotiating between ‘ana-
lytic’ and ‘synthetic’ visions of science. Although the issue appears to be fairly general from this per-
spective, it should have also become clear that these two general research orientations are realised in 
rather specific ways, acknowledging the unique questions and problems of lithic inquiry in Palaeolithic 
archaeology. A short excursion into the realm of empirical discourse will provide sample material to 
better understand some of these more tangible ways in which the ‘analytic’-‘synthetic’ divergence con-
tinues to impact Palaeolithic research. 
                                                          
339 Lycett and Taubadel (2013: 1509), for example, emphasise that morphometric approaches provide ‘far more than merely an 
image capturing technique’ and offer “an automatic method of analysis.” See also Archer et al. (2015, 2016: 61) for an accentua-
tion of the importance of ‘automated approaches’ in lithic studies. 
340 To be more specific here, the 3D-image is used to extract the sought-for data.  This, just like in the case of physical lithic 
objects, suggests that the images are considered evidence rather than data. They first have to be transposed in a normalised 
data-format in order to become data. 
341 I would in fact argue that this process of image-construction cannot be separated from the process of data-analysis since the 
construction of the image may provide insights which are otherwise difficult to gain and deepen the investigators understanding 
of the assemblage-whole. Working with and constructing images becomes therefore another means of holistically making sense 
of a particular lithic context. This inseparability of understanding and image-making affirms the ‘synthetic’ quality of inquiry in 
the French scene. I do admit, however, that an ‘ethnography of lithic image-making’ would be necessary in order to substantiate 
this perspective. 
342 Some recent studies published in the Éditions du Comité des travaux historique et scientifique monograph-series suggest 
that image and text are increasingly seen as equally important in French lithic research. These monographs are extremely well 
illustrated and the image quality is extremely high. Langlais’ Les Sociétés Magdaléniennes de L’Isthme Pyrénéen (2010) and 
Mevel’s Des Sociétés en Mouvement. Évolution des Sociétés Magdaléniennes et Aziliennes des Alpes du Nord Françaises (2017) 
are revealing examples of this trend. 
“I belong to the rarity of archaeologists who think – and hope – that one day, a good portion of 
the work on prehistory can be exclusively presented in images, in drawings, and in schemes.” 
(my translation [for the original French quote, see Appendix Q.7]) (Note his omission of 
graphs and tables here!) 
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Variability and complexity are the subject of lithic research since the field’s inception. Their investiga-
tion can be regarded as part of the core business of Palaeolithic archaeologists, and insights into these 
two aspects of lithic technology generally promise to make an important contribution to our knowledge 
of the deep human past. It is therefore not surprising that both French and Anglophone lithic re-
searchers have always endeavoured to tackle questions of variability and complexity. Both would agree 
that progress in the field to a certain extent depends on our ability to better comprehend and disentan-
gle these two key coordinates of the lithic record. Lithic variability and technological complexity thus 
present themselves as excellent candidates for a comparative conceptual analysis. How are these two 
terms usually understood and examined in the two research spheres? And how does this effect what we 
can know about the Palaeolithic and its technological evolution? What follows in this last section is an 
attempt to address these questions and to investigate to what extent different answers may be ex-
plained with reference to Pepper’s divarication between ‘analytic’ and ‘synthetic’ cognition. The forego-
ing analysis clearly suggests that such an investigation should be both worthwhile and clarifying. 
How is the variability of lithic technology conceptualised? How is it measured and monitored in order 
to determine its significance? In general terms, variability describes how closely related or spread out a 
set of data is. The concept seeks to capture to what degree a particular entity can vary as a function of 
different variables. It is therefore obvious that empirical measures of lithic variability depend upon the 
mobilised kinds of data and the technological entities considered to vary. The question of variability is 
therefore interwoven with questions about data-concepts and the appropriate unit of analysis, issues 
which have already been covered in the previous sections. For this reason, it seems appropriate to 
begin with a survey of terms and concepts invoked in the literature to approach or assess lithic varia-
bility in particular research contexts. What is their presumed level and focus of analysis? 
 In the French case, variability is usually assessed on multiple levels. It can be discussed on the 
level of lithic assemblages, significant sub-units of these assemblages, or on the level of particular 
technical objects, for example bifaces. The central point, however, is that the variability discourse is 
anchored in the identification and discussion of entities that have no direct physical or artefactual cor-
relate. When variability is debated, French lithic experts typically conjure concepts such as chaînes 
opératoires (e.g., Pelegrin et al. 1988; Boëda et al. 1990; Julien 1992; Pelegrin 1995; Geneste et al. 
1997) ‘technical systems’ (systèmes techniques) (e.g., Perlès 1987: 22; Boëda 1991; Inizan et al. 1995: 
14f.; Bodu et al. 2001; Geneste 2010 [1991]; Valentin 2011: 46),343 modalities of volume-management 
(conceptions volumétriques) (e.g., Boëda 1993, 1994; Bodu 1994; Valentin 1995: Annexes; Bourgui-
gnon 1997; Delagnes and Roche 2005), gestural systems (e.g., Pigeot 1987; Le Brun-Ricalens 2005: 
Fig. 9, 14; Koehler 2011: Fig. 11; Valentin et al. 2014; Marchand 2014: Fig. 37), ‘technical logic’ (logique 
technique) (e.g., Perlès 2009; Brenet and Folgado 2009; Chevrier 2012: 769f.),344 schémas opératoires 
(e.g., Boëda 1986, 1994; Pelegrin 1990, 1995; Boëda et al. 1990; Karlin and Julien 1994), or 
‘knowledge’ (i.e., savoir-faire, connaissance, vouloir-faire, skill, and technical competence) (e.g., Pi-
geot 1983, 2004; Ploux 1988, 1991; Karlin 1991; Pelegrin 1991, 2000; Audouze 2010; Ploux and Karlin 
2014; Leroyer 2016). More recently, ‘tool systems’ have been faithfully added to this list (e.g., Boëda 
1991, 1997, 2013; Lepot 1992/1993; Soriano 2000; Bonilauri 2010; Nicoud 2011; Chevrier 2012). Even 
if scholars wish to study lithic variability on the level of social and economic strategies (e.g., Perlès 
1980, 1991b, 1992; Bon 2002, Pelegrin 2011; Renard and Ducasse 2015), these strategies are recon-
structed with reference to some of the listed categories.  
What emerges from this general enumeration of terms and concepts is the recognition that 
variability in the French scene is interrogated on some higher level of lithic organisation. Most of the 
                                                          
343 See already Mauss (1947: 29). [cited in Inizan et al. 1999 [1995]:  14, footnote 14] 
344 See also Boris Valentin in [Devenir Archéologue] Les outils en pierre préhistoriques, uploaded to the YouTube network by 
the University of Paris I-Sorbonne on the 9th of February 2016 [URL = https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MB4CD145z40]. 
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time, the relevant variability is even located within virtual properties of lithic technology – that is, 
properties that refer to an ‘ideal’ aspect of technical reality that is nonetheless real.345 
 There are two immediate consequences of this discursive configuration. The first is that one is 
not only prompted to examine the variability within these categories, but also the variability between 
them – that is, how the various categories are interconnected and linked in a given technical context, 
i.e., in a particular lithic assemblage. The distinction between ‘technique,’ ‘method,’ and ‘concept,’ in-
troduced during the ‘technological revolution’ (cf. Tixier et al. 1980; Perlès 1991a), resonates with this 
ambition. The classic preoccupation of French technological inquiry to reconstruct ‘operational 
schemes’ and to relate them to their corresponding ‘conceptual schemes’ in order to retrace distinct 
‘knapping projects’ can similarly be regarded as a symptom of this basic understanding of variability 
(cf. Schlanger 1994; Pelegrin 1995; Inizan et al. 1999 [1995]: 15). Variability, in this view, is always a 
multi-scalar and multi-dimensional phenomenon (cf. Forestier 1993: Fig. 1): 
The second consequence is that artefactual variability cannot be compared without reference 
to these higher-level categories anymore.346 The goal of technological analysis is to resolve the variabil-
ity of lithic artefacts internally, that is, in terms of reconstructing effective technical groupings or con-
texts, so that the higher-level categories can be filled with technological content. To resolve the varia-
bility of Levallois assemblages, for instance, not only implies to show how many different varieties of 
Levallois reduction can actually be found in the respective assemblages, but also demands one to en-
quire whether apparently disparate sets of lithic artefacts (in terms of frequency distributions, metrics, 
present tool-types, etc.) may nonetheless ‘belong’ to the same technological variety. 
All of these observations suggest that French researchers tend to study lithic variability 
through the prism of ‘synthetic’ categories. Newer attempts to chart aspects of variability in terms of 
abstract ‘technological structures,’ for instance, equally testify to the fact that the subject is approached 
from the perspective of wholes rather than parts (cf. e.g., Boëda 1997, 2005; Forestier 2000, 2010; 
Nicoud et al. 2016). These technical wholes are thought to have properties of their own and it is these 
properties that constitute the primary focus of analysis. With Pepper, we can say that variability turns 
out to be question of ‘relations,’ ‘qualities,’ and ‘nexuses.’ The resulting ‘synthetic’ understanding en-
tails the concession that ‘knowing the variability of lithic parts may mean nothing without knowing 
how it relates to the variability of the corresponding wholes.’ As a result, the variability discourse in 
French Palaeolithic archaeology appears to be directed by an oligarchy of wholes. 
This oligarchy of wholes is countered by a democracy of parts in Anglophone lithic research. 
In the latter, variability is assessed by charting and, if possible, quantifying part-based ‘attributes,’ 
‘traits,’ and other directly observable variables. Variability is understood foremost as a non-stable pat-
tern or structure of lithic data, fluctuating in relation to some relevant independent variables – it is 
primarily seen as a quantitative phenomenon. Variability, in other words, is the result of the various 
interactions, combinations, and associations of the relevant lithic parts and their features – it is the 
outcome of part-centred analysis. Lithic variability is therefore simply defined as a consequence of 
                                                          
345 This findings clearly hints at the important role of interpretive idealisation in French lithic research. Although I cannot pro-
vide an in depth analysis of this research operation here, we will touch upon this issue again in Chapter 5. 
346 In other words: artefactual variability, that is, the variability found in the lithic artefacts themselves, cannot be taken as an 
absolute measure. It needs to be ‘calibrated’ against their technical whole or at least ‘put into perspective’ by this whole. 
“Because lithic variability is not exclusively typological, but simultaneously conceptual, tech-
nical, and economic, it is also likely that the underlying factors are themselves of a varied na-
ture. Although most archaeologists would assent to this proposition, few actually apply it to 
their analyses of lithic industries. Instead, most diachronic and synchronic studies postulate 
single “explanatory” factors – e.g., functional needs, seasonality of occupation, cultural tradi-
tions, etc. – and account for all observational data in light of these “hypotheses.” Such ap-
proaches are necessarily at the methodological level to the extent that they demonstrate the 
potential relevance of a given factor. On the other hand, these approaches lack the capacity to 
discriminate among various causal factors. Such arguments cannot establish either that the 
factor under consideration accounts for all of the observed variability or that it alone could 
produce it. Consequently, these approaches are too restricted for an efficient analysis of ar-
chaeological contexts in which lithic industries, their variations, and their transformations 




varying constellations of ‘particulars,’ ‘characters,’ ‘ties’ or other ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ part-
qualities. This conception is overwhelmingly ‘analytic.’ 
Anglophone scholars typically map different types of variability depending on the type of data 
they harness. We may for example distinguish between typological variability (e.g., Freeman 1966; 
Wymer 1968; Sackett 1973, 1999; Rolland and Dibble 1990: 492; Dibble 1987; Coinman and Henry 
1995; Mellars 1996; Szmidt 2003; Wenban-Smith 2004; McPherron 2006; Olszewski 2016), morpho-
logical variability (e.g., Sackett 1966; Roe 1968; McPherron 1994; White 1998; Iovita 2008, 2011; 
McPherron and Iovita 2011; McNabb and Cole 2015), raw material variability (e.g., Rolland 1977; 
West and Montet-White 1990; Ambrose and Lorenz 1990: 21-24; Jelinek 1991; Dibble 1991b; Kuhn 
2004b, 2011: 100-102), and combined or other more specific axes of trait-based variability (e.g., Bar-
ton 1988: 105-110; Kuhn 1995; Tostevin 2000, 2012; Marks et al. 2001; Henry 2003; McCall 2006, 
2015; Wragg Sykes 2009; Scott 2011; Culley et al. 2013; Ruebens 2014; Monnier and Missal 2014: 
Table 2; Scerri et al. 2014; Conard and Will 2015; Jones 2016; Ruebens and Wragg Sykes 2016; Rezek 
et al. 2018). There is no general hierarchy between these axes of variability, and they, as a result, may 
be analysed as parts themselves – the aim is then to examine their external relatedness and, if possi-
ble, to detect patterns of co-variation and (statistical) correlation. Contrary to the French conception, 
the idea here is that ‘knowing the variability of the whole is largely identical with knowing the variabil-
ity among lithic parts.’ A key precondition for studying variability on an inter-assemblage level is thus 
to keep the analytical part-categories constant. The result is a strong analytical reliance on well-
defined and standardised systems of object classification and similarly formalised trait-lists.347 
On the assemblage-level, variability is generally examined as the degree of similarity or affini-
ty. There are a number of schemes for organising variability at differing scales, but all of them organise 
the data according to some logic of increasing or decreasing affinity, analogy, or resemblance among 
parts. The perhaps most well-known scheme of this type is Clarke’s (1968: 187-189, Fig. 40) ‘hierar-
chical model of archaeological entities’ – a model that is still frequently used today (e.g., Gamble 2001: 
52; McNabb 2007: 7-9; Shea 2013a; 37f.). Clarke discriminates between ‘attribute,’ ‘artefact,’ ‘type,’ 
‘assemblage,’ ‘culture,’ ‘culture group,’ and ‘technocomplex.’ While one climbs up this hierarchical 
ladder of categories, the relevant part-affinities decrease (which means that their variability increases), 
but the spatial and temporal coverage of the categories simultaneously increases. Clarke’ model for 
organising lithic variability is often used in a simplified version, distinguishing merely between ‘as-
semblage,’ ‘assemblage-type,’ and ‘assemblage-tradition’ (cf. McNabb 2007: 7-9). An ‘assemblage’ is 
here defined as a shared set of significant attributes, an ‘assemblage-type’ consists of a series of assem-
blages that share these significant attributes, and an ‘assemblage-tradition’ is encountered when as-
semblage-types persist through longer timespans. Drawing on Pepper, this understanding of the gen-
eral structure of variability can be said to imply ‘The Theory of Types’ and/or set-theoretical premis-
es.348  
Williams’ (2003: 92-95) framework to assess lithic variability in the Levantine Early Upper 
Palaeolithic follows a similar logic. Based on the classic work of Henry (1989a: 81-89) and Marks 
(2003), he differentiates between three lithic entities – ‘complex,’ ‘industry,’ and ‘phase/facie’ (Fig. 9). 
Again, these categories are thought to capture different levels of variability, the relationship between 
the categories being defined as decreasing inter-assemblage affinity measured by the individual char-
acteristics of the lithic artefacts that take part in the assemblages (cf. Williams 2003: 94f.).349 The logic 
of determining variability and organising it is clearly ‘atomistic.’ The basic strategy is to start with the 
smallest elements and gradually built up ever larger groupings of such elements – the regulative idea is 
the ‘law of association’ (see Chapter 2). The ‘smallest’ parts are examined in order to detect robust 
patterns or other new wholes; these patterns or wholes are then ‘turned’ into parts themselves and 
analysed in order to establish new patterns and wholes, and so on. The structure of variability is recon-
structed ‘bottom-up’ and the higher levels remain in principle reducible to the basic elements that 
generate them. 
                                                          
347 See the Section 3.2.1. 
348 See Chapter 2 for a discussion. See also Pepper (1942: 156-162). 
349 This logic of mapping lithic variability enables the discrimination between multiple levels of organisational hierarchy. These 
levels are typically referred to as ‘higher-order groupings’: “[h]igher-order groupings of stone tools consist of a hierarchy of 




These short enunciations are enough to reveal that French and Anglophone approaches to lith-
ic variability appear to be informed by opposite ends of the ‘synthetic’-‘analytic’ spectrum. The survey 
of the various terms and categories that form the bedrock of studying variability in both camps has 
demonstrated that not only the mustered categories themselves differ, but also the ways in which they 
are put to practice. It has become clear that these differences have a strong impact on how the lithic 
record is perceived and understood, with important implications for the possibilities of lithic interpre-
tation and knowledge formation. The exposition has therefore clarified some of the stakes of the 
French-Anglophone divide and further ratifies that Pepper’s epistemological categories are likely well-
suited to unpack it. 
How is technological complexity defined and assessed? What are the key differences between a ‘more 
complex’ and a ‘less complex’ technological make-up? What are the relevant units and the preferred 
focus of analysis to examine complexity? The term ‘complexity’ is typically employed to characterise an 
entity with many components interacting in multiple ways. These interactions ‘create’ complexities of 
various sorts. It is therefore the relationship between parts, their linkages, and the ‘complex’ whole 
they delineate that is central for any understanding of complexity as a phenomenon. Various notions 
of complexity are thus likely to favour their own definitions of these elements and their connections. If 
we wish to investigate the key concepts that guide the empirical examination of complexity in France 
and the Anglophone world, we consequently have to pay attention to these three aspects. We have to 
ask how lithic complexity is build up, what its building blocks and what its consequences are.  
 The basic orientation of Anglophone complexity research is expressed by Perrault et al. (2013), 
who assert that 
The strategy is almost always to determine the boundaries of whatever one wants to analyse in terms 
of complexity, decompose it into its relevant parts and then re-assemble these parts again. The ‘Golden 
Rule’ employed by many of these approaches can be summed up in the following manner: ‘the more 
relevant parts can be observed, the more complex the phenomenon under consideration appears to 
be.’350 Whether the respective parts are identified as ‘procedural units,’ ‘tool categories,’ or ‘concept 
traits’ may of course differ, yet in all cases complexity is considered an aggregate property of techno-
logical wholes, especially lithic assemblages (cf. Bousman 1993; Torrence 2001: 78).351 Rather im-
portantly, the complexity of the whole thereby follows without loss from the whole’s compartmental-
ised part-structure. The result of this research configuration is a strong predisposition of picturing the 
evolution of lithic complexity either as a story of qualitative changes based on the presence or absence 
of certain key traits (e.g., Ambrose 2001, 2010; Brooks et al. 2006; Coolidge and Wynn 2009; Shea 
2009; Shea and Sisk 2010) or primarily in quantitative terms, so that a continuous evolution of more 
or less complex technologies becomes conceivable. Examples for the latter approach are Isaac (1972, 
1976), Dennell (1983), Mellars (1989, 2006: xii), McGrew (1992), Gowlett (1996: 154, Fig. 5.9), Per-
                                                          
350 This orientation is also reflected in the general definitions of complexity employed to direct the ‘human modernity’ discourse: 
“Behavioural complexity is defined relatively as the accumulation of ‘more parts and more connections between parts’ in cultural 
systems (Price 1995, 140), whereas symbolic thought can be defined as ‘the ability to represent objects, people, and abstract 
concepts with arbitrary symbols, vocal or visual, and to reify such symbols in cultural practice’ (McBrearty & Brooks 2000, 492). 
Combining both of these definitions, we define complex behaviour here as that which requires successive cognitive components 
that demand the actor to plan several consecutive steps (such as those used in the manufacture of multi-component artefacts) 
before the execution of the first step, or which require deep understanding of the operation of variables and their complex inter-
play as well as their reactions to deliberate manipulations by the actor. This last part of the definition refers to understandings of 
environment and the operation of the natural world that facilitate, for example, catching deep water fish, making repeated sea 
crossings and navigating between islands or intentionally influencing the natural reproductive cycles and productivity of plants 
and animals.” (Langlais et al. 2008: 291) 
351 Torrence (2001: 78), for instance, defines ‘complexity’ in tandem with other composite properties of lithic assemblages: “Tool 
assemblage structure is described in terms of the particular mix of tool types (composition); number of types (diversity); and 
number of parts of each tool (Torrence 1983) or the average number of parts per tool in an assemblage (complexity) (Bousman 
1993, Bamforth and Bleed 1997).” (original emphasis) 
“[…] the complexity of a technology can be measured by counting the number of elemental 
building blocks associated with it.” (ibid.: 398) 
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reault et al. (2013), Gamble et al. (2014: Fig. 3.4), or Hoffecker and Hoffecker (2018).352 Most of these 
approaches are implicitly or explicitly inspired by common definitions of complexity in biology (e.g., 
Bonner 1988) or the behavioural sciences (e.g. Cochet and Byrne 2015). Some of the reasons for this 
conceptual affinity are historical. Anglophone scholars, especially those engaged with the ‘behavioural 
modernity’ debate, have tended to use complexity arguments in order to negotiate the boundary be-
tween ‘animality’ and ‘humanity,’ as well as between ‘nature’ and ‘culture’ (cf. Corbey 2005).353 An 
important epistemological ideal of all of these definitions is that they aspire to be ‘objectivist’ and to 
facilitate an absolute understanding of lithic complexity that is valid independently of the context of 
inquiry or the technology in question. 
Furthermore, and as Kuhn (2011: 104) for instance also notes, most discussions of lithic com-
plexity refer to or depart from the seminal work of Wendell Oswalt (1974, 1976). Based on ethnograph-
ic observations and parallels, Oswalt proposed that technological complexity can be assessed by com-
paring the number of ‘technounits’ that different technologies host. A ‘technounit’ is thereby defined as 
an “integrated, physically distinct, and unique structural configuration that contributes to the form of 
the finished artefact” (Oswalt 1976: 36). A simple wooden digging stick, for example, has only a single 
‘technounit,’ whereas composite harpoons and other hunting weapons usually consist of multiple 
‘technounits’ (cf. Kelly 2013: 120). Measuring technological complexity with reference to ‘technounits’ 
enables, on the one hand, to obtain a rough measure for the overall complexity of the assemblage – 
what Oswalt termed the elaborateness of technology – and, on the other, to assess the complexity of 
individual tools. The latter provides insight into the variability of tool-complexity within a given as-
semblage. ‘Simple’ tools, according to Oswalt (1974), have parts that do not change their position rela-
tive to other parts during use, whereas ‘complex’ tools do alter the position of their parts during utilisa-
tion. It is easy to see that this account of complexity is ‘analytic’ – it revolves around lithic parts, poten-
tially relates and counts them. Moreover, a ‘part’ may consist of multiple parts itself. It is generally 
sufficient to assess the configuration of these parts in order to gauge the complexity of the technologi-
cal whole to which they contribute. The complexity of the whole, in other words, is always reducible to 
the characteristics of the relevant parts. As a result, Anglophone scholars who draw on Oswalt’s theory 
typically inherit his ‘analytic’ conception of complexity (cf. e.g., Torrence 2001: 78f.; Kelly 2013: 116-
128; Hoffecker and Hoffecker 2018: 203-206, 222f.).  
It should also be noted that Oswalt’s focus on ‘food-getting technology’ laid the groundwork 
for a whole suite of Human Behavioural Ecology (HBE) approaches which conceive of technological 
complexity as an expression of forager adaptations to northern latitudes (e.g., Hoffecker 2001, 2005; 
Reed 2008). Through this prism and in line with Oswalt’s original considerations, technological com-
plexity is seen to “reflect the complexity of the problems that it was designed to solve” (Hoffecker and 
Hoffecker 2018: 217). This view is compatible with ‘optimality’ and ‘risk-centred’ approaches which 
play an important role in the current Anglophone discourse (cf. Bleed 1986; Torrence 1983, 1989c, 
2002; Jochim 1983; Bamforth and Bleed 1997).354 
Even though the scope of this survey is certainly limited given the importance of the complexi-
ty question in Anglophone debates, the discussion nevertheless demonstrates that there exists a strong 
tendency to reconstruct complexity in ‘analytic’ terms and to regard the object of complexity as a com-
positional entity. The analysis of complexity tends to focus exclusively on parts and part-properties. In 
general, the applied definitions thereby seem to cover only a small fraction of the possible spectrum of 
complexity definitions (but see Hoffecker and Hoffecker 2018).355 
In French technological research, by contrast, questions of complexity are typically pursued on 
the level of significant technical wholes. This means that complexity is either gauged relative to some 
                                                          
352 The recent paper by Muller et al. (2017) falls into the same category of approaches, even though the authors cannot be con-
sidered here. 
353 Because of this focus on significant evolutionary transitions, many workers have in fact adopted what Vaesen and Houkes 
(2017: 1246) call the ‘complexity thesis,’ which holds that “cumulative technological complexity is a distinctive characteristic of 
human cultural evolution.” 
354 See the second part of Chapter 4. 
355 The comparison of the discussed Anglophone understandings of complexity with Vaesen and Houkes’ (2017) Table 1 shows 
that only three, perhaps four, of the nine listed conceptions of complexity (definitions nr. [1] and [2], perhaps nr. [3] and [6]) are 
currently applied to the empirical data (cf. Appendix III.3: Table III.1). It should be noted that Anglophone research also 
relies on omitted definition nr. [10], which was originally termed ‘adaptive complexity.’  Even though some of the listed defini-
tions are difficult to operationalise within a strictly ‘analytic’ framework of inquiry, others could have easily been adopted. This 
at least indicates the potential of future conceptual work in this domain. 
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(higher level) properties of the whole which its parts lack, or as a function of interconnections between 
parts that cannot be discovered by an analysis of patterns among part-properties alone. The examina-
tion of technological complexity, in other words, is guided by the intuition of strong systemic emer-
gence. Complexity, in this view, is a property of wholes that cannot be reduced to the properties of 
their parts – an ‘emergent’ property resulting from ‘non-additive’ and ‘non-predictable’ processes.356 
Discussing the concept thus reveals important parallels with the French understanding of variabil-
ity.357 In a now largely forgotten paper on the issue of chaînes opératoires in the animal kingdom, Bey-
ries and Joulian (1990: 23) for example emphasise that one cannot meaningfully talk about complexity 
in the singular, because in reality one always deals with multiple complexities simultaneously. The 
same authors also stress that complexity is about the ‘integration and level of management of func-
tional, technical, economic, ecological, and cognitive factors’ of behaviour (idem).358 All of this mirrors 
what we have found previously, foreshadowing a relational approach to technological complexity. 
While introducing the problem of applying the chaîne opératoire approach to animal behaviour, Bey-
ries and Joulian (ibid.: 17) also indicate that chaînes opératoires, and a fortiori their complexities, 
‘cannot be described or analysed in an absolute manner.’ Already on a general level, therefore, they 
reject an overly ‘objectivist’ account of technical complexity. 
The first important axis of investigating complexity in the French research context is the study 
of varying modalities of managing a volume-matrix. This, for instance, may involve questions about 
the relationship between preparation and reduction, the technical demands of ‘navigating’ a particular 
core architecture or adapting to certain local rules of reduction, the need of altering technical gestures, 
the requirements of rotating cores or reorganising their volumetric structure, the level of redundancy 
or ‘cyclicity’ involved in the reduction process, or the dependency on technical anticipation (cf. e.g., 
Binder and Perlès 1990; Boëda 1991, 2005, 2013; Mourre 2003; Pigeot 1991; Bourguignon et al. 2006; 
Valentin et al. 2014). In most cases, the goal is to determine the co-constitutive relationships that exist 
between some or all of these factors. The important point, however, is that none of these factors can be 
examined by interrogating lithic parts in isolation. Rather, all of the mentioned factors describe quali-
ties of ‘operating’ technical systems. They result from the dynamic interplay of technical knowledge, 
reduction methods, and knapping techniques. Whether one of these factors renders the system ‘com-
plex’ and in what respect depends to a large degree on the system itself (i.e., its organisation). 
The second axis of researching complexity concerns the structure of the chaîne opératoire. The 
idea here is that different ways of organising the knapping process lead to different ‘infrastructures,’ 
that is, different articulations of groups of artefacts and technical operations. Geneste (2010 [1991]: 
429-432, Fig. 1, 2), for example, distinguishes between ‘linear,’ ‘scalariform,’ and ‘ramified’ reduction 
structures (Fig. 10). These may also be combined to form ‘hybrid’ reduction structures and the respec-
tive structural qualities may be expressed to varying degrees (cf. Boëda et al. 1990; Geneste et al. 1997; 
Bourguignon et al. 2004). Brenet (2011: esp. Fig. 8), in a similar vein, discriminates between ‘indepen-
dent’ operational sequences (chaînes opératoires indépendantes), ‘successive’ operational sequences 
(chaînes opératoires successives), ‘simple ramified’ operational sequences (chaînes opératoires rami-
fié simple), ‘mixt ramified’ operational sequences (chaînes opératoires ramifié mixte), and two diffe-
rent types of operational sequences ‘combining’ débitage and façonnage (chaînes opératoires combi-
née débitage/façonnage). All of these categories delineate whole-qualities – they concern the globality 
of the technical processes which define a chaîne opératoire. The underlying conception of complexity 
is consequently ‘synthetic.’ Perlès’ (1980, 1991b) and Boëda’s (1991) concept of ‘complex’ operational 
sequences (chaînes opératoires complexes) supports this view: a ‘complex’ reduction trajectory is 
thought to follow relatively rigid and non-redundant rule-sets, whereas a more ‘simple’ system of re-
duction is typically characterised by a limited number of highly versatile technical rules. 
The third axis of examining complexity concentrates on the nature of the wider ‘technical mi-
lieu’ in which specific technologies make their appearance. Instead of paying attention only to the in-
ternal constitution of particular chaînes opératoires, the various relationships between them come to 
fore here. Researchers can for example investigate the number of co-occurring technologies and 
                                                          
356 See esp. Hodgson (2000) for a discussion of the history and significance of the concept of ‘emergence’ in the social sciences. 
357 See the previous sub-section. 
358 This provisional definition of complexity is consistent with definitions nr. [5] to [8] of Vaesen and Houkes’ (2017) Table 1 (cf. 
Appendix III.3: Table III.1), indicating that we should expect little overlap between French and Anglophone concepts of 
complexity (see previous footnote). 
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whether or not they serve similar functional, economic, or social purposes (cf. Bourguignon et al. 
2006).359 The variability of reduction systems can therefore already be a potent proxy for the techno-
logical complexity of the assemblage in question. Another angle of inquiry focuses on the interactions 
and potential complementarities between broader categories of lithic technology – i.e., débitage, fa-
çonnage, and tool-technology (e.g., Boëda 1991, 1995a, 1997; Soressi 2002; Montoya 2004: Fig. 134; 
Boccaccio 2005: Fig. 159; Renard and Geneste 2006; Brenet and Folgado 2009; Ducasse 2012: Fig. 4). 
The objective is to determine inter-technology ‘synergies’ as well as the reality and extent of a techno-
logical ‘division of labour’ (e.g., Soriano 2000; Brenet et al. 2014). Asking broadly similar questions, 
other researchers have started to examine the link between particular production systematics and the 
utilisation of their associated non-retouched products (e.g., Soressi and Hayes 2003; Lazuén and 
Delagnes 2014). All of these perspectives highlight that technological complexity can only be under-
stood adequately if the dynamic interplay between lithic parts and wholes is taken seriously. 
More generally speaking, French technological scholarship exhibits a strong tendency to assess 
the various ways in which different dimensions of complexity appear to condition each other. An ex-
ample is Roche and Texier’s (1991) mediation of a possible link between the conceptual complexity 
and operational simplicity of chaînes opératoires – whether and, if so, under which conditions the 
two presuppose each other. Delagnes’ (1995) classic discussion of trade-offs between simplicity and 
complexity at the interface of ‘operational schemes’ (chaînes opératoires) and ‘conceptual schemes’ 
(schemas opératoires) follows a similar logic of research. Complexity, therefore, is really understood 
as a multidimensional phenomenon that needs to be approached holistically. 
Due to this multidimensionality of complexity, there is also no way of settling the complexity 
question once and forever. Moreover, complexity cannot even be defined in general terms and French 
scholars are typically somewhat sceptical whether net differences in complexity between different 
technological contexts can be established reliably. As a consequence, practitioners either establish 
complexity as a relative property or discuss how complexity is organised within a well-defined tech-
nical context and what this may mean in terms of human behaviour (e.g., Delagnes 2010; Delagnes 
and Rendu 2011). Bourguignon et al. (2006), for instance, argue that it makes generally little sense to 
invoke a binary opposition between ‘simple’ and ‘complex’ production systems to understand the na-
ture of technology in the French Mousterian. If one compares different reduction systems and investi-
gates their socioeconomic repercussions, one usually finds that different aspects of these systems turn 
out to be ‘complex’ or ‘simple.’ This, in turn, suggests that complexity is a dependent property and that 
investing one dimension of complexity may have potential implications for its other dimensions (cf. 
Brenet et al. 2014). Although different techno-economic systems may therefore turn out to be ‘com-
plex’ in rather different ways, every system will maintain a certain ‘complexity equilibrium’ – the total 
sum of a system’s complexity will rarely change. The question, therefore, is not anymore how ‘complex’ 
a wider technical system is, but rather how its complexity is distributed. Clearly, this understanding 
motivates the default view that technical systems are always complex in a certain sense. 
Technical complexity may be unequally distributed in a technical system because of social fac-
tors. It can for example be expressed as some kind of ‘skillfullness.’360 The latter may vary within a 
technical system because of reasons related to social learning and lithic apprenticeship (cf. e.g., Tixier 
1976; Ploux 1983, 1988; Pigeot 1988a, 1988b; Karlin and Pigeot 1989; Ploux et al. 1991; Karlin et al. 
1993; Delagnes and Roche 2005; Leroyer 2016). Different levels of complexity may consequently be 
the product of different levels of ‘technical competence,’ ‘procedural knowledge’ (savoir-faire), or 
‘conceptual knowledge’ (connaissance) (Pelegrin 1991; Karlin and Julien 1994: 154). This perspective 
continues to be influential in French « Palethnologie », which has traditionally endeavoured to expose 
and study ‘micro-slices’ of time.361 Alternatively, complexity may be unequally distributed because of 
evolutionary reasons (cf. Pigeot 1991). Within the framework of Boëda’s (1997, 2005, 2013) ‘techno-
genetic’ paradigm, the character of technological complexity may considerably change in the course of 
long-term developments.362 The basic idea is that lithic technologies organise themselves in ‘technical 
lineages’ when they navigate evolutionary time. In the earlier stages of technical development, tech-
                                                          
359 Note that the quantification of technical wholes remains a secondary operation since the wholes first need to be constructed 
by qualitative technological research. 
360 See definition nr. [4] in Vaesen and Houkes’ (2017) Table 1 (cf. Appendix III.3: Table III.1). 
361 See the first part of Chapter 5 for a more detailed discussion of some of these issues. 
362 The generalities of the ‘techno-genetic’ approach are outlined and discussed in the second part of Chapter 5. 
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nologies are typically characterised by highly ‘differentiated’ and ‘heterogeneous’ structures – the rele-
vant parts tend to operate independently from one another. In the later stages of technical evolution, 
by contrast, more and more ‘integrated’ structures emerge and these develop increasingly beneficial 
and mutually supportive inter-part relationships at potentially ever higher densities.363 The character 
of this discourse is clearly ‘synthetic.’ Complexity is always analysed with reference to a technical 
whole, which appears to ‘dictate’ the terms under which something may be called ‘complex’ or ‘simple.’ 
Altogether, the conceptual analysis of French and Anglophone complexity research can com-
plement our previous findings. Complexity is mainly investigated from an ‘analytic’ point of view in the 
Anglophone world, whereas the majority of French technologists seems to adopt a ‘synthetic’ perspec-
tive. This recognition further substantiates the significance of Pepper’s world theories for understand-
ing the French-Anglophone divide and warrants an even closer examination of lithic practice on both 
sides. The question is now not only whether Pepper’s ‘analytic’-‘synthetic’ distinction has a general 
bearing on the divide, but rather whether the variability of approaches within both the French and 
Anglophone research enterprise can be illuminated by referring to Pepper’s full spectrum of four world 
theories – ‘formism,’ ‘contextualism,’ ‘mechanism,’ and ‘organicism.’ We will explore this question in 
detail in the subsequent chapters. 
 
 
                                                          
363 This conception of complexity is consistent with definitions nr. [7] and [8] of Vaesen and Houkes’ (2017) Table 1 (cf. Appen-
dix III.3: Table III.1). 
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The foregoing chapters have demonstrated that any approach to lithic evidence relies on pre-casting 
the world into a world hypothesis. It was shown that Anglophone researchers tend to deploy a particu-
lar type of such unrestricted world theories – theories which we have termed ‘analytic’ because they 
prioritise parts. The goal of the present chapter is to further explore this ‘analytic’ orientation and to 
examine its internal variability. Can lithic inquiry in the Anglophone world be broken down into 
‘formistic’ and ‘mechanistic’ strands of reasoning? And if so, does this help us in understanding the 
logic of the Anglophone discourse – why scholars disagree, what they disagree on, and how? Respond-
ing to these questions requires the application of Pepper’s structural categories to particular instances 
“Hypotheses are developed to relate observed properties to one another by means of a 
structural concept. In this way an hypothesis, or an hypothetical model, is constructed for 
the sake of predicting certain correlated regularities” 
– David L. Clarke (1968: 643) 
 
“[…] [A]ll factual knowledge of the archaeological record is created at the time persons 
make observations on the archaeological record. Factual knowledge, or knowledge claims 
regarding properties of the archaeological record are always contemporary with the ob-
servation-documentation event. […] Circumstantial evidence is very different from factual 
“evidence.” If one can give an explanation, then they have a strong argument that is de-
scriptive of a necessary relationship between something seen and some prior dynamic 
process. That is circumstantial evidence of the best form. It’s not a different phenomenon. It 
is simply an explanation carrying the most reliable details of causally relevant procedural 
information. The latter plays the role of the most powerful form of argument, because it 
provides the relevant information regarding causal linkages. As such, the process may be 
duplicated experimentally, and/or identified as having acted by patterned empirical phe-
nomena derived from anticipated causal events and thus linked to observations indicative 
of secure causal sequencing.” 
 





of lithic practice. To put it differently: it requires an empirical evaluation of the utility of the specific 
structural categories of the two world theories for illuminating the activity of Anglophone scholars.  
 The following two sections are designed to complete this task. I present a number of individual 
case studies and smaller fields of discussion which I take to be paradigmatic for Anglophone lithic 
research in Palaeolithic archaeology and analyse them in terms of Pepper’s epistemology (see Appen-
dix III.4 for an explanation of the underlying rationale of case study selection and design). I will begin 
with illustrating the ‘formistic’ aspects of the Anglophone research enterprise by drawing on four dif-
ferent case studies. These are then complemented by an examination of three instructive cases of 
‘mechanistic’ reasoning. The aim is to show that these examples substantiate the relative unity of An-
glophone approaches insofar as all of them are committed to ‘analytic’ premises, yet they also clarify 
counteracting forces and sources of internal diversity that characterise the larger Anglophone research 
endeavour in lithic analysis. 
 If the application of Pepper’s categories of ‘formism’ and ‘mechanism’ to these case studies 
turns out to be successful, this would drive home the claim that ‘Anglophone’ circumscribes a mean-
ingful category in lithic research. Different schools, approaches, and more subtle research orientations 
within this Anglophone sphere of inquiry could then profitably be re-described as varying interpreta-
tions of two conflicting modes of reasoning – ‘formism’ and ‘mechanism’ – which nonetheless share a 
common ‘analytic’ conviction.
Scerri et al.’s Unexpected technological heterogeneity in northern Arabia indicates complex Late 
Pleistocene demography at the gateway to Asia (2014) provides a recent glimpse into formistic as-
pects of reasoning in Anglophone lithic research. The principal objective of this paper is to test scenar-
ios of dispersal and population dynamics at the gateway between Asia and Arabia during MIS 5. These 
scenarios are constructed as ‘hypotheses,’ but the latter are not derived from general high-level theory 
or model-based specifications of causal-determinative factors that may have produced the relevant 
empirical signatures under varying conditions. Instead, the respective hypotheses reflect the nature of 
the ongoing discourse on the role of peopling and population structure in shaping lithic technology. 
They remain rather general and are formulated in terms of similarity expectations (ibid.: 138). In or-
der to test the status of their Saudi Arabian lithic material from the Jubbah basin, the authors compare 
metric and attribute data with the evidence from other sites in southern Arabia and the Levant. In 
terms of potential dispersals and population structuring effects, the guiding assumption is that disper-
sal should produce inter-site signatures of similarity, whereas population dynamics, depending on 
their nature, would either produce mixed signatures or reinforce dissimilarity among lithic assemblag-
es. This logic is made explicit in Table 1, which specifies what the authors term “model expectations” 
(cf. ibid.: 128, 139).  
While Scerri et al.’s (2014) approach is thus clearly hypothesis-driven and develops the respec-
tive test-implications before any lithic evidence is examined, a hypothesis is corroborated simply by 
demonstrating its structural conformity with the revealed data-signature. The authors, in other words, 
seek to establish a general correspondence between a hypothesis and the evidence thought to confirm 
it. The strategy is thereby not to eliminate all but one of the invoked scenarios, but rather to compare 
the results of data-analysis with the implications of the different scenarios in order to assess which 
conforms the most to the encountered lithic patterns. This mode of bringing formal hypotheses to bear 
is clearly formistic and relies on the ‘correspondence theory’ of cognitive criticism.364 
The regulative idea is to certify that there exists a relationship of form between at least one hy-
pothesis and the investigated set of lithic data – i.e., that the type of similarity that is entailed in the 
hypothesis is also encountered in the data: 
                                                          
364 See Chapter 2; cf. Pepper (1942: 180-185). 
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Since the relationship between hypothesis-construction and data-analysis is fairly ‘loose’ – 
neither do the model expectations specify which variables to select for analysis, nor do they enable a 
categorical discrimination between relevant and irrelevant lithic information – the approach to the 
data is largely unconstrained. Scerri et al. (2014) collect as much comparable lithic data as possible 
and analyse this data in multidimensional space.365 The strategy is clearly ‘dispersive.’ All available 
lithic facts are picked up as they are and included in the analysis, the only exception being statistically 
non-comparable data (ibid.: 127). The aim is not to monitor the specific interactions between a limited 
number of variables, but rather to map out the general patterns of association, correlation, and co-
variation that exists between different variables.366 The looked-for similarities and differences be-
tween the studied assemblages are described in terms of the participation of ‘particulars,’ ‘characters,’ 
and ‘ties’ – expressed in artefact types, attributes, metric values, and ratios (cf. ibid: Supplementary 
Online Material [SOM]Table S1-S6) – in the data-patterns they create (ibid.: Fig. 2-8).367 Thus, the 
analysis is mainly oriented towards exploring the structure of the different data sets – what the au-
thors (ibid.: 129) describe as the “orthogonal dimensions of variability in the data” – and the relative 
overlap between these sets. Unexpected technological heterogeneity represents a maximally broad, 
‘part-centred,’ ‘bottom-up,’ and largely ‘inductive’ study of lithic inter-assemblage affinities. This ana-
lytical focus on aspects of ‘pattern participation’ and the implicit reliance on ‘set theory’ to arrange 
patterns in multivariate space are consistent with the hallmarks of formism. 
The authors generally note: 
They further assert that 
and argue 
                                                          
365 Although Scerri et al. (2014: Supplementary Online Material [SOM], 2-6) discuss some theoretical aspects of lithic technolo-
gy, their main concern is to justify the broad approach to the lithic data they have adopted and to employ common and approved 
recording schemes. The goal of the discussion is not to narrow down the set of relevant data points. 
366 Scerri et al. (2014: SOM, 3) explicitly note that this approach allows them “to understand the relationships between several 
variables simultaneously by accounting for their effects on each other.” 
367 For the centrality of pattern-recognition in archaeological research, see also Shennan (1997 [1988]: 3): “[…] inasmuch as all 
interpretation of the archaeological record is concerned with identifying patterning, it is capable of benefiting from a quantita-
tive approach. The point that, within certain constraints, we are identifying patterning rather than creating it is an important 
one to which we will return later. Without such an assumption archaeological evidence would not tell us anything, but one of the 
virtues of the quantitative approach is that it can tell us in particular cases what a lack of pattern actually looks like.” (original 
emphasis) 
“[e]ach test and accompanying variables used in our analyses reflects related and interdepend-
ent knapping actions that can be compared between themselves. Some of these clusters are 
recognised to be affected by one or more processes (see Tostevin, 2012 for discussion). In this 
way our methodology permits the comparison of comparable stages in the chaîne opératoire of 
blank and core classes to achieve a whole structure of similarity and difference. By using multi-
variate statistics to isolate different, uncorrelated sources of variability driving the diversity 
seen in these classes of objects and their domains of manufacture, we can robustly assess 
whether learned behaviours may be isolated in analysis.” (idem) 
“The theory of truth which grows out of the formistic categories is the correspondence theo-
ry. Truth consists in a similarity or correspondence between two or more things one of which 
is said to be true of the others. In the extreme, truth might be ascribed to any one of a lot of 
similar concrete objects, as when we say of apple taken out of a box that it is a true sample of 
the whole lot. But ordinarily the term is reserved for such objects as pictures, maps, dia-
grams, sentences, formulas, and mental images. These are all concrete existents and the 
objects they are said to be true of are not exactly similar to them, but only in respect to the 
form under consideration or in accordance to certain conventions.” (Pepper 1942: 180) 
“Within this broad approach, we also recognise that in order to avoid the pitfalls of intentional-
ity and the construction of abstract schemas, it is desirable to have a priori reasons for choosing 
particular units of study, such as particular attributes (Tostevin, 2012).” (Scerri et al. (2014: 
SOM, 6) 
“[…] that repeated patterns of similarity observed between the different classes of objects 
studied in this way (i.e., cores and flakes) is therefore a meaningful measure of similarity and 




These statements confirm that Unexpected technological heterogeneity is committed to ‘analytic’ prin-
ciples and seeks to identify the interaction of as many lithic variables as possible, some of which repre-
sent predefined ‘classes’ of objects. The value of each data point which can reasonably be recorded is a 
priori identical. The various multivariate analyses performed to determine the degree of association 
between different variables exemplify this situation.368 All included variables, independently of their 
kind, are treated as if they are equally informative. This proclivity to equalise or normalise the evi-
dence is also reflected in the transformation of continuous variables (i.e., metric data) into discrete 
categories by algorithmic clustering techniques. The latter is for example required when the kind of 
input data precludes ‘principal component analysis’ (PCA) and instead requires a ‘correspondence 
analysis’ approach (cf. Scerri et al. 2014: 134). Algorithmic transformation represents a classic 
formistic manoeuvre of data-driven classification.369 Continuous variables are assigned a discrete value 
by analysing the overall structure of these variables and statistically determining inter-variable group-
ings. In other words, continuous variables are examined in terms of the patterns created by their val-
ues. This operation clearly relies on the ‘Theory of Types’370 – even if the resulting types are of course 
probabilistic entities.  
Whether different assemblages host ‘similar’ or ‘different’ constellations of variables is estab-
lished by measuring the relative distance between individual variables or the resulting clusters of vari-
ables in multivariate space. The important aspect of this multivariate approach is that it enables “ordi-
nation – the representation of relationships between items and between variables in a space of a small 
number of dimensions which still retain most of the information in the original descriptive variables” 
(Shennan 1997 [1988]: 265, original emphasis).  The assessment of assemblage similarity is ‘objective’ 
in this sense – it directly results from the characteristics of the mapped out lithic parts.371 Different 
clusters of variables – the patterns created by the recorded trait-sets of different lithic assemblages – 
can then be statistically compared in terms of their relative constellational affinity (Scerri et al. 2014: 
130-138).372  
The fact that Scerri et al. (2014: Figs. 6, 7) employ ‘correspondence analytical’ techniques is 
particularly informative. The virtue of such an approach, as Shennan (1997 [1988]: 308) clearly points 
out, is that ‘multiple sets of object-values can directly be compared without the intervening infor-
mation-losing step of creating similarities/distances.’ The statistical description of these relationships 
results in the identification of norms in the data structure which can rigorously be compared. This 
screening of part-constellations for ‘regularities’ and ‘norms’ and their subsequent juxtaposition with 
other higher-order patterns is typically formistic. The variability in the encountered data-set is regard-
ed to point to a certain ‘ideal’ regulating this variability. How patterned ‘regularities’ and ‘norms’ are 
realised is a question of varying ‘principles of exemplification.’373 The conducted correspondence anal-
ysis, for example to isolate patterns in core exploitation variables or the techno-morphology of Leval-
lois flakes, reveals that the lithic data is analysed in terms of its similarity implications. This concerns 
the similarity of correlated variables, but also the similarity of their overall variability (cf. e.g. ibid.: 
137f.). Unexpected technological heterogeneity is therefore clearly powered by the formistic root met-
aphor. 
But how do the authors interpret the various similarities and differences they have unearthed? 
They conclude that their analyses 
                                                          
368 For a discussion of the principles and ramifications of multivariate analysis, especially ‘principal component analysis’ and 
‘correspondence analysis,’ see Shennan (1997 [1988]: 265-360). Cf. also Olsen and Morgan (2005) for a general epistemological 
defence of multivariate analytical statistics. 
369 Cf. Shennan (1997 [1988]: 216-264) and Rapkin and Luke (1993). 
370 See Chapter 2; cf. Pepper (1942: 165-162). 
371 Scerri et al. (2014: 126) stress that “[…] multivariate analyses allow to quantify the relationship between constellations of 
features including the presence of various methods and concepts without giving typological bias to named industries or tech-
niques.” 
372 The use of unconstrained multivariate techniques marks a potential point of divergence between ‘formistic’ and ‘mechanistic’ 
lithic analysis. The unconstrained exploration of multivariate interaction is typically viewed with extreme suspicion by ‘mecha-
nists.’ They typically complain that such a mode of marshalling the evidence clouds the view for what is actually important in 
terms of data and interactions, and thus ‘prevents us from seeing the wood for the trees.’ McPherron’s (1994) instructive discus-
sion on advantages and disadvantages of multivariate statistical procedures is a point in case. McPherron (ibid.: 54f) provides 
arguments for why multivariate statistics tend to be inferior to narrower, but theoretically pre-informed approaches such as 
‘linear regression.’ The main point is that most multivariate techniques are too ‘dispersive’ for the ‘mechanist’ and she/he would 
therefore typically favour more ‘integrative’ statistical approaches. 
373 See Chapter 2: esp. Box 6 for definitions of the ‘formistic’ concepts. 
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Together with the earlier statement of the authors that 
this clearly suggests that they infer an intimate relationship between technological expressions and the 
history and structure of populations in the respective regions. They argue that the evident complexity 
of these technological expressions likely indicates that the corresponding population-level processes 
were equally complex (ibid.:  140). This is then interpreted as additional evidence for the fact that hu-
man populations indeed moved in and out of Africa in a much more frequent and multidirectional 
manner than previously assumed. They further suggest that their results support the idea that Arabia 
was a key region of human dispersal and are consistent with the emerging recognition of the complexi-
ty of modern human biology at the time – a thoroughly ‘correlationist’ take on the evidence.374 
 The first aspect to note is that a complex data-pattern is thought to reflect a complex underly-
ing process. This drives home the point previously made, that some form of structural congruence 
between evidence and explanation is assumed. The second point is that the process producing the pat-
tern is thought to be of a different nature than the pattern itself. Stones, in other words, cannot be 
explained by stones themselves, but always refer back to their human producers. Since Scerri et al. 
(2014) examine ‘populations of stones,’ the idea seems to be that the delineated ‘patterns,’ ‘norms,’ and 
‘regularities’ tell us something about ‘populations of people.’375 This suggest that there is a basic struc-
tural co-variation between human demography and technological expressions. Instead of framing this 
relationship in causal-determinative terms, it is described fairly generically – the link between lithic 
technology and the structure of human populations is regarded to be of a general kind. This ‘looseness’ 
of the explanatory relationship reflects the formistic conception of the world as a weakly determined 
place.376 With Pepper (1942: 168-170, 177), we can add that demographic processes thereby come into 
view as ‘subsistent’ factors. They themselves do not participate in the observed patterns but are identi-
fiable as sets of not fully particularised ‘complex characters.’377 The ‘subsistent’ category of demogra-
phy is distinguished from the categories of ‘existence’ – i.e., the lithic variables – and thereby satisfies 
the formistic intuition that matter takes specific forms because it exemplifies particular norms.378 
Matter, in other words, takes these forms because of factors not related to matter. This general config-
uration of reasoning clearly demonstrates that Unexpected technological heterogeneity embodies a 
formistic approach to the lithic evidence. The analysis of the African and Arabian Middle Palaeolithic 
                                                          
374 For a similar interpretive ambition, see for example Scerri et al. (2018). 
375 This amounts to a Neo-Platonic manoeuvre. Just like Plato identified the ‘phenomenal’ world as a collection of shadows 
whose creators are not directly graspable, Scerri et al. (2014) consider lithic evidence as a proxy for human populations which 
are not directly observable. Lithic data is essentially viewed as the ‘shadow thrown by intangible populations.’ Obviously, this 
interpretation involves aspects of transcendental reasoning, since it depends on the general assumption that the conditions for 
the possibility of lithic artefacts include human presence and production. ‘Formistic’ patterns of reasoning are therefore often 
masked as generic inferences by abduction. [Abduction is typically defined as inference to the best or most self-evident explana-
tion (cf. Putnam 1981; Poston and McCain 2017).] In general, the compositional structure of the observed phenomena is ex-
plained by a different entity which, in some relevant sense, can be said to have existed prior to the phenomena in question, and 
to lie beyond the ‘horizon of sensation.’ 
376 See Chapter 2. 
377 See Chapter2: Box 6. 
378 Because of the generally open pool of potential ‘subsistent’ candidates, ‘formistic’ reasoning typically relies on excluding other 
such potentially relevant candidates.  This elimination or rejection of competing ‘subsistent’ categories is thereby also a 
‘formistic’ strategy to deal with the problem of equifinality – in ‘formism,’ the problem that similar patterns may point to differ-
ent ‘subsistent’ categories or that similar forms may participate in different ‘laws,’ ‘regularities,’ or ‘norms.’ Scerri et al. (2014: 
128), for instance, not only try to hold constant the eco-zone from which their study material derives (Saharo-Arabian subtropi-
cal grassland and shrubland biomes), but also make sure that their sites have been selected according to river, lake, or raw mate-
rial adjacency. Furthermore, they make some specific arguments in order to reject the possibility that simple reduction effects 
may account for their observations (ibid.: 129-131). 
 
“[t]he premise underlying such a comparison is that technological similarities, particularly 
where recurring through several domains of analysis, can be hypothesised to represent shared 
population histories” (ibid.: 126). 
“[…] find significant technological overlap between northern Arabia and northeast Africa in 
particular, which may indicate either evidence for modern human dispersal or cultural diffu-
sion between dispersing modern humans and existing archaic populations in northern Arabia. 
While a dedicated comparison of these assemblages with Levantine assemblages […] may pro-
vide greater clarification, we suggest that the structure of the observed similarities shows that 
demographic complexity was already a key feature of populations at the gateway to Eurasia” 
(Scerri et al. 2014: 140). 
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data is motivated by a correspondence conception of truth and explained by first exposing the struc-
tures of ‘existence’ and then putting them into perspective by invoking a particular category of ‘sub-
sistence.’ 
The second example of the formistic orientation of Anglophone lithic research is A Unified Lithic Tax-
onomy Based on Patterns of Core Reduction by Conard et al. (2004). This short paper tackles the is-
sue of core classification in a manner characteristic of formism. The authors present a generalised 
taxonomy for organising the variability of cores encountered at Palaeolithic sites from Africa. While 
the paper is not so much concerned with the application of the proposed classification, the authors 
regard their ‘taxonomic work’ as an indispensible prerequisite for engaging with more specific lithic 
research questions and to facilitate scholarly communication both within the community of lithic Afri-
canists and African and European approaches. Accordingly, the chief objective of A Unified Lithic Tax-
onomy is described as 
Based on the examination of the lithic material from a range of especially Southern African 
sites, Conard et al. (2004: 14) suggest that the most part of the observed variability of cores can be 
satisfactorily captured by three “main taxa,” encapsulating ‘Inclined,’ ‘Parallel,’ and ‘Platform’ core-
types (Fig. 11). These are complemented, if necessary, by core categories termed ‘Initial,’ ‘Multidirec-
tional,’ ‘Intermediate Broken,’ ‘Bipolar,’ and ‘Other’ (ibid.: 15). Cores are defined as ‘objects from 
which potentially useful flakes have been removed’ and following Deacon (1982) must exhibit at least 
three deliberate removal scars (ibid.: 14). Individual cores are then classified based on well-defined 
sets of shared characteristics. These include the number of preserved flake negatives, the number of 
adjacent removal surfaces, angle(s) of flake detachment, aspects of general morphology (i.e., ‘conical,’ 
‘biconical,’ ‘asymmetric cross-section,’ ‘polyhedral,’ etc.), the direction of preserved removals, the 
presence and location of core preparation, and the number of striking platforms (ibid.: 15f.). The over-
all constellation of these characteristics, with a particular emphasis on core morphologies and the or-
ganisation of removals on the exploitation surfaces, determines the taxonomic group into which an 
individual piece is placed (cf. ibid.: Table 1). 
 The logic of classification is ‘atemporal’ and revolves around the identification of necessary 
and sufficient conditions for grouping artefacts.379 It is atemporal because the archaeological context 
including the dating of the artefacts but also the particular attitudes and research interests of the ex-
aminers do not matter. The goal is to devise effective core categories that can be used to describe core 
variability of “all ages” (Conard et al. 2004: 14).  The unit of classification is the self-sufficient ‘atom-
ised’ piece. Each single core is analysed in terms of its individual features and then compared to the list 
of characteristics tied to each taxonomic grouping. An artefact is assigned to a specific core taxon only 
if it fulfils all of the listed necessary conditions. Classificatory practice therefore follows a clear ‘if-then’ 
logic determining which core is ascribed to which group of objects under which conditions. The au-
thors themselves repeatedly emphasise that they aim to provide a system of organising lithic evidence 
that is ‘unambiguous’ and easily ‘reproducible’ by different lithic workers. The independent evaluation 
of the reliability of the devised categories by a series of blind tests illustrates this point (ibid.: 16). 
These analytical standards, of course, ought to apply to individual objects, not to assemblages or other 
object totalities. 
 The authors explicitly point out that 
                                                          
379 The search for necessary and sufficient conditions can be a ‘tool,’ ‘heuristic,’ or ‘regulative idea’ to help specify the application 
of a definition or concept under scrutiny (cf. e.g., Brennan 2017). 
“[…] defining a taxonomic system for chipped stone artefacts that can be applied to materials 
from the Early, Middle and Later Stone Age. The motivation for defining a ‘unified taxonomy’ 
stems from the need to develop a system for classifying multi-component surface assemblages. 
The proposed taxonomy revises southern African systems by applying ideas and methods from 
European approaches to lithic technology. Given that much confusion exists on the classifica-
tion of cores and core reduction, the lithic workshops focused on this class of artefact.” (Conard 
et al. 2004: 13) 
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According to Conard et al. (2004: 16f.), these additional key variables comprise the morphology of the 
core endproducts, the degree of reduction between initialised and exhausted cores, the degree of utilis-
ing core circumferences, frequency of striking platform and removal surfaces expressed in numerical 
values (i.e., integer data), and the degree of platform preparation reflected in both cores and dé-
bitage.380 The result is the ability to discriminate between different degrees of inter-core similarity. 
The higher-order taxonomic groupings provide more general descriptions of core types entailing a 
range of lower-order, more specific groupings, such as Levallois cores (ibid.: 16). This illustrates that 
different ‘classes’ of cores, established based on varying granularities of resemblance, can be ranked 
within a larger system of classification.381 This system, in turn, reveals the natural hierarchy of 
facts.382 In other words, those characteristics which define the higher-order groupings are considered 
to be more important in understanding core reduction technology than those discriminating the lower-
order classes.383 The hierarchy of object groupings also tells us whether a grouping is relevant on a 
general level of inquiry or whether it is more likely to be effective in specialised research contexts. The 
higher-order core categories – the ‘taxa’ in the words of Conard et al. (2004) – are thought to have this 
general bearing, whereas the finer-grained categories – what the authors call ‘subclasses’ – should 
help addressing more specific issues and questions in lithic research. This logic is distinctively 
formistic. Not only are differences in lithic parts – objects, traits, attributes and relationships between 
the latter two – systematised according to Pepper’s ‘Theory of Types,’ the explicit goal of A Unified 
Lithic Taxonomy is the creation of a universal classification, ordering the lithic facts from the more 
general to the less general.384 A ‘class,’ in this view, is nothing less than “a collection of particulars 
which participate in one or more characters” (Pepper 1942: 159). The point is that these classes are 
regarded to reveal something substantial about the structure of lithic reality, as well as about the par-
ticular ‘norms’ that must have guided the transformation of ‘matter’ into recognisable lithic ‘forms.’ 
More generally speaking, the interpretation of lithic typology as taxonomy, in particular if the latter is 
viewed as an independent domain of scholarly activity, is a highly diagnostic condiment of formistic 
reasoning. 
 A few remarks on the epistemology of ‘taxonomic reasoning’ may be useful here. Taxonomies 
seek to portray patterned regularities in observable reality; they capture how reality is compositionally 
organised, that is, how one can dismember it into parts. Taxonomies thereby identify and define the 
entities that can be said to populate this reality on various levels of existence – they respond to the 
intuition that ‘unless reality contains some order, we can find no order in it’ (Grene 1990: 239). The 
first aspect to note is that ‘taxonomisation’ is thus typically an ‘analytic’ operation. The second aspect 
is that many different classifications are always possible and taxonomies thus depend on some form of 
external significance. Many taxonomies, for instance, seek to delineate classes that figure in laws or 
facilitate the formation of such laws (cf. Hull 1998; Honenberger 2015: 28). Some authorities would 
                                                          
380 Two aspects are remarkable here. First of all, some of these variables have already been covered, at least partially or in a 
slightly different format, by the initial list of core classification (cf. Conard et al. 2004: Table 1, 15f.). The specified additional 
variables meant to create sub-classes therefore feel redundant at times. Secondly, although the proposed classificatory scheme 
focuses exclusively on cores (ibid.: 13), the authors now suddenly introduce non-core features. This invocation of endproducts 
and débitage preparation is surprising at best. The authors, for instance, leave it completely open how the corresponding dé-
bitage pieces can reliably be identified. These difficulties almost certainly generate some interpretive problems. 
381 The prototype of a ranked system of classification is the nested hierarchy of nature encapsulated in Linneus’ Systema Natu-
rae. This classificatory system discriminates between ‘family,’ ‘order,’ ‘genus,’ and ‘species’ (see also Simpson 1961; Schuh 
2000). The general idea in lithic studies has always been to come up with an analogous way of classifying lithic objects and to 
learn something from it about the general organisation of human stone technology. 
382 The distinction between the three ‘main taxa’ of cores and five complementary taxa as well as the differential interpretive 
treatment of the groups suggests that the former are regarded to embody a degree of “truth” or “certainty” that the latter are 
lacking. It indeed appears as if the complementary taxa represent “half-truths,” a genuine category of ‘formism’ (see Chapter 2). 
383 This ‘hierarchy of facts’ may be interpreted as specific way of theorising the classic ‘formistic’ distinction between essential 
and accidental properties (cf. Robertson and Atkins 2018). An essential property is a property that an entity, typically an object, 
must have. Accidental properties, by contrast, are properties that entities happen to have but could lack. Classifications can be 
interpreted to reveal the grading between these categories of properties: the more general the class, the more likely is it to delin-
eate essential properties. This is why more general classes are sometimes said to be more ‘real.’ This way of using classifications 
entails some form of ‘essentialism.’ 
384 See Chapter 2: esp. Box 6; for the role of classification as a primary analytical operation in ‘formism,’ see Pepper (1942: 159-
161). 
“[…] the taxa described below represent a high-level classification and that within the main 
groups of Inclined, Parallel and Platform many subclasses exist and can be recognized using 
the key variables discussed at the end of the paper.” (Conard et al. 2004: 15) 
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indeed argue that ‘true’ classes are distinguished precisely by their participation in these laws. This 
conception not only reflects the formistic understanding of laws as ‘strong norms which regulate oc-
currences in nature and render them regular’ (cf. Pepper 1942: 166),385 it may also result in the identi-
fication of classes as natural kinds.386 ‘Natural kinds’ are groupings that echo the natural structure of 
the world (e.g., Bird and Tobin 2018). Classification, conversely, supplies a tool to detect such ‘natural 
kinds.’ Yet, the fact that different classifications compete for knowledge and that classification itself 
usually fails to provide the ultimate means to reach out to the genuine structure of reality can be taken 
as evidence for the formistic idea that reality is only weakly ordered. The same formistic belief in the 
lack of ‘integrative determination’ motivates a strong reliance on classification in the first place. The 
creation of taxonomic systems is typically a reflex of ‘dispersive’ modes of handling evidence, in which 
the primary emphasis lies on the proliferation of fact and the incorporation of as many disparate facts 
as possible. 
 A number of observations suggest that Conard et al.’s (2004) grasp of classification and its role 
in lithic studies is in accordance with this general characterisation of ‘taxonomic reasoning.’ The au-
thors for example note: 
They also emphasise that 
and add: 
 
These enunciations make clear that the authors regard ‘taxonomisation’ as important coordinate of 
scientific progress in the field. They similarly indicate that the interpretation of taxonomic groupings 
depends on the kind of background theory adopted.387 This last point is evident when one reads the 
individual descriptions of the different core taxa, in which recurrent reference is made to ‘stages of 
knapping’ and a ‘continuous process of lithic reduction’ (cf. ibid.: 15f.).388 Already the description of 
the taxa includes interpretive suggestions what these might mean in terms of reduction dynamics and 
a continuous space between ‘early’ and ‘late’ reduction stages. The taxon ‘Initial’ is for example identi-
fied as likely reflecting earlier stages of lithic knapping (ibid.: 15). The generally continuous character 
of lithic reduction also regarded to explain some of the observed borderline variation. The authors 
explicitly state that we should “not be surprised that some cores are difficult to classify because they 
fall within the ‘grey zone’ between the main types” (idem). Individual cores may either deviate from 
                                                          
385 Cf. Chapter 2: Box 6. 
386 Hull (1969: 169f.) for example notes: “[t]raditionally the notion of type entails that membership in a natural kind is deter-
mined by one set of characters which are severally necessary and jointly sufficient.” 
387 Although Conard et al. (2004) admit the theory-ladenness of scientific classification (cf. Schurz 2011: 63), they determine the 
key classificatory variables on the basis of the structure of their evidence. Theory, therefore, plays only some vague and rather 
post hoc role in their taxonomic approach. Clearly, the primary emphasis of the authors lies on phonetic classification, that is, 
classification based on the resemblance of traits. Following Schurz (2011: 66-70, Abb. 2.11), phonetic classification can be distin-
guished from phylogenetic classification which may either take the form of cladistics (after Henning) or evolutionary systemat-
ics (after Mayr). The latter are methods of ‘top-down’ classification. Note that although ‘formists’ generally tap into the full 
spectrum of classificatory means, the more ‘functional’ taxonomies are typically also accepted by ‘mechanists,’ especially if clas-
sification reflects their principles of causality and ‘primary laws.’ 
388 Needless to say, the tacit adherence to a ‘continuum’ conception of lithic reduction is highly significant, but it is not the main 
concern of the present analysis. We will return to this issue in the second part of the present chapter, when various incarnations 
of Anglophone lithic ‘mechanism’ are scrutinised. 
“It should, however, be stressed that cores change as they are reduced so that it is possible for 
cores to reflect different patterns of reduction at different stages of knapping. […] Equally 
important is the observation that there is continuous variation between the three main pat-
terns of reduction.” (ibid.: 15) 
“Here it is worth reiterating Brew’s (1946) observations that there are no perfect or ideal taxon-
omies in archaeological systems, and that the field has more often suffered from having too few 
rather than too many taxonomies. As new knowledge accumulates and new problems are de-
fined, new taxonomies will be needed. While all new systems should be viewed with a healthy 
dose of scepticism, one should not resist attempts to develop new approaches. Taxonomic sys-
tems that do not prove to be useful can and should be discarded. Conversely, to a certain extent, 
the existence of multiple mutually intelligible systems presents no significant problems to re-
searchers and can enrich archaeological discourse.” (ibid.: 13f.) 
“[c]lassifying lithic artefacts does not constitute an end in itself; it should be seen as one step in 
the overall analysis of lithic artefacts in relation to patterns of human behaviour.” (ibid.: 13) 
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the reduction pattern they normally embody or they may represent in-between reduction stages. This 
insistence on the ‘normality’ of pattern and the idea that individual core taxa represent ‘norms’ of lithic 
knapping which are materialised by particular ‘principles of exemplification’ (i.e., methods of reduc-
tion) is a classic formistic figure of interpretation. 
 Because such ‘norms’ of lithic reduction are inferred on the basis of ‘complex sets of charac-
ters,’ a norm itself is rarely fully particularised and thus typically transcends its complete materialisa-
tion.389 The author’s assertion that their lithic core taxonomy somehow resonates with different ‘meth-
ods of reduction’ (ibid.: 14, 16) is only intelligible if we accept this interpretation of reality and identify 
the behaviour of reducing cores in various ways as the ‘subsistent’ category of their analysis. The idea 
would be pretty simple: if there are different knapping plans or norms of reduction, these would result 
in a differential treatment of ‘matter’ which, in turn, would result in varying lithic ‘forms’ – that is, 
varying constellations of the physical characteristics of cores. ‘Methods of reduction’ are exemplified 
by particular part-configurations but resist complete materialisation – they “subside” as Pepper (1942: 
177) would say. Whether the ‘method of reduction’ throwing its material shadow into the world of ‘ex-
istence’ is thereby conceptualised strictly as a ‘technical norm’ or a ‘technical law’ in the formistic sense 
of these notions does not matter much. The key point is that the correlation between ‘methods of re-
duction’ and ‘complex lithic patterns’ is effectuated by the distinction between a directly observable 
domain of lithic objects and a veiled realm of ‘subsistence.’390  The latter supplies the conditions for the 
possibility of encountering particular patterns in ‘concrete’ reality and must therefore ‘exist’ in some 
sense itself. Conard et al.’s (2004) ‘methods of reduction’ therefore assume an almost Platonic status – 
as abstract entities with concrete material correlates. 
 A Unified Lithic Taxonomy generally occupies similar epistemological ground as Monnier 
(2009: 122), who has recently given a strong voice to the formistic argument that there can be no lithic 
knowledge without explicit classification:391  
The importance of this formistic argument for the indispensability of the ‘Theory of Types,’ classifica-
tion, nomenclature, and taxonomy can hardly be overrated. The issue of “typological reasoning” – to 
use the words of famed biologist Ernst Mayr (1976 [1959]: 27f.) – has divided ‘mechanistic’ and 
formistic camps of scholarship ever since. This division is for instance expressed in the authorative 
‘Grene-Hull debates’ on the status of typology and the concept of species in evolutionary biology (cf. 
Honenberger 2015). While David Hull (1965a, 1965b, 1976, 1989 [1986]) joined the ranks of Mayr and 
others arguing that typological reasoning and hollow taxonomies represent relics of a pre-Darwinian 
and essentially ‘non-scientific’ era of research (cf. Winsor 2006), Marjorie Grene (1958, 1974, 1989, 
1990, 2002), by drawing on a solid Aristotelian foundation, defended the obligatory status of ‘typologi-
sation’ and ‘taxonomisation’ in understanding both nature and evolution. Grene (1990) in particular 
argued that the kind of ‘population thinking’ propagated by Mayr, Simpson, and other architects of the 
‘New Evolutionary Synthesis’ inevitably leads to self-contradiction – to all kinds of logical absurdities 
– and is thus untenable;392 she also stressed the need to take serious the observable structure of reality 
which, according to her, is typically explained away by Neo-Darwinian approaches (cf. Grene 1958: 
                                                          
389 Cf. Chapter 2: Box 6. 
390 ‘Mechanists’ are typically sceptical about this form of pattern-explanation mirroring. They tend to insist on the ‘specifity of 
response’ principle and argue that explanations need to remove any vagueness in the relationship between the explanandum 
and the explanans. An explanation, in other words, cannot only be adequate by its form, that is, structural congruence between 
observed patterns and more abstract concepts driving these patterns. 
391 See also Clarke’s (1968: Chapter 12) invocation of ‘numerical taxonomy’ as an early, yet influential expression of taxonomic 
reasoning in Anglophone archaeology. 
392 For the role of the debate on ‘essentialism’ and ‘typological thinking’ on the development of the ‘New Evolutionary Synthesis,’ 
see Chung (2003), Amudson (2005), and Winsor (2006). 
“I submit that we cannot, in fact, escape typology. Regardless of one’s ultimate goal, artifacts still 
need to be organized in some way before they can be analyzed. The search for technological pat-
terns cannot begin until lithic artifacts are organized into coherent categories based on techno-
logical attributes and features. The creation of a typology of technological attributes should be 
done carefully and should be informed by the science of classification (e.g., Adams and Adams 
1991). Most of all, this typology should avoid confounding description with interpretation. […] In 
conclusion, although many would agree that the ability of Bordian typology to inform us about 
human behavior in the Middle Paleolithic is limited, typology itself is not a “bad approach.” It is 
a necessary tool of archaeology because our first task is to organize the artifacts we are studying. 




125-127). The debate is thus a classic instance of the clash between formistic and mechanistic stand-
points. The formistic view highlights the need to pay heed to the organisation of facts in both their 
phenomenal horizontality and verticality and assumes that the distinct kinds identifiable in this way 
refer back to the ‘subsistent’ qualities responsible for their ‘existence.’ The mechanistic view, by con-
trast, insists on a more specific, necessity-governed link between the observable and the unobservable 
and tends to conceptualise the matrix of causality as a ‘field structure’ (cf. Chapter 2). Within this ‘field 
structure’ of reality, all residual discreteness must be resolved because any remaining discreteness 
would ultimately undermine the singularity of cause-and-effect.393 Arguably, the discussion in Palaeo-
lithic archaeology can be reconstructed along similar lines. The supposed formistic ‘essentialisation’ of 
reality, for instance, is regularly criticised by more mechanistically-inclined researchers (e.g., Shea 
2011b).394 We will recurrently come back to this issue in the course of the present chapter.395 
A brief look into the latest work of the first author of A Unified Lithic Taxonomy further reas-
sures us that formism, for the most part at least, provides the relevant cognitive framing in this con-
text. In a paper on behavioural variation and change throughout the Middle Stone Age sequence of 
Sibudu cave (South Africa), for instance, Conard and Will (2015) identify patterned regularities and 
trends in lithic technology based on an explicit ‘attribute analytical’ approach. Their measure to estab-
lish ‘regularity’ and ‘focused’ patterns of change is statistical similarity. They directly link the emerg-
ing patterns in the lithic data to ‘patterns of behaviour.’ Again, the idea is that the lithic evidence re-
flects back to hominin behaviour in rather generic, yet nonetheless intimate ways. Hominin behaviour 
and lithic patterning, in other words, are thought to substantially co-vary.396  
Similarly, the author’s generalised and fairly abstract hypotheses (ibid.: Fig. 16) are evaluated 
in terms of the latter’s structural similarity with the patterns observed in ‘concrete’ reality. The same 
tendency of structurally aligning empirical findings and advocated explanations results in the empha-
sis of the purported ‘complexity’ of the behavioural strategies under investigation. Thus, ‘behaviour’ 
clearly accounts for the ‘subsistent’ category of the study – a category that is illuminated by an ex-
tremely detailed examination of the lithic evidence, yet remains deprived of equally rich characterisa-
tions. Metaphorically speaking, this situation clearly attests to the formistic recognition that the details 
of ‘subsistent’ qualities typically remain ‘hidden’ and ‘stored away’ behind a wall of ‘existence.’  
Furthermore, the ‘subsistent’ category of behaviour, in classic ‘correlationist’ fashion, is ulti-
mately secured by demonstrating that potentially competing ‘subsistent’ categories such as external 
environmental or ecological conditions are not significantly correlated with the lithic patterns in ques-
tion and can thus faithfully be excluded as candidates of explanation.397 The reasoning is thus as fol-
lows: if there is no evident external correlation, the relevant ‘subsistent’ category must be ‘internal’ – 
i.e., it must be a category intrinsically bound to the ‘primary existence’ of the lithic artefacts in ques-
tion. This logic of research, overall, is undoubtedly formistic. 
 
A third window into Anglophone formistic thought is opened by the application of elaborate morpho-
metric approaches to lithic artefacts (e.g., Lycett 2007a, 2009b, 2010, 2016; Iovita 2008, 2011; O’Brien 
2010; Archer and Braun 2010; Eren and Lycett 2012; Lycett and Cramon-Taubadel 2013, 2015; Archer 
et al. 2016, 2017; Iovita et al. 2017).398 ‘Morphometrics’ is commonly referred to as the quantitative 
study of shape, morphology, or form. In contrast to more traditional methods of describing these fea-
tures in archaeology, morphometrics uses an array of statistical tools to determine object geometries, 
often using ‘landmark’ and ‘semi-landmark’ approaches (cf. Iovita 2008; Lycett 2009b; Eren and 
                                                          
393 See also Appendix II.2 for a discussion of this issue. 
394 Indeed, the entire ‘human modernity’ discourse can be reconstructed along these lines. 
395 To counter a potential scepticism of the attentive reader, it should already be noted that the present author argues that the 
French tradition has largely departed from its initial ‘formistic’ trajectory. Even though the ‘Bordian era’ (sensu Sackett 1991) 
was clearly build on ‘formistic’ reasoning, the ‘technological revolution’ co-initiated by Leroi-Gourhan and Tixier in Paris marks 
a definitive break with ‘formistic’ epistemologies. This will become clear when the role and status of lithic typologies in French 
technological inquiry is examined (cf. Chapter 5, first part). 
396 Cf. “Cultural taxonomy should not be regarded as a static tool, but as a way to qualify and quantify degrees of behavioural 
variation.” (Conard and Porraz 2015: 129) 
397 Cf. Conard and Porraz (2015: 128). 
398 I use a relatively broad definition of morphometrics here to include the work by Stephen Lycett and others. 
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Lycett 2012: S1).399 The main concern of these techniques is ‘shape realism,’ that is, the idea that ob-
ject-shapes represent ‘rich’ and ‘complex’ phenomena which need to be measured and compared as 
what they are – as morphological totalities.400 The general contention is that significant variation in 
the morphometric properties of lithic artefacts is easily overlooked when adhering to methods that 
tend to reduce the multidimensionality of shape-data to a limited set of variables or simply capture 
different kinds of shapes by distinct descriptive categories. These approaches are regarded as ‘reduc-
tionist’ by proponents of morphometric analysis. Morphometrics seeks to bring the ‘three-
dimensionality’ of objects to the fore of lithic inquiry and to carve out data that takes the ‘plasticity’ of 
lithic forms seriously into account. The basis of morphometric approaches is provided by an explicitly 
‘analytic’ understanding of ‘geometry,’ ‘shape,’ and ‘size,’ so that these vectors of object variability can 
be modelled and compared “with the precise language of mathematics” (Thompson 1961 [1917]: 269, 
cited by Lycett 2009b: 79; cf. Lycett and Cramon-Taubadel 2013: 1509): 
As Lestrel (2000: 59f.) correctly notes, the morphometric approach owes a great debt to Plato 
and Aristotle.  First, it recognises the fundamental distinction between matter and form. Shaped 
matter assumes certain ‘shapes,’ ‘sizes,’ and ‘morphologies’ and has a particular ‘structure.’ Access to 
the form of an object is provided only by sense perception, but form always relates back to something 
non-sensory. The reason is that form presupposes the actualisation of altered matter and this, in turn, 
implies a shaper other than matter itself. Forms therefore throw a ‘shadow’ on non-spatiotemporal 
aspects of reality – aspects that cannot directly be observed and must be inferred. In formism, these 
aspects are identified as ‘norms,’ ‘laws’ or other patterned regularities. The crux, as we learned before, 
is that these are never fully materialised and can therefore only be pointed at – they ‘subside’ (cf. Pep-
per 1942: 177). That morphometric research often has to retain a notion of the ‘ideal’ in order to move 
‘beyond’ the sensually given, can for example be seen in the fact that researchers typically isolate 
trends of ‘normality,’ calculate complex statistical averages, and utilise visualisation techniques such as 
‘group centroids’ to compare different data-sets (cf. Lycett 2009b: esp. Figs. 1, 2). The entities that 
come into view in this way are not directly observable. 
 Morphometric research is guided by the conviction that a more careful, precise, and detailed 
analysis of artefact form puts researchers into a better position to interpret the significance of the vari-
ability of lithic form. What is thereby tacitly assumed, of course, is that discrete form is a basic facet of 
‘concrete’ reality. Notwithstanding, morphometric results may for example be harnessed in order to re-
investigate shape patterns among lithic artefacts and to re-address questions of co-variation between 
artefact geometry and other artefact-external variables. Another commonly used possibility is to rigor-
ously explore the structure of lithic shape variability and to compare the results to the structure of 
other domains of reality. Since morphometric approaches tend to improve both the quality and quanti-
ty of geometric lithic data, they can supply novel typologies and other more specialised object classifi-
cations. All of this helps placing classic formistic reasoning onto firmer empirical grounds. 
 Gowlett (2010), for example, self-consciously embraces this new opportunity for lithic re-
search: 
                                                          
399 The methodological and conceptual background of ‘morphometrics’ has been developed in biology and palaeontology (cf. 
O’Higgins 2000; Slice 2005, 2007; O’Higgins and Jones 2006). Even more specialised methods such as ‘Fourier Analysis’ derive 
from biological or physical anthropological applications (e.g., Lestrel 1997). 
400 This, of course, does not necessarily mean that a different type of data is used altogether. Neither does it mean that these 
approaches are ‘synthetic.’ What changes, however, is the density of geometric information that is used to analyse the form of 
objects. 
“‘Morphometrics’ is now seen as a major field of growth in biology and palaeontology, including 
physical anthropology (e.g., O’Higgins 2000). Put simply, morphometrics is the application of 
the principles of geometry to the study of shape. Others have pointed out that morphometrics 
may also usefully be termed ‘statistical shape analysis’ (e.g., Dryden and Mardia 1998).” (Lycett 
2009: 79f.) 
“New is often better, and the Morphometrics has many possibilities. For instance, its tech-
niques allow the analysis of form free of size variation (effects), with particular benefits for 
archaeology’s yearning to explore templates. Such an “ideal” form should not exist in biology, 
as natural selection is primarily undirected, but in cultural phenomena (and here we hark back 
to Plato’s Ideals) the pressures towards norms can create the situation where everyone agrees 
about the same thing (“it should be just like this”). The implication is that we need to know a 
great deal more about stereotypes and templates, and how they operate in modern humans, to 
get even more out of these […].” (ibid.: 310) 
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Gowlett’s statement is remarkable, for it explicitly contends that morphometric approaches cannot 
only facilitate the search for ‘templates,’ but also help isolating ‘ideals’ and ‘norms’ of hominin behav-
iour. He even evokes Plato’s ideas. Needless to say, all of this attests to a deeply formistic mode of rea-
soning (cf. Chapter 2: esp. Box 6). 
 A specific way of putting morphometric approaches into perspective is by using their results to 
answer phylogenetic questions (e.g., Lipo et al. 2005; O’Brien et al. 2013; Lyman 2015). The recorded 
variability of lithic forms can be studied as the result of evolutionary processes producing non-random 
patterns of geometric development through time. Morphometrics, then, serves the explanatory goals of 
Darwinian evolutionary theory, which often changes the looked-for units of analysis (Lyman and 
O’Brien 2000) – typically ‘populations of artefacts’ that evolve over time (e.g., Shott 2011; Edinbor-
ough et al. 2015; Lycett 2016).401 Lycett (2016: 83-88; cf. Lycett and Taubadel 2015), for instance, ex-
plicitly argues that inherited changes in behaviour, culture, and social transmission will affect how one 
makes tools  and thus inevitably alter at least some dimensions of artefact form.402 This is why chang-
ing patterns of form can be used to infer trajectories of hominin behaviour, culture, and possibly social 
transmission.403 Form-based data of discrete lithic parts is used to reveal developmental patterns 
pointing towards the unobservable horizon that lies behind empirical reality. The important point is 
that although evolutionary mechanism that fulfil the ‘specifity of response’ requirement are often dis-
cussed, they are not strictly needed to explain the observed regularities since ‘neutral variation,’ ‘drift’ 
and other stochastic effects may be similarly invoked. In the extreme case, ‘time’ itself may be conjured 
as a sufficient ‘subsistent’ category.404 This leads to ‘historical’ interpretations of morphometric change 
and reintroduces the dimension of cultural history. 
 Even though the majority of morphometric and phylogenetic studies to date has been conduct-
ed in New World research contexts (e.g., Buchanan et al. 2014), similar approaches become also in-
creasingly popular in studying the Palaeolithic of the Old World. The work of Lycett (2007, 2009a, 
2009b, 2010, 2016) and, more recently, Archer et al. (2016, 2017) exemplifies this emerging trend. 
Two of these papers – Lycett’s (2009a) attempt to make use of phylogenetic analysis in order to track 
hominin dispersal in the Lower Palaeolithic on the one hand, and Archer et al.’s (2016) investigation of 
the regionality of point technology in the South African MSA on the other – will be analysed in more 
detail in the remainder of this section. As case studies, they will help throwing further light on the 
formistic conditions of lithic knowledge production in Anglophone lithic inquiry. 
                                                          
401 These approaches are typically modelled on biological or cultural evolutionary theory. An expression of the former school of 
thought is Darwinian Archaeology seeking to understand artefact phylogenies by means of concepts and methods borrowed 
from biology and/or palaeontology (Dunnell 1989; Lyman and O’Brien 2000; cf. Donald and Maschner 1996). The second 
strand heavily draws from principles of cultural evolution in order to understand the patterns of the past (cf. Shennan 2009; 
Mesoudi 2016). Shennan’s Genes, Memes and Human History (2002) is surely one of the founding texts of this second ap-
proach-type. In contrast to Darwinian Archaeologies, cultural evolutionary models emphasise role of social transmission as a 
general mechanism of evolutionary change. In practice, of course, biological and cultural evolution are often combined to pro-
vide an integrated perspective on the past (O’Brien and Lyman 2003; Shennan 2008; O’Brien and Shennan 2010). Mesoudi et 
al.’s (2006) plea for a unified science of cultural evolution still resonates with the agendas of many of these approaches (cf. 
Mesoudi 2011). More generally speaking, the important manoeuvre has been to re-define the concept of culture and to recast it 
as a patterned process of social transmission – a view that generally aligns with the proposals of ‘Dual Inheritance Theory’ (Boyd 
and Richerson 1985; Richerson and Boyd 2005). 
402 Cf. “[…] The key point here is that many quantitative traits of artifacts segregate across several different heritable causal 
factors, just as in the case of multifactorial quantitative traits examined in biology. Yet also, some aspects of attribute variability 
may result from the type of clay to which these socially learned factors are applied – in other words, the “environment” in which 
the inherited components operate may influence variability in observable attributes too […]. Hence, observable archaeological 
traits will invariably be influenced by multiple unobservable and “pleiotropically” operating cultural elements, while also simul-
taneously being influenced by “environmental” effects […].” (Lycett 2016: 80) 
403 There is a large body of theoretical literature on different types of social transmission that may have played a role in bringing 
forth different patterns of continuity and change. This general theory is sometimes called ‘cultural transmission theory’ (Eerkens 
and Lipo 2007). It is noteworthy that different types of social transmission are usually discriminated in order to enable correla-
tional procedures. Different processes and mechanisms of transmission are also thought to have different observable conse-
quences. Depending on the mode of mobilising this body of theory, approaches may develop into ‘formistic’ or ‘mechanistic’ 
strands of inquiry. 
404 Cf. Chapter 2: Box 6. 
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Lycett’s Understanding Ancient Hominin Dispersals Using Artefactual Data: A Phylogeographic 
Analysis of Acheulean Handaxes (2009a) tests the ‘African Acheulean Hypothesis,’ that is, the idea 
that the presence of Acheulean handaxe technology in non-African contexts is the result of hominin 
dispersal out of Africa. The author invokes the ‘serial founder effect’ as a potential mechanism to ac-
count for changes in handaxe technology as a result of dispersal events. The ‘serial founder effect’ de-
scribes a bottleneck situation that typically occurs when sub-populations separate from their larger 
mother-population. The result is a correlated reduction of in-group variance with increased geographic 
distance from the source population’s point of origin (ibid.: 2). It is asserted that, by analogy, processes 
of social transmission should be equally affected by this reduction of in-group variance. In other 
words, some general changes in the structure of hominin populations are predicted to have a propor-
tional impact on the structure of handaxe assemblages. Already this structural analogising is suspi-
ciously formistic: not only are population-level and assemblage-level characteristics regarded as ‘re-
flecting each other,’ the link between the two is conceptualised as a rather generic type of undirected 
co-variation.405 What holds populations and technologies together is a ‘social inheritance’ of artefactu-
al traits, so that a modification of population structure will impact what is possibly ‘inherited’ by the 
artefacts: 
Reality is viewed to be ordered, but only weakly so and in a general sense of the word. Moreo-
ver, the various compartments of reality close ranks according to a ‘symmetry principle.’ The test-
implications of this construal are the following: if the compositional structure of Acheulean handaxes 
traces dispersal patterns, non-African assemblages should exhibit significantly lower in-group variance 
than their African counterparts. This decrease in intra-assemblage variance should, moreover, mirror 
increasing geographic from Africa (idem). 
 Lycett (2009a) conducts a ‘phylogeographic’ analysis to examine whether intra-assemblage 
variance of handaxes informs us about the assemblages’ geographic origin. For this purpose, the au-
thor records a total number of 72 individual characters on each lithic object within the 10 studied lithic 
assemblages. Each character documents either a distinct metric measurement, a shape coefficient, an 
index, a discrete value, or a feature count (ibid.: SI Table S1; cf. Lycett et al. 2006; Lycett 2007a, 
2007b). After screening the resulting data set for artificial variable interdependencies using ‘Pearson 
product-moment analyses,’ 66 of these lithic characters are identified as independent enough to war-
rant further scrutiny (ibid.: 4). Taken together, these data are regarded to proxy the detailed object 
geometry of the handaxes in question. The author then employs a cladistic ‘maximum parsimony anal-
ysis’ to arrange the data sets according to their distance from one another (ibid.: 2, 4, Figure 1). In this 
process, all characters were treated equally, that is, were given similar weight.406 Subsequently, a 
‘bootstrap analysis’ is performed to assess the robustness of the identified relationships (ibid.: 4; Fig-
                                                          
405 As already indicated in Chapter 2, this conception of generic co-variation illustrates the formistic inclination to interpret the 
relationship between ‘subsistence’ and ‘existence,’ or between the ‘indirectly’ and ‘directly’ observable, as a form of superveni-
ence. To recall, ‘supervenience’ is when two correlated, yet discrete domains of reality are stitched together in such a way that 
change in one domains implicates change in the other. These different domains are sometimes also termed ‘levels of existence.’ 
Change is thereby not necessarily specified and may concern merely aspects of structural organisation. ‘Supervenience’ is typi-
cally called upon to explain interdependencies between brain and mind (cf. Kim 1984) – it is thus a prototypical formistic strate-
gy to circumvent the mind-body problem that results from the differentiation of reality into discrete parts. 
406 An important detail of the cladistic analysis is that quantitative measures need to be transformed into ‘discrete character 
states.’ Lycett (2009a: SI Text S1) uses a ‘divergence coding method’ to achieve this. This is a statistical method that helps de-
termining the most suitable way of breaking down the recorded variability of character states into discrete units. Obviously, this 
entails classification and a ‘Theory of Types,’ although the latter is of course interpreted statistically. 
“In recent years it has been increasingly recognized that the manufacture of artefacts such as 
handaxes results from the process of social transmission of knowledge between individuals and 
across generations [18-21]. It is also been increasingly recognized that social transmission may 
be modeled as a mechanism of inheritance broadly analogous to that of genetic transmission 
[22-27]. This is not to say that these two inheritance mechanisms are identical in all respects. 
One obvious difference is that in the case of social transmission the ability to acquire infor-
mation is not limited solely to copying biological parents; there is also the opportunity to copy 
more distantly related kin and unrelated individuals. Nevertheless, attention has increasingly 
been drawn to the fact that the evolution of cultural traditions involves a process of social inher-
itance, variation in the details of practice, and differential representation of given variants in 
subsequent generations (i.e. sorting due to various selection processes and cultural drift) 
(e.g.[28,29]).” (Lycett 2009a: 1f.) 
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ure 2). This test is followed up by the creation of a ‘model’ tree designed to represent conditions of 
severe raw material constraints (ibid.: 4f.:  Figure 3). This ‘model’ tree is compared to the most parsi-
monious tree returned by the original cladistics approach. The purpose is to determine whether the 
results of the conducted phylogeographic analysis significantly differ from a model scenario, in which 
the structure of the tree is known to be shaped by locally varying raw material conditions. 
 Lycett (2009a) finds that his phylogeographic tree generated by the cladistics analysis is ro-
bust and conforms to the formulated geographic expectations, namely that non-African and African 
handaxe assemblages should group together. All African assemblages are situated at the base of the 
tree, whereas the non-African assemblages occupy positions higher on the tree (Fig. 12). The author 
interprets this finding as evidence for the fact that handaxe intra-assemblage variance reflects geo-
graphic distance from Africa, and the non-African assemblages must therefore represents ‘derived’ 
phenotypes (ibid.: 2). Since the output of the ‘bootstrap analysis,’ a majority-rule consensus tree, is 
generally consistent with this finding and the raw material ‘model’ tree differs statistically, i.e., in 
terms of the Kishino-Hasegawa test (ibid.: Table 1), from the original parsimonious tree (ibid.: 2f.), he 
concludes that the handaxe evidence ultimately supports the ‘African Acheulean Hypothesis’: 
Altogether, the phylogeographic distance between handaxe groups is reconstructed solely on 
the basis of the structural similarity among shape-based characters. The employed ‘maximum parsi-
mony analysis’ thereby delivers a method of hierarchical classification, arranging the lithic assem-
blages in the multidimensional space of variables.407 Furthermore, all of the post hoc assessments, 
including the ‘bootstrap analysis’ and the ‘model’ tree, address the ‘contingency’ of pattern and search 
for the ‘normality’ thereof. The goal is to detect strong ‘norms’ in the data-structure and, in the case of 
the raw material ‘model’ tree, to juxtapose these empirical norms with theoretical norms derived from 
competing scenarios. These ‘ideals’ are simply compared in terms of their structural congruity, indicat-
ing that lithic knowledge is corroborated following a ‘correspondence conception’ of truth. The fact 
that Lycett (2009a) puts so much effort into demonstrating that alternative candidates of explanation 
– i.e., locally differing raw materials – can be excluded further suggests that ‘raw material’ is treated as 
a potential ‘subsistent’ category; it can safely be excluded because its empirical consequences do not 
correspond to the patterns of the observed ‘concrete’ reality. All of this signals that ‘population-level 
social transmission’ and ‘geographic location’ work together as the explaining ‘subsistent’ categories. 
They are shown to regulate the structure of the evidence and to create strong patterns in the data but 
remain partially ‘concealed’ – the actual hominin populations and their social transmission capacities 
are not fully actualised in the lithic material; yet, they remain necessary to explain the discovered data-
structure. That ‘space’ is interpreted as an ultimate ‘subsistent’ is not uncommon in formism.408 It is 
also not unusual to identify multiple explanatory ‘subsistent’ categories as long as they do not logically 
or empirically contradict each other; put differently, the same basic particulars of ‘existence,’ in this 
case individual handaxes, may simply participate in more than a single form. 
                                                          
407 This is a technique of ‘numerical taxonomy’ and its rationale is to organise similarity among artefacts and their traits on 
different levels: “[w]e have seen that behind this group of techniques lies the idea that objects can be similar to one another at 
different levels, so that the results can be represented in the form of a dendrogram: a tree representing the relationships between 
individuals and groups.” (Shennan 1997 [1988]: 235) 
408 See Lycett (2009c) for an example of the phylogenetic study of technological ancestry deploying ‘time’ as its ‘subsistent’ 
category. 
“Parsimony analyses of the Acheulean handaxe dataset, which includes samples from Africa, 
the Near East, Europe and the Indian subcontinent, produced a tree consistent with the phylo-
geographic prediction derived from the African dispersal hypothesis. Importantly, a randomi-
zation procedure (phylogenetic bootstrapping) provided further evidence that the major Afri-
can versus non-African phylogeographic pattern depicted in the maximum parsimony (MP) 
tree is robust. Moreover, the MP tree was also shown to be statistically different from a com-
parative tree constrained by the raw materials used to manufacture the stone artefacts. This 
latter result demonstrates that raw material parameters (long known to be a potential influ-
ence on the form of stone tools) do not constitute a confounding factor in these analyses. These 
results demonstrate that nested analyses of behavioural data, utilizing methods drawn from 
biology, have the potential to shed light on ancient hominin dispersals.” (Lycett 2009a: 3) 
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Archer et al. (2016) investigate geometric patterns in bifacial point technology of the South African 
‘Still Bay’ – a long recognised techno-tradition of the African Middle Stone Age (MSA) featuring prom-
inently in narratives about modern human behavioural evolution and demography. The authors’ focus 
is the ‘assessment of the homogenous nature of the Still Bay’ and its broader implications for questions 
of human adaptation and behaviour during the MSA (ibid.: 59). They ask whether the shape and size 
variability documented in Still Bay points is continuous across different regions or whether diverging 
“design imperatives” were guiding the production of these points at different places (idem). What is 
Still Bay? Human biogeography and bifacial point variability uses a ‘3D geometric morphometrics’ 
(3DGM) approach coupled with an ‘Elliptical Fourier Analysis’ (EFA) to address this issue (ibid.: 
61).409 The point of departure is the ‘null hypothesis’ – derived from the conclusions of previous work 
on the Still Bay phenomenon – according to which heightened sociocultural interaction in this period 
should have produced a relative homogeneity of point shapes across different regions. This hypothesis 
is tested with the high-resolution 3DGM shape-data gathered from the studied sample of Still Bay 
points. The basic reasoning is that interregional connectivity should be reflected in overall point shape 
similarities, while regionalisation should produce a more structured pattern of shape variability. 
 This construal of the research problem and its possible solutions already carries a formistic 
signature. Examined is the relationship between the general sociocultural organisation of the Still Bay 
and the shape variability of its bifacial points. A change in the structural constitution of one of the two 
dimensions is thought to have structural repercussions for the other. The underlying logic of reasoning 
stresses the general correspondence between the two dimensions without referring to any specifics of 
causality or determination. This presumed structural co-variation between the realm of lithic technol-
ogy and the realm of sociocultural life leads to the establishment of two pairs of analogies – ‘homoge-
neity’ and ‘continuous variability’ on the one hand, and ‘heterogeneity’ and ‘structured variability’ on 
the other. The ‘predictions’ of the authors only make sense if this reconstruction is accepted.410 It can 
then confidently be stated that the general structure of lithic variability at least broadly reflects back on 
the structural organisation of the sociocultural entities having produced this variability. The potential 
co-variation between lithic technology and a differentiated landscape is thereby reinforced by invoking 
aspects of ‘design theory’ and the tenets of general ecological reasoning (Archer et al. 2016: 60; cf. 
Torrence 1989c; Bousman 1993; Bleed 1997). The purpose of this body of theory is to bolster the gen-
eral rationale of the study and to call attention to the range of factors that might have contributed to 
the total shape variability of the studied lithic objects. This last point also shows that ‘variability’ is 
understood as a compositional variable which can ‘analytically’ be deconstructed into its constitutive 
components: 
The authors’ approach to bifacial shape variability is designed to isolate and remove those 
parts of the overall variability tied to contingent situational factors, such as reduction stage and raw 
material variability (Archer et al. 2016: 59, 63f.). Only the ‘residual’ variability, if any, may inform us, 
as they say, about the structure of Still Bay society. The guiding idea here is that different aspects of 
shape variability are the product of different underlying processes. Arguably, these processes represent 
the relevant ‘subsistent’ categories of the investigation. The fact that they need to be separated and, if 
possible, eliminated as potential explanatory candidates simply mirrors the formistic conception that 
the ‘particulars’ of ‘concrete’ existence – i.e., individual Still Bay points – often participate in different 
‘norms,’ ‘laws’ or regularities. In order to examine particular ‘patterns of participation,’ one must 
                                                          
409 See Archer et al. (2015) for a detailed presentation of the methodology and broader rationale of this approach. 
410 Although the authors explicitly use the term ‘prediction,’ their trajectory of inference is not based on ‘predictive reasoning’ in 
the strict sense. What they mean with prediction is simply ‘correlation’ insofar as some compartments of reality can be said to 
regularly co-vary. This understanding of prediction exploits the discrete structure of reality and the patterned correlation among 
its parts. It calls upon the regulatory relationship between the realms of ‘existence’ and ‘subsistence.’ Their notion of prediction 
is therefore significantly different from the concept’s significance in ‘mechanism,’ where it plays a key role in explanation. The 
only exception is when the authors take the allometry of bifacial tools into account, that is, the predictable relationship between 
morphology and size (Archer et al. 2016: SOM esp. SOM Fig. 1; cf. McPherron 1994, 1999, 2003, 2006). 
“Variation in point design, and variation underpinned by the extent of point manufacture, re-
sharpening and recycling activities provide information about different spheres of technological 
adaptation. It is, therefore, important to attempt to isolate these components of point variation 
from one another.” (Archer et al. 2016: 60) 
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therefore also address the interference of ‘norms,’ ‘laws,’ and regularities (cf. Pepper 1942: 178f.). Ac-
cording to formism, these interferences tend to ‘distort’ the discreteness of experienced reality. As a 
consequence, the view for what is normal and results from the natural order of things becomes cloud-
ed (cf. idem).411 Therefore, explanation and insight are only possible if one isolates the potentially in-
terfering categories for they are all correlated with their own patterns in ‘existence.’ The attempt to 
correct for such distorting categories hence reveals the status of these factors as ‘subsistent’ and shows 
that the applied logic of research is largely formistic. 
 After having removed the distorting components of variability using various statistical tech-
niques, Archer et al. (2016: 65f.) show that their 3DGM shape data of bifacial points is strongly struc-
tured along spatial coordinates. This result is based on 218 Still Bay point specimens from well-
controlled archaeological contexts, each delivering 518 distinct shape coordinates (landmarks and 
semi-landmarks). The authors compare this pattern of point variability with the three main South 
African precipitation zones taken to proxy varying ecological conditions and the general distribution of 
sites during the Still Bay. While the ecological context of the points appears to structure the data only 
weakly at best (ibid.: Fig. 6), the archaeological site distribution seems to broadly reproduce the struc-
ture of point variability (ibid.: Fig. 7). Archer et al. (2016: 65f., Table 3) conduct a ‘principal compo-
nent analysis’ (PCA) to demonstrate that the configuration of residual shape characters varies signifi-
cantly between a North-Eastern and a North-Western site cluster (Fig. 13). Because this correlation 
concerns the ‘pure’ shape variability (raw material and allometric reduction effects have already been 
subtracted), they interpret these findings as evidence for the presence of different ‘design imperatives’ 
in the two groups, suggesting that regionalisation played a much more important role in the Still Bay 
than often argued. A closer examination of the internal data-structure of the two groupings leads to the 
additional conclusion that not just the shape patterns differ but also which variables interact (ibid.: 
Figs. 8, 11). The multivariate inspection of these structural differences suggests that point production 
in the two regions is governed by different reduction trajectories resulting in different life-history pat-
terns (cf. ibid.: 68). The authors in fact argue that bifacial production starts off rather similar in the 
two site clusters – by producing bifacial rough-outs – and then diverges as reduction continues and 
points are worked out in more detail. 
Two observations are important. The first is that patterns are thought to indicate a ‘norm.’ 
This ‘norm,’ conversely, is regarded to regulate the observed patterns. The reliance on various statisti-
cal methods to extract mean differences and other trends in the shape data illustrate this point. The 
differences between the identified reduction trajectories, for example, are differences in the ideal tra-
jectories. The identification of such differences presupposes the recognition of order in terms of nor-
mality and the existence of non-observable forces being responsible for the ‘normality of pattern.’ All 
of this is certainly formistic and attests to ‘subsistent’ categories at work. These are to a certain extent 
eternal, that is, they delineate unchangeable truths; they are, in other words, universals which may be 
exemplified under different historical conditions in different ways. An example is the ‘subsistent’ cate-
gory ‘reduction’ which corresponds to a certain correlated structure of evidence that, in principle, nev-
er changes. The same reduction effects play a role in different technologies and can be identified by 
using broadly similar approaches. The second observation concerns the significance of ‘classes.’  It 
should be sufficient to note that the segregation of two groups of bifacial points in conjunction with 
two “pockets of sites” (Archer et al. 2016: 68) relies on a correlative classification. The subsequently 
conducted statistical comparison between the two classes of entities simply conforms to assessment of 
class overlap, anchored in ‘set theory.’ 
                                                          
411 Cf. “What, then, about a mass that is restrained from following its law, such as the lead ball held in the hand before it is 
dropped? As far as the formist is concerned, this law is still acting and shows itself as weight or pressure downward, but it is 
being interfered with another law in which this particular lead ball also participates. […] These interferences of laws with one 
another as a result of the participation of basic particulars in characters with themselves participate in laws, which frequently 
conflict, constitute such a marked feature of formism that they deserve further illustration. […] There is evidence, we saw, for the 
norm of an oak tree. A botanist or horticulturalist could tell us in great detail what is the normal growth and appearance of any 
particular variety of oak. Give the oak suitable soil, water, sun, fertilization, and freedom from other vegetation, from insects, 
and the like, and the normal oak will be exemplified. The law of the oak will exhibit itself in concrete existence just as the law of 
gravitating mass exhibited itself in the dropped ball. But plant the oak in poor soil or on a windswept hill, or in a thick forest, 
and it will be distorted from its normal growth just as the planet was from the normal gravitational path. This distortion will be a 
resultant of the forces of other laws in which the characters of the oak participate in conjunction with normal law of growth of 
the oak.” (Pepper 1942: 178f.) 
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 In general, the formistic orientation of What is Still Bay? is also reflected in Archer et al.’s 
(2016) emphasis on artefact form. The authors effectively argue that shape variability is able to con-
serve an intelligible combination of utilitarian and cultural information. They indicate that the identi-
fied reduction trajectories are likely associated with divergent mobility-environment systems. The 
differences in ‘pure’ shape can therefore be interpreted as a cultural signature. They further invoke the 
results of a number of use wear studies to show that functional explanations are insufficient to account 
for the documented variability of point shapes. These enunciations make clear that all of these factors 
are regarded as potential form-givers and that form is conceptualised as a highly plastic category. 
Form is ‘shaped matter’ and many different factors may contribute to the process of ‘shaping.’ Differ-
ences and similarities in artefact form are therefore the central axes of lithic inquiry. In the case of the 
Still Bay, stark differences in the form-aspects of bifacial technology are taken to signal the relative 
cultural isolation of Still Bay populations. This, in turn, is taken to suggest that technological conver-
gence and independent innovation are responsible for the particular recurrence of form we recognise 
today as the Still Bay point (ibid.: 70). Form is really conceptualised as a ‘historical document’ that 
records the totality of processes which brought it into existence: 
All things considered, Archer et al.’s (2016) approach seems to be a clear example of formistic 
reasoning. The authors’ emphasis of the complexity of past reality is also a homage to the ‘dispersivity’ 
of fact and the related difficulty of coming to grips with a world in which many determinative forces 
participate in the forms we observe. Within this complexity of pattern, Archer et al. (idem) maintain 
that ‘culture’ forms an important ‘subsistent’ category – a ‘subsistent’ that is often not taken seriously 
enough. It is notable that ‘culture’ is thereby spatialised. Cultural differences among populations are 
primarily expressed in terms of geographic differences between lithic assemblages. Again, this simply 
attests to the fact that time and space are typically seen as the ‘standard’ categories of ‘subsistence’ 
which, because of their elementary status, must play a certain role in any explanation. Pepper (1942: 
174) has seen this quite lucidly and noted: 
What is Still Bay? puts forth the cognate argument that all lithic particulars can be shown to partici-
pate in the basic spatial norms of culture, independently of other forms they may participate in. 
The fourth and last glimpse into Anglophone lithic formism is granted by the discourse on the status 
and significance of Lower Palaeolithic handaxes (or bifaces), a subset of the so-called ‘Large Cutting 
Tools’ (LCTs) (e.g., McNabb et al. 2004; Petraglia and Shipton 2008; Shea 2013a 55-64). The long-
standing question of the purported place of these certainly enigmatic stone tools in human evolution 
continues to ignite many lively discussions in the field of lithic studies (e.g., Wynn 1979; Clark 2001; 
Lycett and Gowlett 2008; Gowlett 2015; Wynn and Gowlett 2018). Traditionally, the issue of imposed 
form, especially symmetry, has occupied a prominent position within these debates (Hodgson 2010, 
2015; White and Foulds 2018; cf. Abramiku 2012: 188-192). On closer inspection, one might in fact 
speak of an entire ‘symmetry discourse’ centred on broader questions of hominin cognitive and social 
evolution, where researchers attempt to establish the precise sociocognitive implications of the materi-
al handaxe record, if any (e.g., Mithen 2003; Hodgson 2009, 2011; McNabb et al. 2018). This discus-
sion has engendered two opposing groups of scholars – the first group argues in favour of symmetry-
patterns and their evolutionary significance, whereas the second rejects the reality of the pattern, its 
significance, or both (cf. e.g., (Gowlett 1984, 2006;  Leakey and Roe 1994; Ashton and McNabb 1994; 
McPherron 1994, 2000; Wynn 1995, 2000; Kohn and Mithen 1998; Kohn 1999; Nowell 2000; Mithen 
2003; McNabb et al. 2004; Machin and Mithen 2004: 668f.; Machin et al. 2005; Lycett 2008; Machin 
2009; Hodgson 2009; Iovita and McPherron 2011; Spikins 2012; Gamble et al. 2014: 119-123; Cole 
“Stone artefacts widely considered diagnostic in the identification of some of these [MSA] 
traditions are the products of dynamic sets of interactions between ecological contexts, techno-
logical capacities and cultural tendencies.” (Archer et al. 2016: 70). 
“[…] it would seem probable that all concrete existences participate in the laws of physical time 
and space, whatever other forms they may also participate in.” 
136 
 
2015; McNabb 2013, 2017; McNabb and Cole 2015; Iovita et al. 2017).412 The logic of this debate is 
illuminating and it is worth unpacking some of its details. 
 Mithen (1996), for example, points out that 
 
Abramiuk (2012), reviewing the whole discussion, similarly asserts: 
Coolidge and Wynn (2009) add: 
These enunciations all posit that the form of a handaxe – a specific configuration of shaped matter – 
can be said to stand for some more abstract concept or idea. The material recurrence of the handaxe 
as a stable and recognisable form, in other words, can only be explained by new, but similarly stable 
non-material conditions. The latter ‘resist’ complete materialisation – they are discrete, non-material 
entities – yet must be recognised as the sine qua non of the ‘existence’ of handaxes. The handaxe is 
thus nothing else than the historical exemplification of a more general category of existence.  It is no 
great leap to suggest that this more fundamental ‘level of existence’ must be a pure, quasi-universal 
category, especially since the handaxe phenomenon persists over thousands and perhaps millions of 
years in the archaeological record. In the above-quoted cases, these categories are ‘planning depth,’ 
‘standardisation,’ ‘aesthethic sensibility,’ and ‘tool concept.’ They relate features of handaxe form to the 
realm of hominin cognition and posit that the two represent correlated realities. The emergence of the 
handaxe form in the archaeological record can therefore be said to signal the emergence of a new type 
of cognition. This construal clearly implies that various cognitive categories, or simply ‘cognition’ itself, 
are mobilised as ‘subsistent’ categories, and that the material configuration of a handaxe is viewed to 
point to a horizon beyond materiality (cf. Pope et al. 2006). Put differently, the handaxe embodies a 
‘norm,’ and this norm informs about the essence of being a handaxe-producer. The formistic logic of 
this line of reasoning is undeniable. 
 The controversy on the recognition of patterned ‘symmetry’ – whether defined as ‘plan view,’ 
‘partial,’ ‘edge-on,’ or ‘basal’ symmetry – in the handaxe record and its potential meaning further clari-
                                                          
412 It is notable, although I cannot go into the details here, that much of these discursive dynamics appear to be a product of the 
historical alliance between British Cognitive Archaeology and strands of Evolutionary Psychology (see esp. Mithen 1996; Gam-
ble et al. 2014). 
“The Acheulean handaxe was essentially a large, teardrop-shaped tool, the rounded end of which 
could be held in the hand and swung in a chopping motion with the beveled end directed at the 
target (Bordes 1968: 64-76). […] From a cursory inspection of Acheulean tools, it is evident that 
their makers had a definite sense of aesthetics; […] What this suggests is that it was not only im-
portant for Homo erectus to have a point or an edge with which to work; it was also important to 
have a tool with a definite shape, as well as a tool that might be useful for unforeseen tasks in the 
future.” (ibid.: 185) 
“Archeologists often overlook a fact about bifaces that is really quite important. They were the 
first tools that probably existed in the minds of their makers as tools. In non-human and Mode 
1 tool use the target was task completion – cracking open a nut or butchering a carcass – and 
the tools were components of those procedures. They did not exist as things apart from those 
contexts. But bifaces did. Hominins made bifaces, carried them around, and used them again 
and again as tools and as sources of flakes. The role of tools had changed. Instead of being 
elements in a procedure, tools themselves had acquired the status of permanent objects in 
hominin daily life, even when not in use.” […]Bifaces remain a perennial puzzle for archeolo-
gists. On the one hand their “toolness,” and imposed shape, were very different from what apes 
do and suggest that Homo erectus had a very different relationship with tools. On the other 
hand, the complete absence of innovation, and the dogged conservatism of the form (for well 
over 1 million years!), indicate that the relationship was also very different from the one mod-
ern humans have with tools. In this sense, at least, Homo erectus was neither ape nor human.” 
(ibid.: 112f.) 
 
“[t]he most characteristic artifact produced by Early Humans was the handaxe. Even a brief 
look at handaxes indicates a number of significant differences from those artifacts produced 
within the Oldowan tradition. They often display high degrees of symmetry, sometimes simul-
taneously in three dimensions, and indicate that the knapper was imposing form on the arti-
fact, rather than just creating sharp edges as with an Oldowan chopper. […] To achieve such 
symmetry in form, longer knapping sequences were required. […]  Planning ahead is essential 
if symmetry is to be achieved, and maintained as the piece is developed. […] Consequently to 
produce standardized forms, the knapper needs to exploit and adapt his or her toolmaking 
knowledge, rather than just follow a fixes set of rules in a rote fashion.” (ibid.: 132f.) 
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fies this formistic figure of inference. After taking stock of a critical argument by McNabb et al. (2004) 
that early South African handaxes do not seem to be particularly symmetric at all, Abramiuk (2012), 
for example, emblematically states: 
This statement unambiguously showcases that a shared artefact form – the handaxe – is thought to 
indicate a shared ‘mind frame.’ What this ‘mind frame’ exactly is, of course, remains a matter of de-
bate. Even McNabb et al. (2004) who have so poignantly criticised the notion of an empirically recur-
rent pattern of early handaxe symmetry, maintain that while hominins at this time apparently lacked a 
concept of symmetry, they clearly shared the ‘mind frame’ of an LCT – a phenomenon they refer to as 
‘conceptual standardisation.’ Furthermore, one of the authors has subsequently suggested that the lack 
of the ability to express the concept of symmetry might have been due to certain underdeveloped brain 
functions (Hodgson and McNabb 2005). This suggests that even those who criticise the ‘symmetry’ as 
a cognitive ‘subsistent,’ adhere to the same general logic of explanation. 
 Abramiuk’s (2012: 188-191) recap of the symmetry debate is also revealing for another reason: 
he explicitly refers to the possibility that the respective hominins ‘maintained a concept of symmetry 
but did not express it at this moment in time.’413 He (idem) thereby explicitly grants that certain mind 
frames might have been present, but were not actuated, manifested, or exemplified. Not only is this 
terminology doubtlessly formistic – it clearly evokes the ‘principle of exemplification’ – it also draws 
attention to the categorical distinction between capacities and expressions. This distinction is such a 
marked characteristic of formistic thought that it deserves closer consideration. Perhaps most im-
portantly, the polarity between ‘capacity’ and ‘expression’ suggests that even though ‘existence’ and 
‘subsistence’ are correlated, they are not identical. This secures the ‘discreteness’ of reality and the 
separate existence of the realm of non-empirical, ‘ideal’ entities. In addition, differentiating between 
‘capacities’ and ‘expressions’ drives home the formistic insistence on the fact that some principles, 
laws, regularities, and norms are of such a nature that they cannot fully be particularised, let alone at 
all times and in all places. The polarity between ‘capacity’ and ‘expression,’ in other words, legitimises 
the formistic belief in ‘subsistence.’ Moreover, it expounds the possible aspectual dimensions of exem-
plification in formism. This figure of thought further reinforces the ‘subsistence’-‘existence’ boundary 
since it asserts that only ‘subsistent’ categories can stand for universals –entities that appear to be 
‘eternal’ in a certain sense. The question is therefore always how these categories are exemplified and 
it is far from clear whether they do always ‘show themselves’ in a similar way. The unit and mode of 
exemplification may accordingly vary across time and space; different aspects of the same form may 
refer back to different ‘subsistent’ categories. Abramiuk’s (ibid.: 191) consideration, following Wynn 
(2002), that ‘broken or partial symmetries rather than whole symmetries concerning the entire tool 
may have been important to some hominins’ reflects this problem of exemplification. This difficulty 
seamlessly flows into the problem of multiple realisability.414 The idea of ‘multiple realisability’ picks 
up the formistic presumption that there are ‘levels of existence’ and that these broadly co-vary; yet, 
more fundamental levels – those which are exemplified by their ‘derived’ levels of existence – may be 
expressed in a multitude of different ways. This delivers the formistic interpretation of equifinality. 
According to the formist, ‘equifinality’ of form is therefore a problem of ‘subsistence.’ 
 The general strategy to infer cognition from artefact form complies with Abramiuk’s (2012: 
146-152) conditional approach for inferring cognitive capabilities. This approach is primarily con-
cerned with explaining how form, which itself stands for certain behaviours, has resulted from particu-
lar capacities. The relationship between ‘capacity’ and ‘expression’ is then formulated as a conditional 
                                                          
413 For essentially the same situational-functional argument contra McNabb et al. (2004), see Machin and Mithen (2004: 668f.). 
414 The concept of ‘multiple realisability’ (MR) is widely used in the philosophy of mind to address the problematic relationship 
between ‘mental states’ and physical ‘brain states’ (e.g., Fodor 1974; Sober1999). The contribution of MR to this debate is that it 
allows us to make sense of the correlated nature of the two phenomena and to accept the ‘existence’ of both of them (‘levels of 
existence’). In addition, the same ‘mental state’ may be implemented by varying ‘brain states.’ MR arguments are arguments 
against reductionism. ‘Formism’ guards itself against ‘mechanism’ here. 
“This could mean two things. First, early Acheulean tools were not intended to be symmetrical; 
that is, early Homo erectus lacked a concept of symmetry. Second, early Homo erectus did 
maintain a concept of symmetry but was unable to express the concept behaviorally. Third, 
early Acheulean tools, although asymmetrical to us, may have appeared symmetrical to Homo 
erectus.” (ibid.: 188f.) 
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statement.415 The conditional approach consequently relies on formal reasoning, taking advantage of 
the patterned character of reality on which formistic inquiry is based. A classic conditional clause, fol-
lowing Abramiuk (ibid.: 147) would be ‘if p, then q’ where ‘p’ represents the antecedent and ‘q’ the 
consequent. Neither ‘antecedent’ nor ‘consequent’ are identified as variables, they both function as 
conditions. In the given example, more precisely, ‘p’ constitutes a sufficient condition for inferring ‘q.’ 
Yet, it is similarly valid to state that ‘q’ is a necessary condition for ‘p.’ Thus, the conditional approach 
reiterates the formistic logic of ‘necessary and sufficient conditions’ introduced earlier in this part of 
the chapter. The conditional approach is intuitively appealing, typically cherishes simplicity of reason-
ing, and represents a ‘substrate independent approach’ (ibid.: 151). It can be employed to study the 
behaviour or cognition of any organism and is therefore especially suitable to be used in comparative 
research programmes. 
 Gowlett’s (2006) account of the significance of bifaces, for instance, can be viewed as an ex-
emplification of this general logic of inquiry. He declares that his research 
and adds that 
This brings us to the problematic distinction between ‘form’ and ‘function.’ Quite often, this distinction 
is simply indicative of clashing ‘mechanistic’ and formistic perspectives on the lithic record. While the 
latter consider form as primary and look for correlations between ‘form’ and ‘function’ – ‘function,’ 
then, becomes just another possible ‘subsistent’ category – ‘mechanists’ regard lithic objects as ma-
chines and are interested mainly in their efficacy, that is, their function within hominin behaviour. The 
‘mechanist’ is sceptical about artefact form and tends to delegate it to the realm of mere ‘appearances.’ 
The relationship between ‘form’ and ‘function’ thus always needs to be substantiated. In formism, to 
the contrary, ‘function’ is a relevant ‘subsistent’ category from the beginning, one that potentially in-
terferes with other ‘subsistents.’ Functional explanations, therefore, are rarely actively pursued, but 
functionality instead becomes a focus of inquiry when scholars seek to debunk such explanations. Mul-
tiple strategies have been adopted to establish the ‘more-than-functional’ significance of handaxe ge-
ometry in formistic lithic research. Typically, the goal of these approaches is to reinforce the idea that 
the morphological class ‘handaxe’ is truly a ‘natural kind’; that is, represents a form in the proper sense 
of the concept – i.e., a strictly imposed form. To show that handaxe form appears to be ‘over-
determined’ or ‘over-designed’ – i.e., cannot fully be explained by the functional or adaptive dimen-
sions of handaxe use – is a classic manoeuvre to present hominins as the relevant ‘imposers.’ In the 
case of the symmetry issue, it may for instance be demonstrated that a symmetry of form does not 
increase the functional performance of the objects in questions (e.g., Machin et al. 2007) and also un-
likely to emerge as a by-product of handaxe manufacture and maintenance (e.g., Wynn 1995: 14).416 
Inquiries such as these motivate the conclusion that the significance of handaxes must lies beyond the 
utilitarian realm.  
                                                          
415 In the context of the Levantine Mousterian, Kerry and Henry (2000: 242) for example explain: “[u]ltimately, if we are to 
evaluate the contextual model or other cognitive models, we need to identify nonambiguous linkages between specific conceptu-
al domains (e.g., symmetry, horizontality, conservation, numbers of elements in structure mapping) and certain artifact attrib-
utes. The attributes need to be quantifiable as to the degree to which the domain is achieved, and the attributes need to be ones 
that cut across specific lithic technologies.” This structural equalisation between ‘capacity’ and ‘expression’ is typical for ‘form-
ism’ and directly derives from its theory of cognitive criticism centred on ‘correspondence.’ 
416 Symmetry as a by-product is problematic for the ‘formistic’ argument because, as Abramiuk (2012: 192) readily maintains, a 
by-product contradicts the hypothesis of symmetric handaxes being “manifested ideals.” This reference to the notion of ‘ideal’ is 
not coincidental but gives voice to the ‘formistic’ category of abstract ideas which are not fully particularisable. 
“[…] considers “what” bifaces are at a deep level, arguing that they inform us richly about the 
nature of abstraction and its origins, and that they inform us too about the difficult relation 
between human knowledge “in theory” and knowledge “in practice”, and about the interface 
between function and style.” (ibid.: 203) 
“[t]he idea of form is crucial – almost every archaeologist will start from the intuitive position 
that they know what a biface is – even if they then proceed to argue that bifaces are not prod-
ucts of an intended design. Here, however, we encounter a problem, reflected in archaeology 
in a traditional dichotomy of form studies and function studies. Some emphasize the form and 
its abstract concepts. Others can see no need for such form to be intended by early humans, 




It is no coincidence here that in the face of many competing ‘subsistent’ categories and the re-
sulting need to narrow down the space of explanation, the favoured ‘subsistent’ categories are regularly 
secured by ‘abductive’ reasoning – i.e., inference to the best explanation (Harman 1965; cf. Poston and 
McCain 2017).417 ‘Abduction’ thereby simply ensures that the respective ‘subsistent’ categories reflect 
the ‘best’ explanation currently available for the observed patterns of form in ‘concrete’ existence. 
Thus, ‘abductive’ reasoning in formism entails the argument that an encountered form is more likely to 
exemplify the ‘subsistent’ category in question than other competing ‘subsistents.’ Yet, because form-
ists have no problem accepting that similar forms may participate in a number of different ‘laws,’ 
‘norms,’ or ‘regularities’ (cf. Pepper 1942: 178-180), form may easily be conceptualised as a kaleido-
scope – as reflecting back on many interfering ‘subsistent’ categories at the same time. ‘Interference’ 
interpreted in this way of course becomes an enabling factor of inquiry since central tendencies in arte-
fact form can be regarded to capture the cardinal dimensions of societal wholes. A notable example of 
this cognitive strategy is Machin’s The role of the individual agent in Acheulean biface variability. A 
multi-factorial model (2009). In prototypical formistic style, Machin argues that handaxes must ulti-
mately be regarded as microcosms of hominin society. She offers a poignant account of handaxe form 
that stresses the latter’s partial superposition on most of the potentially relevant categories of ‘subsist-
ence’ (i.e., aesthetics, style, sociality, cognition) (Fig. 14).418 In this way, the complexity of handaxe 
design can be grasped as a structural convergence between artefact form and hominin society, again 
evoking the formistic principles of ‘similarity’ and ‘correspondence.’ 
 Arguably, much of the discursive space of explaining Lower Palaeolithic handaxes can be un-
derstood as a ‘give and take’ between proponents of different categories of ‘subsistence.’  The dynamics 
of discourse can hence be described as a struggle of subsistent categories. Scholars have for example 
proposed the ‘subsistent’ categories of ‘tradition’ (e.g., McNabb et al. 2004; Lycett and Gowlett 2008), 
‘signal/symbol’ (e.g., Kohn and Mithen 2009; cf. McNabb 2012b), ‘sociality’ (e.g., Spikins 2012; Gam-
ble et al. 2014: 123-126), and, more recently, ‘hominin biology’ (Corbey et al. 2016 and replies by 
McNabb 2017; Hosfield et al. 2018; and Wynn and Gowlett 2018) or ‘latent solution’ (Tennie et al. 
2017). All of these approaches consciously or unconsciously embrace the ancient Greek tenet of ‘hylo-
morphism’ – the idea that matter takes particular forms because of reasoning not related to matter 
itself. This view often entails the assumption, as we have seen, that matter and form are the two main 
substances of which the realm of ‘concrete’ existence is made. All other entities, including concepts, 
ideas, and more abstract features of reality such as society, tradition, or culture are situated in the 
realm of ‘subsistence’; they are the potential reasons for why matter takes particular forms. The result-
ing mode of inquiry is thoroughly formistic. 
 Two prominent ‘mechanistic’ angles of critique are worth mentioning here because they direct-
ly refer to this general formistic pattern of reasoning.  The first is the so-called ‘fallacy of the finished 
form’ or ‘fallacy of the desired end product’ (cf. Davidson and Noble 1993: 372; Dibble et al. 2017: 816-
821). Critique of the idea of a ‘mental template’ falls into the same category (cf. Ashton and White 
2003; Marks et al. 2001; Chase 2008, 2016). In contrast to formists, lithic ‘mechanists’ are highly sus-
picious of artefact forms which they categorise as mere ‘appearances.’ Such appearances, according to 
‘mechanists’ cannot be taken at face value. Without any principle of determination linking form, 
mechanism, and case, form-centred explanations remain ‘empty’ and ‘ineffective’ they argue. The link 
between ‘subsistence’ and ‘existence’ that formism seeks to establish, is too unspecific and generic for 
die-hard ‘mechanists.’ It is thus not a big stretch to suppose that some of the major division lines with-
in the handaxe discourse can probably be reconstructed as a product of the lasting  tension between 
‘formism’ and ‘mechanism’ in lithic studies. 
                                                          
417 The classic example for ‘abduction’ is the problem of explaining wet grass. If grass is wet, it probably rained. However, other 
explanations are possible depending on the context. For instance, the proposed explanation might be the best one for England 
where it regularly rains, while it might be not the best explanation for Arizona where automatic sprinkler systems are used to 
keep the grass wet during the dry season. ‘Abductive’ reasoning therefore typically requires elimination of competing ‘best’ 
explanations and a specification of contextual variables – yet, one does not necessarily need to specify any causal mechanisms. 
418 See e.g. Ruebens (2012) for a similar explanatory strategy in more mundane lithic research. 
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Henry’s Correlations between Reduction Strategies and Settlement Patterns (1989b) provides a first 
illustration of ‘mechanistic’ reasoning in Anglophone lithic studies. The paper may be counted as an 
early elaboration of the ‘Reduction Thesis,’ but also seeks to position the study of lithic reduction se-
quences within a broader ecological framework. Above all, Correlations delivered an important meth-
odological impulse by demonstrating the interpretive merits of a ‘dimensional approach’ to the dynam-
ics of lithic reduction (cf. Tostevin 2012: 144-147). Henry (ibid.: 140) opposes this new approach to 
conventional ‘morphological approaches’ and regards the former as a crucial complement for the latter 
(ibid.: 153): 
The ‘dimensional approach’ shifts the attention from the retouched elements of lithic assem-
blages (tools) to their un-retouched counterparts (the plain débitage). According to Henry (1989b), 
reduction sequences are best understood by first examining the dimensional relationships between 
cores and their associated blanks; only in a second step may the results of this analysis be compared to 
the metric and non-metric data of lithic tools. Based on some general theoretical considerations, the 
author outlines a basic mechanical process which underpins any reduction sequence and is first and 
foremost ‘reductive,’ i.e., directed and irreversible. This recognition is central to Henry’s account since 
the effects of lithic reduction, then, cannot simply be ‘unmade’ or ‘overwritten,’ especially when plain 
débitage is concerned. Henry (ibid.: 140f.) asserts that each reduction sequence thus by necessity au-
thors a general trend of raw material “diminution” resulting in a decrease in core size and associated 
blank size (Fig. 15). Because general theory about technological organisation and hunter-gatherer 
mobility indicates that the ‘reduction stream’ is often spatially segregated, this fundamental principle 
can be analytically exploited. Within any given lithic assemblage, one can compare the dimensionality 
of the preserved core facets, blanks, and tools in order to gain a “more precise understanding of the 
reduction stream within each of the broader segments (or stages), as defined conventionally” (ibid.: 
140). The crux of the equation is the change in perspective from individual artefacts to ‘populations of 
artefacts.’419 These populations of artefacts are agglomerative entities – i.e., non-structured artefact 
totalities. By means of population thinking, it becomes possible to assess the general trends in the di-
mensionality of these different artefact categories. Since lithic reduction is –as the term implies – re-
ductive and there is a causal correspondence between the blanks and their original core facets, one 
would expect that lithic reduction in situ would produce similar mean values of core facet and blank 
dimensionality. Similarly, dimensional differences between core facets, blanks, and tools may tell us 
whether tools have been manufactured prior to in situ-reduction or whether it is possible that tool 
production instead occurred on-site. Consequently, the comparison of the dimensionality of core fac-
ets, blanks, and tools provides a relative measure for the degree of core exhaustion and the possible 
mobility of tools (ibid.: 141). Since one can compare these measures to other conventional measures 
for core reduction, for example the relative ratio of cortex-bearing blanks or the dimensionality of pri-
mary elements, core reduction intensities can be estimated with high accuracy. 
 This pattern of reasoning shows that Henry’s (1989b) ‘dimensional approach’ is firmly rooted 
in a mechanistic understanding of lithic reduction sequences. Lithic reduction is considered a relative-
                                                          
419 This approach is sometimes also labelled ‘aggregate analysis’ or ‘mass analysis’ (cf. Andrefsky 2001: 3-6). As an instance of 
‘population thinking’ in lithic research, it primarily represents a methodological manoeuvre. The goal is to isolate assemblage-
level trends and regularities that sometimes give lie to individual artefact differences. In other words, not every artefact needs to 
embody the respective trends and regularities (cf. Porter 1986). Nonetheless, this position is not at all ‘synthetic’ since it still 
accepts the doctrine that these assemblage-level characteristics can be repatriated to the configuration of all aggregated artefact-
properties. As Ariew (2008) puts it, population thinking adopts a ‘bottom-up’ approach to population-level phenomena. 
“The reconstruction of a reduction sequence relies upon the elemental observation that 
throughout the developmental life of a stone tool, from raw material acquis[i]tion through fabri-
cation and use, the morphological changes that occur are subtractive in nature. However, con-
ventional analytical procedures have focused on morphological, as opposed to dimensional, 
attributes for reconstructing reduction sequences (Collins 1975; Bradley 1975). […] Convention-
al means of analysis allow for a general reconstruction of reduction strategies, but they ignore 
an important source of information, i.e., the trend of diminution during the course of an item’s 
fabrication and use-life.” (idem) 
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ly closed, mechanical core-blank system – a lithic machinery – operating by the interlocking of various 
successive knapping events. Each event has unequivocal and largely inevitable consequences on future 
core states which, in turn, precondition the results of future knapping events. The sequence of reduc-
tion is recast as a chain of causal adjustment. The basic regularity of reduction is the co-diminution of 
cores and blanks during the knapping process. In the language of Pepper’s mechanism, this regularity 
can be identified as the ‘primary law’ of lithic reduction. The ‘law’ specifies the configuration of ‘prima-
ry qualities’ in the lithic machinery, typically expressed in exact quantitative terms.420 ‘Primary quali-
ties’ are the elementary observable features of lithic parts – i.e., individual artefacts – which are at-
tributable to these parts alone and are relevant for the kind of action – i.e., mineral detachment – 
powering the core-blank machinery. In Correlations, the key ‘primary quality’ of lithic artefacts is their 
dimensionality since the outlined ‘primary law’ of lithic reduction predicts directed change especially 
in this domain of variables; cortex is also defined as a ‘primary quality’ since it similarly indicates the 
position of reduction and helps identifying what Henry calls “primary elements.”421 This conceptualisa-
tion of the relationship between the lithic machinery and its ‘primary qualities’ presupposes a ‘field of 
locations.’ The ‘field of locations’ defines the precise position of each lithic part in the spatiotemporal 
field inaugurated by a reduction sequence. The ‘field of locations’ therefore determines what can be 
‘cause’ and what is ‘effect’ and thereby fixes the ‘function’ of each part in the machine. Henry’s Figure 1 
(cf. Fig. 15) provides nothing else than a graphical representation of the general workings of the lithic 
machine and the nature of its associated ‘field of location’ – the figure may be classified as theoretical 
imagery.422 The whole point of the ‘field of locations’ is that each spot in the field can only be occupied 
once and by a single lithic part. Consequently, the ‘field of locations’ opens up a Newtonian space in 
which ‘distances’ can be measured in absolute fashion. If one knows the ‘primary laws’ of the machine 
that inaugurates the field, in other words, one can unambiguously infer the field-position of the at-
tendant parts by analysing their ‘primary qualities.’ Henry’s use of artefact dimensionality and cortex 
value are authorised by this general understanding of lithic reduction. With Pepper (1942), one may 
additionally point out: 
This conceptualisation of the reduction process has an important epistemological consequence. The 
only discrete element that is left in the reduction sequence are the lithic parts themselves. Since each 
part occupies an exact and unique position in the ‘field of locations’ and since parts are causally en-
chained, this view greatly promotes a continuous understanding of reduction. The variables that define 
the parts making up the chain of reduction gradually merge into one another. The mechanistic inter-
pretation of ‘field’ underlines this understanding. A field structure is the ‘integrated’ unobservable 
cause for the observable workings of the machine; the field unifies the machine as a whole and re-
moves any remaining discreteness by means of ‘integration.’ This view opposes what Henry (1989b: 
140) terms the conventional approach to lithic reduction, discriminating between four broader reduc-
tion stages. This is precisely where radical mechanists disagree with the exponents of almost all other 
world theories. 
 Henry’s (1989b) critique on the residual discreteness of lithic reduction is conveyed by his 
notion of the ‘reduction stream.’ This metaphor of the stream is certainly instructive. A ‘stream’ repre-
sents a flowing entity whose constitutive elements grade into each other, so that they are hardly indi-
vidualisable anymore. The ‘stream’ implies a steady transition of character states and a continuous 
movement of matter. It presupposes clear-cut directionality and profuse structural integratedness. A 
‘stream’ can hardly be said to proceed in stages. It is this notion of the ‘stream’ that the author har-
nesses in order to characterise the process of lithic reduction. The key idea here is ‘nominalistic,’ posit-
                                                          
420 See Chapter 2: esp. Box 7. 
421 Primary elements comprise plain débitage with more than 50% cortex, whereas blank elements are defined as plain débitage 
with less than 50% cortex (cf. Tostevin 2012: 144). 
422 See Chapter 3 for a general discussion of the role of theoretical or conceptual imagery in specifying test conditions and in 
laying out the workings of the world within Anglophone lithic research. 
“To this absolute space of externally related locations was gradually added an absolute time 
similarly conceived as an infinite one-dimensional manifold of externally related dates. The 
dimension of time was not even at first amalgamated with the three dimensions of space. Space 
was rather conceived as traveling intact like a freight car along the track of time. Thus one could 
have the identical space location at different times. Space, in other words, was external. It was 
changeless though it did move bodily from date to date.” (ibid.: 199) 
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ing that only particulars can be said to ‘exist’ (cf. Pepper 1942: 198). Reduction ‘stages,’ by contrast, 
amount to ‘ideal’ entities and mechanists are generally sceptical about the existence of such entities. 
Henry’s ‘aggregate analytical’ approach outlined before entails ‘population thinking’ (sensu Mayr 1959, 
1991; Sober 2006) insofar as strong ‘essentialism’ is rejected and only individual-based variation 
granted.423 The basic research orientation articulated by Correlations is therefore clearly mechanistic. 
 Representing lithic reduction as a machinery governed by ‘primary laws’ allows Henry (1989b) 
to formulate precise test expectation. The reason is of course that the specific articulation of ‘primary 
qualities’ in the ‘field of locations’ causes the ‘primary qualities’ to change in a directed and thus largely 
predictable manner. ‘Predictability’ – in accordance with the adopted methodological approach – is 
interpreted as a population-level phenomenon. This ‘predictability’ of patterns in artefact dimensional-
ity is rooted in the mechanistic insistence on the ‘specifity of response,’ the fact that each knapping 
event, as a function of its position in the ‘field of locations,’ has highly specific consequences for both 
its products and future knapping events. The functioning of the lithic machine is strongly determined. 
Henry’s core expectation is that there is an equivalency between cause and effect and hence a co-
diminution of artefact dimensionality when technologically relevant groups of artefacts are com-
pared.424 Any observed deviation from this ‘equilibrium condition’ can be interpreted in terms of re-
duction intensity, mobility, and the potential of spatial segregation within knapping activities (ibid.: 
141). The author provides two examples of possible patterns of deviations that would indicate that the 
assemblages in question do not represent the whole reduction sequence. 
 These two theoretical situations describe opposing ends on the spectrum of lithic reduction 
(Henry 1989b: 141, Figure 2; Fig. 16). Each of the two situations is characterised by specific relation-
ships between the three technologically relevant artefact sub-populations and concerns the configura-
tion of their ‘primary qualities.’  Figure 2A (cf. Fig. 16A) shows a close overlap of the dimensionalities 
of blanks, primary elements, and core facets, with the blank population hosting the smallest and the 
population of primary elements the largest artefact dimensions. This situation suggests that the pre-
sent cores are not fully exhausted yet and that some cores might even be missing, for example because 
they were transported to another location. Figure 2B (cf. Fig. 16B), by contrast, shows a much more 
partitioned picture. Here, the size of blanks and core facets overlap, but occupy the lower part of the 
figure, with core facets being often smaller than blanks. Primary elements in this scenario only overlap 
with the largest blanks and generally tend to be larger than both blanks and core facets. This configu-
ration points to high degrees of core exhaustion and a nearly complete reduction sequence. Building 
on these theoretical insights, Henry’s proposition is that statistical differences in the relative overlap 
between blank, primary element, and core facet dimensionalities should be informative about differ-
ences in reduction activity and potential import-export dynamics. He (ibid.: 140, 144) suggests that 
these assemblage-level differences can be used to track nomadic mobility systems and human ecologi-
cal adaptations.425 Henry’s example of Epipalaeolithic land-use in Southern Jordan will suffice here as 
an illustration (ibid.: 141-150). 
 Henry (1989b: 141) analyses nine Epipalaeolithic sites from near the Jordanian Plateau com-
prising fourteen individual assemblages. His main argument is that these sites, which occupy different 
elevation zones across the southern edge of Jordanian Plateau and the neighbouring lowland regions, 
were once integrated into a larger ‘transhumant’ settlement system (ibid.: Figure 3; cf. Henry 1986, 
1987, 1989a, 1995).426 The goal, drawing on Binford’s (1979) concepts of ‘personal’ and ‘situational’ 
gear, is to elucidate that the composition of lithic assemblages changes relative to specific activity pro-
files on the seasonal mobility cycle. The analysis of plain débitage dimensionality is therefore comple-
mented by an examination of tool dimensionality and the structure of toolkits (Henry 1989b: 144-146). 
                                                          
423 Cf. Ariew (2008). 
424 Pepper (1942: 190) notes: “[…] since we found that we could substitute kilogram bricks for the tree stump and so increase the 
precision of our description of the machine [i.e., a lever] for that end of the bar, it follows that we can do the same for the pres-
sure of the arm at the end of the bar. […] This is the fact of balance. It is important because it exhibits the equivalence of push 
and pull. The kilogram bricks for the tree stump and the arm are now seen to be just equal and just alike. We might have thought 
of the stump as a passive pull and of the arm as an active push. We now see that push and pull can be substituted for each other.” 
425 For the purpose of assemblage-level analysis, Henry (1989b: e.g. Table 3) regularly collapses the overall variability of dimen-
sional artefact values into statistical parameters of entire assemblages. This facilitates the direct comparison between different 
assemblages and helps isolating the main trends of reduction for each individual assemblage. 
426 Broadly understood, ‘transhumance’ describes a mode of mobility in which nomadic groups alternate between relatively fixed 
summer and winter pastures. These pastures are often defined relative to elevational and topographic gradients. 
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 In the first step of the analysis, the author distinguishes between Epipalaeolithic sites of differ-
ing elevation belts (i.e., lowland, highland) and intensity of occupation determined by factors such as 
thickness of cultural layer, site orientation, and artefact density. Henry (1989b: 149) reveals that there 
is a correlation between elevation-type and the character of site occupation: higher elevations tend to 
harbour smaller, dispersed sites near flint outcrops, intermediate altitudes tend to be associated with 
small and shallow occupations, and low elevations seem to host primarily large and deeply stratified 
sites that are often situated close to water bodies (cf. ibid.: Figure 3, Table 1). He further shows that on 
a general level, the structure of the accompanying toolkits and production ratios (i.e., blanks per core, 
tools per core, tool proportions to all blanks) also differ between these three groups of sites (ibid.: 144, 
Figure 4, Table 2): 
This dichotomy between lowland and highland sites is also found to be correlated with major differ-
ences in lithic production efficiencies (Henry 1989b: 146). Whereas higher elevations are characterised 
by generally fewer blade and bladelet débitage per core than the lower elevations, lower elevation sites 
are more varied in blank productivity and seem to disintegrate into two groups of sites: the first re-
sembling the higher elevation sites in blank productivity, and the second being almost three times 
more productive (idem). Henry suggests that this pattern, in contrast to common intuition, cannot be 
explained in terms of raw material economising behaviour (ibid.: 147). Rather, these differences must 
be explained by the nature of the reduction sequences inferred by the ‘dimensional approach.’ 
 In the second step of the analysis, Henry (1989b) compares the results of his conventional 
analysis with the dimensional lithic data in an effort to explain the observed variability and to effec-
tively link it to human ecology during the Jordanian Epipalaeolithic. Again, the author identifies a 
different pattern of core reduction when the lowland and highland sites are juxtaposed. He demon-
strates that the lowland sites exhibit shorter primary elements and core facets than the highland sites 
(ibid.: 147). In fact, the primary elements are even shorter than the average bladelet (idem). Henry 
consequently concludes: 
 
The highland sites, by contrast, yield very similar dimensional values for blank size, core facet size, and 
the size of primary elements (Henry 1989b: 148). In the words of the author (idem), the relationship 
between the dimensionality of these artefact groups “trace an unbroken reduction stream from prima-
ry element, to core facet, to bladelet.” Henry argues that this reduction signature indicates that human 
occupation in the highlands was of a different character (cf. ibid.: Figure 7). He interprets the data as 
suggesting that occupation was brief and linked to a set of activities exploiting the full breadth of the 
reduction sequence (ibid.: 148). Since the metric mean distance between the length of the three rele-
vant artefact groups is extremely small, he infers short but complete reduction sequences: 
According to Henry (1989b: 149), the only way to account for the puzzling discrepancy between the 
high productivity of blanks and the low degree of core exhaustion in the lowland sites is by postulating 
the import of laminar blanks from the highlands.427 
                                                          
427 This is an instance of mechanistic ‘abductive’ reasoning. The postulation of blank-import is the best explanation because the 
problem of lithic site-signatures is framed as a problem of a unified settlement system. With Pepper (1942), we can say that this 
settlement system represents a higher-level machine regulating the nature of site occurrences in geographic space. The ‘primary 
law’ of this system is ‘transhumance,’ i.e., the necessary transition of populations from the lowlands to the highlands and other 
way around in specific seasons of the years. Each site, then, comes into view as a somewhat fixed position in the system’s ‘field of 
locations.’ As a consequence, if the internal reduction structure of an assemblage is contradictory, as in the case of lowland sites, 
this must be interpreted as the effect of another node in the system. Because the system is constructed around the duality be-
“The differences in the variability between assemblages are consistent with the proposed dif-
ferences in site types. The more ephemeral occupations of the piedmont sites are likely to have 
been associated with fewer and more site specific tasks than those conducted in the longer term 
occupations of the lowland shelters. Therefore, greater variability between the tool-kits of the 
piedmont sites should be expected.” (Henry 1989b: 144, 146) 
“These data suggest longer productive lives for the lowland cores, but their facet lengths, being 
only about 2mm shorter, on the average, than the lengths of associated bladelets, indicate that 
the lowland cores were still far from exhaustion.” (ibid.: 147f.) 
 
“Thus both the pattern of reduction and the dimensions of the piedmont assemblages are con-
sistent with what one would expect in the context of ephemeral camps, where cores were used 
briefly in the production of a few bladelets for the expedient manufacture of tools.” (idem) 
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 Correlations ultimately proposes that this overall organisational pattern of lithic technology 
can best be understood by a shift in procurement strategy that must have paralleled the transition 
from the lowland to the highland occupations, and vice versa (Henry 1989b: 149f.). The author pro-
poses that the differences between lowland and highland occupations can be explained by a general 
change in mobility strategy. While the total character of occupation in the highlands suggests a more 
‘residential’ mode of settlement (sensu Binford 1980) where human presence was essentially “mapped 
onto resources” (ibid: 150), the nature of human settlement in the lowlands instead points to a ‘logisti-
cal’ strategy placing more emphasis on the portability of lithic materials and hence favouring the im-
port of laminar blanks from the highlands. Henry thus closes the ‘transhumant’ settlement system by 
illustrating the functional complementarity of highland and lowland occupations and the flow of lithic 
material between them. 
 The author takes his results as an opportunity to criticise overly simplistic ‘distance-decay 
models’ of raw material economisation. He argues that such models, by predicting a close link between 
the size of artefacts and the distance to potent raw material sources, fail to take into account that hu-
man groups sometimes impose strong metric constraints onto certain tools (cf. Henry 1989b: 153) – 
constraints that are probably more ‘cultural’ than ‘situational.’ In such a situation for which he regards 
his Epipalaeolithic case study as an example (ibid.: 149; cf. Henry 1973; Marks 1976; Bar-Yosef 1981), 
alternative means for economisation must be employed. The case of the highland sites is taken to indi-
cate that such an alternative strategy may consist in “advancing the reduction stream or manufacturing 
process closer to the finished implement when near raw material sources” (Henry 1989b: 153). This 
shows that reduction behaviour can be economic even if it does not follow a ‘distance-decay’ pattern – 
‘economisation’ is often achieved by spatially segregating lithic reduction which, as a consequence, 
provides general information about the organisation of the adopted settlement system(s). 
 Overall, Correlations treats lithic technology as a ‘derived’ phenomenon. It is seen as a product 
of human ecology.428 As such, lithic technology primarily affords a means to cope with particular envi-
ronments, in particular the uneven and often patchy distribution of resources therein. This results in a 
well-defined chain of determination guiding argumentation and explanation. The base of the chain is 
built by the physical environment and its resource potential.429 Henry (1989a) effectively uses topog-
raphy, i.e., elevation belts, as a proxy for changing ecological conditions and resource availability. Hu-
man groups have to adjust their behaviour relative to this basal environmental structure if they wish to 
survive. Mobility provides a flexible strategic means of doing so. Thus, settlement systems can be 
viewed as a systematisation of implemented mobility solutions. Lithic technology, then, has to support 
these specific mobility strategies and variation in these strategies, conversely, bring forth different 
requirements for lithic technology. Just as Darwin (1859: 90) proclaimed an ‘economy of nature’ to 
understand the evolution of life, lithic technology is identified as a locus of ‘human economy’ to under-
stand human ecology. This is why technological signatures can be used to infer the working principles 
of particular settlement systems. Varying lithic reduction signatures are interpreted as the outcome of 
the specific intersection of human mobility and human ecology (cf. e.g., Henry 1987, 1995; Kelly 1988; 
Nelson 1991; Kuhn 1995; Kuhn et al. 2016; Cicero 2017).430 The reconstruction illustrates that reality is 
compartmentalised and the different compartments are regarded to constraint each other in a largely 
predefined manner. The physical environment is always more foundational than human mobility, and 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
tween ‘lowland’ and ‘highland,’ this node, understood as a cause, must be a highland site. The best explanation of the discrepan-
cy is thus that there is a flow of objects between different elevations. [See also Henry (1989b: 149) for an additional metric ar-
gument why import is the most parsimonious explanation] 
428 See esp. Henry (1995: 1-6); cf. Henry (1982, 1986, 1987). 
429 Cf. Henry et al. (2017) for a more recent expression of the same research configuration. 
430 This is a general theme in Anglophone lithic research. Patterns of lithic technology are often interpreted from the perspective 
of mobility – a preoccupation that Kuhn et al. (2016: 86f.) have termed the ‘human movement ecology paradigm’. This paradigm 
can be traced back to Binford’s (1978, 1980) influential ethnoarchaeological work with the Nunamiut of Northwestern Alaska 
and the related recognition that hominin mobility needs to be studied beyond ‘sedentism’ and ‘nomadism’ (Kelly 1992; cf. Kuhn 
et al. 2016: 92). Binford’s (1980) distinction between ‘residential’ and ‘logistic’ modes of mobility was an attempt to address this 
issue (cf. Ambrose and Lorentz 1990; Grove 2008, 2010). Inspired by the foundational work of Kelly (1983, 1995) and others, 
mobility became quickly the socket of studying human strategic behaviour in general. Research within this paradigm can be 
decomposed into three different strands of lithic inquiry: (a) Technological Organization (cf. Shott 1986; Bamforth 1991; Neslon 
1991; Carr and Bradbury 2011; McCall 2015); (b) Human Behavioural Ecology (HBE) (cf. McCall 2007; Shea 2011b, 2017a; 
Kelly 2013); and (c) Optimal Foraging Theory (cf. Winterhalder 1981; Bleed 1986; Bousman 1993; Winterhalder and Smith 




human mobility is always more basal than lithic technology. The ‘chain of determination’ therefore 
authors a clear-cut direction of determination, so that the more basic rungs of reality constitute the 
more derived levels. With Pepper (1942), we can say: the more basic the compartment, the more ‘effec-
tive’ its categories. The underlying logic of reasoning is mechanistic. Not only entails the structure of 
reality causal hierarchies, the world is generally viewed as a strongly determined place. Henry’s 
(1989b) approach is clearly based on ‘hard ecology’431 and takes up a theme that has traditionally expe-
rienced considerable attention in Anglophone Palaeolithic archaeology: human-environment adjust-
ments (e.g., Butzer 1964 [1971], 1982, 1986; Butzer and Isaac 1975; Binford 2001; Braun et al. 2008a; 
Petraglia et al. 2009b; Barker 2017). Even though we will return to this issue in more detail at the end 
of this chapter, it is already clear from Henry’s (1989b) account that reasoning on the role and status of 
lithic technology is guided and corroborated by a theory of causal adjustment. Technological signa-
tures are considered ‘specific responses made by an organism on the stimulus of specific environmen-
tal configurations’ (Pepper 1942: 226). 
The advanced explanation reflects the principle of heteronomy,432 i.e., the mechanistic certain-
ty that each phenomenon must be explained in terms of another phenomenon, preferably a ‘less de-
rived’ one. Explanation, in other words, is firmly grounded in the specificity of external relatedness. 
These externally related phenomena are seen as the parts of a worldly whole; they can be graded 
somewhere between the ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ categories of reality. However, in contrast to the role 
of correlation in the ‘formistic’ endeavour of explanation, correlations in mechanism are never explan-
atory ipso facto, but are typically used to identify potential pairs of ‘effective’ and ‘ineffective’ catego-
ries. The detection of correlations thus facilitates the identification of causally coupled sections of 
reality. The twist is that these correlations, if they tell us something meaningful about reality, must be 
predictable in an unequivocal and highly detailed manner, and not merely in terms of structural simi-
larities. From a mechanistic point of view, to explain a given domain of reality – in Henry’s case lithic 
technology – means to show that its observable features follow by necessity from the constitution of 
the relevant interfacing domains of reality.433 
These expositions should be sufficient to demonstrate that Correlations furnishes a mechanis-
tic perspective on the lithic record. The analysis has revealed that two mechanistic systems of lithic 
technological organisation can be distinguished. The first is the reduction system itself, with its 
‘stream’ of raw material diminution; the scale of this working system is the individual assemblage. The 
second system is the settlement system in which multiple localised reduction systems take parts; here, 
the scale of observation is a structured landscape. Both of these system, as we have seen, bring forth 
their own ‘field of locations’ – local reduction systems may in fact be recognised as the discrete loca-
tions of their larger settlement system – and each is characterised by specific ‘primary laws.’ With 
Bunge (2013), these systems can be understood as ‘concrete’ and structured composite entities. Each 
of them has one or more mechanisms or characteristic processes which determine their observable 
character. A ‘concrete’ systems in Bunge’s sense can be defined by the ordered quadruple composition-
environment-structure-mechanism (ibid.: 590). Clearly, this conception is consistent with Henry’s 
(1989b) account and tightly situates Correlations in the realm of mechanistic approaches. 
                                                          
431 Ecological thought has traditionally supported two species of approaches: ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ ecology. The division is well-
documented in a number of scientific disciplines but has received some notable attention especially in environmental ethics (cf. 
Shrader-Frechette 1995). ‘Soft ecology’ approaches emphasise relational thinking and tend to be qualitative and general. The 
corresponding scientific attitude is ‘interpretive’ and ‘understanding-based’ (cf. Chapter 3). ‘Hard ecology,’ by contrast, seeks to 
be precise and predictive and stresses the importance of quantitative reasoning. It generally attempts to unearth second- or 
higher-order principles of ecological functioning, its science is ‘explanatory,’ and its explanations tend to be subsumptive, i.e., 
subsume the particular under the general. An example of a prototypical hard ecology approach anchored in ‘hypothetico-
deductive’ reasoning is provided by Peters (1991). In general, soft ecology often relies on qualitative concepts such as ‘ecosystem’ 
which hard ecologists find difficult to operationalise. As Shrader-Frechette (1995: 126) puts it, soft ecology perspectives tend to 
underestimate certainty and may thus often demand too little from ecology, whereas hard ecology probably overestimates 
certainty and may thus frequently demand too much from ecology. This difference resonates with diverging conceptions of the 
structure of reality which place different emphasis on determinateness and the strength thereof (cf. Chapter 2). 
432 Heteronomy is the dogma that the existence and development of phenomena is fully dependent on factors external to these 
phenomena. In ‘mechanism,’ this seeded character of reality is interpreted in terms of external causal constitution. The resulting 
causal structure presupposes a hierarchy of observable qualities of reality. 
433 Cf. “Integrating technological studies into archaeology’s mission within paleoanthropology, namely to document and explain 
evolutionary change in human behavior, inevitably leads beyond the confines of technology itself. In order to bring technological 
data to bear on major changes in human adaptations, it is essential to explore how toolmaking was related to hominin subsist-
ence and foraging ecology.” (Kuhn 2014 [1995]: 16) 
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The second window into mechanistic approaches within Anglophone lithic research is opened by the 
study of general ‘reduction effects,’ the investigation of artefact ‘biographies’ and ‘transformational 
histories,’ as well as various themes of ‘reduction economy.’ These inquiries pursue two interrelated 
goals: on the one hand, they seek to better understand the physical-mechanical ramifications of lithic 
reduction; on the other hand, they hope to shed new light on the significance of classic concepts such 
as ‘form’ and ‘typology,’ often in the context of ecology- and mobility-oriented studies or the broader 
endeavour to chart strategic behaviour in human evolution. The first objective is often linked to the 
ambition of reconfiguring the interpretive space of lithic analysis and to offer more ‘basic’ or ‘founda-
tional’ explanations of the evidence than typically provided (McPherron 1994: 29; cf. Jelinek 1976). 
The second aim encapsulates a similarly mechanistic attitude; the ambition is to demonstrate that 
categories of ‘form’ and ‘type,’ although doubtlessly being detectable in the empirical world, must be 
treated with great caution:  
Form’ or ‘type’ categories are considered to trace ‘appearances’ and to be indicative of ‘reality’ only if 
the elementary processes that bring them into being have been identified and described.434 The key 
issue here is the problem of equifinality, i.e., the circumstance that different processes may produce 
similar or even the same forms and types.435 Both ambitions register the fundamental mechanistic 
trouble of policing the problem of Appearance and Reality (cf. Chapter 2). The status of the ‘phenom-
enal’ realm – i.e., what is observationally given – is deeply ambivalent for a mechanist: although the 
observational paves the only conceivable and reliable way to knowledge about what actually is, observ-
able patterns may easily seduce the analyst and draw her/his attention away from the ‘true’ structure 
of reality.  
 Technologies of reduction have traditionally been of interest to lithic scholars examining the 
interface between economy and mobility (e.g., Kelly 1988; Kuhn 1992, 1995). A central reason is that 
aspects such as an object’s ‘use life,’ ‘reduction intensity,’ and ‘trajectory of reduction’ promise to in-
form directly about object-mobility and economising behaviours of the object-users. Binford’s (1979) 
distinction between ‘expedient’ and ‘curated’ technologies, later refined by Nelson (1991: 63-65), was 
intended to answer similar questions. ‘Curated’ objects, that is, highly reduced, re-sharpened, and/or 
re-cycled lithic elements, are generally thought to reflect ‘mobile’ items that have the potential to be 
carried around over considerable timespans and geographic distances (cf. Marks 1988); ‘curated’ tech-
nologies help to conserve raw material and thus deflect problems of raw material supply and predicta-
bility which may arise in settings of high group mobility (cf. Bamforth 1986; Kuhn 1992). ‘Expedient’ 
objects, by contrast, indicate situational on-spot solutions, lower degrees of mobility, reduced plan-
ning, and may entail ad hoc strategies of tool-utilisation (Nelson 1991: 64-66). As Nelson (1991: 65) 
correctly notes, however, ‘opportunistic’ and ‘unanticipated’ behaviours must strictly be distinguished 
from ‘expedient’ behaviour since the latter is often a regular and integral element of the overall set of 
strategies employed to meet particular situations and conditions. Although the dichotomisation be-
tween ‘expedient’ and ‘curated’ has been criticised as too simplistic (e.g., Nahler 1991) and it is clear 
now that one needs to take into account the entire gradient of more or less curated and more or less 
                                                          
434 Again, this is where ‘mechanism’ and ‘formism’ tend to disagree strongly, for ‘formism’ takes the form in ‘concrete existence’ 
as its point of departure. Within American Palaeolithic archaeology, this coordinate of conflict is for example illustrated by the 
heated discussion between Angela Close (1991a, 1991b) and Harold Dibble (1991c) on the interpretive significance of lithic types. 
435 ‘Equifinality’ is usually referred to as the principle that ‘a given end state can be reached by many potential means’ (Mayhew 
2015). In geomorphology, for example, the concept indicates that similar landforms may have been brought into existence by 
different sets of processes. In a notable study of geomorphic equifinality, Cruslock et al. (2010) have demonstrated that two 
different erosional processes – wave action and ice scour – result in highly similar erosional products and meso-scale landforms 
in structurally comparable lithological settings. Landforms alone, therefore, are not unequivocal proxies of the causal factors 
involved in their geomorphic genesis. 
“In large part the debate over reduction strategies, reduction intensity and typological variabil-
ity revolve around the reality of types. If one’s perspective on the types is that they represent 
real or natural divisions in artifact variability, then it is natural to view lithic reduction strate-
gies as geared towards the production of these various types. If, on the other hand, one’s per-
spective on the types is that they represent arbitrarily imposed subdivisions in continuous 
variability, then it is natural to view them as stages of a single reduction strategy. […]  Neither 
Bordes, Roe or anyone else has ever established that the Acheulian biface types are anything 
other than arbitrary divisions of continuous variability […].” (McPherron 1994: 38) 
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expedient technologies (Shott 1986; Nelson 1991), qua theoretical distinction it remains a valuable 
distinction and enables the formulation of precise predictions and test implications to guide future 
research (cf. Dibble et al. 2016: 827).  
Generally speaking, the study of reduction intensities and economies – that is, to answer the 
question: how much material is missing? (e.g., Barton 1988; Kuhn 1990; Eren et al. 2005; Shott 
2005b; Marwick 2008b; Iovita 2008) – is viewed to elucidate the functioning of a mobility system in a 
particular environmental setting. Object transformation and reduction are the inevitable consequence 
of task-specificity, the working principles of the attendant settlement system, and the present natural 
environmental conditions including raw material quality and availability (e.g., Kuhn 1994). Thus, 
knowledge on lithic technology is gained and secured by causally adjusting the reduction patterns to 
these ecological parameters (cf. Jochim 1976; Binford 1980; Kelly 1988; Rolland and Dibble 1990; 
Kuhn 1993; 2014 [1995]). This explanatory strategy is not only ‘integrative’ because factors of raw ma-
terial consumption take over a privileged position in reconstructing hominin behaviour, but also be-
cause the structure of ecological constraints yields a specific mechanism of explanation:436 
What Binford describes in this short passage is nothing else than an ecological equilibrium system in 
which the respective elements, including reduction economies, are structurally adjusted to one anoth-
er. The mechanistic orientation of this type of reasoning should be obvious.  
 Can this mechanistic signature be retraced in more specific instances of Anglophone lithic 
inquiry? Without any doubt, the best-known model of lithic reduction and artefact ‘use histories’ has 
been proposed in a series of influential papers by Harold Dibble (1984, 1987, 1988, 1995b). His ‘scrap-
er reduction model’ was introduced to explain typological patterns in the French Mousterian and de-
livered an important argument in the aftermath of the ‘Binford-Bordes debate.’ The model has various-
ly been identified with the ‘reduction argument’ (Kuhn (2014 [1995]: 15f.). The reduction argument 
holds that artefact form – i.e., shape- and morphology-based characteristics – change in the course of 
raw material attrition. It draws from older ideas (Cooper 1954; Frison 1968), especially on what is now 
widely known as the ‘Frison effect’ (after Jelinek 1976) and applies them to the variability of scraper 
types in the French Mousterian arguing that these types embody transformational phases, rather than  
‘functional’ or ‘cultural’ markers. Already on a general level, Dibble’s approach thus testifies to a mech-
anistic critique of purportedly ‘static,’ ‘fixed’ and overly ‘eternalised’ categories of concrete reality.437 
Even though its central argument of course challenges Binford and Binford’s (1966; cf. Freeman 1966) 
take on typological variability, it shares the ‘Binfordian’ conviction that the essentially ‘static record’ of 
the past needs to be explained by the ‘dynamic processes’ that created it. The static record itself, there-
fore, is the gateway to proper knowledge, yet cannot be taken at face value (cf. Binford 1972, 1977, 
1981b: 25).438 Binford (1981b: 26) himself explicitly noted that the gulf between ‘static’ evidence and 
‘dynamic’ explanation may best be bridged by invoking causal relationships and general principles of 
necessity. The categorical distinction between ‘static-ness’ and ‘dynamic-ness’ thereby justifies the 
                                                          
436 A general goal here is to achieve high-resolution, target-sensitive explanations and to disentangle the various causes underly-
ing the formation of a given lithic assemblage: “[i]solating evidence diverse economic roles in lithic assemblages is not just a 
matter of measuring variation, of recognizing that some artifacts were completely used up while others had very short lives, or 
that some tools were moved long distances and others produced on site. We expect a certain degree of variability within any 
assemblage created by mobile toolmakers, especially when that assemblage accumulated over a long period of time, under vary-
ing conditions. What is more significant is the partitioning of variation, the degree of independence among artifact life history 
trajectories. Convincing evidence that artifacts reflected differing social or economic roles would come only from consistent 
associations between artifact forms, resharpening/maintenance, and perhaps raw material selection.” (Kuhn 2011: 103) 
437 Cf. esp. Dibble et al. (2017: 817-825). 
438 Kelly (2016: 17) similarly notes in his chapter How Archaeologists Think: “[i]n a textbook, we might write a chapter describ-
ing “what happened” during Basketmaker times, a description of the people’s subsistence and their social and political organiza-
tion as we interpret it from material remains. Another chapter would use the material remains of Pueblo I sites to relate how 
subsistence and social and political life changed from Basketmaker times. This is not easy, yet breathing life into material re-
mains is what archaeology is all about – going from the static remains of the past to the dynamic behavior that produced them.” 
Put another way, since systems of adaptation are energy-capturing systems, the strategies that 
they employ must bear some relationship to the energy or, more important, the entrophy struc-
ture of the environments in which they seek energy. We may expect some redundancy in the 
technology or means, as well as the organization (labor organization), of production to arise as a 
result of “natural selection.” That is the historical movement toward an “optima” for the setting. 
Put another way, technology, in both its “tools” sense as well as the “labor” sense, is invented and 
reorganized by men to solve certain problems presented by the energy-entrophy structure of the 
environment in which they seek to gain a livelihood.” (Binford 1980: 13) 
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conceptual separation between ‘theory’ and ‘data’ (cf. Chapter 3) and identifies the problem of Ap-
pearance and Reality (cf. Pepper 1942: 145; see supra) as a key venue in the epistemology of Palaeo-
lithic archaeology. As McPherron (2006: 268) puts it, one may then “explicitly use typology to recon-
struct process.” Evidently, this research orientation draws heavily on mechanism: 
The initial reduction argument of the 1980s has gradually evolved into a full-fledged ‘Reduc-
tion Thesis’ (e.g., Potts 1991; McPherron 1994; Dibble 1995b; Chase et al. 2009; Braun et al. 2009; 
Dibble et al. 2017: 827). This thesis provocatively asserts that patterned categories of lithic ‘form’ are 
likely to reflect arbitrary stages, steps or grades on a continuum of reduction whose causal-
determinative coercion has to be identified in each individual case (cf. Marwick 2008a: 108, 112f.): 
The ‘Reduction Thesis’ has since been applied to a number of case studies in the Palaeolithic 
and Epipalaeolithic of the Old World. Examples are the Oldowan (Potts 1991; Braun et al. 2009), 
Acheulean handaxes (McPherron 1994, 1999, 2000; Iovita and McPherron 2011), the Middle Palaeo-
lithic (Barton 1990; Holdaway et al. 1996; Iovita 2008); the African Aterian (Iovita 2011); the Western 
European Aurignacian (Blades 2003), and the Near Eastern Epipalaeolithic (Olszewski 1993, 2016; 
Neeley and Barton 1990). All of these studies challenge the overall stability of lithic reduction sequenc-
es. They promote a view of lithic reduction that highlights the fluidity, continuity, and flexibility of 
both the knapping process and the management and use of different knapping products (cf. Dibble et 
al. 2017: 827f.). A curious epistemological ramification of this conception seems to be the status of 
lithic reduction somewhere between natural (n-transformation) and cultural (c-transformation) pro-
cesses of transformation.439 The research programme supplied by the ‘Reduction Thesis’ specifically 
interrogates whether lithic reduction trajectories can be explained by non-human or system-internal 
factors alone, or whether at least some cultural input needs to be assumed even if some details of the 
reduction sequence are comprehensible in natural terms (cf. Baumler and Speth 1993). The ‘Reduction 
Thesis’ thus puts a counterweight on what it perceives as the dominant ‘idiographic’ view of lithic 
technology, at least balancing the tides between ‘idiographic’ and ‘nomothetic’ explanations in lithic 
analysis.440 In line with their insistence on ‘low-level’ explanations (see supra), proponents of the ‘Re-
duction Thesis’ want to demonstrate that basic principles of the reductive process are sufficient to ac-
count for much of the encountered intra- and inter-assemblage variability. These processes are as 
‘natural’ as they are ‘anthropogenic.’ 
 Dibble’s ‘scraper reduction model’ (1984, 1987, 1988, 1995b) posits that the main recognisable 
scraper types of the French Mousterian represent metastable states of a dynamic, yet generally con-
tinuous and unified reduction system. The scraper ‘types’ are argued to reflect recurrently instantiated 
stations on a well-defined trajectory of reduction (cf. Dibble 1995b: 318f.). While this overall trajectory 
                                                          
439 For the distinction between n-transformation and c-transformation within general ‘formation theory,’ see Schiffer (1976: 1-
3; cf. Bernbeck 1997: 67-81). 
440 The duality between ‘idiographic’ and ‘nomothetic’ science was introduced by New-Kantian philosopher Wilhelm Windel-
band (cf. Thomae 1999). In his Geschichte und Naturwissenschaft (1904 [1894]), Windelband defined ‘nomothetic’ as the ten-
dency to generalise in and to derive laws in an effort to explain types or other ‘objective’ categories of reality. A ‘nomothetic’ 
approach, according to him, is more common in the natural sciences [Naturwissenschaften]. ‘Idiographic,’ by contrast, was 
defined as the tendency to specify and to seek understanding of meaning and contingency which often results in an emphasis of 
uniqueness and the subjectivity of phenomena. Windelband attributes this research orientation primarily to the humanities 
[Geisteswissenschaften]. More recently, the term ‘nomothetic’ is sometimes also used to designate approaches that focus on 
inter-individual variation (i.e., variation between parts), whereas ‘idiographic’ serves to describe approaches that concentrate on 
intra-individual variation (i.e., variation within wholes) (cf. Beltz et al. 2016). In archaeology, ‘nomothetic’ approaches are often 
associated with processual archaeologies insofar as they employ Hempelian hypothetico-deductive schemes of reasoning (cf. 
Bernbeck 1997: 68; Chapter 2, 3). 
“In the long run, the most significant contribution of the “reduction argument” has been to 
focus attention on the “life histories” of tools. Viewing artifacts as the end product of a long 
dynamic process of manufacture, use, and renewal – rather than as fossilized conceptual blue-
prints – has helped to divert research in a very productive direction, one which is much more 
in keeping with other developments in Paleolithic studies.” (Kuhn 2014 [1995]: 16) 
“[…] It is important to note here that the use of the word “stage” in the context of the reduction 
strategy does not imply that these stages were somehow recognized by the makers of these 
artifacts. The word stage is substituted for the word type only to emphasize the connection 
between them and the idea of a single process. Still, the stages, like the types, are completely 
arbitrary constructs, and there is absolutely no intention to argue that these stages correspond 
to actual stages that may have been recognized by the makers of the artifacts (cf. Newcomer 
1971). They are simply a heuristic device and no more.” (McPherron 1994: 38) 
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may tell us something about the behaviour and culture of its Neanderthal authors, the types them-
selves are explicable in terms the ‘primary laws’ and regularities of sustained raw material attrition. 
Mechanical processes of lithic ablation and attrition, in other words, are regarded to have specific ty-
pological consequences. Typology, therefore, is not – as usually in ‘formism’ – the input variable but is 
rather identified as the inevitable output of not directly observable reduction processes. Typology be-
comes a category that captures the ‘specifity of response’ of the processual constitution of lithic reality. 
As a result, typology can only be convincingly explained if its patterns can be unequivocally linked to 
different process-specific effects. Dibble’s (1987: Figure 4) reconstruction of the specific sequence of 
scraper attrition, illustrated as a sequence of typological scraper states, reflects this mechanistic logic 
(Fig. 17). Dibble (ibid.: 116) specifically contents that the different scraper types illustrate different 
phases of the potential use-life of scrapers. He argues that ‘single scrapers’ constitute the natural point 
of departure and thus the first ‘stage’ of scraper attrition; they are gradually transformed into various 
variants – in ‘formistic’ terminology ‘sub-types’ – of ‘double scrapers’ or, alternatively, may result di-
rectly in different types of ‘transverse’ or ‘déjeté scrapers’; ‘double scrapers,’ however, may further 
wear down into various kinds of ‘convergent scrapers.’ On a more general plane, Dibble (1995b: 319) 
distinguishes between two theoretically independent sequences of scraper reduction: the single-
double-convergent and the single-transverse (déjeté) sequence. Which pathway of scraper transfor-
mation is taken primarily depends on whether or not additional edges are retouched in the course of a 
scraper’s use-life.  
Three features of Dibble’s argumentation are important to highlight here. The first is that spe-
cific interdependencies between scraper morphologies and the location and intensity of edge modifica-
tions or attritions are outlined (cf. Dibble 1987: Figure 2, 1995b: Fig. 9; Fig. 18). These interdepend-
encies can be described and modelled in mathematical language (Dibble 1995b: 319f., Fig. 10). This 
means that the various effects of scraper attrition become predictable. Specific actions and processes 
are linked to a specific morphological outcome by means of a principle of determination – a cause in 
the broader sense of the term is introduced. Thus, in order to corroborate the relevant interdependen-
cies, one simply needs to causally adjust the relevant parameters. The second point is that these rela-
tionships are valid independently of hominin intervention, but they provide us with valuable clues as 
to when hominin interference is most likely to occur and how it can be evidenced. While the processes 
of raw material attrition themselves are purely mechanical, hominins of course need to ‘allow’ further 
attrition to occur and are ‘in command’ of certain aspects of reduction. They for example have to de-
cide whether or not they wish to add a second working edge by incipient modification or use. The 
‘scraper reduction model’ thus helps separating between different sources of typological scraper varia-
bility. Based on these considerations, one may even suggest that the single-double-convergent trajecto-
ry involves more hominin agency than the single-transversal sequence of scraper reduction. At any 
rate, the model elucidates that only a relatively low degree of hominin interference seems necessary to 
explain the observable variability of Mousterian scraper tools. The third feature that requires some 
attention is the precise nature of the scraper ‘types’ themselves. In this context, it is notable that Dibble 
(1995b: 318) aggregates various typologically distinct kinds of scrapers into broader categories – i.e., 
‘single scrapers’ which are only retouched along one edge, ‘double scrapers’ with two laterally re-
touched edges, ‘convergent scrapers’ with two laterally retouched edges converging at one end, and 
‘transversal scrapers’ with a single broad edge located at the distal end of the blank. Minor scraper 
classes are discarded from the analysis because they are considered to represent background noise or 
non-stable points on the reduction continuum, for example as products of idiosyncratic behaviour, 
random sources of variation, or non-sustained tool-utilisation (cf. Dibble 1995b: 332f.). This fact alone 
bespeaks of an ‘integrative’ attitude of explanation. More important, however, is the circumstance that 
the aggregated main scraper types are strongly theory-informed; they are deliberately ‘theory-laden,’ 
one might say. The reason, of course, is that mechanism can only accept form-based categories of reali-
ty if they turn out to be instrumental for the advanced mechanistic explanation. The scraper types, in 
other words, serve the adopted higher-level theory of reduction and attest the causal adjustment be-
tween the categories of ‘appearance’ (i.e., types, classes) and the categories of ‘reality’ (i.e., processes, 
causes, laws). By being ‘effective’ categories in this sense, the reality of these types is exposed and they 
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can be treated as the active parts of the reduction machinery and its specific ‘field of locations.’ Im-
portantly, the types can therefore be identified as the ‘effective’ categories of mechanism.441 
The reduction process underlying the formation of the four main scraper types of the French 
Mousterian can now be understood in complete mechanistic terms. That Dibble (1995b: 318f.) calls 
attention to the four types as points on a continuum of reduction simply expresses the fact that they 
occupy different ‘positions’ in their ‘field of locations’ – a field which is propelled by a least one ‘prima-
ry law’ of reduction. This law comprises the subtractive effects of ongoing lithic reduction (e.g., modifi-
cation, attrition, re-sharpening) and the specific mechanical relationships that were identified between 
the four groups of scrapers.442 These relationships also specify the effective ‘primary qualities’ that 
power the reduction machine and lead to the predictable outcomes. The types are thus nothing else 
than idealised events which, by virtue of their ‘location’ in the field structure of reduction (cf. Pepper 
1942: 191f.), are causally enchained in a specific order. The reality of the types and their significance is 
confirmed by the fact that they occupy this well-defined and necessary place in the total reduction 
machinery. The circumstance that the scraper types are effectively interpreted as metastable states – 
as ‘foci of instantiation’ if you will (see supra) – further indicates that the reductive machinery is con-
ceptualised here as a fully integrated ‘field structure’ in which almost no residual discreteness is left.443 
The types simply denote the locations of the field where the potentialities of material instantiation are 
highest. This view is supported by the particular fashion in which noise and minor scraper classes are 
explained away (see supra). It also explains the still problematic nature of ‘types’ and their lurking 
status as epiphenomena.444 With Pepper (1942: 212-220), we can conclude that, overall, Dibble’s 
‘scraper reduction model’ provides a prototypical example of a ‘consolidated’ variant of mechanism: 
the empirical lithic world is apprehended by the non-observable singularity of a structured and caus-
ally-imbued field. An implication is that the behaviour of lithic reduction systems is defined by analogy 
to the behaviour of already known field structures (e.g., electromagnetic field, quantum field). From 
this perspective, reduction systems come into view as spatiotemporal wholes with a unified reduction 
geometry.445 
The preferred mode of visualising such a fully determined reduction system is the flowchart or 
even more basic digraphs (cf. Harary et al. 1965). These graph types enable the formal representation 
of constitutive relationships within a spatiotemporal matrix. They draw to varying degrees on ‘graph 
theory’ (e.g., Bondy and Murty 1976) and are therefore well-suited to depict dependent and independ-
ent causality and directed cascades of causation. In theory, they should also allow the representation of 
metastable states and subordinate conditions – in short, to capture the potential hierarchies within a 
mechanistic reduction system. Because digraphs may be constructed with the help of mathematical 
equations, graph conjectures may even be directly tested against the available data (cf. Bang-Jensen 
and Gutin 2007). A ‘digraph’ or directed graph is a simplification of a causal system but retains its 
cardinal characteristics. In the case of lithic analysis, reduction systems can be visualised as pure 
‘fields of locations.’ Each node or junction of the graph stands for an ‘event’ or quasi-stable state, each 
                                                          
441 See Chapter 2: esp. Box 7. 
442 It is no coincidence that the ‘Frison effect’ (Jelinek 1976; Frison 1968) is regularly invoked here as fundamental principle of 
lithic reduction. Arguably therefore, the ‘Frison effect’ can be interpreted as a ‘primary law’ of lithic reduction (cf. esp. Dibble 
1981: 7f., 1984: 435, 1995b: 299-306, 355; McPherron 1994: 175; Dibble et al. 2017: 819). 
443 ‘Metastability’ is a property of a dynamic system that seeks to explain the emergence of what can be called pseudo-
discreteness on an entirely unified substrate. Typically, phenomena of metastability refer to the existence of two or more time-
scales on which the system under consideration exhibits very different behaviours (cf. Bovier 2009: 178). The concept therefore 
helps to understand the issue of transition between timescales and system-behaviours. On shorter timescales, dynamic systems 
tend to quickly reach some sort of equilibrium state and the kind of equilibrium will depend on the initial conditions. On longer 
timescales, however, one occasionally observes transitions between multiple of equilibrium states; each timescale, if you will, 
has its proper equilibrium state. These equilibria are only stable at the metalevel and a set of new system-internal stimuli may 
cause another transition. The point is that metastable states essentially describe statistical realities. The analogy of the ‘meta-
stable state’ allows one to understand why some states are recurrently instantiated while others are not – the latter seem to 
delineate non-stable, transitional states. It therefore provides a means to grasp how non-discrete processes can produce ‘pseu-
do-discrete’ outcomes. 
444 In other words, the possibility to explain the occurrence of certain lithic types by calling upon the heterogeneous potentiality 
of a unified field-structure solves the problem of types being both ‘real’ and ‘unreal’ at the same time. Types are real because they 
explain how the reduction machine is powered, yet they are unreal because they represent a derived category of existence – one 
simply cannot deny their status as ‘appearances.’ By invoking specific field structures and their causal-determinative principles, 
it becomes possible to elucidate the specific empirical qualities of types ‘bottom-up’ without fully explaining them away. This 
cognitive strategy to overcome the problem of Appearance and Reality is characteristic for ‘consolidate’ versions of ‘mecha-
nism.’ 
445 Cf. Pepper (1942: 212f.) for a detailed explanation of the notion of ‘geometry’ in the context of ‘consolidated mechanisms.’ 
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of which is connected to at least one other element of the graph by some determinative principle. Such 
graphs can thus coevally capture the precise ‘location’ of the ‘working’ parts of the reduction machine, 
the overall configuration of the ‘field structure,’ and the principles of causal integration. It is no sur-
prise, then, that Dibble (1987: Figure 4) also conveys his application of the ‘Reduction Thesis’ to Mous-
terian scraper technology as a compact ‘digraph’ (cf. Fig. 17). Other well-known applications of the 
‘Reduction Thesis’ have followed his lead and employ similar imagery. For example, Neeley and Barton 
(1994: Figure 6, 8; Fig. 19, 20) use simple digraphs to illustrate the reduction pathways of Epipalaeo-
lithic microliths. Potts’ (1991: Figure 1; Fig. 20) reconstruction of the Oldowan reduction continuum 
also makes use of this type of imagery. It is important to note that all of these images theorise non-
equivocal relationships between different reduction nodes; these links, represented by two or more 
directed arrows impinging on a single node, specify the equifinality of systemic functioning (cf. Kuhn 
2014 [1995]: Figure 4.9, 4.11). This point is important since only mechanism interprets ‘equifinality’ in 
this particular manner, as the problem of different processes producing broadly the same results. The 
issue of ‘equifinality’ can therefore only be solved if the relevant system-states are mapped onto their 
‘field of locations’ and the associated ‘primary’ and ‘secondary laws’ that hold this field together are 
outlined. ‘Digraphs’ and flowcharts in Anglophone lithic research serve this function. They are there-
fore explanatory devices in their own right, but according to the specific mechanistic understanding of 
this concept.446 
The general mechanistic orientation of approaches that deploy the reduction argument is not 
least reflected in Dibble’s (1995b) summary of his broader survey of reduction dynamics in different 
Lower and Middle Palaeolithic contexts: 
How can one be sure, in general, that these interdependencies between pattern and process 
hold true in general? In other words, how can we know their universality? A possible mechanistic an-
swer would be: by means of controlled experimentation. The ‘Philadelphia school’ of lithic research 
would plausibly provide a very similar answer. Not only are the descendants of this school responsible 
for establishing seminal experimental research programmes all over the Anglophone research sphere, 
controlled experimentation has already played a key role in the formulation of the ‘Reduction Thesis’ 
itself. In general, lithic experiments are designed to bridge ‘theory’ and ‘data,’ as well as to assist in the 
construction of general reduction models and to verify them through direct observation (cf. Shott et al. 
2000; Dibble and Rezek 2009; Lin et al. 2017). 447 They have a two-fold purpose: on the one hand, they 
help to isolate potential causal factors, determinative principles, and ‘laws of reduction’ which might 
have given shape to varying reduction phenomena; on the other hand, they enable to investigate under 
laboratory conditions how these factors interact with one another and what the results of these interac-
tions are. The subsequent comparison of experimentally attested regularities with empirical patterns 
in real lithic assemblages is a classic mechanistic signature. Dibble’s own doctoral dissertation Techno-
logical Strategies of Stone Tool Production at Tabun Cave (1981), for instance, has adopted this re-
search strategy. 
 Experimental reasoning also constitutes the epistemological backbone of the ‘scraper reduc-
tion model.’ The model rests on a number of key experimental studies that established a constitutive 
relationship between limited numbers of independent lithic variables. It is only through this experi-
                                                          
446 As the examination of lithic imagery in Chapter 3 shows, these images therefore form a somewhat original category of scien-
tific visualisation. Their explanatory role, however, can only be understood if the ‘mechanistic’ categories are unpacked; they 
simply serve to satisfy the epistemological needs of ‘mechanism,’ especially if it seeks to reconstruct causal systems. 
447 See e.g. Speth (1981), Pelcin (1997), Davis and Shea (1998), Dibble et al. (2005), Eren et al. (2005, 2008), Rezek et al. (2011), 
Lin et al. (2013), Iovita et al. (2014) and Magnani et al. (2014) for a sample of ongoing work in the domain of controlled experi-
mental lithic research. 
“But these convergences [in artefact form during the Middle Palaeolithic] have broader implica-
tions than just the fact that we are able to classify the tools into the same typological framework. 
First, it is surprising that such similarities occur throughout the range of Lower and Middle 
Paleolithic industries. Second, not only do the same types occur, but they exhibit the same sorts 
of relationships between them. These facts point to a very fundamental explanation of tool vari-
ability. Processes like those proposed for scraper reduction have already been witnessed ethno-
graphically, and they have been proposed for virtually all periods of human prehistory. Thus, 
they are real and represent the kind of low level explanation that can crosscut both stylistic and 
functional considerations. Given that the patterns of Middle Paleolithic tools are so consistent 
with the predictions of these models, it would seem that a reduction argument is the simpl[e]st 





mentally attested status of two or more variables being ‘causally adjusted’ to one another that they may 
assume a place as key variables of mechanistic reasoning. The reason is of course that mechanism is 
committed to an ‘integrative’ approach in which epistemic relevance and irrelevance delineate areas of 
inquiry themselves. A not unimportant aspect of mechanistic explanations, in other words, is to ex-
plain away part of the available evidence (cf. Chapter 2). Experimental research to a large degree con-
sists of the analysis of flake formation, that is, how a flake is made (cf. Rezek et al. 2016).448 It typically 
quantifies the mechanical aspects of this process (e.g., Speth 1972) and uses mechanised and automat-
ed equipment (e.g., hydraulically powered knapping robots) to achieve this goal (Fig. 21). Interesting-
ly, this research design represents a direct imitation or, perhaps better, implementation of the mecha-
nistic root metaphor – the causally operating ‘machine.’ It also testifies to the already noted proclivity 
of mechanism to place the foundations of lithic inquiry on maximally ‘objective’ grounds whereby ‘ob-
jectivity’ is opposed to human interference and subjectivity (cf. Chapter 3).449 As Lin et al. (2017: [8]) 
readily admit, this type of experimental research thus requires ‘uniformitarian’ assumptions. Having 
said this, such experiments for example established a strong interdependency between length and 
width when artefacts are continuously reduced and thereby paved the way for the ‘scraper reduction 
model’ (Dibble 1988, 1991a). Equally important was the discovery that surface and platform area of 
lithic artefacts appear to be systematically correlated and that the respective ratio can be understood as 
a relative measure for original blank size (Dibble and Whittaker 1981; Dibble and Pelcin 1995). This 
knowledge about original blank size is invaluable and enables the precise determination of reduction 
intensity since the ‘missing’ material can easily be calculated by subtracting the encountered blank size 
from the original blank size. Other cardinal experimental findings, for instance the patterned co-
variation between surface area and thickness (Holdaway 1991) or the significance of exterior platform 
angle configurations for producing certain flake types (Dibble and Pelcin 1995), delivered crucial sup-
portive arguments to feed the reduction argument.  
Many of these basic findings serve to establish and refine the test implications of the argument 
(cf. Dibble 1984: 110; 1995b: 324-332). Experimental findings, in other words, enable scholars to pre-
dict certain regularities among the lithic variables and to assess whether these regularities support the 
available hypotheses. All three elementary relationships on which the original ‘scraper reduction mod-
el’ is based – i.e., (i) that retouch intensity is related to different scraper types; (ii) that retouch intensi-
ty corresponds to length-reduction; and (iii) that the more derived scraper types (convergent, trans-
verse) have small surface areas but comparatively large platforms (cf. McPherron 1994: 175) – were 
established in an experimental setting. 
 The role of experimentation in this research context is thus complementary to the status of 
‘theory’ in ‘analytic’ science (Lin et al. 2017:  Fig. 1; cf. Chapter 3). We are now in a position to appreci-
ate why. As shown by Dibble’s approach and the role of controlled experiments in the construction of 
the ‘scraper reduction model,’ the employment of experimental reasoning is essentially an attempt to 
‘objectify’ the ‘context of discovery’ which is typically discredited for its ‘psychologised’ and ‘subjective’ 
nature. By means of experimentally adjusting lithic variables and exploring the general space of varia-
ble interaction, correlations and relevant ‘primary qualities’ can be identified and discovered before 
primary data-analysis begins. Experimentation can thus fill the conceptual void between ‘subjective’ 
theory-creation and the ‘objective’ assessment of theory-derived test implications (cf. Chapter 3). Ar-
guably, ‘experimental reasoning’ have already supplanted purely ‘theoretical reasoning’ in many 
branches of Anglophone lithic research because of this reason. 
This ‘experimental mode of inquiry’ – an approach to experimental testing modelled on phys-
ics and other key experimental sciences – has its origin in the ‘scientific turn’ of the 1960s.450 From 
                                                          
448 It is possible to argue that experimental research in this tradition is an attempt to build a specialised ‘formation theory’ – a 
theory that is dedicated to explaining the fossilisation of lithic artefact properties under varying conditions (cf. Schick and Toth 
1993, 2001; Shea and Klenck 1993; Barton and Riel-Salvatore 2014; McPherron et al. 2014; Kuhn and Clark 2015; Dibble et al. 
2017: Fig. 4, 830-837). 
449 As already argued in some detail in Chapter 3, this ‘objectivist’ understanding of experimentation based on ‘causality’ and 
‘predictability’ is not shared by French experimental research which relies more strongly on personal insight and an ‘under-
standing-based’ recognition of processes and technical relations. We can now appreciate the reason for this discrepancy: the 
Anglophone notion of experiment is modelled upon the experimental sciences, especially physics, and therefore tends to inter-
pret the very concept of ‘experiment’ mechanistically.  
450 Eren et al. (2016) refer to this type of archaeology as ‘hypothesis-driven’ and regard the replication of lithic artefacts as a key 
feature of such an ‘objective’ and ‘scientific’ archaeology. ‘Replication’ is here considered to be synonymous with prediction. It 
engenders a mode of explanation proper to ‘mechanism.’ 
153 
 
early on, controlled experiments were seen as an indispensible ingredient of a truly ‘scientific’ ap-
proach to the Palaeolithic past. Unsurprisingly, experimental research thus quickly became an integral 
element of the multidisciplinary research architecture of Clark Howell and Desmond Clark’s Paleoan-
thropology (1966) or Glynn Isaac’s Human Origins (1989). This ‘Berkeley era’ was a significant histor-
ical moment not only because it marks the synergetic fusion of research traditions from the U.S. and 
the U.K. and hence the proper birthplace of a joint Anglophone research endeavour in Palaeolithic 
archaeology, but also because it cemented the status of experimental research as a basic pillar of in-
quiry in the study of human beginnings (cf. Isaac 1967; Schick and Toth 2001). The work of Kathy 
Schick (1986, 1987, 1997) and Nicolas Toth (1982, 1985, 1991, 1997) on lithic assemblage formation 
and the dynamics of tool-making are outstanding examples of this research trajectory (cf. Toth and 
Schick 1983; Reti 2016). Again, the central aspiration of these investigations was to illuminate the 
‘dynamic processes that are responsible for the observable patterns of an essentially static record’ 
(sensu Binford 1972).  
This guiding principle of the ‘static’ record and the ‘dynamic’ past, adopted by Binford and 
many others, is co-extensive with the classic mechanistic distinction between ‘pattern’ and ‘process.’451 
As Binford (1981b: 25, 1983b) himself has made clear on several occasions, the corresponding figure of 
speech is more than just a “matter of talking,” it entails an epistemological thesis – namely that the 
archaeological record has to be understood as a contemporaneous phenomenon.452 This recognition 
cannot be overemphasised for its epistemological ramifications are tremendous. The first and perhaps 
most important consequence is that because the record is ‘static’ and its patterns only observable in 
the ‘present,’ we need to develop knowledge about general relationships between ‘pattern’ and ‘pro-
cess’ in this present before we can competently advance to the ‘dynamic’ aspects of the Palaeolithic 
past. The major reason for this inferential detour is the particular mechanistic understanding of 
equifinality (see supra). Since similar patterns might be driven by vastly different processes, one can-
not simply infer process from pattern. The implication is clear: ‘abductive’ reasoning has to be ban-
ished and ‘inductive’ inference becomes problematic. The only prospective answer to the problem is 
offered by an axiomatic reconfiguration of the discipline around the principles of ‘actual-
ism’/‘presentism’ (cf. Toth 1991; Rossignol 1992: 4; Schick and Toth 1993; Pobiner and Braun 2005; 
Toth and Schick 2001, 2009a; Pickering et al. 2009) and ‘uniformitarianism’ (cf. Cameron 1993: 43-
54; Shea 2011c)453: 
Thus, the constitutive relationships that hold specific patterns and specific processes together under 
particular conditions must be assumed to convey constants of reality – otherwise there is no hope of 
ever gaining ‘objective’ knowledge about the past (e.g., Binford 1983b: 18). The target universally valid 
interdependencies, however, are not interpreted as abstract concepts or ‘subsistent’ categories, but 
rather as properties – ‘regularities,’ ‘laws,’ or ‘principles of determination’ – of the causally integrated 
spatiotemporal field we call planet earth. The presence and the past are connected by their participa-
tion in the same mechanistic machinery and this machinery, following Bunge (2013: 590), can be 
                                                          
451 Cf. Chapter 2. 
452 Cf. “[…] It seems to me we must begin with certain fundamental statements of “being as such.” The archaeological record is a 
static contemporary phenomenon.” (Binford 1981b: 25; original emphasis) 
453 Following Cameron (1993: 43), I acknowledge that the notion of ‘uniformitarianism’ can be broken down into at least three 
variants, each of which may serve different epistemological purposes: substantive uniformitarianism, methodological uniformi-
tarianism, and associative uniformitarianism. The ‘substantive’ variant argues that similar observations about the past and 
present can be correlated and explained by a constant rate or variable (e.g., the amount of C14 in the atmosphere); ‘methodologi-
cal’ variants seek to derive general principles from the present correlations to guide inquiry into the past (ibid.: 42); and ‘associ-
ative’ uniformitarianism asserts that certain regularities in the association artefacts in the past must tell us something about the 
unobservable (and perhaps unique) behavioural and social processes of the past (ibid.: 43). With Pepper (1942), we can see that 
the first two variants serve the epistemological goals and principles of ‘mechanism,’ whereas associative utilitarianism tends to 
be summoned in ‘formistic’ approaches (see previous part of the chapter). 
“Among Binford’s principal original contributions was his insistence that the correlations used to 
infer human behavior from archaeological data had to be based on the demonstration of a con-
stant articulation of specific variables in a system. He argued that all analogies were inconclusive, 
whether they were based on worldwide evidence or were homologies drawn from the same cultural 
tradition as the archaeological data being interpreted. Instead, all behavioral explanations of ar-
chaeological material had to be based on a lawful demonstration that in the living (actual) world 
there was a constant correlation between a particular form of human behavior and a specific type 
of material culture.” (Trigger 2007: 399f.) 
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modelled as an ordered quadruple of composition-environment-structure-mechanism. Binford (1972: 
106), for example, explicit called attention to the “interface between a living system and its field.” 
The central problem is always how one ought to deal with the disconnect between Appearance 
and Reality, a disconnect that is severely aggravated in the deep time context of Palaeolithic archaeol-
ogy where not even the protagonists are invariable. At any rate, the entire suite of ‘Middle Range Theo-
ry’ (MRT) brought to bear by Binford and others, partly as a consequence of the interpretive impasse 
of the ‘Binford-Bordes debate’ (cf. Trigger 2007: 405-407), and its ethnoarchaeological research man-
date can be understood as an attempt to deal with the difficult relationships between ‘pattern’ and 
‘process.’ 454  The development of a generalised archaeological ‘formation theory’455 by eminent figures 
such as Brain (1967, 1981), Ascher (1968), Binford (1978, 1979, 1981a), Schiffer (1983, 1988), as well as 
Isaac (1976, 1981, 1989) and his students (e.g., Bunn et al. 1980; Bunn 1982, 2007; Kroll and Isaac 
1984; Potts 1982, 1988; Blumenshine 1987; Pobiner and Blumenshine 1993; Kroll 1994) was motivated 
by the same problem (cf. Speth 2011: 134; Lucas 2012: 93-104).456  
The question that was prompted by this research was of course what the most productive uni-
formity assumptions are and whether they may differ in varying contexts of application. Potts (1988), 
for instance, maintained that while early hominins clearly left patterns of ‘butchering’ debris in the 
archaeological record, the actual composition of the debris is often not even broadly analogous to 
butchering sites of present day hunter-gatherer groups; and that it may in fact well be that ‘hunting’ 
chimpanzees provide the better frame of reference in this case (cf. Cameron 1993: 44f.). Problems like 
this, however, only recalibrated the discourse and underlined that the search for the appropriate 
frames of references to reconstruct coupled systems of ‘pattern’ and ‘process’ was as important as do-
ing ‘actualistic’ research (cf. Gowlett 1997, 2002, 2009; Binford 2001; Lycett et al. 2007; Toth and 
Schick 2009b; Shea 2017a, 2017b). The emergence of a ‘primatological’ branch of experimentation and 
field observation (e.g., Toth et al. 1993, 2006; Pickering and Wallis 1997; Plummer and Stanford 2000; 
White and Toth 2007; Pobiner et al. 2007) is a noteworthy example of the increasing expansion of this 
mechanistic mode of inquiry.457 The guiding question, however, is always how one can bridge archaeo-
logical patterns and the putative processes that may have shaped them. Since the quest for such de-
pendencies is essentially the attempt to grasp the working principles of particular causally integrated 
systems governed by ‘primary’ and ‘secondary laws,’ this entire species of research leans heavily to-
wards mechanistic world theories. 
The third and final example of persistent mechanistic tropes in Anglophone Palaeolithic research takes 
up the general character of the wider lithic discourse centred on hominin-environment interactions. 
There is no doubt that the ‘environmental question’ – i.e., whether and, if so, to what effect human 
                                                          
454 It has to be said, however, that research relying on ‘Middle Range Theory’ (MRT) is not automatically committed to a ‘mech-
anistic’ worldview. What makes a key difference is usually whether MRT is based on clear-cut uniformitarian principles – i.e., 
laws and other universal causal processes – or whether it is propelled by (statistical) analogies – i.e., ethnographically attested 
regularities. While the former tends to support ‘mechanistic’ modes of inquiry, the latter may easily sustain ‘formistic’ reasoning. 
The reason is of course that MRT-analogies often identify ‘participation in patterns’ as a precondition for secure knowledge 
formation (for the underlying difference between ‘uniformitarianism’ and ‘analogical reasoning,’ see Cameron 1993). In general, 
MRT has thus the capacity to unify the ‘analytic’ approaches to the past.  
455 ‘Formation theory’ is defined here in rather broad terms, as a collection of various approaches that address site and assem-
blage formation processes. My definition follows Lucas’ (2012: 74) use of the term. 
456 As Bleed (2001: 109) correctly notes, the concept of the ‘reduction sequence,’ in contrast to the French chaîne opératoire, has 
been developed in close interaction with ‘formation theory.’ One may in fact argue that the reconstruction of reduction sequenc-
es often amounts to applying formation theory (cf. Dibble et al. 2006; Egeland 2008; Braun et al. 2008b). Richter (2018: 47) is 
therefore right in saying that the term reduction sequence most of the time simply accounts for a ‘transformational analysis’ of 
stony raw materials in order to understand the involved site formation processes (SFP) [in the sense of Transformationsana-
lyse (see e.g., Uthmeier 2004)]. Depending on the research interests of individual scholars and their scientific background, 
differential emphasis is thereby placed on the elucidation of ‘n-transformations’ and ‘c-transformations’ (sensu Schiffer 1976). 
457 As Van Reybrouck (2012: 321-323, Figure 22) has shown, the Anglophone use of primatology-derived information to render 
the Palaeolithic past intelligible has engendered a constant move back-and-forth between similarity-based holistic projection 
and causality-based attribute transfer. In essence, these two alternate strategies of bringing primatological information to bear 
on the interpretation of the past help further solidifying the thesis that Anglophone Human Origins research, maximally broadly 
and inclusively defined, is characterised by the general discursive tension between ‘formistic’ and ‘mechanistic’ tendencies. What 
Van Reybrouck terms ‘similarity-based holistic projection’ may well reflect the type of correlative-associative thinking promoted 
by ‘formism,’ while ‘causality-based attribute transfer’ sounds suspiciously ‘mechanistic’ insofar as it insinuates domain-
independent causalities governing organismic behaviour in general. 
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evolution is propelled by eco-climatic forces – continues to galvanise both individual scholarship and 
collective research programmes (e.g., Clark 1984; Potts 1996b, 2013; Petraglia and Korisettar 1998; 
Van Andel and Davies 2003; Shea 2003; O’Connell 2006; Petraglia 2006; Stringer 2006; Marean 
2007; Petraglia and Allchin 2007; Jones 2007, 2010; Barker et al. 2007; Petraglia et al. 2007, 2009a, 
2009b, 2012; Riel-Salvatore et al. 2008; Wragg Sykes 2009; Boivin 2010; Potts and Sloan 2010; Pet-
raglia and Rose 2010; Riel-Salvatore 2010; Lycett and Norton 2010; Pettitt and White 2012; Barker 
2013, 2017; Foley et al. 2013; Dennell 2013; Kuhn 2014 [1995]: 166; Johnson 2014; Petraglia and Boi-
vin 2014; Popescu 2015; Davies et al. 2015; Roberts et al. 2015; Groucutt et al. 2015; Barker and Farr 
2016; Clark and Baron 2017; Boivin et al. 2017; Roberts 2017; Robinson and Sellet 2018);458 the study 
of lithic technology is also increasingly seen as branch of ‘behavioural-strategic’ research (Kuhn 1993: 
25-27; Shea 2013a: 13f., 2015),459 in which environmental constraints are a prominent target of inves-
tigation and often play key roles in explanatory endeavours. Generally speaking, this pivotal status of 
the environment in Anglophone lithic research is hardly surprising from a Pepperian point of view. As 
leading experts of the ‘strategic’ or ‘ecological’ approach would readily admit (e.g., Torrence 1983, 
1989a; Bamforth 1988; Nelson 1991; Kuhn 1995; Henry 1995; McCall 2007, 2015; Surovell 2009; Shea 
2011b; Carr and Bradburry 2011; Bettinger et al. 2015), their central objective is to elucidate systems of 
behaviour, rather than simply describing and explaining distinct assemblages or artefact occurrences 
(cf. e.g., Isaac 1980, 1981; Butzer 1986; Blumenshine et al. 2012). In mechanistic terms, these ‘systems’ 
must be recognised as operating in a specific ‘environment,’ providing some of the relevant external 
stimuli to which hominins, just like any other organism, must respond (cf. Pepper 1942: 226f., 228). 
Since mechanism predicates the ‘specifity of response,’ both the ‘structure’ and the ‘configuration’ of 
past behavioural expressions must somehow be linked to the environmental conditions in which they 
occur. Usually, this requires the introduction of a general mechanism connecting environment and 
behaviour and rendering the observed patterns of behaviour consequential, that is, they are shown to 
be unsurprising. In this way, systems of behaviour can come into view as causally integrated wholes. 
They encapsulate a ‘behavioural machinery’ with a specific ‘field of locations’ and distinct regulatory 
‘principles’ and ‘laws.’460 This basic research configuration clearly resonates with Torrence’s (1989b: 
vii) directive “to look at the general causes lying behind the variability in stone tool form and produc-
tion,” and reproduces the ordered quadruple composition-environment-structure-mechanism which 
Bunge (2013: 590) has identified as the conceptual bedrock of mechanistic world-making. Shea 
(2013a), in a similar vein, characterises the resulting rationale of ‘behavioural-strategic’ inquiry in the 
following manner: 
                                                          
458 A number of influential idea and theories revolve almost exclusively around the environmental theme: Potts’ environmental 
variability hypothesis (1996a, 1996b, 1998, 2007, 2012a, 2012b, 2013), according to which human evolutionary history parallels 
the earth’s environmental history (cf. Behrensmeyer et al. 1992; Potts and Sloan 2010); Finlayson’s water optimisation hypoth-
esis (2013, 2014) and his glacial refugia hypothesis (2004, 2008, 2009; cf. Finlayson et al. 2000, 2012; Finlayson and Carrión 
2007); Mellars’ ‘Garden of Eden’ hypothesis (2002, 2006, 2009); Marean’s ‘Aquatic Paradise’ hypothesis (2007, 2010, 2011); 
and Ambrose’s volcanic bottleneck hypothesis (1998, 2003; cf. Hoffecker 2009; Jones 2012). 
459 Shea (2015) has recently noted that the ‘strategic’ approach to hominin behaviour owes a great debt to the provocative con-
nection between John Tooby, anthropologist and co-founder of the “hard” Evolutionary Psychology programme (cf. Cosmides 
and Tooby 1987, 2009), and Irven DeVore, student of famed primatologist Sherwood Washburn and co-editor of the seminal 
Man the Hunter volume (Lee and DeVore 1968). He re-casts their joint paper The reconstruction of hominid behavioral evolu-
tion through strategic modelling  (Tooby and DeVore 1987) as a founding document of the strategic approach. An important 
aspect of this approach, then, is that it crosscuts the human-animal boundary or any other species-level differences for that 
matter – it is “substrate-neutral.” Although Shea’s argument concerning the specifics of intellectual inheritance will surely be 
contested by others, it assures us of the general epistemological affinity between socioecological reasoning, Evolutionary Psy-
chology, and strategic research endeavours in Palaeolithic archaeology. Interestingly, Lee and DeVore’s 1987 paper in fact ad-
dresses an until this day largely unresolved issue, namely the conceptual and methodological integration of Behavioural Ecology 
and Evolutionary Psychology (see Shea 2011c for a number of archaeological problems related to this issue). The strategic 
approach, in other words, holds his share in the scientific effort to render the study of behaviour a unified and universal enter-
prise. The call for a general theory of behaviour (O’Connell 1995) is a distant call of the same ‘foundationalist’ ambition (cf. Van 
Reybrouck 2012: 227). 
460 Cf. Chapter 2: esp. Box 7. 
“[Behavioral-strategic] approaches place more emphasis on reconstructing particular aspects 
of prehistoric behavior and less on formal taxonomic divisions among lithic assemblages. […] 
These studies focus on technological variation among cores, flakes, and retouched tools, relat-
ed to “strategic” variation in raw material economy, mobility patterns, artifact designs, and 
tool curation. Most practitioners of technological organization approaches are less concerned 
with evaluation the relative significance of different behavioral factors, such as residential 
versus logistical mobility, and their correlated technological strategies in the formation of 
particular archaeological assemblages.” (ibid.: 13f.) 
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Isaac’s (1978, 1980, 1981, 1989) landscape-ecological reconfiguration of Lower Palaeolithic 
archaeology in Africa – epitomised by his memorable desideratum of ‘casting the net wide’ (cf. Sept 
and Pilbeam 2012) – may count as an early attempt to adopt a ‘behavioural-strategic’ research per-
spective. His ‘palaeogeographic’ approach (cf. Behrensmeyer 2012) shifted the attention away from 
well-stratified, high-quality sites to the organisation of hominin activity on a landscape scale.461 The 
perhaps central departure from conventional approaches to the lithic record concerned this notion of 
the site itself (cf. esp. Dunnell 1992).462 Isaac emphasised the enormous informational value of doing 
‘off-site archaeology’ or even ‘non-site archaeology’ (cf. Foley 1981; Ebert 1992) and of systematically 
surveying and mapping mini- and nano-sites, low-density scatters, and other artefactual occurrences 
indicating hominin activities ‘between the main artefact patches’ (Isaac and Harris 1980; cf. Isaac et al. 
1981). The whole point of this new research strategy was to conceive of lithic technology as an active 
participant in geographically-framed systems of artefact production, transport, utilisation, and even-
tual discard (cf. e.g., Blumenshine and Masao 1991; Blumenshine et al. 2003, 2008, 2009, 2012; 
Plummer 2004; Braun 2006, 2013; Braun et al. 2008a, 2009):463 
Isaac (1986: esp. Fig. 15.6; Fig. 22) explicitly contends that one has to abandon the notion of lithic 
items or toolkits as ‘fixed’ or ‘static’ entities and instead regard them as ““fallout” of more complex 
systems of artefact extraction and management.” Geographic space, in other words, is viewed as a me-
dium in which a network of activities with more or less delineated artefact patches becomes apparent. 
This conception not only takes up the productive tension between ‘static’ and ‘dynamic’ (see previous 
section), but also considers the question of where a site begins and where it ends as meaningless; the 
distinction between ‘sites’ and ‘empty space’ between them becomes practically arbitrary. Hominin 
behaviour is regarded to act as an ‘irrigating’ force that potentially covers up the entire landscape and 
produces a “veil of stones” of varying density and composition (idem).464 The recognition that, realisti-
cally, this ‘stone curtain’ must be conceptualised as a continuous entity is extremely crucial. Isaac’s 
model of hominin land-use pictures geographic patterns in the lithic data as the result of an ‘integrated 
spatiotemporal system of behaviour’ in which any residual discreteness is resolved. The system itself, 
                                                          
461 For an early example of this lasting re-orientation of Palaeolithic research in Africa, see Harris and Isaac (1976). 
462 In prototypical mechanistic fashion, Dunnell (1992) problematises the ‘reality’ or ‘relevance’ of a site as a unit of observation 
and analysis. He (ibid.: 21f.) argues that the concept is defective and hampers the recognition and appropriate interpretation of 
the continuous distribution of artefacts on the scale of a landscape and underestimates the contemporaneity of much of the 
observable patterns (cf. Dunnell and Dancy 1983). Instead of a site-centred approach to the past, Dunnell (1992: 33-36) propos-
es a ‘siteless’ approach in which individual artefacts constitute the smallest units of observation. As we will see below, this repre-
sents a classic ‘mechanistic’ position. 
463 This distinct approach to landscape-scale hominin behaviour is consistent with what Rossignol (1992: 4f.) has outlined as the 
landscape approach contrasting with interpretive landscape archaeology in the wake of Tilley, Hodder, Bender, Thomas, and 
Roberts: “[w]e define landscape approach as the archaeological investigation of past land use by means of a landscape perspec-
tive, combined with the conscious incorporation of regional geomorphology, actualistic studies (taphonomy, formation process-
es, ethnoarchaeology), and marked by ongoing reevaluation and  innovation of concepts, methods, and theory. This landscape 
approach not only provides a common theater for a variety of archaeologists to interact, but, more importantly, it provides a 
directed, but flexible, orientation for theory building.  In other words, our landscape approach addresses regional-level problems 
in archaeology by capitalizing on the interaction among regional-level geological, ecological, and actualistic studies. This frame-
work takes inspiration from Butzer’s contextual approach (Butzer 1982; see also Hassan 1979) and Foley’s regional taphonomic 
and off-site approach (Foley 1981a, b). Our landscape approach differs substantially from landscape archaeology. Because of 
their explicitly historical emphasis, method and interpretation of landscape archaeologists do not incorporate ecological and 
geological system variables. Both British and American practitioners of landscape archaeology assert an historical and (Hod-
derian) contextual focus for the discipline (Roberts 1987; Deetz 1990; Crumley and Marquardt 1990).” (original emphasis) 
464 Note that this realisation prompted a number of important methodological changes in how one would “sample” a palaeoan-
thropological landscape by systematic and semi-random test-trenches on a lager geographic scale (cf. Blumenshine et al. 2012: 
248). 
“The landscape paleoanthropological approach was adopted to broaden the site-scale focus of 
Leakey’s excavations to the whole lateral extent of Oldowan-aged deposits, including those with 
less conspicuous or no apparent archaeological occurrences (Isaac et al., 1981). Similar ap-
proaches described collectively as landscape archaeology (e.g., Wandsnider, 1992) include “off-
site archaeology” (Foley, 1981), “non-site archaeology” (Thomas, 1975), “siteless survey” (Dun-
nell and Dancey, 1983), “scatters-between-the-patches” (Isaac and Harris, 1978), and “distribu-
tional archaeology” (Ebert, 1992). None of these approaches assume that high-density artifact 
occurrences, such as many of those excavated previously at Olduvai, are representative of hom-
inin activities involving material discard. Rather, individual artifact/bone occurrences in the 
landscape array are material traces of different phases of a subsistence continuum (cf. Bin-
ford,1982), which had been demonstrated for Olduvai’s Oldowan to include the acquisition, 
processing, transport, and use of stone and carcass resources (Stiles et al., 1974; Bunn, 1981; 
Schick, 1987; Toth, 1987).” (Blumenshine et al. 2012: 248) 
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therefore, ultimately comes into view as a unified field structure. Hominin behavioural systems thus 
become intelligible as ‘fields of locations,’ as differentially configured activity fields with continuous 
breakpoints. The various ‘locations’ are connected by hominin movement, and the transport and dis-
card of lithic items – sometimes in a randomised fashion, sometimes planned (cf. Fig. 22). In an im-
portant sense, sites and other pseudo-discrete aggregates of lithic artefacts therefore describe meta-
stable states – locally materialised potentiality of the integrated system.465  
The ‘fallout metaphor,’ employed by Isaac (1986) himself, provides indirect support of this in-
terpretation. A ‘fallout,’ generally speaking, is the product of radioactive decay or the entropy of a sys-
tem and always affects a larger geographic area; it typically becomes manifest as a constant rain of 
atomised matter. The point is that in the case of hominin behaviour, the fallout metaphor suggests that 
varying configurations of artefacts are realisations of field properties, i.e., a consequence of the basic 
‘geometry’ of the underlying causally-integrated field (sensu Pepper 1942: 215).466 Alternatively, we 
may understand the use of the fallout metaphor as a convenient means to indicate that lithics repre-
sent ‘derived’ categories of reality whose ‘primary structure’ is laid out by the respective behavioural 
system and its regulatory mechanisms. The ‘veil of stones’ conveys the particular ‘appearances’ that are 
correlated with this ‘primary structure.’ In mechanism, the concept of ‘emergence’ is usually mustered 
to describe this specific relationship between the ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ categories of existence (cf. 
ibid.: 217).467 In any case, this conceptual exposition makes clear that Isaac’s landscape-ecological ap-
proach tackles hominin behaviour as an expression of a broader spatiotemporal machinery whose 
‘composition,’ ‘environment,’ ‘structure,’ and ‘mechanism’ need to be disclosed (sensu Bunge 2013). 
The explanation of lithic reality is therefore subsumptive (ibid.: 591) – individual artefact occurrences 
and characteristics are explained by organisation and functionality of the behavioural system in ques-
tion. The approach thus clearly carries the sparks of a ‘consolidated’ mechanism (cf. Pepper 1942: 212-
221). 
As Blumenshine et al. (2012: 248) have remarked, one of the main challenges of the land-
scape-ecological approach is to actually advance from the landscape evidence to critical aspects of 
‘hominin ecology’. The problem is that the evidence for hominin behaviour on a geographic scale – in 
part also because of the immense methodological and practical issues that such an approach has to 
overcome – is typically “too fragmentary and incomplete” to serve as the sole baseline for reconstruct-
ing hominin ecology (idem). Symptomatically, Blumenshine et al. (idem) therefore suggest to rather 
view the landscape-ecological approach as an instrument to test and refine substantial theoretical 
models of hominin ecology; this explicitly model-based procedure, in their view, would pave the way 
toward a more fruitful engagement with past behaviour and ecology. Based on earlier work on inter-
face between landscape ecostructure of the Olduvai basin, including the distribution of key resources, 
and hominin site composition and distribution therein (cf. Peters and Blumenshine 1995, 1996), Blu-
menshine and Peters (1998) offer a predictive model of Lower Palaeolithic hominin ecology in the area 
to accommodate this demand. This model is intended to derive testable predictions about the inter-
linkages between “particular landscapes, particular hominids, and their associated technologies in a 
particular time and space” (ibid.: 568). Blumenshine and Peters (1998) explicitly note:  
In a first step, Blumenshine and Peters (1998: 569, 571) reconstruct the abundance and variety 
of ‘affordances’ (sensu Gibson 1977) tied to varying ‘landscape facets.’ This landscape facet represents a 
relatively homogeneous local landscape-segment which broadly corresponds to a general habitat type 
                                                          
465 See the previous section for an explanation of the concept of ‘metastability’ and its relevance for ‘mechanism’ in conceptualis-
ing lithic reduction processes. 
466 Cf. “It is even possible to conceive of atoms popping in and out of existence all over the field, so long as their popping should 
conform to the structure of the field. That would, after all, be the fully discrete treatment of atoms in the field. The fact that we 
instinctively reject the idea indicates that a fully discrete mechanism has never been seriously contemplated.” (Pepper 1942: 
203) 
467 ‘Emergence’ is therefore typically defined as ‘weak’ insofar as an intimate connection to the respective ‘primary structure’ of 
reality is maintained (see e.g. Greve and Schnabel 2011 for a discussion of ‘weak’ versus ‘strong’ emergence). This not only en-
sures that ‘mechanism’ can sustain its ‘bottom-up’ research agenda, but also shows that the role of the concept is to explain the 
directed transition between ‘reality’ and ‘appearance,’ rather than to theorise the reality of system-level properties that are more 
than the sum of their parts. In mechanism, ‘weak’ emergence simply signals the correlatedness and structural quasi-identity” of 
the ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ categories of reality. 
“In order to use the archaeological record to test hominid land use models, hominid behaviors 
must be linked predictively to their material traces by causal ecological mechanisms related to 
the ecostructure of specified landscape facets […].” (ibid.: 571) 
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(ibid.:  569). The ‘affordances’ of this landscape facet are defined as the sum of the possibilities for 
interaction that result from the combination of its properties, substances, and surfaces (idem); the 
associated potential for ‘hazards,’ i.e., the structure of risk tied to certain interactions, is also included. 
Blumenshine and Peters (ibid.: 571) argue that the character of these facet ‘affordances’ ultimately 
determine the nature of the encountered artefactual traces. In a second step, different landscape facets 
and their material lithic and non-lithic correlates are compared in order to isolate inter-landform dif-
ferences in hominin-affordance interactions (idem). In a third and final step, then, these patterns of 
eco-behavioural co-variation are shown to be the inevitable consequence of particular ultimate and 
proximate mechanisms (ibid.: 571f.).468 As proximate mechanisms, the authors discuss several break-
age patterns of bone and stone linked to particular extraction and knapping behaviours (idem), where-
as ultimate causes are identified as various “ecological mechanisms” (ibid.: 572-580, Figure 1). These 
mechanisms define a causally and functionally integrated system of hominin-landscape interaction 
with distinct and largely unambiguous empirical correlates. Blumenshine and Peters (ibid.: 572-578) 
for example list varying scavenging opportunities (‘scavenging affordances’) and changing levels of 
inter-carnivore competition for carcass-access as primary ecological mechanisms. They further main-
tain that the function and transport-patterns of lithic artefacts reflect the technological organisation of 
hominin activities and that the two can directly be linked to the ecological mechanisms in terms of the 
density and composition of archaeological occurrences – distance to the nearest raw material sources 
(‘flow model’) and activity-relative safety play key roles here (ibid.: 578). We do not need to go into the 
details of their certainly impressive account in order to recognise that their reasoning is thoroughly 
mechanistic. The behavioural system469 they wish to reconstruct is re-cast as a causally determined 
structure in which the relevant constitutive relationships are singled-out, described, and linked to each 
another;470 truth is secured and knowledge corroborated by means of causally adjusting the specified 
factors of reality. Prediction amounts to a key operation (cf. ibid.: 595-599) and, insofar as the predic-
tions can be successfully tested, is co-extensive with explanation.471 Again, lithic technology comes 
primarily into view as a ‘derived’ phenomenon – as a ‘problem-solving’ device that responds to the 
more basic stimuli of its operating environment (sensu Pepper 1942: 226-228). 
 Braun et al.’s paper Landscape-scale variation in hominin tool use: evidence from the Devel-
oped Oldowan (2008a) subscribes to a similar approach.472 The authors use techniques of digital-
image analysis to accurately measure lithic core reduction intensities, which they proxy by the ratio 
between single platform core mass and the relative platform area of the core. They then map the ag-
gregated values of calculated ‘reduction intensity’ onto the palaeogeographic setting in which the re-
spective cores have been discarded (ibid.: Fig. 5; Fig. 23). Although the pattern does not conform to 
the ‘flow model’ or ‘distance-decay’ scenario of raw material use,473 which would predict an intensifica-
                                                          
468 The distinction between ‘ultimate’ and ‘proximate’ mechanisms in evolution has been popularised by Tinbergen (1963, 1965). 
Tinbergen proposed to place the study of behaviour on his famous Four Whys: (i) causation, (ii) adaptation, (iii) phylogeny, and 
(iv) ontogeny. While Tinbergen’s ethology was essentially conceived as a ‘mechanistic’ science, he maintained that multi-causal 
explanation is often superior to mono-causal accounts. He stressed, however, this condition requires the analyst to neatly dis-
criminate between different kinds of causes. The distinction between ‘ultimate’ and ‘proximate’ causation also served this larger 
purpose. ‘Ultimate’ mechanism are the ‘first causes’ and most elementary explanations for a given phenomenon. An ultimate 
explanation for a phenotype would be its genotype or its shape-giving selective pressures. ‘Proximate’ mechanisms, by contrast, 
are ‘secondary causes’ [Wirkursachen], that is, the more immediate reasons that lead to certain behaviours. Such reasons are 
often directly tied to the physiology or ecology of the organism in question. 
469 For an explicit usage of the term ‘behavioural system,’ see e.g. Tyron and Potts (2011: 376, 383). 
470 Cf. “The direct and indirect causal pathways involved in deducing archaeological patterning from the ecostructure of land-
scapes are complex (Figure 1). Nonetheless, our predictions about trace fossils of hominid landscape interactions rest upon two 
simple principles.” (Blumenshine and Peters 1998: 600) 
471 Cf. “Our ability to identify the source(s) of potential flaws in the models, and therefore to revise them in ways that reflect this 
improved understanding of prehistoric hominid ecology, is enhanced by the systematic and explicit manner in which the predic-
tions are generated. Even if the precise source of the flaws eludes us, the structure of the land use model (Figure 1 and Tables 1 
through 3) serves the valuable function of systematically organizing thought on a subject matter that traditionally has been 
treated inductively with respect to the archaeological record, and that has generated no independent and incisive test implica-
tions.” (Blumenshine and Peters 1998: 600) 
472 Cf. “[…] Variability also appears as a major feature of the Oldowan archaeological record. This may be the result of the nu-
merous hominin species that existed throughout the Oldowan period (Delagnes and Roche 2005). Yet a more testable explana-
tion is that Oldowan behavior is very sensitive to its ecological context (Plummer 2004). If this is the case, paleoecological anal-
yses conducted in concert with Oldowan archaeological projects is crucial. If Oldowan archaeologists can understand behavioral 
patterns relative to varied environmental contexts, it may be possible to really understand the ecology of early Pleistocene hom-
inins.” (Braun 2013: 342) 
473 For discussions and applications of the ‘distance-decay model’ (Renfrew 1969; Clark 1979), see e.g. Dibble (1995c), Roth and 
Dibble (1998), Brantingham (2003), and Blumenschine et al. (2008: 78). 
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tion of lithic reduction as the distance to the nearest raw material source increases, the authors are 
able to show that palaeogeographic discard patterns exist and that there is a trend towards increasing 
reduction intensity as one moves away from water bodies. Braun et al. (2008a: 1061) add that the re-
spective transport decisions also show that the assessment of the potential use-life of the objects prob-
ably played a significant role. They (idem) conclude that this behaviour reflects a strategy of ‘mitigat-
ing the risks associated with a subsistence pattern that requires sharp-edged tools.’ This study not only 
showcases ‘causal-adjustment reasoning’ and the use of standard-predictions (ibid.: Fig. 6) to facilitate 
interpretation, it is also decisively ‘integrative.’ The distribution of lithic assemblages in the wider 
landscape is effectively explained by a single measure – a measure that is argued to causally bridge 
hominin activity and ecology. 
 Jochims’ (1991, 1998) model of the relationship between hominin settlement pattern and envi-
ronmental structure provides another illustration of the mechanistic reconstruction of causally-
integrated behavioural systems. The author (1991: Figure 1) theorises the basic causal-determinative 
linkages that define the temporal and spatial axes of such an integrated system (Fig. 24). The model 
entails specific predictions designed to guide the examination of particular empirical cases. It pays 
particular attention to the relative strength of particular linkages and their relative symmetry under 
different conditions. The main regulating factor in the model is the nature of environmental variabil-
ity. Jochim (ibid.: 311) simply recognises that some nomadic groups face temporally variable but spa-
tially relatively stable environments, or the other way around. Alternatively, the hosting environments 
may be coevally variable or stable on both temporal and spatial coordinates. In general, he asserts that 
the temporal and spatial structure of the environment affects the abundance and distribution and thus 
the locational and temporal predictability of key resources (ibid.: 311-313). This, in turn, will shape the 
patterned association between the location of campsites, seasonality, and the activities carried out 
there. The result is the identification of five ideal-typical archaeological “signatures” (ibid.: 313, Figure 
1: A-E; cf. Fig. 24). It is easy to see that this systemic articulation of environmental structure, resource 
availability and predictability, and human settlement pattern describes the mechanistic quadruple 
composition-environment-structure-mechanism (sensu Bunge 2013).474 It is also clear that the vari-
ous domains of reality are connected by directed ‘causal chains’ and that there is a simple ‘hierarchy’ 
among these chains: the environment constraints the resource potential, and the resource potential 
constraints human settlement: 
Thus, the further up this chain a phenomenon is situated, the more ‘derived’ it appears. It must conse-
quently be explained in terms of the qualities of the next lower stage of the chain. These seemingly 
derived qualities, then, are interpreted as ‘secondary qualities,’ while the causing qualities are identi-
fied as the ‘primary qualities.’475  The designation of ‘primary’ and ‘secondary qualities’ may of course 
change as one moves up and down the ladder. Yet, the important point is that conceptions like this rely 
on the ‘hierarchy of response model’ of ecological functioning (sensu Miracle 1995: 3; cf. Nelson 1991: 
Figure 2.1; Hoffecker 2002: Fig. 1.6; Steenhuyse 2007: 11-24; McCall 2015: Figure 2.4; Fig. 25). This 
notion is not only the hallmark of ‘hard ecology’ approaches, but reflects the mechanistic perception of 
the world as a ‘layered cake’ [Schichttortenmodell] (cf. Hahn 2013: 34; Appendix II.3: Fig. II.1), 
                                                          
474 Cf. “By recognizing and concentrating on the variability in settlement pattern and structural data, both within and among 
hunter-gatherer systems, it becomes possible to propose that patterns of organization relate to conditions external to the exam-
ined systems and to begin to do pattern recognition studies in these domains. [Julian] Steward, of course, was a pioneer in the 
investigation of the ecological relationships that hunter-gatherers maintained with their environment, and it may be that all of 
his work, his research in this domain constitutes our most important inheritance.” (Binford 2001: 30; original italics) 
475 Talking about ‘mediating’ or ‘intermediate’ layers of reality – for example mobility – regulating environmental adaptation 
does not change this situation. These constructions simply spell out what it means to invoke a causal chain. In the case of mobili-
ty for example, lithic technology is typically construed as an adaptation to mobility requirements, that is, to the specific mobility 
system in place, but the mobility system is itself regarded to be an adaptation, namely to particular eco-environmental condi-
tions (cf. Straus 1996: 95-96; Thacker 1996: 120-121; Bettinger 1998: vi; Riel-Salvatore and Barton 2004; Hopkinson 2004; 
Ambrose 2008). These constructions effectively increase the focus and precision to the analysis – two highly valued virtues in 
any ‘integrative-mechanistic’ framework of inquiry.  
“If the various typologies of hunter-gatherers are taken as a guide, […] [behavioral] variability is 
not necessarily characteristic of all groups, nor is it randomly distributed among them. Rather, it 
is directly related to characteristics of their natural environments: variability of behavior is di-
rectly related to variability in the environment. An examination of different sorts of environ-
mental variability leads to some conclusions about the structure of behavioral variation.” 
(Jochim 1991: 311) 
160 
 
emphasising the ‘bottom up’ assembly of distinct compartments of reality.476 Depending on the 
strength of the respective ontological claims, such approaches tend to adopt a more or less ‘discrete’ 
version of mechanism (cf. Pepper 1942: 195-212). This mechanism allows for residual ‘discreteness’ 
among its elements – in fact, discreteness turns out to be a crucial precondition of externally relating 
these elements.477 The prototypical case of ‘causal adjustment’ – and thus of demonstrating ‘cause-
and-effect’ relationships – consequently tends to support ‘discrete’ interpretations of mechanism,478 
rather than its ‘consolidated’ variant; in ‘discrete’ incarnations of mechanism, heteronomic strategies 
of explanation can more easily be maintained. The fact that Jochim (1991) frames his general model 
and its application to the South German record of the Magdalenian-Holocene transition as “long-term 
ethnography” finally illustrates that Pepper’s world theories crosscut conventional academic divisions 
and that mechanistic reasoning is not just a matter of ‘behavioural-strategic’ or strictly ‘ecological’ 
approaches. 
Mellars’ (2001, 2006: x-xi, 2009) reconstruction of the dramatic demographic and social 
changes during Oxygen Isotope Stage 3 (ca. 50-30 kya), for instance, amply illustrates the kind of 
causal-inferential chain which is typically summoned by mechanists: 
The highly influential ‘Cambridge school’ of palaeoeconomics established by Eric Higgs and 
his followers (cf. Coles and Higgs 1969; Vita-Finzi and Higgs 1970; Higgs 1972, 1975; Dennell 1983; 
Bailey and Parkington 1988) similarly stresses the derived nature of lithic technology and considered 
patterns of technological organisation as a specific response to the needs and characteristics of its cor-
related ‘subsistence economy.’ Higgs himself (1972, 1975) at times even came close to regarding lithic 
technology as a mere epiphenomenon. In the introduction to Palaeoeconomy, Higgs and Jarman 
(1975: 3f.) explicitly note that 
 
and 
The core business of the ‘palaeoeconomic approach,’ namely to reconstruct subsistence economies, 
was, in other words, thought to be in principle independent of what was regarded to constitute ‘cultur-
al data,’ including stone tools  (cf. Barker and Dennell 1976; Bailey 1999: 552-557). Although this view 
certainly represents an extreme voice in the wider Anglophone scene, it spotlights the potential ramifi-
cations of an extreme version of mechanism in lithic studies. By embracing a radical conception of a 
layered reality-assembly, Higgs was obliged to also adopt a radically ‘integrative’ stance. According to 
this position, only the economic conditions can count as ‘real’ since only they serve the immediate 
purpose of survival and livelihood. All other phenomena must consequently be thrown into the ‘unre-
al.’ Being ‘unreal’ in this sense does not necessarily imply that the phenomena in question do not exist, 
it simply points to the fact that they cannot claim to possess ‘independent existence.’ They can thus 
                                                          
476 Within ‘consolidated mechanisms,’ the ‘hierarchy of response model’ is interpreted to suggest that there must be a ‘first mov-
er’ – a causal singularity. This singularity ultimately confirms that only a single particular ‘truly exists’ (cf. Pepper 1942: 214). 
This single particular, in a perfect mechanistic world, is of course the fully integrated field structure itself. 
477 This is precisely the point where ‘mechanism’ is threatened to collapse into a refined version of ‘formism’ emphasising dis-
creteness and similarity (see Appendix II.2 for a detailed discussion). 
478 See for example Basell (2008) who employs an explicit ‘push and pull’ logic to explain the distribution of archaeological sites 
during the East African Middle Stone Age (MSA). 
“[…] the primary human adaptation to the environment is the economy […]”  
“[p]alaeoeconomic studies lay their main stress on a basic aspect of human behaviour which can 
be shown to conform to predictable laws over long time periods.” 
“To cut a long story short, I argued that the rapid climatic and ecological changes of OIS 3 
would inevitably have promoted major shifts in both the distribution and overall densities of 
human populations in different areas of Europe, which in turn would have led to a sharp in-
crease in the frequency of population interaction, and direct competition, between the adjacent 
groups for both space and resources. All of these competitive social pressures, combined with 
the scale of the environmental changes themselves, would have had equally inevitable impacts 
on the subsistence activities and associated technologies of the human groups, leading to inevi-
table, if not entirely predictable, patterns of technological change. A number of social adapta-
tions (such as the formation of larger residential units, or perhaps increased separation of indi-
vidual economic and social roles within the individual groups) could be seen as equally plausi-




fully be reduced to their constitutive factors. In the conceptual language of mechanism, the respective 
phenomena amount to the ‘ineffective’ categories of reality; they describe merely the ‘secondary quali-
ties’ of the more basic and hence ‘effective’ categories of reality. This epiphenomenalisation of lithic 
technology is just another symptom of the mechanistic exigency of negotiating the Appearance and 
Reality gap (see the previous section and supra). 
What seems to guide most of these approaches, independently of their specific intellectual 
background, is the notion of a functional-systemic equilibrium. The objective of Anglophone mecha-
nistic lithic research is often to find the precise conditions under which the functionally related com-
ponents of a behavioural system – e.g., lithic technology, mobility, and the natural environment – can 
be said to be ‘in balance.’ The total system effectively inaugurates a principle of ‘checks and balances’ 
from which no component has reason to break out. The equilibrium describes a state in which the 
components are causally-related in such a way that changing one component would most likely change 
the whole system. Pepper’s (1942: 227-230) principle of ‘causal adjustment’ is simply the specification 
of an equilibrium state in which the components causally enforce each other – ‘causal adjustment’ 
consist in the causal coordination of the ‘effective’ parts of reality. We can speak of equilibrium be-
cause the mechanistic logic implies a symmetry between ‘push’ and ‘pull’ or ‘cause’ and ‘effect’ (cf. 
Pepper 1942: 190). Within the framework of the ‘behavioural-strategic’ paradigm, equilibrium condi-
tions are typically modelled as ‘best’ responses. In the extreme, the match or mismatch between stra-
tegic equilibria and actually realised responses may be taken as a measure for ‘adaptive performance’ 
(cf. Krebs and Davis 1978; Winterhalder 1981, 2001; Winterhalder and Smith 2000; Bird and 
O’Connell 2006).479 Implicitly or explicitly, equilibrium reasoning is inspired by economic ‘game theo-
ry’ (e.g., von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944; Nash 1950), especially its evolutionary branch (e.g., 
Taylor and Jonker 1978; Maynard Smith 1982; Skyrms 2001, 2004), and typically feeds into ‘Deduc-
tive Equilibrium Methodologies’ that provide the cognitive resources to detect and analyse ‘rational 
expectations’ and phenomena such as ‘Bayesian Nash Equilibria’ (cf. Van Huyck et al. 1990).  
Some of these economic ramifications of mechanistic thought will be taken up in the following 
sub-sections. I will first address the underpinnings of Human Behavioural Ecology (HBE) and of what 
is known as Technological Organization (TO) before discussing two specific economic approaches to 
reconstruct the “coming together” of stone tool technology and hominin behaviour.480 These examples 
will help to further lay bare the epistemological stakes of mechanistic reasoning in Anglophone lithic 
studies. 
The ‘behavioural-strategic’ (e.g., Hoffecker 2001, 2002; Odell 2001; Adler 2002; Elston and Branting-
ham 2002; Wallace and Shea 2006; Adler and Tushabramishvili 2004; Surovell 2009; Shea 2011b, 
2013a: 13f., 2017a; Kelly 2013: Chapter 5, 2014; Churchill 2014) and the ‘organisational approach’ 
(e.g., Binford 1973, 1979; Torrence 1983, 1989c; Bleed 1986; Kelly 1988; Bamforth 1991; Nelson 1991; 
Bousman 1993; Kuhn 1995; Bamforth and Bleed 1997; Carr and Bradburry 2001, 2011; McCall 2007, 
2015: 61f., 79-90), while representing the two main mechanistic lithic research frameworks, are built 
on broadly similar methodological and epistemological maxims and often overlap in practice. This is 
not to say that there are no important divergences and conceptual tensions between the two, but these 
are relatively minor and can be neglected for the present purpose. We have already seen that both ap-
proaches make productive use of the assumption that lithic technology is one of many factors contrib-
uting to an integrated spatiotemporal system of behaviour (cf. Tyron and Potts 2011).481 Yet, technolo-
gy is not just any factor; it represents the primary means with which hominins access their social and 
                                                          
479 The study of ‘maladaptation’ is logically implied here. ‘Non-adaptive’ behaviour can then be defined as behaviour that devi-
ates from the derived optimality expectations (cf. Jochim 1983). 
480 The latter two examples have been sampled from the recent volume Lithic Materials and Paleolithic Societies edited by 
Adams and Brooks (2009). 
481 For a specific emphasis on the aspiration of processual archaeologies to scientifically reconstruct ‘behavioural and formation-
al systems underlying the organisation of the archaeological record’ (Rossignol 1992: 5), see also Willey and Sabloff (1980: 195) 
and Dunnell (1986: 38). Even ‘adaptation’ is understood as a systemic variable – as the ‘congruence’ or external relatedness of 
systemic components (i.e., cultural organisms and their environment) (Binford 1978: 3; cf. Rossignol 1992: 5, footnote 1). 
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natural environments, extract energy, and potentially change these environments. Technology, there-
fore, occupies a key position at the interface of compartments and domains of reality (e.g., Isaac 1977a, 
1977b; Butzer 1977; Jochim 1981; Kuhn 2011; Kelly 2016: Chapter 3, esp. 28, 32).482 It is this interfac-
ing status that renders lithic technology fundamentally ‘mouldable.’ While the ‘discrete’ mechanist 
would argue that this technological ‘plasticity’ is a necessary result of the ‘causal adjustment’ of the 
different parts of reality and the tendency of wholes to find seek out stable equilibria, ‘consolidated’ 
mechanists would simply maintain that since there is no place for discreteness in reality, technology 
automatically merges with its underlying field-structure, leaving almost no inherent ‘sturdiness’ be-
hind.483 Shott et al. (2011) give a voice to this ‘received view’ of technological customisability when 
they note: 
This recognition of lithic technology as a fluid behavioural set tempered and conditioned by environ-
mental and situational factors remains central to both ‘behavioural-strategic’ and ‘organisational’ ap-
proaches. As Torrence (2001: 73) correctly points out, this conception allows one to engage with the 
‘Big Picture’ of how lithic variability is shaped and structured. To conceive of lithic technology as a 
‘plastic’ entity enables the focused investigation of the relative strength and significance of the various 
causal factors that might have contributed to the formation of particular lithic assemblages and tech-
nological signatures. ‘Discrete’ mechanism would thereby concentrate on individuated causal varia-
bles, whereas ‘consolidated’ mechanism usually focuses on ‘constraints’ (cf. Goldratt 1996). This talk 
about ‘constraints’ signals that technology is analysed in terms of its relative position within the inte-
grated behavioural system. A ‘constraint’ is a factor or element that restricts another entity, that is, it 
prevents that entity from achieving its potential alternative goals; constraints create bottlenecks and 
thereby regulate the expression of the constrained phenomena.484 At least two points are important 
here. The first is that the character of technological expression depends on its ‘location’ in the larger 
machinery of which it is a part (sensu Pepper 1942: 191, 197). Each part of the behavioural system, in 
other words, is constrained by its position in the ‘field of locations’ and thus by all other ‘locations’ 
connected to it. This brings us to the second point, namely that speaking about constraints in this 
manner means speaking about the properties of the mechanistic field-structure. The relevant con-
straints are only understandable if the entire quadruple composition-environment-structure-
mechanism is taken into account. ‘Constraints,’ understood in this way, do not stand for discrete pro-
cesses anymore but describe field forces and field potentials that can precisely be quantified. 
 In Anglophone lithic inquiry, scholars typically convey this research orientation by conjuring 
the study of technological ‘costs and benefits,’ and the relative trade-offs between different economic 
factors and design decisions (cf. Torrence 1989c: 2; Ambrose and Lorenz 1990; Kuhn 1993, 1995; 
Bousman 1993; Carr and Bradburry 2011: 308, 310; Shea 2011a, 2013a: 39).485 Researchers have mus-
tered an entire array of potential ‘currencies’ to measure the strength and significance of the active 
‘field forces’ that give shape to a particular behavioural system. The most popular currencies are ‘ener-
gy,’ ‘calories,’ ‘time,’ ‘uncertainty,’ ‘security,’ and especially ‘risk’ (e.g., Torrence 1989c: 3, 2001: 73-78; 
Blumenshine and Peters 1998; Bright et al. 2002; Ugan et al. 2003; Bettinger et al. 2006). Other more 
object-centred currencies are for instance the ‘portability’ and ‘curational potential’ of lithic artefacts 
(e.g., Binford 1979; Cole 2009; Kuhn and Miller 2015), but also the design-properties of lithic imple-
ments or complex projectile delivery systems, i.e., their ‘functional efficiency,’ ‘versatility,’ as well as 
                                                          
482 Churchill (2014: 53-59), for instance, speaks explicitly about ‘lithic technology as an adaptive interface.’ This notion, grosso 
modo, of course resonates with Binford’s (1962: 218) influential proclamation of “culture as an extra-somatic means of adapta-
tion”   
483 Borgerhoff Mulder (2005), for instance, underscores the ‘extreme phenotypical plasticity’ which HBE approaches typically 
predicate. 
484 See Cox and Goldratt (1986) and Goldratt (1990) for a general ‘theory of constraints.’ 
485 Shea (2011b: 14), for example, argues that the link between lithic patterns and hominin behaviour should be studied in “stra-
tegic terms, to seek the cost-benefit structure of the incentives underlying particular behaviors, and to document variation in the 
contexts in which particular behavioral strategies are deployed (or not).” 
“[…] The systematic production of usable flakes is often presented by lithic technologists as a rigid 
set of strategies or procedures to be followed in a step-by-step fashion. The quintessential example 
is the chaîne opératoire, developed by the French in the 1980s and widely applied today. An alter-
nate view is that lithic reduction is a fluid behavioral set conditioned by an intimate familiarity 
with techniques and materials and tempered by environmental and situational circumstances.” 
(Shott et al. 2011: 320; original emphasis) 
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their ‘reliability’ and ‘maintainability’ (cf. Bleed 1986, 1997; Nelson 1991; Bamforth and Bleed 1997; 
Hopkinson 2004; McCall 2015: 80). The regulative idea is that some or all of these currencies have to 
be optimised, yet under general conditions of constraint. Bruce Winterhalder (2001: 31-33) has re-
ferred to this core feature as the ‘assumption of constrained optimisation.’ Optimisation is simply de-
scribed as some kind of ‘utility’ that is maximised under conditions of scarcity and systemic constraint. 
The utility function that can be extracted by analysing and comparing the role of some or all of the 
relevant currencies within the behavioural system helps understanding why lithic technology takes 
particular forms and what the systemic role of particular lithic ‘locations’ is. To isolate, theorise, and 
investigate variable currencies and their role in structuring ‘systems’ and ‘locations’ facilitates the 
recognition of the causally-integrated whole that mechanists wish to illuminate. These currencies are 
nothing else than causal variables that are evaluated in terms of their relevance and explanatory pow-
er. The adjustment of these currencies in changing temporal and spatial contexts provides lithic ex-
perts with the means to come up with hypotheses about the “working” principles of the behavioural 
machinery seek to decipher:486 
Torrence’s (2001: 78-80) discussion of the role of the ‘severity of risk’ and its associated ‘fail-
ure costs’ in explaining general latitudinal differences in the technological make-up of ethnographical-
ly documented nomadic groups similarly showcases the determinative role of the respective factors 
and highlights the ‘chain of causality’ in which they participate: 
The necessity of risk management provides the general ‘mechanism’ required to link the ‘composition’ 
and ‘structure’ of technology to a specific ‘environment’ (cf. Read 2008; Hoffecker and Elias 2003, 
2007; Hoffecker 2005). Risk, in other words, emerges as the ‘lubricating’ stuff that keeps the behav-
ioural machinery running. It is not coincidental here that ‘risk’ is a somewhat curious entity; it is nei-
ther material, nor an abstract idea. Rather, it must be understood as a field property which, although 
being unobservable, delineates a ‘primary’ and ‘effective’ category of reality – it is therefore ‘real’ inso-
far as it causally conditions the observable. 
 Nettle et al.’s (2013) praise of HBE research as the study of human behaviour from an adaptive 
perspective and in terms of how behaviour varies with ecological context – as providing ‘clear predic-
tions’ and heightened ‘methodological rigor’ – arguably resonates with the ambition and self-
recognition of ‘behavioural-strategic’ and ‘organisational’ approaches to lithic technology in Anglo-
phone Palaeolithic archaeology. Nettle et al. (2013) especially highlight the aspiration of HBE to disen-
tangle ultimate and proximate mechanisms (sensu Tinbergen 1963; Mayr 1988; cf. Krebs and Davies 
                                                          
486 The guiding metaphor here is a complex clockwork with many adjustable screws. The task of the analyst is to adjust them in 
such a way that the clockwork ‘runs’ smoothly. This obviously requires finding the correct or effective mechanical links between 
the various screws and understanding the general ‘working’ principle(s) of the clockwork. 
“Failure costs, and therefore the level of risk, increase toward the poles because the availability 
of food decreases with longer winters and there are fewer alternative resources because species 
diversity has an inverse relationship with latitude. Latitude is therefore a useful proxy measure 
for severity of risk with higher latitudes having higher risks. […] The type of tool used to procure 
animals also responds to increasing failure costs as monitored by latitude. Near the Equator 
small mammals are mainly hunted with instruments and weapons, but in the far north untend-
ed facilities such as traps are more common (Torrence 1983: Table 3.4). Similarly, tended facili-
ties are used in the hunting of large terrestrial mammals to a greater degree in the riskier north-
ern environments than among low-latitude groups.” (ibid.: 27) 
 
“Stone artifacts come to us as static entities, but they are products of dynamic behavioral 
processes. Linking static lithics to dynamic behavior requires one to correlate patterns in 
variation in the lithic record to variability in behavioral strategies. Strategies are solutions to 
a specific set of problems determined by the interaction of costs, benefits, and risks on evolu-
tionary actors (Krebs and Davies 1991, Pianka 1988). Modeling strategic variation involves 
hypotheses about the changing relationship between cost and benefit overt time. The three 
most fundamental of these relationships are optimization (maximizing benefits per unit of 
cost), satisficing (obtaining minimally necessary benefits per unit of cost), and intensification 
(increasing costs in return for unchanging or declining benefits). […] The precise currencies 
of costs and benefits involved in various dimensions of lithic variability and how to measure 
them are much debated. Time, energy, and risk are obvious variables (Torrence 1989, 2001), 
as they are for nearly all behavior, but other factors specific to stone tool technology involve 
utility (potential for continued use), versatility (potential for multiple uses), and portability 




1978) – they admit, however, that for practical reasons it is usually more profitable to focus on the 
proximate causes – and to integrate the study of ‘behavioural variability’ with the study of ‘behavioural 
optimality.’ Shea’s (2011b: 11, 15) insistence on determining the sources of lithic variability is an echo 
of the same research mandate. Some would certainly argue that this undertaking requires an integra-
tion of ecological and Neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory, including relevant subfields such as evolu-
tionary ecology and evolutionary economics (cf. Kuhn 2004a; Bettinger et al. 2015; Goodale and An-
drefsky 2015). In general accordance with Torrence (1989c: 4f.), Kuhn (1993), and many others, Bor-
gerhoff Mulder (2005) also stresses the importance of adopting a ‘problem-solving approach’ in order 
to examine ‘adaptive strategies’ and ‘how humans have been selected to respond flexibly to environ-
mental conditions in ways that enhance their fitness.’ The evocation of classic Darwinian mechanisms 
such as ‘adaptation,’ ‘selection,’ and ‘inheritance with modification’ in the study of hominin behaviour-
al variability487 thereby unequivocally earmarks these approaches as mechanistic.488 
 
In Technological Efficiency as an Adaptive Behavior Among Paleolithic Hunter-Gatherers, Cole 
(2009) examines patterns of lithic economic change across the Middle-to-Upper Palaeolithic transi-
tion, comparing in particular Châtelperronian and Aurignacian assemblages from three sites of the 
Périgord region of Southwest France – La-Côte, Caminade Est, and Le Flageolet I. The article is pri-
marily concerned with issues of raw material ‘economisation’ and sets out to identify the specific be-
havioural strategies adopted in varying contexts to respond to these problems. Cole (ibid.: 128-131) 
departs from a general body of evolutionary and ecological theory to highlight the ‘adaptive signifi-
cance’ of varying strategies of lithic raw material acquisition and conservation, as well as their differen-
tial ‘efficiency.’489 From these general considerations, he derives three hypotheses linking particular 
economic concerns to particular observable consequences (Fig. 26). These enunciations are purely 
theoretical and the goal is to pinpoint correlated economic and lithic variables to predict assemblage-
level patterns that can be tested against empirical data. The basic rationale of this approach is to use 
the predicted patterns as a baseline to back-infer the correlated economic strategies. The author (ibid.: 
131-133) discriminates between the ‘blank portability hypothesis,’ the ‘distance attrition hypothesis,’ 
and the ‘mixed strategy hypothesis’; each of the three represents a different generic solution to the 
problem of raw material economisation in high-mobility settings, i.e., the fact that lithic raw material 
is finite and potentially has to be carried around in different formats. Cole (ibid.: 133f.) uses dimen-
sional data and diversity estimations490 to assess the overall size difference between artefacts made 
from local and nonlocal raw materials, the difference between tool and blank size in these two groups, 
and the difference in diversity between the two. All three hypotheses project distinct combinations of 
signature values for these three respective lithic variables. 
The first hypothesis, the ‘blank portability hypothesis,’ describes a tactic of lithic raw material 
acquisition and conservation revolving around the planned transportation of high-quality raw materi-
als (Cole 2009: 131). This tactic consequently entails the intense reduction of selected raw materials 
and a heightened anticipation of raw material needs. Therefore, (i1) non-local raw materials are ex-
pected to be smaller sized, (ii1) there should be no significant difference in blank size when local and 
non-local raw materials are compared, and (iii1) non-local raw materials should be generally less di-
verse.  
The second hypothesis, the ‘distance attrition hypothesis,’ represents a raw material manage-
ment tactic grounded in the principle of tool curation (Cole 2009: 132). This tactic implies the differen-
                                                          
487 It is noteworthy that there is a long tradition of thinking about stone tool technology as extended phenotype (sensu Dawkins 
1982) – as the effective extension of the hominin body ((Washburn 1959: 30, 1960; Leakey 1971; Foley 1987; Schick and Toth 
1993; Foley and Lahr 2003; Kelly 2016: 29; Shea 2017b: 39-42). This conceptualisation – the ‘prosthetic view’ of technology – 
not only abets the direct selection of technology-hominin couplets, but naturally evokes the idea of ‘phenotypic plasticity’ in the 
context of lithic technology. Toth and Schick (2009a: 299), for example, explicitly speak of lithic tools as “synthetic organs” and 
refer to the nature of technological evolution as “techno-organic.” 
488 Bunge (2013: 590) explicitly lists Darwinian evolution as an example of mechanistic explanatory system relying on “nonme-
chanical” mechanism. 
489 See also Steenhuyse (2007: 11-24). 
490 Additional lithic data include lithic weight data and estimations of reduction intensity (e.g., ratio of retouched versus un-
retouched blanks per raw material unit). 
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tial treatment and transportation of retouched and unretouched lithic artefacts. As a result, (i2) there 
should be no overall size differences between local and non-local raw materials, (ii2) the size difference 
between tools and blanks is expected to be less pronounced in non-local raw materials, but (iii2) local 
and non-local raw materials should be similarly diverse. 
The third hypothesis, a mixed strategy that combines elements of the previous two tactics, 
specifies an approach to raw material economisation in which both differential raw material transpor-
tation and tool curation plays a role (Cole 2009: 132f.). The strategy therefore implies both the selected 
treatment of certain raw materials and a focus on the raw material potential of tools. In this scenario, 
one can expect that (i3) lithic artefacts made from non-local raw material are generally smaller, (ii3) the 
difference between tool and blank size is higher in local raw materials, and (iii3) non-local raw materi-
als should be less diverse (ibid.: Table 9.1).  
Based on the juxtaposition of these test implications with the dimensional data and the diver-
sity measures derived from La-Côte (level III), Caminade Est (level G), and Le Flageolet I (levels XI 
and IX), Cole (2009: 134-139, 140) argues that the encountered lithic patterns provide evidence for a 
general increase in technological efficiency in the timeframe between 38 and 32 kya in the Périgord 
region. This conclusion is based on the recognition that different economic strategies appear to be 
reflected in different lithic assemblages. Whereas La-Côte level III does not conform to any of the test 
projections and therefore appears to indicate a ‘neutral’ strategy or, alternatively, socioeconomic con-
ditions under which economisation proved unnecessary, Caminade Est level G reveals a strategy in 
which blank portability was a major concern but the differential modification and reduction of blanks 
was apparently not important (cf. Cole 2002). The lithic signature of Le Flageolet I level XI, by con-
trast, suggests raw material economisation in terms of portability and distance attrition (Cole 2009: 
140). The chronological sequence of these economic strategies signals that raw material economisation 
became an increasing concern across the Middle-to-Upper Palaeolithic interval. There is both a trend 
of strategic ‘formalisation’ and ‘diversification.’ Although Cole (ibid.: 128), in classic mechanistic fash-




he is ultimately hesitant to announce a ‘law of progression’ or a general ‘evolutionary principle’ of in-
creasing economic efficiency. The circumstance that he sympathises with this idea, however, shows the 
felt necessity of linking ‘pattern’ to ‘process’ and to specify a general mechanism to account for the 
lithic observations (Cole 2009: 128f.). 
There is another mechanism, however, which the author tacitly entertains, and without which 
his analysis would fail. This principle is a generalised version of rational choice. For his theoretical 
projections of the three generic tactics of raw material economisation with special attention on opti-
mising technological ‘efficiency’ to be valid, it is required that the respective hominin players can be 
conceptualised as rational players. In fact, their economic rationality must be comparable to the ra-
tionality of the community of analysts since otherwise the projection of economic rationality is serious-
ly hampered. Having said this, Cole’s (2002, 2009) hypotheses about strategic behaviour and lithic 
raw material economy clearly entail rational conjectures on how one would manage lithic artefacts 
given particular strategies. The kind of economic rationality that he presumes, moreover, is technolo-
gy-neutral, that is, independent of the respective technological systems adopted by hominins at the 
time.491 Only then is it viable to assess issues of ‘economisation’ based on a fixed set of variables. 
Whether the author believes that economic behaviour and technological behaviour are to be separated 
since the former represents a more ‘basic’ category of reality, whereas the latter delineates a ‘derived’ 
category regulated by the first category must remain open, yet would at least be consistent with the 
pursued line of reasoning. The key point is that ‘rational choice theory’ (cf. Robbins 1932; Becker 1976; 
Cashdan 1990; Binmore 2009; Chibnik 2011: 2-5), even though not explicitly elaborated on, provides 
the set of fundamental mechanisms needed to study economic behaviour in the Upper Palaeolithic by 
                                                          
491 As we will see in the subsequent chapter, this conceptualisation is heavily disputed by French technologists who regard eco-
nomic organisation as critically dependent on the infrastructure of technology (see esp. the first part of Chapter 5). Beyond the 
larger world theory differences, we may also understand this divergence as local resurfacing of the ‘substantivist-formalist de-
bate’ in economic anthropology (cf. Eriksen and Nielsen 2001: 83-85; see infra). 
“[…] is aware of no scientific theory that would predict an increase in the efficiency of [sic!] 
hunting and gathering throughout the Pleistocene without reference to any causal factor,” 
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similar means as one would study such behaviour in the present.492 Cole’s Technological Efficiency is 
the study of homo economicus in the deep past. As Kliemt (2013), for instance, points out, homo eco-
nomicus furnishes a ‘model’ of economic behaviour emphasising ‘opportunity-taking rational action’ 
and revolving around future directedness, insofar as individuals need to distinguish between what is 
and what is not a causal consequence of each of their actions and decisions taken separately, case-by-
case motivation, and subjectivism, i.e., methodological individualism; it is the ‘consistency assump-
tion’ underpinning this model (idem) that provides the kind of generalised mechanism required to 
place Technological Efficiency on firmly mechanistic grounds.493 This invariable rationality principle 
is the precondition for the type of predictive reasoning adopted by the author. 
Blades’ paper Aurignacian Core Reduction and Landscape Utilization at La Ferrassie, France (2009) 
argues that the lithic economy evidenced in the Aurignacian layers of La Ferrassie in the Dordogne 
region can be explained as a response to changing ecological conditions in the vicinity of the site (esp. 
ibid.: 194; cf. Blades 1997 [2001], 1999). The ecological backdrop of the site is defined as the co-
variation of climate regime and animal ecology which, in tandem, are regarded to have affected the 
structure of neighbouring animal communities and therefore the availability of potential prey species. 
Blades’ approach is rooted in the heteronomic assessment of lithic patterns with respect to the local 
ecological circumstances into which they are ‘inscribed.’ The lithic patterns retrieved from the dia-
chronic Aurignacian record of La Ferrassie are externally related to the available ecological data in 
order to isolate significant correlations. The author’s general strategy is to derive reliable proxies for 
each of the two domains – lithic economy and human ecology – and to juxtapose them. 
As a proxy for lithic economy he uses ‘core reduction intensity’ which he measures in terms of 
relative core-length(s) (Blades 2003, 2009: 191). Human ecology, by contrast, is approximated by the 
diversity and composition of the faunal assemblages documented in the Aurignacian layers (K6-l1) of 
the site. Since varying climatic conditions are expected to support differentially packed animal and 
mineral resources in the immediate surroundings, the structure of the local animal community can be 
taken as a rough proxy for the general ecology of the site.  
The author then simply evaluates the two proxy measures in terms of patterned co-variation 
(Blades 2009: Figure 13.1, 13.3). He finds that core-length values appear to vary as a function of colder 
versus warmer climate regimes (ibid.: 191). The determination of colder climates in the earlier phases 
is based on the association with reindeer-dominated faunal assemblages, whereas the later Aurigna-
cian phases are characterised by a more diverse (bison, horse, deer) faunal composition (ibid.: 191). 
Cores are on average shorter in the earlier phases of the Aurignacian (K6-K4) which the author inter-
                                                          
492 Cole’s (2009) approach therefore resonates with the often-cited assertion by economist Becker (1976: 14) that “[…] all human 
behavior can be viewed as involving participants who maximize their utility from a stable set of preferences and accumulate an 
optimal amount of information and other inputs in a variety of markets.” The emphasis here lies on all; economic theory is 
thought to provide a universal set of regulatory principles to study human behaviour across time and space, independently of its 
context or history. The principles that guide economic action and decision-making are considered invariable – they have the 
status of mechanistic ‘principles’ or ‘laws’ (cf. Chapter 2: Box 7). 
493 Arguably, Cole’s (2009) approach, as most other approaches that can be grouped under the labels ‘behavioural-strategic’ and 
‘organisational’ (see supra), is firmly rooted in the ‘formalist’ tradition of economic anthropology. ‘Formalists’ are usually op-
posed to ‘substantivists’ since the so-called ‘formalist-substantivist debate’ is a major date in modern anthropological discourse 
(cf. Eriksen and Nielsen 2001: 83-85). This debate was about the nature of economy and whether it can be studied as self-
sufficient domain of human life, propelled by economic principles and law-like regularities. ‘Formalists’ have tended to adopt 
this view and argued that economy can therefore be studied by the same means and guided by the same assumptions in any 
context, past or present. ‘Formalism’ in economic anthropology has emphasised quantitative approaches and ‘rational choice 
theory.’ Inquiry in this tradition has typically focussed on pragmatic strategies and sought to demonstrate that utility maximi-
sation plays a role in any human society (cf. Leclair and Schneider 1968): “[i]f we recognize that a difference of degree rather 
than of kind exists between most of our economic institutions and those of other peoples, the unity of the data concerned with 
the problem of economizing must be apparent” (Herskovits 1952: 42). Firth (1939, 1967), Schneider (1964, 1974), and Her-
skovits (1952), for example, were some of leading ‘formalists’ of their time. ‘Substantivism,’ by contrast, holds that economy 
cannot be studied as an independent phenomenon; it is always embedded in sociocultural practice and hence a product of hu-
man cultural life. As a result, not all human economies can be studied by the same means or in the same way, and there are 
serious epistemological preconditions of understanding them properly. ‘Substantivists’ have for example variously argued that 
modern economic concepts such as ‘risk’ and ‘time-budgeting’ are often not applicable to tribal or prehistoric societies, simply 
because these people do not necessary shared this concept. ‘Substantivism’ favours a qualitative and ultimately interpretive 
approach to economic organisation. Prominent ‘substantivists’ are for example Polanyi (2001 [1944]), Dalton (1961, 1969), and 
Bohannan (1955, 1959), but also scholars such as Sahlins (1972) and Godelier (1999). The ‘substantivist-formalist debate’ has 
lost much of its former heat in recent years but remains largely unresolved. 
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prets as evidence for an overall more intense lithic reduction (ibid.: 191, 194, Figure 13.1; cf. Blades 
2003). Thus, the cores of the later and slightly warmer Aurignacian phases (K2, J, l3-l2) are on average 
longer. Complementarily, these are interpreted as less reduced (Blades 2009: 194). Blades (ibid.: 188-
190) adds that the treatment of cores in terms of scar directionalities and platform configurations re-
mains complex and mixed throughout the entire sequence and that there is thus no reason to believe 
that core technology sensu stricto is an important developmental factor; he (ibid.: 190) explicitly 
stresses the ‘importance of a reduction continuum’ in this regard.  
Based on general considerations from evolutionary ecology, Blades (2009: 191, 193) establish-
es a theoretical link between ‘reduction intensity’ and mobility strategy, that is, foraging radius. Since 
core reduction intensities can be taken to reflect relative raw material consumption and therefore rep-
resent a measure for the ‘economisation’ of stone, they can be related to the frequency and character of 
hominin movement(s). The author (ibid.: 191) asserts that this, in turn, seems to suggest that 
The exact inverse relationships can then be projected for the group of shorter cores, which appears to 
indicate longer travel distances from raw material sources, less regular access to these sources, and/or 
more frequent moves from campsites to other localities without necessary transporting the cores.494 
Blades (2009: 192, 194) concludes that Aurignacian lithic technology at La Ferrassie reflects 
changing economic strategies tied to differential mobility and prey exploitation patterns. These strate-
gies seem to have been structured by the prevailing climatic regimes. Core length is seen to record 
‘economising’ behaviours related to ‘adaptive’ requirements. These conclusions are consistent with the 
author’s earlier work, which essentially finds the same relationships based on a number of additional 
lithic variables such as tool retouch intensity and blank weight (cf. Blades 1997, 1999). Altogether, the 
adopted cognitive strategy is clearly mechanistic. Not only is knowledge established and corroborated 
by causally adjusting selected technological variables and ecological parameters, the reconstruction 
also reveals a clear-cut ‘chain of inference’ predicating the environment-subsistence-mobility link as 
the basal layer of determination. Again, behaviour is understood as a systemic phenomenon with its 
unique ‘field of locations,’ so that the individual lithic assemblages from La Ferrassie can be recognised 
as relative parts constrained by the other working parts of the total machinery. Basic economic princi-
ples are ultimately responsible for rendering the machine a viable one. Blade’s (2009) study is also 
notably ‘integrative’ insofar as it mobilises only a handful of variables to determine the overall charac-
ter of the adaptive system. This not only underlines that these factors are identified as causally relevant 
but also shows that ordered causation – in the sense of a ‘directed chain’ – and its ‘specifity of re-










                                                          
494 Note that the inference of travel distances relies on a general distance-decay model assuming that raw materials diminish 
with increasing distance from the point of origin (see supra). This model, as we have seen, is inherently ‘mechanistic’ (see the 
first part of this larger section). 
“[…] the longer cores during the later Aurignacian occupations may mean that groups travelled 
shorter distances from quarries, had more regular access to quarry locations, and/or moved 





If French lithic research in Palaeolithic archaeology exhibits a strong ‘synthetic’ conviction, we would 
expect that the main research trends can profitably be described in terms of Pepper’s relatively ade-
quate ‘synthetic’ world theories – ‘contextualism’ and ‘organicism.’ Like in the Anglophone case, suc-
cessful reconciliation between the key features of French lithic inquiry and Pepper’s ‘synthetic’ theories 
can therefore explain (i) why even counteractive forces in the French scene are able, grosso modo, to 
meaningfully interact with one another and coevally demonstrate that (ii) lumping French lithic re-
search into a single higher-level category makes sense, at least when it is contrasted with Anglophone 
                                                          
495 The French original of the opening quotes are given in Appendix Q.8 and Q.5. 
“[…] I deliberately dismissed the path of functional typology. It is for the lack of data on the behav-
iour of prehistoric men based on their activities with their tools, for the lack of power, at least at 
the moment, to discern the intentions of use, that I devoted myself to grasping the intentions of 
knapping instead. [...] For a term to be precise and unequivocal, it must contain in itself the inten-
tion of the craftsman who has knapped a prehistoric tool.” 
 – Jacques Tixier (1978 [2012]: 115, 117; my translation) 
 
“[…] Every society therefore comes into view first and foremost through the features of its adapta-
tion to its environment. But this notion deserves to be properly evaluated: it signifies, in our opin-
ion, the adaptation to particular natural conditions mediated by social prerogatives acting accord-
ing to an internal dynamic. In this sense, these natural constraints operate only on the bark of a 
society, and not on its core. Thus, the preference of privileging a more or less collective approach to 
hunting, to promote technologies which allot hunting equipment a more or less prominent place, 
both respond to social imperatives that are independent of the conditions of the natural environ-
ment. In the same way, it is never the environment that imposes on a human group the need to 
become a farmer or a shepherd, but it is the proper evolution of man and his societies that may 
lead to it. Admittedly, the environment can hinder or promote such a behavioural transformation, 
but it does so in a passive manner. It is in this sense that the environment is not a cause but a 
means of this evolution. The technological and economic expressions of a culture thus reveal an 
“alloy” of external and internal determinants perfectly independent of one another.” 





inquiry. Arguably, the characterisation of French lithic analysis as the dynamic interplay between ‘con-
textualistic’ and ‘organicistic’ modes of thought helps to unearth some key aspects of the cognitive 
peculiarity of the French tradition, including its distinct ways of marshalling and interpreting lithic 
evidence. 
 In the two parts that follow, I will first break down four exemplary cases of ‘contextualistic’ 
research in the French scene and then present three symptomatic examples of ‘organicistic’ reasoning 
therein. Again, these examples consist of a combination of individual case studies and larger discursive 
formations. These cases are taken as paradigmatic of French lithic inquiry (see Appendix III.4 for a 
detailed discussion of case study design and selection). 
Certain operational cornerstones of chaîne opératoire analysis (Brézillon 1968; Tixier 2012 [1978], 
1980) and of the ‘technological approach’ in general (Tixier et al. 1980; Pelegrin 1988, 1990; Perlès 
1991a; Inizan et al. 1999 [1995]) provide a direct entry point to modes of contextualistic inquiry preva-
lent in the French tradition. I will first reiterate some key features of contextualistic thought, and then 
show how these features can be retraced in French technological research. 
The key category of contextualism is context-dependency, or the situatedness of collectable 
facts in the world. To recall, qua ‘synthetic’ world theory contextualism presupposes that contexts have 
interpretive priority over facts (parts) and legislate on how they are to be connected; parts, in the view 
of contextualists, are fundamentally dependent on their wholes and thus necessarily ‘whole-endowed.’ 
It is the unity of facts that requires the most attention according to contextualism. 
Two regulative ideas guide the contextualistic enterprise of mapping varying contexts in their 
complexity and diversity: (a) polyvalency – the dogma that the same facts may have a fundamentally 
different meaning when they appear in different contexts – and (b) inter-action – the idea that facts 
are connected by relations and that these are always to be regarded as, minimally, bidirectional af-
fairs.496 The latter specifies the belief that connections between facts cannot be carved out or found in 
the facts themselves, but can only be elucidated by returning all facts into their original context. The 
root metaphor of ‘situationality’ thus generally motivates scholars to study the world in its radical rela-
tionality, as a web of interconnected nodes (parts) framed by a context (whole). It is possible to show 
that these two interpretive notions – ‘polyvalency’ and ‘inter-action’ – are directly reflected in how 
lithic technical systems and/or chaînes opératoires are studied by French technologists.497 
 French practitioners typically identify relations among lithic artefacts, techniques, and tech-
nical processes in a well-defined assemblage context as the basal units of analysis (e.g., Tixier 2012 
[1978]: 32; Pelegrin et al. 1988; Valentin 2011: 111). Instead of concentrating primarily on discrete 
artefact traits, attributes, and/or other ‘atomistic’ measures, scholars try to understand how lithic ob-
jects relate to one another and what sorts of connections explain why specific objects and object-
groups can be found in their respective lithic assemblage(s) (cf. Valentin 2011: 80f.). The granting of 
epistemic primacy to qualitative and relational data is a result of this general research configuration 
(cf. Tixier 2012 [1978]: 67; Perlès 1987; 1991a; Boëda 1988, 1994); it is a deeply built-in feature of what 
is commonly referred to as the ‘technological approach’ in France (e.g., Tixier 1980; Tixier et al. 1980; 
Perlès 1987, 2016; Boëda et al. 1990; Geneste et al. 1997; Bon 2002; Bourguignon et al. 2004).  
Indeed, the objective of technological research in this tradition is to reconstruct ‘technical sys-
tems’ which are defined by the articulation of physical objects (lithics), techniques, methods, concepts, 
corpora of knowledge, and bodily gestures (cf. e.g., Pelegrin 1988; Geneste 1991; Boëda 1991; cf. Chap-
                                                          
496 I deliberately use the spelling ‘inter-action’ here to emphasise the concept that ‘action’ takes place in-between two or more 
action-givers. Interaction is thus not interpreted as correlation, co-variation, or as a ‘tie’-relationship as in ‘formism’ or ‘mecha-
nism,’ but instead as a co-constitutive relationship potentially changing the status of the involved action-givers themselves. 
Interaction in ‘contextualism’ is a dynamic relation that informs the functioning and character of the whole. It may in fact be 
highly telling that some French lithic specialists also prefer to use this particular spelling (Ploux 1988; see quote infra). 
497 The strong emphasis that French scholars typically place on the idea of a ‘technical system’ is illuminating (cf. Geneste 2010 
[1991]: 421-424; Soressi and Geneste 2011); this notion signals that systemic articulations are regarded as the key features of 
lithic technologies and that it is ultimately their ‘wholeness’ which defines them. Approaches that reconstruct lithic technical 
systems in this manner are ‘synthetic’ by definition. 
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ter 3)498 – and hence by the various ways in which these heterogeneous factors inter-act with one an-
other to form integrated technical wholes (Inizan et al. 1999 [1995]: 14). A ‘technical system’ in this 
sense is always characterised by the ‘interpenetration’ of observable and deducible facts – a structural 
category proper to contextualism: 
It follows that each of the elements participating in a technical system potentially co-shapes any other 
element; description of the whole therefore requires the specification of the entire web of ‘co-
constitution.’499 The classic strategy with which to approach this problem is the study of technical 
wholes from three interrelated perspectives – these perspectives are sometimes re-cast as complemen-
tary ‘levels of analysis.’ Technical wholes, accordingly, can be defined by their (a) ‘structure’ (struc-
ture); their (b) ‘operation’ (fonctionnement); and their (c) ‘function’ (fonction) (see Sigaut 1991, 2012: 
52-54; cf. Geneste 2010 [1991]: 423f.; Valentin 1995: 16, 24; Soressi and Geneste 2011: 337).  
‘Structure’ thereby refers to the specific arrangement of sub-units that make up a technical 
whole (see e.g., Boëda 1991: 40f.). These sub-units are often identified as sub-structures or sub-
systems and respond to the question ‘what is it?’ and ‘what does it consist of?’ (Sigaut 2012: 53); ‘struc-
ture’ thus defines the whole as it formally comes into view if inspected from an external perspective. 
The category of ‘operation’ addresses how the technical whole functions internally (idem); it responds 
to the question ‘how does it work?’ and consequently seeks to provide a dynamic description of inter-
nal processes, movements, and/or relations insofar as they help to clarify the role and status of the 
various parts or sub-units of the system.500 This category is crucial and seems to be quite specific for 
‘synthetic’ interpretations of lithic technology. ‘Function,’ finally, defines the finality or goal-
directedness of a technical whole; it responds to the question ‘what is the point of all this?’ and gener-
ally theorises the effects of the internal organisation (interplay between ‘structure’ and ‘operation’) 
(idem). This latter category defines how the whole is externally-related – for instance, its place and 
role within a larger ‘super-structure.’ The category thus helps to recognise the function of a whole in an 
even larger whole, explaining why technical systems are regularly re-cast as sub-systems of broader 
socio-economic formations (e.g., Perlès 1987: 22; Geneste 2010 [1991]: 423; cf. Inizan et al. 1999 
[1995]: 14). 
This tripartite conception of ‘technical systems’ can be clarified considerably with the help of 
Pepper’s structural categories of contextualism: the ‘structure’ of a technical whole and its mode of 
                                                          
498 This conceptualisation of ‘technical systems’ is inseparable from the historical formation of the ‘technological approach’ in 
France and chaîne opératoire research in general (e.g., Karlin 1991; Perlès 2016). It represents the coalescence of several potent 
strands of research, most notably of what is sometimes called ‘Anthropology of Techniques’ and the ‘History of Techniques.’ The 
former, also known under the label technologie culturelle (cf. Bensa 1996), was instrumental in bringing forth chaîne opératoire 
theory and methodology. It was spearheaded by Robert Cresswell (1983, 1994, 2010) and Pierre Lemonnier (1976, 1983, 1986) 
and led to the establishment of Techniques & Culture, a platform for interdisciplinary research into human technicity (cf. Roux 
2013: 27). The second strand of inquiry, based on the disciplinary legacy of history and sociology, is represented by Bertrand 
Gille and his seminal Histoire des techniques (1978), perhaps with the addition of Jean Baudrillard’s (1968) Le système des 
objets. The ‘systemic’ conception of technology itself is probably even older, having already made its way into French Palaeolith-
ic archaeology through the work of Gilbert Simondon (1958) and others. Systemic thinking is since then an irreducible ingredi-
ent of French technological thought (cf. Séris 1994; Lemonnier 2012). 
499 This accounts for the ‘contextualistic’ belief that we can only presume that nothing can be presumed – which is simply to say 
that there can be no fixed categories on which one can confidently base all inquiry independently of the character of the context 
in question (see Chapter 2 for details). 
500 Again, the term ‘dynamic’ is not innocent here; a dynamic description is nothing less than a description that takes seriously 
the genuine and differential contribution of all elements that make up the technical whole. To regard technology as a ‘dynamic 
system’ in this sense reiterates the ‘contextualistic’ conviction that nothing can be ‘absolute’ and everything must consequently 
be context-dependent (see supra). 
“[…] Each of the artefacts featuring in the same assemblage has potentially a different fate. This 
situation proves the opportunity to recognise the inter-actions between each technical process – 
at best identifiable from a sidescraper whose micro-traces indicate skin-working, a burin which 
served to work animal antlers, etc.– and each technical chain. […] In reality, however, a multi-
tude of modalities is envisageable, depending on whether the nature or plan of inter-action 
establishes a correspondence between a process and one or more chains, whether or not each 
chain participates in multiple processes, or whether the same artefacts successively take part in 
several processes within the same operational sequence, either in the same physical form 
[blank] or after transformation [tool]. At the scale of assemblages, the entirety of these modali-
ties or only certain ones may be represented, illustrating strongly different behavioural attitudes 
towards the organisation of technical activities. The importance of this type of information has 
already been emphasised multiple times [….]” (Ploux 1988: 39; my translation [for the original 
French quote, see Appendix Q.9]) 
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‘operation’ delineate the key aspects of the specific ‘texture’ of a technical system (or context) – that is, 
its ‘technological architecture’ – whereas the interrelationships between ‘structure,’ ‘operation,’ and 
‘function’ provide insight into the ‘fusion’ of the texture-giving elements – i.e., how the ‘infrastructural’ 
features come together – thus clearing the view for the immanent ‘quality’ of the whole. Taken togeth-
er, the three categories thus provide the contextualistic frame of reference in which technical ‘inter-
action’ can be meaningfully examined. To study the ‘spread’ of the ‘quality’ of a technical whole among 
its texture-giving parts then simply means to isolate distinct sub-units of ‘inter-action’ and to expose 
their spatiotemporal organisation (cf. Pelegrin et al. 1988): 
This implies that even the categories of space and time are interpreted from a contextualistic vantage 
point. They are seen not so much as the dimensional axes of a predefined ‘Newtonian’ space-time grid, 
but as context-dependent variables themselves. Space and time are re-cast as whole-categories that 
help to illuminate the articulation of objects and processes – they make sense as interpretive categories 
only if they facilitate the ordering and grouping of the encountered technical relations.501 This typically 
results in the identification of spatial and temporal features which are specific to distinct technical 
contexts; a predisposition that paves the way for the recognition that different chaînes opératoires 
bring forth distinct spatio-temporal matrices. This fact simply reflects the contextualistic conviction 
that ‘quality’ is spread out differently in dissimilar technical wholes.502 
It should not be surprising, then, that the temporal unfolding of a chaîne opératoire (« dérou-
lement ») depends entirely on its organisation (e.g., Geneste 1985: 170, 178-183) – i.e., how many stag-
es are distinguishable, how many kinds of gestures, techniques, and technical objects participate in a 
single stage (including their own temporalities), whether and when the technical chain branches off 
into various sub-chains, and so forth (Pelegrin 1988; Bourguignon et al. 2004; Rocca 2013; Fig. 27, 
28). Similarly, each technical whole typically brings forth its own distinctive spatiality – that is, a spe-
cific pattern of how the various parts of a ‘technical system’ arrange themselves in space (cf. Boëda 
1993; Delagnes et al. 2007, 2012). This spatiality can be understood in ‘volumetric’ (e.g., Boëda 1994; 
Pelegrin 1995; Bourguignon 1997) or ‘geographic’ terms (e.g., Geneste 1985, 1988; Julien and Rieu 
1999; Audouze 2006; Delagnes 2010; Mevel 2010; Valentin et al. 2013), depending on the scale of 
analysis and the ‘technical system’ in question. The fact that key differences between varying lithic 
technologies or technological conceptions are generally described as disparities in the ‘volumetric or-
ganisation’ of reduction processes gives voice to this interpretive matrix (cf. Valentin 1995: Annexe 
[Première Partie], 2011: 17; Fig. 29).503  
All of this highlights a certain relativity of the spatial and temporal characteristics of a ‘tech-
nical system,’ a relativity that is distinctive for contextualistic reconstructions. Moreover, the amena-
bility of spatial and temporal determinations to change and their requirement for context-sensitive 
                                                          
501 This demarcates a key difference between French chaîne opératoire approaches (COA) and the classic Anglophone ‘reduction 
sequence’ approach (RSA). RSA typically presumes dimensional time and thus draws lineal artefact-consequences from the 
passing of time, e.g., that artefact dimensionality/size diminishes and/or cortex ratios decrease; the space-time is a constant is 
conceptualised as given, so that its particular effects can be measured in individual artefact characteristics. The direction of 
inference is upwards, from dimensional time to specific artefact features. COA, by contrast, generally draws spatiotemporal 
conclusions (staging of technology, reduction depth etc.) from the organisation of the encountered artefact totalities; the spatio-
temporal structure of technology is reconstructed in a downward direction, following from the nature of the technical system. 
502 We can therefore say that different technical wholes typically possess distinct temporalities of ‘operation’ and procedural 
presence/ongoing. 
503 Almost the entire range of new technological definitions and/or re-definitions of long-standing ‘industrial’ complexes that 
were proposed after the ‘technological revolution’ yielded volumetric definitions of lithic reduction systems. Examples are the 
various methods and modalities of the Levallois concept (Boëda 1986, 1988, 1993 1994), the ‘Clactonian’ method (Forestier 
1992, 1993; Amiot 1993), the Châtelperronian (Pelegrin 1995; cf. Roussel 2011), the Discoid conception (Boëda 1993; Jaubert 
1993; Mourre 2003), Quina technology (Bourguignon 1996, 1997), the MTA (Soressi 2002), the Early Aurignacian and Protoau-
rignacian (Bon 2002; Le Brun-Ricalens and Brou 2003), the Badegoulian (Cretin 2000) as well as smaller-scale technical enti-
ties such as the ‘Pucheuilian’ (Delagnes 1993), the ‘Orvillian’ (Perlès 1977, 1982), the ‘Belloisian’ (Valentin 1995), the ‘Néronian’ 
(Slimak 2004, 2007), or the ‘Hoabinhian’ (Forestier 2000, 2010). More recent work on lithic technology follows a similar lead 
(e.g., Klaric 2003; Teyssandier 2003; Montoya 2004; Boccaccio 2005; Faivre 2008; Renard 2010; Langlais 2010; Ducasse 2012; 
Mevel 2017). 
“[…] [The] unfolding [of the chaîne opératoire] presents itself as an enchainment of different 
means organised in time and space, so that the technical chain can be broken down into sever-
al spatiotemporal operational sequences.” (Ploux 1988: 41; my translation [for the original 
French quote, see Appendix Q.9]). 
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analysis are direct consequences of the ‘polyvalency’ condition;504 this enshrines the conviction that 
lithic artefacts without context are incapable of unambiguously informing us about their volumetric 
and/or temporal position (chronology, core geography, reduction stage, etc.) in a technical process. In 
this way, each lithic artefact comes into view primarily as a spatiotemporally ‘situated’ part, the infor-
mational value of which depends completely on our ability to determine its relative place in the tech-
nical context to which it belongs. 
This pervasive ‘polyvalency’ of physical forms culminates in the conception that the same lithic 
shapes and even the same groups of artefacts might recur in different technical contexts even though 
their technological role, status, and/or signification may differ vastly across these contexts (cf. e.g., 
Coudenneau 2013: 300-307; Fig. 30). The prototypical example of the application of this logic of rea-
soning is that of the Levallois point (« pointe à Levallois ») (e.g., Boëda 1986: Fig. 177, 1991: Figure 6, 
2013: Figure 84; Texier 1995; Mourre 2003; Bourguignon and Turq 2003; Locht 2004; Goval et al. 
2016). Boëda (1986) has summarised the dilemma as follows:
According to this general assessment, different systems of handling a volumetric core-matrix during 
blank exploitation have the potential to produce objects that look like Levallois points.505 A striking 
example is the Discoid débitage system, which cyclically produces so called ‘pseudo-Levallois points’ 
when the core convexities are rejuvenated (Boëda 1993, 1995a; Mourre 2003). Several ‘pyramidal’ 
structures of blade extraction, especially simple convergent methods, similarly yield triangular blanks, 
slightly elongated or not, that prima facie appear to be Levallois point-like (cf. Coudenneau 2013: 
300). It follows that the mere presence of objects resembling Levallois points in a lithic assemblage is 
not sufficient to identify with certainty the technology of which these objects are a product.506  
Only a detailed ‘map’ of intra-technological relationships is thought to provide researchers 
with the means to determine the technological implication of similar-looking lithic objects, even as 
they appear across different technical contexts.507 The general idea, typical for contextualism, is that 
while forms do not fully determine their context, contexts constrain the quality and frequency of the 
total range of forms they host; the resulting multipolar and multidirectional determination of lithic 
artefacts through significant wholes is a characteristic facet of contextualistic thought.508 
Returning the totality of lithic pieces to their technical context(s) ultimately requires the solu-
tion of a ‘4D’ puzzle (cf. Valentin 2008a: 285) – the reconstitution of the volumetric and temporal 
position of each three-dimensional lithic object in its technical system (Geneste1985; Boëda 1994; 
                                                          
504 The cognate concept of ‘polysemy’ is for instance employed by Valentine Roux (2013: 18f.) to describe this condition. For an 
explicit use of the term ‘polyvalency’ in lithic research, see Coudenneau (2013: 300-307) who distinguishes three different vari-
ants of lithic polvalency: (i) polyvalency of functions (polyvalence de fonctions); (ii) polyvalency of forms (polyvalence de 
forms); and (iii) polyvalency of productions (polyvalence de productions). 
505 It is also clear that the potentials are not the same. But the significance of these differences and their quantitative and qualita-
tive effects cannot be known a priorily. It is for this reason that fact-based ‘contextualistic’ analysis becomes indispensible. 
506 This reoccurrence of similar forms in different contexts is the basis for the ‘contextualistic’ critique on the ‘formistic’ root 
metaphor of ‘similarity.’ 
507 This effectively issues a plea for finding technical differences where similarity in forms prevails. In contrast to the manage-
ment of ‘equifinality’ in ‘formism’ and ‘mechanism,’ the calibrating factors are viewed to be found in the same domain of reality 
– namely, in the technical domain. Similar forms might be instantiated by different contexts not because these contexts are 
similar, or at least driven by similar imperatives, but because the morphometric space of lithic reduction is limited and variabil-
ity must thus be revolved internally – through the study of inter-actions and inter-relations. 
508 It is of course clear that contexts are rarely complete because lithic pieces have been removed in the past and/or because sites 
have only been partially excavated; this also generates a problem for ‘contextualistic’ inquiry but the problem is formulated 
differently than by other world theories. Part of this difference can be captured if we refer to the proposed distinction between 
‘semantically-orientated’ and ‘syntactically-orientated’ archaeological research by Plutniak. According to Plutniak (2015: 44), the 
notorious incompleteness of the archaeological record can be conceptualised as an incompleteness of the empirical data which 
needs to be overcome by adequate epistemic techniques such as analogy and/or interpretation. As he puts it (idem), archaeology 
then becomes “mostly a way to get an understanding of the meaning of material remains and to draw a restitution of the past.” 
This is what he calls ‘semantic-oriented’ archaeology. But incompleteness can also be regarded as an epistemic feature of how 
we ought to construct archaeological arguments and knowledge. This view is generally sceptical of too much interpretation and 
calls for a strict “control of archaeological enunciation” (idem). Archaeology in this view is regarded as “the study of the trans-
formations of a set of artefacts over time” (idem). This is what Plutniak names ‘syntactic-oriented’ archaeology. It should be 
clear from what has been said thus far that the ‘semantic’ proclivity is more typical for French lithic research whereas Anglo-
phone approaches tend to be more ‘syntactic.’ 
“The Levallois point may result from different knapping conceptions, which a determination 
by simple typological means cannot bring to light. Only the technological analysis of the 
knowledge used to realise it can reveal the potential variability of the volumetric conceptions 
of cores and the methods that result from it.” (ibid.: 263; my translation [for the original 
French quote, see Appendix Q.10]) 
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Pelegrin 2005).509 The puzzle is four-dimensional because three-dimensional objects – blanks, cores, 
preparatory elements, etc. – are pieced together to form larger three-dimensional complexes of objects 
(e.g., core sequences or burin-spall sequences). Yet, the puzzle metaphor is only partially adequate. 
Puzzling together lithic artefacts is rarely a straightforward or self-evident undertaking. Unlike puzzle 
pieces made from cardboard or plastic, lithic assemblages are notoriously incomplete and direct arte-
fact-conjoins are therefore often the exception rather than the rule; ‘physical refitting’ is therefore gen-
erally difficult and cannot be expected to be a reliable, context-independent baseline of knowledge-
production. 
Additionally, ‘physical refitting,’ unfortunately, reconstructs above all the mechanical succes-
sion of artefacts and not necessarily, let alone automatically, the ‘inter-actions’ of objects and process-
es as they account for technological meaning (i.e. the systemic functioning of a technical whole). 
Moreover, if ‘physical refitting’ is possible, it typically leads to a fragmentary reconstitution of the 
technical spatiotemporal sequence(s) (chaîne opératoires) because there are always artefacts that have 
been exported from archaeological sites and the sites themselves are rarely excavated in toto;510 this 
collides with the intrinsic ambition of French technologists to holistically reconstitute hominin tech-
nicity. The central issue is that ‘physical refitting’ remains naturally incomplete and thus almost always 
part-centric.511 
If one wants to capture technical wholes, one therefore has no choice but to make sense of puz-
zle pieces which only imperfectly fit each other.512 To respond to this problem, French technologists 
have devised two interpretive strategies – (i) ‘mental refitting’ (« remontage mental ») and (ii) techno-
logical ‘reading’ (« lecture ») (cf. e.g., Pelegrin 1986; Boccaccio 2005: 38). These two prisms of techno-
logical analysis unequivocally confirm that lithic research in the French tradition subscribes to the 
contextualistic project. They will be disentangled in the following to flesh out this point. 
Technological ‘reading’ – or « lecture » in French – is the practice of deciphering technical 
stigmas and their interrelationships on individual lithic artefacts as well as to interpretively arrange 
objects in a technological space to understand their signification (cf. e.g., Inizan et al. 1999 [1995]: 
Chapter 6; Pelegrin 2005).513 « Lecture » always has a dual significance: first, intra-artefact relation-
ships are mapped in order to understand the character of the present artefact-wholes before, secondly, 
the artefact ‘maps’ determined in this way are related to other co-present artefact ‘maps’ in order to 
devise a comprehensive technological ‘super-map’ of all artefact inter-actions (cf. Pelegrin et al. 1988; 
Boëda et al. 1990).514 This approach is dynamic since it requires an ongoing cross-adjustment of inter-
pretive strands and scales within a cyclic structure of hermeneutic inference (cf. Chapter 3). Marie-
                                                          
509 Typically, the determination of the frame of the ‘4D’ puzzle is part of the puzzle-solving: in practice, lithic assemblages are 
regarded as consisting of a number of sub-puzzles (sub-contexts) which are part of the bigger assemblage puzzle. 
510 The issue is of course aggravated when lithic assemblages are to be compared because the unstable success rate of ‘physical 
refitting’ threatens to undermine the comparability of different assemblages (if compared through the prism of refits); refits 
from different assemblages often provide different insights, are unequally complete, frequent, and/or technologically repre-
sentative. 
511 This is another reason why refitted sequences are often used as parts and contextualised with other pieces of information to 
reconstitute technical wholes. ‘Contextualism’ thereby seems to have the somewhat unique capacity to cope with heterogeneous 
parts; relating partially refitted sequences with non-refitted lithic artefacts and their characteristics is regularly achieved in 
French ‘contextualistic’ lithic research. 
512 It is no mere coincidence that practices of ‘mental refitting’ (sometimes also denominated ‘virtual refitting’) are widely used to 
study animal bone assemblages (cf. Christensen 1999; Averbouh 2000); these are often highly fragmented and preservation 
renders bones per definition imperfect to conjoin. The method has therefore, rather ironically, been discussed more extensively 
in branches of zooarchaeology (e.g., Averbouh 2001). 
513 The deliberate use of the term ‘reading’ here can be seen as a tacit admission of the difficulty of the task. Not only is the prob-
lem of understanding lithic technology seen analogously to understanding a written text, the term also signifies that each piece 
must be inspected multiple times – it must be ‘read’ and ‘re-read’ until intelligibility has been reached. This tacit analogy also 
points to a residual ambiguity of all reading procedures, no matter how refined they are. This is why technological reading is 
only the beginning of inquiry, not the end of it. 
514 The identification of parts and wholes is dynamic and may shift dependent on the problem context at hand. With regards to 
an individual object and its technological reading, the object is the whole and its features (scars, ridges, platforms, morphology, 
convexities, etc.) are the parts. When it comes to the reading of an assemblage, artefacts turn into parts and the assemblage itself 
becomes the whole. In reality, the situation is even more complicated since various intermediate categories of technological 
signification may be invoked to explain the overall variability of facts. Such intermediate categories can be different technical 
systems or modalities if the assemblage is too heterogeneous to explain the variability it hosts by reference to one single super-
whole. Mousterian lithic assemblages are the prime example for the necessity of introducing intermediate wholes. These assem-
blages are thought to be the result of multiple co-occurring technical systems. In such a scenario, we are facing at least three 
levels of changing part-whole relationship and hence a truly nested structure of cyclical inference. The resulting reasoning pro-
cess is unmistakably ‘hermeneutic’ in character (see Chapter 3). 
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Louise Inizan and colleagues (1999 [1995]) specify this general inclination in Technology and Termi-
nology of Knapped Stone with respect to individual objects: 
Practices of technological reading typically require engagement with the schéma diacritique of 
a lithic object (e.g., Boëda 1994: 21; Crassard 2007: Annexe 3.1). Reconstructing this schéma dia-
critique constitutes the methodological cornerstone of any chaîne opératoire analysis (Tixier 1978 
[2012]: 121; Pelegrin 1995). The schéma diacritique is a simplified graphical representation of an ob-
ject, which sets spatially distinct parts of an object into chronological relation (cf. Dauvois 1976: 195-
201; Fig. 31). For the most part, this amounts to a contextualistic interpretation of ‘reduction histo-
ries’ as they are reflected in scar inter-relationships of particular lithic objects. In its most basic form, 
devising a schéma diacritique implies the study of truncations and overlaps between scars to distin-
guish groups of scars and to order them chronologically – it is an attempt to capture the spatiotem-
poral dynamics of working a lithic object (cf. Soriano 2000: Annexe 2 [411-413]; Crassard 2007: An-
nexe 3.4 [234-285]; Roussel 2011: Chapitre 5). It is no mere coincidence that this way of ‘reading’ ob-
ject biographies co-developed with new ways of drawing lithic artefacts that emerged in the course of 
the ‘interpretive turn’ ushered in by Tixier and his followers (e.g., Inizan et al. 1999 [1995]: Chapter 7). 
To embark on a « lecture » approach to understanding the organisation of lithic assemblages 
usually also means to plunge into practices of ‘mental refitting’ – « remontage mental » in French 
(Pelegrin 1986; Le Brun-Ricalens 1993: 134; cf. Inizan et al. 1999 [1995]: 90).515 In the words of 
Jacques Pelegrin (1995: 23f., my translation): 
‘Mental refitting’ always seeks to identify and retrieve technical relationships of co-
constitution. It aims to elucidate how particular characteristics of lithic artefacts ‘inter-act’ to produce 
certain systemic technological outcomes. ‘Mental refitting’ therefore qualifies inter-artefact relation-
ships that specify key technical consequences, morphological and/or technical complementarities, or 
specific ‘logics of knapping’ rather than to map artefact-centred similarities or correlations (cf. Perlès 
1991a; Pelegrin 2005);516 it implies nothing less than to mentally juxtapose and compare all artefacts in 
a given set of artefacts in order to find a well-defined spatiotemporal place for each artefact; the tech-
nical characteristics of each lithic artefact, in other words, must be interpreted in light of the character-
istics of all other artefacts that are present in the assemblage. The procedure therefore practically relies 
on multiple and recurrent steps of sorting and pre-sorting an assemblage – ‘mental refitting’ gives 
voice to an embedded mode of hypothesis-testing (see Chapter 3). However, in contrast to ‘physical 
refitting,’ ‘virtual’ or ‘mental refitting’ only enables a general reconstitution of chaîne opératoires, 
                                                          
515 This term already appears in Tixier’s Méthode pour l’étude des outillages lithiques (1978 [2012]: 124), although the precise 
formulation he uses there is “mental reconstruction” (« restructuration mentale »). 
516 For the notion of ‘technical logic’ (« logique technique »), see e.g., Perlès (2009) and Chevrier (2012: 769f.). [See also Boris 
Valentin in [Devenir Archéologue] Les outils en pierre préhistoriques, available on YouTube (URL= 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MB4CD145z40, uploaded on the 9.2.2016)] 
“[…] it is necessary to go through the process of reading a stone object before attempting to 
study the lithic assemblage it belongs to. From the perspective of [a] technological study, a 
stone object, be it a tool or a waste product, is part of a technical operation, all elements of 
which are interdependent. Moreover, in such a perspective, the reading of an object brings 
into play the raw material used, as well as the technical actions and the knowledge, which 
together work towards the conception of the tool, in the broader sense of the term (tool, 
weapon, tool component...). It is therefore essential to have an in-depth understanding of the 
basic document, in the present case each lithic object of an assemblage, in order to enrich 
subsequent inferences.” (ibid.: 89) 
“[…] We must then call upon what may be referred to as mental re-fitting: the study of each 
lithic object, according to its morphology, the presence and position of cortex, and the order 
and characteristics of the negatives of removals (visible on both blanks and cores: observa-
tion of ‘diacritical schemes’) attested by a short preceding sequence, can enable, by mentally 
juxtaposing each object with all other objects and with the untreated blocks, the reconstruc-
tion of the specific systems of which the lithic objects are the outcome (an essential notion 
formalised by J. Tixier 1978).) Such a mental operation, which re-arranges the pieces in the 
three dimensions of space and according to the order of their detachment, allows one to 
access a “technical logic,” for which a good practice in the study of collections is mandatory 
and which always profits from experience in knapping hard stones (cf. the technological 
reading of lithic pieces: J. Tixier et al., 1980, p. 35).” (original emphasis changed from bold 





without capturing subtle knapping details or intra-assemblage differences in lithic knapping perfor-
mances (Ploux 1983). 
The evaluative criterion for a successful « remontage mental » is a fairly pragmatic one: suc-
cessful working.517 ‘Mental refitting’ aims to specify constitutive technical relationships that ‘work,’ 
those that remove interpretive problems or the ‘blocking’ of ‘strands’ in Pepper’s sense. This ‘workabil-
ity’ is assured by disbanding any remaining inconsistencies within the proposed reconstruction of lith-
ic technology in a given assemblage. ‘Mental refitting’ hence also showcases the ‘dispersive’ nature of 
chaîne opératoire research in France. Rather than to extract and to thereby pre-select artefact-traits to 
be examined, technological inquiry takes the artefact as it is and relates it to all other artefacts as they 
are.518 The objective is to determine a set of ‘inter-active’ principles and a global organisational struc-
ture that, taken together, ‘harmonise’ as many object relationships as possible – this is the interplay 
between Pepper’s (1942: 238) categories of ‘texture’ and ‘quality,’ both diagnostic for contextualism as 
an epistemic endeavour.  
‘Mental refitting’ makes room for a hyper-‘dispersive’ approach to lithic facts. In the spirit of 
contextualism, it enables the effective integration of background experience and epistemic ready-
mades such as individual knapping expertise or first-hand knowledge about other lithic assemblages. 
It urges scholars, for instance, to effectuate ‘physical refittings’ and to study them technologically – 
even if the thereby reconstructed sequences are naturally fragmented (cf. e.g., Cahen et al. 1980; Ploux 
1988; Karlin 1991; Bodu 1993; Pigeot 2004; Julien and Karlin 2014). The reason is of course that 
‘physical refits’ – if they inform about technology519 – can be used as an additional layer of background 
information to enhance the interpretation of the observed facts (e.g., Delagnes and Roche 2005; 
Bachellerie et al. 2007; Delagnes et al. 2012).520 This general focus on aspects of ‘quality’ and ‘texture’ 
of lithic technologies combined with a strongly ‘dispersive’ strategy of handling evidence unmistakably 
identifies this mode of reasoning as contextualistic.521 
Last but not least, contextualistic inquiry in French lithic analysis aims to relate systemic ‘in-
ter-action’ with technical practice and to discuss them both in their social and historical situatedness 
(e.g., Pigeot 2004; Schmider and Roublin-Jouve 2008; Audouze 2010). The assemblage context is re-
cast as a reflection of its wider socio-historical context – lithic assemblages make accessible « systèmes 
techniques » which themselves take part in larger sociocultural systems (Perlès 1987; Valentin 2011: 
114). Lithic assemblages are viewed as a context of objects as much as they are seen as a context of 
practices – of what can be termed ‘technical habitus’ (ibid.: 58). Therefore, technological readings 
(« lectures ») typically entail a specification of applied ‘knapping techniques’ and ‘technical gestures’ 
(Pelegrin 2000; cf. Bon 2009: 143). These, in turn, are interpreted holistically as a reflection of hom-
inin cognition, psycho-motoric aptitude, and socio-technical choice (cf. Perlès 1991a).  
‘Knapping techniques’ include interpretive categories such as soft and hard hammer percus-
sion, « pierre tendre » (soft stone percussion) as well as direct, indirect, and tangential modes of de-
tachment (Pelegrin 2000, 2005, 2011; cf. Soriano et al. 2007). These techniques are thought to imply 
particular ways of instrumentalising the body and of coordinating mind, hand, and torso – they imply 
percussive movement that necessarily refers to an embodied knapper (cf. Bril 1984). This, in total, 
constitutes the (historical) knapping context – a context that is identified as the transcendental condi-
tion for observing particular configurations of artefacts and stigmas of knapping. In the end, ‘knapping 
techniques’ are thus interpreted through the lens of Mauss’ Les techniques du corps (1935) and are 
                                                          
517 This ‘cognitivist’ category is of course rejected by those who embrace ‘materialism’ as the guiding philosophy of science and it 
is thus no surprise that ‘mental refitting’ has become a prominent target of critique (e.g., Tostevin 2000: 67; Chazan 1997: 728) 
– both from the perspective of ‘mechanism’ and ‘formism.’ Some of the prominent friction points in debating Levallois technolo-
gy (Bar-Yosef and Van Peer 2009) can in fact be reconstructed along similar lines. 
518 This ushers in an anti-reductionist plea against artefacts as such. Describing lithic artefacts by their traits rather than in their 
globality can then simply be viewed as a reductionist manoeuvre; even individual artefacts tend thus to be interpreted ‘syntheti-
cally’ – a basal difference to ‘analytic’ conceptions of artefacts that cannot be overemphasised. 
519 These types of refits are sometimes referred to as ‘technological refits.’ 
520 ‘Contextualism’ thus actively supports the positive mobilisation of general background knowledge, epistemic experience, and 
a ‘prejudice structure of knowledge’ [Vorurteilsstruktur des Wissens] – epistemic qualities that are typically cultivated within 
hermeneutic and generally ‘unlocked’/‘open-ended’ frames of reasoning. 
521 Note that for Tixier the difficult-to-solve problem of integrating insights from refits into quantitative lithic studies provided a 
strong incentive to re-orient technological research into the realm of qualitative inquiry (see e.g., Tixier in Tixier 1980: 14). 
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understood to echo speci-fic contexts of socialisation and learning – particular ways of using humani-
ty’s ‘first instrument’: the body (idem).522  
‘Technical gestures’ are more complex entities and they refer to more general aspects of tech-
nology-body interlinkage(s) (Leroi-Gourhan 1968; Balfet 1991);523 they are often used as a vehicle to 
reveal how bodily aspects of hominin technicity relate to volumetric aspects of core exploitation. 
Knapping is generally seen as a process through which technologies and hominin bodies become en-
chained and resonate with one another.524 A technical gesture is nothing less than a specific mode of 
handling a particular volumetric structure (e.g., a ‘core’ or a ‘biface’) – giving voice to the idea of situ-
ated human-matter inter-action(s) (e.g., Pigeot 1987; Ploux 1988; Bodu 1994: 87f.).525  
An obvious example of a particular mode of volume management is the involvement of events 
of re-orientating a core during lithic reduction – in which the volumetric matrix is turned and a new 
sequence of removals effectuated. Another example is the study of directionalities and angulations of 
knapping and their effects in relation to reconstructed volumetric structures (cf. Koehler 2011: Fig. 
11).526 This ‘gestural’ dimension of lithic technology is seen as central to any form of hominin technicity 
because it forms an irreducible part of the ‘technical milieu.’ 
The study of ‘rhythms of knapping’ and ‘progressions of knapping’ represents another coordi-
nate of mapping hominin-technology ‘inter-action.’527 Building on the early work of Pigeot (1983, 1987: 
24) among others, this type of inquiry revolves around interpretive concepts such as « débitage frontal 
» (frontal débitage), « débitage tournant » (rotational débitage), « débitage semi-tournant » (semi-
rotational débitage) and/or « débitage demi-tournant » (half-rotational débitage) – concepts which 
are designed to describe the distinct articulation of embodied knappers and the material and non-
material correlates of their core extraction technologies (cf. Ploux 1988: Fig. 25, 26; Bodu 1994; Valen-
tin 1995: Annexes [17-19]; Bon 2002: 40; Fig. 32).528  
That this type of lithic research is still very much alive becomes clear if one invokes the recent 
study Initialisation and progression of the core reduction by Valentin and colleagues (2014), where 
                                                          
522 This concept resonates with the ambition to portray prehistoric humans in their l’homme totale nature (technicity, cognition, 
and sociality are imbricated into each other) and to depict human technicity as a « fait social total » (cf. Marchand 1999a; Pigeot 
2004: 255; Valentin 2008: 58-61) – both Maussian tropes. 
523 This is the reason why French researchers have pondered already early on drawing from the science of « Ergonomie » to 
elucidate handling modalities of lithic tools (cf. e.g., Perlès 1974: 818).  
524 The central point is that ‘technology’ is conceptualised inclusively, i.e. in very broad terms (see e.g., Balfet 1975; Sigaut 1994). 
Generally speaking, technology therefore includes corporeal practices and the instrumentation of the hominin body itself. This 
essentially mirrors Marcel Mauss’ (1935) well-known notion of the body as humanity’s ‘first instrument.’ The idea is that bodily 
techniques, as long as they display efficacity (material consequentiality), are as ‘technical’ as any other technique (cf. Sigaut 
2007, 2012: 64f.). The implication is that technology can only be studied comprehensively if sensomotoric aspects of technicity 
are taken into consideration; an implication that has led to classifications and inventories of technical gestures (Leroi-Gourhan 
1943) as well as the detailed investigation of motor actions of the human hand (e.g., Sigaut 2012: 37-56). The French notion of 
« technologie », literally the ‘science of techniques,’ still carries this connotation (in contrast to the English term technology 
whose ordinary meaning is largely restricted to artificial productions). In France, there is an entire branch of socio-ethnological 
research dedicated to this topic. André-Georges Haudricourt (1946, 1964, 1987) and his ‘gestural anthropology’ are probably the 
most important manifestations of this particular approach to human technology (cf. Bert 2010; Sigaut 1978, 2012). Yet, what is 
perhaps most critical about this angle of research is that the concept of adaptation – at least compared to Anglophone interpre-
tations – is inversed: rather than to view tools as an adaptation to the external environment, tools are instead regarded as adap-
tations to human gestures (« L'outil est adapté au geste et non inversement »; cit. Haudricourt 1987: 158); adaptation is thus 
internally directed, a factor that appears to undermine evolutionary ‘adaptationism.’ The associated pattern of thought ultimate-
ly gives way to definitions of tool-use and tool-functionality in terms of gestural factors – a predisposition explicitly reflected in 
François Sigaut’s (2012: 92f.) distinction between ‘true tools’ (outils vrai/outils nécessaires) and ‘auxiliary tools’ (outils auxil-
iaires/outils prothèses): while manual gestures either assist or enhance the mode of action of the latter tool category, the mode 
of action of the former category remains original – i.e. no manual gesture would be able to perform a similar action of its own 
accord. There are thus several reasons why the emergence of ‘true tools’ is likely to mark a key threshold in technological evolu-
tion. 
525 ‘Bodily techniques’ are not necessary consciously executed and ‘knapping techniques,’ insofar as they can be viewed as ‘bodily 
techniques,’ must therefore be interpreted as a part of the socialised habitus (sensu Bourdieu 1972) of ancient hominins; that 
French lithic experts often employ the term ‘algorithm’ to describe embodied patterns of knapping (e.g., Forestier 1993; Soriano 
2000: 285-287) underscores this largely ‘unconscious’ and ‘pre-programmed’ status of ‘knapping techniques.’ 
526 This typically requires that volumetric conceptions are reconstructed by finding an efficacious spatiotemporal ‘place’ for each 
artefact in an assemblage – a place that illuminates both the ‘quality’ and ‘texture’ of the technical context. In a second step, 
thereby reconstructed volumetric structures of lithic technology are related to particular methods by which each structure is 
exploited and maintained. 
527 This testifies to an inclusive concept of technology that involves ‘more’ than just material artefacts. The analysis of ‘gestures’ 
and ‘techniques’ as cornerstones of technological practice including their relationships to aspects of body instrumentalisation is 
firmly rooted in French ‘gestural anthropology’ in the wake of Georges-André Haudricourt and the ‘Early’ Leroi-Gourhan. For 
Leroi-Gourhan (1993 [1964/65]: 283, 309f.), the key concept was the evolutionary liberation of the hominin hand which estab-
lishes a certain ‘freedom’ to manipulate raw material volumes in a multitude of different ways. 
528 See also Marchand (1999b: 216, 2014: Figure 37), Bordes and Tixier (2002: 183), or Roussel (2013) for additional examples. 
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the authors devise a set of new interpretive concepts to shed light on core reduction habits reflected in 
‘symmetric’ or ‘dissymmetric’ trajectories of core removal (Fig. 33). The widely cited work of Le Brun-
Ricalens (2005) on the status of carinated endscraper technology in the Early Aurignacian represents a 
cognate attempt to disentangle aspects of rhythmicity and spatiotemporal patterns of lithic reduction 
(Fig. 34).  
I cannot go into much detail here, but this approach provides ample opportunities to re-think 
variability at the interface between individuals and social groups – and hence to re-examine contextual 
aspects of lithic knapping such as ‘skill,’ « savoir-faire » (know-how), and ‘social learning’ (cf. e.g., 
Ploux 1988: Fig. 25, 26; Ploux and Karlin 2014; Leroyer 2016; Perlès 2016: 227; see Chapter 3). What 
remains important, however, is that these aspects are analysed by an exposition of various types of 
intra-technology relations and are hence explored from ‘within,’ without necessarily invoking much a 
priori or ‘analogical’ reasoning. It comes as no surprise that such inquiry into hominin technicity, in-
cluding the ‘gestural’ dimensions of handling dissimilar lithic technologies, tends to inaugurate tech-
nology-specific insights – a classic fingerprint of contextualism and its preoccupation with historical 
singularity.529 This general mode of reasoning groups under the umbrella of « Palethnologie » and 
seeks to ‘rehumanise’ the past through the study of ancient ‘modes of life’ (« modes de vie ») (e.g., 
Leroi-Gourhan 1971; 1983b) and their linkage with particular ‘modes of doing’ (« manières de faire ») 
(e.g., Pelegrin 1995: 35f.; Pigeot 2004: 178, 255)530 – research that typically puts technical details cen-
tre stage and reflects an ongoing concern with ‘novelty’ and ‘change’ as structural categories. 
We can thus conclude that chaîne opératoire analysis in its various manifestations – i.e. ‘tech-
nological reading’, ‘mental refitting,’ and the examination of schémas diacritique – attests to a deeply 
contextualistic logic of inquiry. Lithic assemblages are considered as ‘situated’ wholes; they have to be 
examined in terms of ‘quality’ and ‘texture,’ both in their synchronic integratedness (‘spread,’ ‘fusion’) 
and their infrastructural variability (‘strands,’ ‘references’). In the process, ‘qualitative relationships’ 
are identified as the key loci of technological information (Perlés 2016: 223);531 technical systems, 
therefore, tend to be studied with regards to their historical specificities. The resulting lithic knowledge 
claims are corroborated by their workability – that is, the overall consistency and ‘barrier-freeness’ of 
the totality of invoked arguments, assertions, and observations. This leads to an ongoing and generally 
open-ended exploration of contextual factors to characterise technological practice and knowledge, but 
the primary context of interpretation rarely exceeds the limits of the ‘technical milieu’ (cf. Pelegrin 
2004).532 
 
Renard and Ducasse’s De la rupture typologique à la fracture socio-économique (2015) provides a 
second example of contextualistic reasoning in French lithic analysis. The paper proposes a synoptic 
re-interpretation of the Solutrean-Badegoulian transition in South-Western France. It draws on im-
portant doctoral research on the techno-economic organisation of the Solutrean (Renard 2010) and 
the Badegoulian (Ducasse 2010, 2012); the paper also integrates newer insights into non-lithic do-
mains of material culture, most notably organic technology (e.g., Pétillon and Ducasse 2012; Baumann 
2014). In general, the paper’s approach marks a comparative shift in technological research and signi-
                                                          
529 This aligns with the structural category of ‘novelty’ (Pepper 1942: 235f.) and has also been described as a key interpretive 
category in French lithic analysis by Catherine Perlès (2016: 232). 
530 According to Jacques Pelegrin (1995: 35f.), specific « manières de faire » (‘ways of doing’) are coextensively interlaced with 
particular « manières de voir » (‘ways of seeing’) (cf. Pigeot 2004; Audouze and Valentin 2010: 35), again suggesting that dis-
tinct technical practices go hand in hand with characteristic cognitive operations. Following this trail of thought, one may con-
clude that particular ways of working stone reflect aspects of how ancient people have seen their world – stone working hence 
imbricates tropes of past cosmologies. 
531 Some of these ‘qualitative’ relationships – e.g., ‘logical’ and ‘complementary’ links – cannot, in principle, be ‘quantified.’ 
532 It cannot be overemphasised that the idea of the ‘technical milieu’ already demarcates a ‘contextualistic’ category; it defines 
the totality of means, objects, resources, agents, ideas, body techniques, etc. which are readily available in a given society-level 
context of technicity. It follows that, in order to understand a material correlate of a specific ‘technical milieu,’ it is required to 
scrutinise as many of the intra-milieu relationships that define the place of the material object in the milieu as possible. One may 
note that the idea of the ‘technical milieu’ already makes its appearance in the œuvre of the ‘Early’ Leroi-Gourhan (1943/1945), 
although he speaks of the ‘internal milieu.’ 
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fies the emerging potential of lithic scholars to bring to bear their ‘localised’ expertise in new and inno-
vative ways.533  
The main thesis, supported by an ongoing revision of dated evidence, is that the Solutrean-
Badegoulian transition in South-Western France was associated with a radical re-organisation of socie-
ties on almost all functional and ideational levels. Accordingly, new taphonomically reliable archaeo-
stratigraphic and radiometric data are summoned to support a rather swift and saltatory scenario of 
Solutrean-Badegoulian succession between 24 and 21 kya (ibid.: 196-198);534 this sudden turnover is 
thought to be reflected in the evolution of the associated lithic technologies as well (ibid. 201). The 
authors argue that careful comparison of the two technical systems reveals two strictly opposing tech-
no-economic conceptions, implying a true Badegoulian ‘revolution’ and thus a ‘palaeo-historical’ shift 
of considerable anthropological significance.535  
 De la rupture showcases a preoccupation with two of the key structural categories of contextu-
alism – ‘novelty’ and ‘change’ (cf. Pepper 1942: 235) – and epitomises the contextualistic core intuition 
that no context is identical to any other context, re-casting contextual wholes as critical difference-
making factors. The resulting mode of ‘world-making’ is particularistic rather than nomothetic; facts 
are born out of changing ‘situationalities,’ and an ongoing re-organisation of contexts and their con-
tents is seen as the historical status quo rather than the exception.536 According to Renard and Ducasse 
(2015), this is precisely how we should make sense of the transformations that led from the developed 
Solutrean to the Badegoulian. As signalled by the title of their paper, the observable typological ‘rup-
ture’ between the two complexes can be considered a consequence of a pervasive ‘fracture’ between 
two techno-economic systems. In this light, the Badegoulian appears as a true ‘palaeo-historical’ con-
tingency not predictable from the Solutrean substrate: it systematically breaks with the latter’s system-
ic logic and implies a fundamentally new ‘way of living.’  
The same contextualistic logic is employed to present the lithic evidence and to define the 
technological ‘context’ of its comparison; the aim is to expose the common threads that run through 
the Later Solutrean and the Badegoulian, necessitating the disciplined comparison of the technological 
‘mean signatures’ of the two techno-cultural entities: 
This cognitive strategy is both ‘synthetic’ and contextualistic – it concentrates on the main features 
that hold techno-cultural wholes together in time and space (‘spread’ of ‘quality’) and thereby defines 
the contexts of comparison. The important point is that this approach precludes any form of direct 
confrontation of artefact features and traits because, to become comparable, these must first be trans-
lated into context-level characteristics. The comparison of entire technical contexts, typical for contex-
tualism, can only be effective if one investigates resemblance in terms of the ‘quality’ of each context, 
reconstructed by a detailed exposition of its techno-economic infrastructure (its ‘texture’). What are 
effectively compared this way are larger configurations of relations, rather than merely the composi-
tion of object-level properties. 
 The details of Renard and Ducasse’s technological analysis are highly diagnostic and may serve 
here as an illustration. The first aspect of note is that the authors, in line with our expectations, base 
their interpretation almost exclusively on an evaluation of technological ‘structures,’ by which they 
mean qualitative wholes defined by second- and higher-order relationships. Such relationships specify 
the connection(s) between two or more groups of interrelated artefact nodes. They theorise how ‘dis-
                                                          
533 We can recognise this trend as an attempt to counterbalance the ‘contextualistic’ dilemma of being trapped in one’s own 
context of research; the comparative manoeuvre acknowledges this condition but hopes to bring different contexts into new 
dialogue by confronting them in terms of both ‘quality’ and ‘texture.’ This, in turn, greatly motivates the drawing together of 
complementary lithic and non-lithic expertise. 
534 This part of the argument is crucial since it aims to reject alternative explanations based on population movements and/or 
the gradual integration of Solutrean and Badegoulian signatures. 
535 Their argumentation, therefore, implies a resolute critique on persisting notions of gradual ‘transition’ (processes e.g., bap-
tised as « désolutréanisation » or « magdalénisante »).  
536 See also Bon (2009: 243, 337) for a similar view.  
“[...] we have opted for an “integrated” and qualitative presentation of the data by contrasting 
two complexes: the younger Solutrean on one hand (i.e., the Solutreén à pointes à cran) and 
the Badegoulian on the other (i.e., the Badegoulien ancien and récent).The proposed hypothe-
ses are thus based on a synthetic view “averaging” each of these complexes, a undertaking nec-
essary to putting them into perspective in the broadest possible sense” (Renard and Ducasse 
2015: 195; my translation [for the original French quote, see Appendix Q.12]) 
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order’ and ‘fusion’ produce intelligible technical contexts and the place of individual objects, opera-
tions, and other technical processes in these contexts: 
A pivotal disparity in techno-economic structure between the Developed Solutrean and the 
Badegoulian is thought to become evident when the relationship between the production of ‘domestic’ 
elements of technology and elements that support ‘hunting’ activities is examined in detail (Renard 
and Ducasse 2015 : 201). This provides a typical example for ‘infrastructural’ reasoning since a con-
text’s ‘quality,’ its global structure, is elucidated by analysing the interplay of significant sub-
structures, so that the resulting architecture of sub-structures may be mobilised to describe the con-
text’s ‘texture’: 
The above quote further suggests that the authors tacitly galvanise a concept of ‘functional equilibri-
um’ to make sense of technological ‘infrastructure;’ they look for stable relationships between the two 
technical sub-systems (‘domestic’ vs. ‘non-domestic’) to draw techno-economic conclusions. To find 
context-internal equilibrium conditions between technical spheres dealing with ‘domestic’ tools and 
those dedicated to ‘hunting’ equipment is nothing less than an attempt to characterise the ‘operation’ 
(fonctionnement) (sensu Sigaut 1991) of a technical system by removing all ‘blocking’ strands and oth-
er epistemic obstacles that inhibit overall interpretive consistency. ‘Internalist’ equilibrium considera-
tions can thus clear the view for the ‘texture’ of a technical context and help to work out the structural 
and functional division of labour that defines it.  
The authors emphasise that different equilibrium solutions seem to specify the Developed So-
lutrean and the Badegoulian respectively; each context is depicted as an original integration of differ-
ent types of lithic production and different systemic trade-offs can consequently be observed (Renard 
and Ducasse 2015: 198-203, Fig. 2). This type of reasoning expresses a proclivity toward portraying 
structural ‘novelty’ and spelling out its contextual corollaries; additionally, this approach again high-
lights the fact that ‘infrastructural’ differences in technological organisation are thought to reflect 
marked differences in the ‘quality’ of the techno-cultural contexts in question. In a manner characteris-
tic of contextualism, it is thus the ‘qualities’ of contexts that are ultimately compared in order to gauge 
similarity and difference.537 
 The process by which the ‘texture’ of two or more technical systems is explored is equally in-
formative and reflects a more general approach to Upper Palaeolithic technicity that is currently influ-
ential in the French scene. This approach rests on two complementary pillars. The first pillar is the 
distinction between a ‘domestic’ and a ‘hunting-oriented’ component of lithic technology (cf. Ducasse 
2012: 153; Renard 2010), put forth by Bon (2005, 2009) and others (e.g., Geneste and Plisson 1986; 
Geneste 2010 [1991]: 437f.; Texier et al. 1998; Tartar et al. 2006; Teyssandier et al. 2010; Pelegrin 
2011; Bachellerie et al. 2011; Anderson et al. 2015).538 ‘Domesticity’ thereby refers to everyday activities 
tied to the needs of sustaining human settlement – i.e., scraping and cutting duties performed primari-
ly at occupational sites – while the ‘hunting’ domain includes all activities focused on the extraction of 
                                                          
537 This is of course very different in ‘mechanism’ or ‘formism’ as we have seen, where discrete features of parts or selected ties 
between/relationships among these parts are mobilised to assess similarity and difference in lithic technology (see Chapter 4). 
538 The purpose of this distinction is to theorise the differential contribution of parts that form sub-structures in a technical 
system to the overall ‘function’ (fonction) of the system; it is their differential interplay that is considered key to determining 
aspects of ‘quality’ and ‘texture’ of the technical whole and to investigating how the system generally works. 
“[…] the techno-economic approach shows that between the Solutrean and the Badegoulian, it 
is the structuring of the technical system itself which seems to have undergone profound 
changes. The Badegoulian of the French South-West appears indeed as a moment of total over-
haul where the techno-economic architecture of the system of production and the management 
of lithic equipment is completely reworked […]. This reorganisation is reflected in particular by 
a new economic relationship between domestic tools and hunting weapons, a new balance of 
which we propose to explore the correlates in terms of the spatio-temporal organisation of 
activities.” (idem; my translation [for the original French quote, see Appendix Q.12]). 
“The status of each of these [lithic] productions is thus defined with regards to the entire lithic 
technical system in order to assess the techno-economic investment that is respectively con-
ferred on them as well as their level of mutual dependence (integration or disjunction of objec-
tives, economic “hierarchy”). Solutrean and Badegoulian lithic productions can hence be com-
pared step by step and aspect by aspect in order to measure their degree of techno-economic 




animal resources, in particular meat and fat, which require the killing of these animals – i.e., duties 
facilitated by specialised lithic implements that are parts of armature and weaponry systems. Although 
the involved spatial dynamics are certainly important, the focus remains economic; the goal is to sepa-
rate lithic production modes and modification strategies that result in differentiated tool-kits (‘domes-
tic’ vs. ‘hunting-oriented’) and thus reflect a diversification of economic needs. This amounts to noth-
ing less than an inquiry into the economic ‘status’ and ‘role’ of different functional parts in a larger 
technical system.539 The inclination is of course deeply relational – the resultant approach enables the 
investigation of how technical components of potentially dissimilar economic status relate to one an-
other on the systemic level, e.g., whether or not the components are technologically ‘integrated’ or 
‘disintegrated.’ 
The second pillar is the proposal, popularised by Jacques Pelegrin (1995, 2000) and others (cf. 
e.g., Tsanova et al. 2011; Valentin 2011: 31; Langlais et al. 2012), that lithic technological evolution in 
the Upper Palaeolithic was driven largely by a need to prepare and maintain well-defined projectile 
technologies, tethered to new hunting tactics (cf. Pelegrin and O’Farrell 1998; O’Farrell 2004). The 
resultant research objective is to identify ‘levels of hierarchisation’ within and between blank produc-
tion systems and to assess whether particular ways of organising lithic reduction respond to the ‘needs’ 
of particular mobility and hunting systems. The guiding idea is that lithic technicity in the Upper Pal-
aeolithic was anchored in the production of more or less well-differentiated projectile blanks and that 
the emerging key problem is thus to also support other ‘domestic’ needs (e.g., Valentin 2011: 66; Bor-
des and Teyssandier 2011).540 From a contextualistic perspective, this dilemma can be reformulated in 
terms of the structural categories ‘quality’ and ‘texture:’ the fact that technical systems foreground the 
manufacture of blank-types destined to become part of the hunting equipment pertains to the overall 
‘quality’ (immanent total meaning) of the technical systems. The price of this technological ‘quality’ is 
the need of organising the system in such a way that the full spectrum of tasks can still be supported, 
and eventually impacts the ‘texture’ of the system (grammatical relations). The analysis of ‘technical 
intentions,’ that is, the techno-economic ‘purposefulness’ of a lithic system, then simply consists of the 
determination of the distinct liaison between ‘quality’ and ‘texture’ which leads to distinct patterns of 
systemic ‘operation’ (cf. Pelegrin 2011: 146). 
 Renard and Ducasse (2015: 194) integrate these two angles of inquiry to show that the fabrica-
tion of hunting equipment in the Developed Solutrean appears to have a radically different techno-
economic status than in the Badegoulian (Fig. 35). In the Solutrean, armature and projectile point 
production are found to lie at the heart of the technical system and the entire system appears to be 
oriented towards the generation of suitable blanks to support this ‘non-domestic’ component of tech-
nicity (ibid.: 198). This privileged status of the hunting-related ‘strand’ of lithic technology is signalled 
by a number of interrelated organisational features which typify the techno-economic architecture of 
the Solutrean.  
First, blank production is ‘diversified’ and furnishes a panoply of ‘domestic’ tool types – e.g., 
scrapers, burins, and borers – but these types are neither tied to a specific chaîne opératoire dedicated 
to produce them, nor are they manufactured on the blanks of ‘primary intention’ that are extracted 
from the dominant blade production system.541 Instead, ‘domestic’ tools are primarily produced from 
                                                          
539 The objective, again, is to determine the ‘operation’ (fonctionnement) of the system in light of the orchestration of its parts. 
540 The important point is that such a shift in the nature of the economic problem-situation is possible. Other ‘qualities’ of a 
technical system may face other kinds of economic issues – technologies may, for instance, be oriented towards ‘domestic’ pro-
duction, therefore requiring the ‘non-domestic’ tool domain to be supported by ‘infrastructural’ means. The activities enabled or 
facilitated by a technical system and the technological problems it generates are therefore always a product of the dynamic in-
terplay between the ‘quality’ and ‘texture’ of a technical context; they cannot be defined or known without knowledge of the 
technical context itself. 
541 Lithic products of ‘primary intention’ are not just ‘intuited’ but are determined in the course of careful ‘synthetic’ examina-
tion. The main point is that ‘technical intentions’ are not extracted from individual lithic artefacts and their characteristics, but 
can only be studied in the light of system-level properties. A technical system is ‘purposeful’ or ‘directed’ insofar as it has a ‘func-
tion’ (fonction) – typically referred to in the French literature as its ‘finality’ – and blanks of ‘primary intention’ are those blanks 
that serve or support the respective systemic ‘function.’ This also means that assessments of the sort implied by categories such 
as blanks of ‘primary intention’ depend entirely on the determination of the immanent ‘quality’ of a technical whole. The in-
ferred structure of ‘intentionality’ therefore generally mirrors the ‘texture’ of the technical system in question; ‘intentionality’ 
can then be hierarchised by evaluating how systemic ‘quality’ authors a specific systemic ‘function’ and how the two articulate 
(or not) with the documented systemic ‘infrastructure’ (‘texture’). All of this is perfectly ‘contextualistic’ since all of these catego-
ries can be defined only in mutual dependency and are amendable to constant modification and correction; it is ultimately the 
inter-relationality between them that enables conclusions about the ‘purposefulness’ of a technical whole and the status of vari-
ous parts (e.g., lithic artefacts) within all of this. ‘Purposefulness’ defined in this sense is a genuinely ‘contextualistic’ category. 
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by-products and preparatory blanks that arise during blade production and its maintenance. The raw 
material base of these ‘domestic’ tools is rather heterogeneous and represents a mix of local and non-
local materials of varying quality, larger endscrapers constituting perhaps the only exception to this 
configurational logic.  
Secondly, the treatment of ‘domestic’ elements contrasts with the handling of large blades ac-
counting for the blanks of ‘primary intention.’ These blanks are either transformed into pointes à 
cran or provide the raw material for different variants of ‘laurel’ leaf points. Secondary modification 
(retouch etc.) of these pieces attests to elevated levels of ‘economic investment’ (ibid.: 199); for in-
stance, they regularly exhibit secondary surface shaping (façonnage) by means of flat pressure flaking 
– a treatment that is completely absent in the ‘domestic’ sphere of production. Although the raw mate-
rial spectrum covered by these ‘non-domestic’ tools is also diverse, the diversity is primarily a function 
of high-quality raw materials, testifying to the ‘mobility’ of the objects and the ‘planning’ and technical 
‘anticipation’ involved in their production. Some of the extra-large ‘laurel’ leaf points can even be in-
terpreted as couteau de chasse (hunting knives) and hence emerge as a supplement to the primary 
‘hunting gear’ in the form of projectile points (ibid.: 201).  
Thirdly and certainly related to the previous point, many of the bifacially shaped objects seem 
to be ‘over-designed.’ They can be interpreted as signalling economic ‘over-investment’ and embodying 
a high level of ‘technical competence’ (« savoir-faire »), perhaps even reflecting the ‘valorisation’ of 
certain ‘non-domestic’ needs (ibid.: 203f.).542 The resulting relative imbalance between ‘domestic’ and 
‘non-domestic’ spheres of lithic production is interpreted in terms of a proper hierarchy of techno-
economic organisation (ibid.: 203): ‘domestic’ and ‘hunting-related’ (« cynégétique ») needs are re-
garded as well-separated and infrastructurally differentiated. While the production of ‘domestic’ 
blanks appears to be ‘embedded’ and is thus not implicated in the overall ‘quality’ of the technical sys-
tem, there is an over-accentuation and elaboration of technical means of assembling projectile ele-
ments and other specialised tools that support hunting trips. 
 This general architecture of the Solutrean contrasts markedly with the lithic evidence from the 
Badegoulian. Renard and Ducasse (2015: 201) argue that domestic and cynégétique needs in the 
Badegoulian are deeply entangled with one another and seem to be fully integrated. The respective 
chaînes opératoires are thought to evince an ‘imbrication’ (overlap) of ‘domestic’ and ‘nondomestic’ 
needs. This techno-logical structure is captured by the notion of ‘ramification.’543  
In contrast to technological organisation in the Solutrean, Badegoulian technical systems are 
based almost exclusively on the production of flakes (Renard and Ducasse 2015: 201). These flakes 
vary in shape and size, are often slim in character, and are used as blanks for tools but also as volumet-
ric matrices for the production of bladelets and micro-bladelets. In addition, the raw material base for 
the manufactured tools is largely of local origin. The articulation of all of these factors is interpreted as 
non-hierarchical strategy of volumetric exploitation, capable of quick-and-easy adjustment to local 
circumstances (idem). Badegoulian lithic technology is consequently seen as inherently ‘transforma-
tive’ and relatively flexible in its ability to satisfy different production needs. It follows that the distinc-
tion between objects of ‘primary intention’ and objects of ‘secondary’ or even ‘tertiary intention’ makes 
little sense in such a technological context – a finding that speaks to the basic difference in ‘texture’ 
between Badegoulian and Solutrean techno-economic contexts.544  
In total, Badegoulian technological organisation is viewed as expounding to a plurality of co-
existing ‘technical intentions,’ which are enshrined in a single sequence of continuous but structured 
lithic reduction (Renard and Ducasse 2015: 202). Moreover, the centrality of flake matrices in the 
techno-logic of the Badegoulian is thought to reveal the polyvalency of this blank-type in this particu-
lar context as well as the fundamental ‘pliability’ of the techno-economic systems it hosts.545 De la rup-
ture therefore proposes to understand the differences between Solutrean and Badegoulian techno-
economic organisation in South-Western France as the symptom of an abrupt transition from differen-
                                                          
542 See also Geneste and Plisson (1986), Renard and Geneste (2006), and Pelegrin (2007, 2013). 
543 The structural analogy for this ‘arboreal’ or ‘dendritic’ organisation of lithic reduction is derived from previous work on vari-
ants of the French Mousterian (Geneste 1991; Bourguignon et al. 2004). 
544 However, one might nevertheless speak of a ‘nested’ structure of blanks since flakes that are used to produce micro-flakes or 
bladelets are often blanks themselves (core-on-flake system) – this is of course precisely the significance of a ‘ramified’ techno-
logical structure. 
545 Renard and Ducasse (2015: 202) speak explicitly of « matrices polyvalentes ». 
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tiated and highly specialised production systems with a clear focus on projectile weaponry and hunting 
equipment to more integrated modes of production in which ‘domestic’ and ‘nondomestic’ needs were 
expediently satisfied. With Pepper we can conclude that the difference in techno-economic ‘quality’ 
between the Developed Solutrean and the Badegoulain pertains to a clear-cut disparity in the ‘texture’ 
of the two contexts, which is expressed in the differential relationship between ‘domestic’ and ‘non-
domestic’ domains of lithic organisation.546 
 In typical contextualistic fashion, Renard and Ducasse (2015: 203-206) further suggest that 
these disparities in techno-economic organisation can be brought into dialogue with structural differ-
ences between some of the non-lithic domains which are tied to the respective lithic systems. They 
highlight mobility systems and their associated organic technologies (idem). We can thus characterise 
their approach as hyper-relational – intra-technological relations are used to describe the ‘structure,’ 
‘operation,’ and ‘function’ of a technical whole, only to analyse the interconnections between the whole 
and other wholes of its wider ‘super-structural’ surrounding; this amounts to nothing less than the 
introduction of a higher level of analysis, on which wholes again become parts and are examined in 
their systemic interplay.547 It also shows that we are dealing with a ‘soft’ ecology approach, where ‘in-
terpenetration’ is the regulative idea and everything potentially shapes (and is shaped by) everything 
else. The advocated contextualism is ‘refined:’ categorically distinct domains of reality (lithic technolo-
gy, mobility, organic technology, etc.) are understood to be massively intertwined,548 and a ‘dynamic’ 
interpretive holism takes centre stage.549  
This holism enables the exposition of ‘palaeo-historical’ articulations of l’homme total (‘the 
complete man’) (see Appendix II.3);550 human realities can be reconstructed in their totality since 
even the study of a single context of reality (e.g., technical) allows conclusions about other contexts 
(e.g., mobility, worldview, cognition, etc.) to be drawn. The reason is unmaskingly contextualistic: 
everything is interconnected with everything else and thus points to everything else.551 L’homme total, 
however, is always ‘situated’ since each broader historical context (‘super-context’) is substantially 
unique, reflecting contextualism’s commitment to ‘novelty’ and ‘change.’ The consequence is that, if 
techno-cultural entities such as the Solutrean or Badegoulian are re-cast as significant contexts of in-
terpretation, they tend to yield divergent descriptions of l’homme total. The homme total of the Solu-
trean thereby differs from l’homme total of the Badegoulian.552 This is probably precisely what is re-
ferred to when Renard and Ducasse (2015: 194) stress the ‘anthropological signification’ of the system-
ic changes they observe at the Solutrean-Badegoulian boundary. The two contexts ultimately showcase 
different instances of being human.553 
The authors enunciate that the Developed Solutrean and the Badegoulian were characterised 
by two distinct ways of organising activities in space and time, which they identify with “two quasi 
                                                          
546 Again, what is identified as ‘domestic’ and ‘hunting-related’ varies between the two structural wholes and is thus context-
dependent. In sum, this approach therefore provides a prototypical example for the ‘contextualistic’ tendency to delineate and 
compare context-specific features of the same kind. 
547 We can thus speak of reality as a highly structured and granular entity. There are several levels of analysing ‘texture’ and 
‘quality,’ so that one can examine ‘texture’-‘super-texture’ relations and so forth. From the perspective of ‘contextualism,’ the 
purpose of such continuous exploration of lower and higher levels of analysis and their inter-linkage is to determine to ‘spread’ 
of the ultimate explanatory contexts. 
548 This is perhaps where Pepper’s structural category of ‘fusion’ comes into play. According to Pepper (1942: 243), the ‘quality’ 
of a context always exhibits some degree of fusion of the details of its ‘texture’ – an aspect that secures the unity of ‘quality’ and 
‘texture.’ Thus, ‘fusion’ motivates scholars to conceptualise the world as an entangled whole. 
549 Interpretation is exhaustively ‘synthetic;’ the idea is simply that every aspect of reality is potentially implicated in any other 
aspect of reality. It follows that technicity, sociality, cognition, and so forth are systematically embedded in each other; each of 
them consequently has implications for all others, or, in other words, analysis of any of them may deliver conclusions about all 
others. Needless to say, conclusions become much more robust as more aspects, domains, and/or categories of reality are taken 
into account. To a certain degree, contexts that by definition enshrine only parts of reality can then be viewed as ‘microcosms’ of 
the whole of reality. French-type chaîne opératoire analysis aims to do precisely this: to provide an account of technical systems 
as ‘microcosms’ of society, cognition, practice, and body instrumentalisation, to name but a few (see e.g., Bon 2009: 143, 213 for 
an explication). 
550 For a detailed discussion of Mauss’ l’homme total conception, see e.g., Schlanger (2012). 
551 Cf. Appendix II.3: Fig. II.1 for the interplay between the ‘contextualistic’ constitution of worldly affairs and the regulative 
idea of the l’homme total: the vision of the l’homme total can be brought into fruitful contact with what Hans-Peter Hahn (2013: 
34f.) has identified as the ‘pound-cake model’ (Rührkuchenmodell) of sociocultural realities. 
552 We can interpret this as a reminder of deep time alterity, in the sense that even humans that biophysiologically resemble 
modern humans are likely to have been very different from us in how they lived, thought, and behaved. Placing emphasis on 
facets of ‘alterity’ is a regular feature of ‘contextualistic’ reasoning (see Chapter 2). 
553 In Éric Boëda’s ‘organicism,’ this inclination gives way to what I call a ‘radical anthropology of alternative humanities’ (see 
second part of this Chapter). 
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oppositional solutions of anticipating needs” (Renard and Ducasse 2015: 203, my translation). The 
Solutrean techno-economic profile, with its high potential for functional differentiation, is shown to 
correspond to a settlement system that is characterised by a ‘complementarity’ of distinct techno-
economic site profiles in geographic space (idem). Techno-economic differentiation in the Developed 
Solutrean is therefore thought to be reflected in a diversity of site functions. The ‘texture’ of lithic tech-
nology, in other words, is shown to be mirrored in the ‘texture’ of the mobility system. By contrast, the 
techno-economic structure of the Badegoulian appears to correspond to a settlement system compris-
ing a multitude of sites with relatively ‘stable’ techno-economic profiles, but hosting a rather diverse 
set of activities (ibid.: 203f.). 
For Renard and Ducasse (2015: 203), this structural difference provides further evidence that 
hunting activities played an outstanding role in the Solutrean, potentially betraying a strong ‘segmen-
tation’ of the social realm and the extraordinary socio-political status of some individuals (cf. Renard 
and Geneste 2006; Pelegrin 2007, 2013). The situation in the Badegoulian appears to be very different. 
Badegoulian technology comes into view as a technology « tout-terrain » (‘all-terrain’) centred on 
‘adaptation’ and ‘travelling.’554 This is taken to suggest that Badegoulian society was probably more 
‘collective’ and mobility likely took ‘cyclical’ forms (Renard and Ducasse 2015: 203).555 The inherent 
‘technical suppleness’ (« souplesse technique ») of the Badegoulian is regarded as having enabled the 
relative stability of lithic toolkits across a vast geographic extent, which explains the spatiotemporal 
homogeneity of this techno-cultural complex at large (ibid.: 203, 205). This homogeneity can be con-
trasted with the relative spatiotemporal heterogeneity of the Developed Solutrean, which is known for 
its well-delineated regional groupings that are often centred on distinct styles of projectile heads (cf. 
Smith 1966). Thus, there seems to have been a proper ‘cultural geography’ in the Solutrean (ibid.: 205; 
cf. Ducasse and Renard 2012),556 whereas a similar structure-giving geographic moment is missing in 
the Badegoulian.557  
The cognitive strategy is to relate specific « manières de faire » (‘modes of doing’), identified 
in the realm of lithic technology, to particular « manières d’occupation » (‘modes of occupation’) re-
flected in settlement patterns, in order to evoke associated « manières de penser » (‘modes of think-
ing’).558 Different contexts of past reality are compared in terms of their configurations to demonstrate 
that they share a similar structure; this is then taken as evidence for a stable ‘super-structure’ regulat-
ing the observed structures.559 The strategy, in a manner characteristic of contextualism, is also deci-
sively ‘dispersive’ since the search for the unifying super-structure that provides ‘quality’ to its ele-
ments is guided by the proliferation of fact (addition of contexts). Moreover, knowledge is corroborat-
ed by a pragmatic principle of verification: one context is taken as a training ground to develop a con-
sistent and beneficial interpretation of its ‘texture’ and ‘quality’; the structural features of the latter are 
then retraced in added contexts on a similar level of analysis. If the structural qualities of the training 
context turn out to be helpful in elucidating the added contexts and their links to the original training 
                                                          
554 An obvious metaphor to circumscribe Badegoulian lithic technology, although not explicitly mobilised, is that of the moun-
tain bike or amphibian vehicle. 
555 The authors explicitly refrain from the use of theoretical models in the vein of Binford and others to characterise the kind of 
mobility they are most likely facing (Renard and Ducasse 2015: 204). This seems counterintuitive at first glance (Badegoulian 
mobility seems to conform to a ‘residential,’ Solutrean mobility to a ‘logistical’ one). However, the underlying contention seems 
to be that deep time alterity cannot be taken lightly. The argument is that mobility is not explained or illuminated by simple 
categorisation, but by taking seriously its idiosyncrasies and relating it to other characteristics of the same reality in order to 
flesh them out. This comes close to saying that there can be no a priori categories within which one can meaningfully place 
mobility systems of the deep past – a prototypical argument of ‘contextualism.’ 
556 This detail is important since the technological centrality of hunting-gear production mirroring that of projectiles and other 
‘hunting-related’ weaponry is directly reflected in the fact that these products became a factor in catalysing regional fragmenta-
tion during the Solutrean. In other words, the fact that these pieces and not others played a role in organising proper ‘territories’ 
attests to their more-than-functional significance. 
557 For the specific corpus of theoretical literature on ‘cultural geography’ typically referred to by French scholars, see e.g., Bon-
nemaison (2000), Claval (2001, 2003), Chivallon (2003), Allemand (2004), Rasse 2010, and Di Méo (2008); for an explicit 
treatment of the topic in French Palaeolithic archaeology, see Bon (2009: Chapitre III) and Chevrier (2012: Chapitre III.3). 
558 The authors deliberately evoke these notions in some of their section headings: e.g., Deux manières d’occuper le territoire ? 
(‘Two manners of occupying the territory?’) (ibid.: 203) and Pour deux manières de penser le territoire ? (‘For two manners of 
thinking the territory?’) (ibid.: 205). 
559 The way in which this ‘super-structure’ is conceptualised of course varies among French practitioners. An example is François 
Bon who, in Préhistoire. La fabrique de l’homme (2009: 324), explicitly declares: “[…] [b]ut the important thing is to recognise 
the articulation of these various domains – economic, technical, religious – around the ideological structure that renders a 
human group a true human society. And this without starting from the assumption that the most accessible domains, like those 
pertaining to the techno-economic identity of a given population, act in the form of a more powerful determinant than other 
components of the same society.” (my translation [for the original French quote, see Appendix Q.5]) 
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context, the interpretation is found to be ‘workable.’ This confirmative strategy is typical of developed 
forms of contextualism.560 
 As a last manoeuvre, Renard and Ducasse (2015: 204) argue that the distinct logic of ‘domes-
tic’-‘nondomestic’ interaction in the Developed Solutrean and in the Badegoulian is supported by the 
nature of economic investment in organic tools in both periods (Fig. 36). Based on the work of 
Chauvière, Pétillon, and Baumann, they contend that Solutrean organic technology exhibits a strong 
investment in organic points and other ‘hunting-related’ objects – the only notable exception perhaps 
being compresseurs (idem).561 This pattern obviously reproduces the general hierarchy between ‘do-
mestic’ and ‘non-domestic’ spheres of lithic production. In the Badegoulian, to the contrary, the organ-
ic technological domain attests to an economic ‘equilibrium’ between ‘domestic’ and ‘hunting’ arma-
ture (idem). The authors take these findings as evidence of the validity and generality of the organisa-
tional relationships they have isolated. This part of the argument simply confirms what has been said 
earlier, namely that knowledge corroboration is pragmatic and the mode of inquiry holistic and ‘hyper-
relational.’  
To strengthen this general systemic reconstruction, Ducasse and colleagues (2016) have re-
cently integrated evidence on personal ornaments and other ‘artistic’ domains of material culture from 
both the Developed Solutrean and the Badegoulian; this evidence is thought to reproduce and thus to 
confirm the division. This again brings to light the ‘dispersive’ nature of inquiry and corroboration. It 
is once more the proliferation of fact, through the enumeration of even more contextual evidence 
which is regarded as helping secure scientific ‘approvability.’ The approach is ‘dispersive’ because its 
strength is to include a broad latitude of available data without presuming from the start that some 
data are more important than others; the same methodological symmetry holds for the domains of 
reality which have been included in the analysis – none are regarded as privileged, but instead viewed 
to point equally to the same ‘super-structure’ or ‘macro-context.’ The combined evidence for Pepper’s 
contextualism is thus overwhelming; its structural categories greatly clarify what the authors have 
done and why they have done it. 
Following the discussion in the previous section, it is instructive to take stock of the so-called French 
‘techno-economic approach’ more generally (e.g., Perlès 1980, 1991b; Pigeot 1983; Geneste 1985, 1991 
[2010]: 429-431; Jaubert 1993; Cretin 1996; Geneste and Jaubert 1999; Thiébaut 2006: Chapitre II; 
Renard 2010). This approach is already contextualistic in terms of its basic premises and orientations: 
it is primarily interested in the interplay between – that is, the ‘co-fashioning’ of – technology and 
economy. A key assumption is that technological and economic rationalities are largely co-
extensive.562 Techno-economic inquiry is typically concerned with the economic implications of vary-
                                                          
560 This ‘theory of cognitive criticism’ is probably a combination of what Pepper (1942: 272-278) identifies as the ‘contextualistic’ 
principle of a verified hypothesis and qualitative confirmation (see Chapter 2). The insights from the original training context 
are used to ‘inductively’ develop a number of hypotheses which are then explored in the added contexts (‘direct verification’); the 
‘qualitative confirmation’ theory, on the other  hand, simply states that all elements, ‘strands,’ and/or ‘references’ take up the 
qualities of their context, which means that a multiplication of recurring structures can be regarded as indicative for the fact that 
these somehow take up the ‘quality’ of their overarching context (‘super-context’). One therefore confirms what one asserts if 
and only if one retraces particular structural features of the whole in its parts, whereby wholes and parts are dynamically de-
fined. 
561 Compresseurs are bone objects with often marginal traces of utilisation that are difficult to decipher (Patou-Mathis et al. 
2002). It is interesting, however, that a possible role of these items in applying pressure for lithic retouch has regularly been 
invoked. Needless to say, a ‘synergetic’ relationship with practices of shaping foliates in the Solutrean would further strengthen 
the argument presented by Renard and Ducasse. It would directly tie these pieces to ‘hunting-related’ domains of lithic technici-
ty and further detach them from strictly ‘domestic’ spheres of production and use.  
562 It is noteworthy that the mobilisation of essentially hybrid terms such as ‘techno-economic’ or ‘techno-economy’ to describe 
the project of lithic economic inquiry is largely restricted to the Francophone world. In Anglophone research, by contrast, schol-
ars typically speak of ‘lithic economy,’ ‘economy,’ and/or ‘economics.’ While technology and economy fuse terminologically into 
each other in the first case, they are typically kept separate in the latter. This observation alone signals that largely distinct con-
ceptions about the nature and status of economy are in place. It also indicates that in the Anglophone world economic aspects of 
lithic technology are really approached from the perspective of economics, a specialised academic field with specialised theoreti-
cal and methodological resources but mainly concerned with the present day. In addition, and I will return to this point below, 
economy in Anglophone research is often seen as a ‘glue’ that aids the understanding of how technology interfaces with its natu-
ral exterior (see Chapter 4). In France, the ‘fusion’ of technical and economic aspects is thought to illuminate how technology is 
stitched to its sociocultural substrate and how techno-economy is therefore always socially embedded. 
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ing technological make-ups.563 Lithic economy, a term that is in fact rarely used, is therefore studied 
from the perspective of technical wholes rather than from the viewpoint of generalisable economic 
principles or laws. The idea, again, is that both domains of reality – technology and economy – ‘inter-
penetrate’ each other and therefore inscribe themselves onto each other’s structure (cf. Perlès 1991a: 
9). The technical ‘interface’ is thought to resonate both with its economic neighbour and with the soci-
etal whole and thereby picks up key characteristics of both. This inherently ‘contextualistic’ trope fur-
nishes the central research mandate for French techno-economic studies.  
Techno-economic inquiry in the French tradition effectively begins with Marie-Louise Inizan’s 
Nouvelle étude d’industries lithiques du Capsien (1976), in which the author coined the interpretive 
concept of « économie de débitage » (‘blank production economy’) (see also Inizan 1980) – a concept 
that is still widely used today. Lithic approaches that draw on this concept set out to investigate the 
economic dimension of varying blank production systems (débitage). The guiding motivation, con-
sistent with what has already been said, is to theorise and examine the precise economic implications 
and effects of organising lithic reduction in a number of different ways. Again, the ‘structure’ (struc-
ture) and ‘operation’ (fonctionnement) of a given technical system – i.e., the ‘infrastructural’ features 
of the targeted lithic technology – are viewed as informative of the system’s economic status and pur-
pose; in other words, the ‘texture’ of technology is used to infer a special axis of its ‘function’ (fonc-
tion): its « fonction économique » (‘economic function’). The interaction between the two is regarded 
as providing critical insights into the ‘economic quality’ of various technical systems.  
A central line of techno-economic investigation is to evaluate the differential capacity of lithic 
technological systems to support blank ‘normalisation’ or ‘standardisation,’ the ‘diversification’ of 
blanks, tools, and/or raw materials, and whether and in what way they require ‘technical investment,’ 
‘anticipation’ and/or collective ‘planning’ (planification)564. While a lot of research has traditionally 
been dedicated to better understanding the interaction of knapping concepts and tactics with different 
raw material qualities and formats (e.g., Pigeot 1987; Meignen 1988; Geneste 1989; Perlès 1991b; Cret-
in 1996, 2000),565 recent approaches have increasingly paid attention to ‘inter-technological’ trade-offs 
(e.g., Soriano 2000; Soressi 2002; Faivre 2008; Brenet and Folgado 2009; Brenet et al. 2014); that is, 
how different economic needs can be satisfied by employing a number of distinct technical solutions 
that complement and/or support each other economically.566 The contextualistic inclination of this 
type of research is evident. Various technical ‘micro-contexts’ in the form of particular technological 
systems (e.g., various Levallois concepts, Discoid, Quina, and/or varying bifacial technologies) are 
related in such a way that their larger economic ‘macro-context’ becomes apparent; thus, the configu-
                                                          
563 Methodologically, this direction of inference and argumentation is explicitly laid out in ‘Fig. 1’ of Renard and Ducasse (2015). 
564 The notion of planification, which is regularly invoked when French scholars address the problem of economy (e.g., Bon 
2009: 252; Langlais 2010: 301), carries a strong social connotation; it again signals that the ‘techno-economic’ approach is based 
on the conception that technology, sociality, and economy are mutually embedded into each other. This conception brings 
French techno-economic inquiry close to ‘substantivist’ views in economic anthropology (e.g., Polanyi 2001 [1944]; Dalton 1961, 
1969), where economy is theorised as an expression or derivate of sociocultural organisation (and not the other way around!). 
Although the term planification is still best translated as ‘planning,’ its meaning is historically informed and refers to a top-
down form of collective planning. The term was used originally to designate types of economic planning in which regulation, 
control, and coordination by higher-order (i.e. state) institutions played a cardinal role (cf. Quinet 1990). Economic planning 
understood in this way transcends the level of individual action and potentially even precedes the awareness of individual actors; 
strictly speaking, planification signifies a deeply sedimented form of patterned economic organisation which is negotiated on 
the highest society-level. It is therefore inconsistent with ‘methodological individualism’ and ‘atomistic’ reasoning (see Block and 
Somers 1984 for some of the reasons). 
565 The early work of Nicole Pigeot (1987) is an example of inquiry focussing on the economic interplay between raw material 
quality, knapping skill (technological variability), tool functionality, and the use of an excavated habitation space. Her results of 
the combined analysis of these various factors indicate that in the Magdalenian of Etiolles U5 high-skilled production of high-
quality blades occurred around the central hearth area, whereas other flint-knapping areas probably result from the activities of 
less-skilled knappers who primarily produced expedient products and tools for immediate domestic consumption. Therefore, 
different economic needs may be satisfied by different people and different technical competences can be used to examine intra-
group divisions of labour. 
566 A good example for this type of inquiry is the doctoral research of Sylvain Soriano (2000) introduced in Chapters 1 and 3. The 
central point of this study was to identify the changing logic of interaction between flake-production systems (débitage) and 
bifacial shaping systems (façonnage) across the Lower-to-Middle Palaeolithic boundary. Soriano shows that the ‘status’ and 
‘role’ of both ‘micro-contexts’ of lithic production change as a function of their interrelationship through time. In the case of 
Gouzeaucourt level G, he is able to demonstrate that the present débitage systems of ‘Clactonian’ affinity are largely stationary 
technologies and thus supply the material for immediate domestic consumption at the sites (diversification of functional poten-
tial in terms of distinct blanks). This contrasts with the present façonnage systems which exhibit evidence for considerable 
resharpening and off-site production (suggested by the under-representation of tranchet- and volume-construction products) 
and is hence interpreted as a highly flexible but ‘mobile’ technology (dynamic and synergetic implementation of techno-
functional-units/UTFs). The conclusion is that débitage and façonnage system complement each other in their ‘function,’ sug-
gesting a differential use of space including technical anticipation and the spatiotemporal fragmentation of economic needs. 
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ration of this ‘macro-context’ is thought to yield a basic explanation for why particular ‘micro-contexts’ 
make their appearance.567  
Perlès’ Économie de la matière première et économie du débitage (1980) marks a turning 
point in the techno-economic discourse. Starting from the raw material question, Perlès argues that 
the concept of an « économie de débitage » merely describes a particular economic strategy – one that 
solves the problem of producing a toolkit diversified enough to satisfy all functional needs by means of 
a differential organisation of knapping. She contrasts this strategy with an alternative one, which she 
baptises « économies de la matière première » (‘raw material economies’). The latter achieves toolkit 
diversification not by means of differentiated knapping modalities, but by differential raw material 
selection, acquisition, and exploitation (cf. Cretin 1996: Fig. 4; Fig. 37). The basic contention is that 
toolkit differentiation can be realised in a number of different ways (Perlès 1991b: 36f.); although the 
effective result – a diversified toolkit – may be broadly similar, each solution has different economic 
consequences and may offer distinct economic affordances (cf. Perlès 1987, 1991b, 1992). These di-
verse technical solutions and their consequences can in turn be charted by examining the ‘texture’ and 
‘quality’ of different chaîne opératoires and their articulation (or lack thereof) with varying raw mate-
rial substrates. 
 According to Perlès (1991b: 37-40), a knapper can generally decide whether she/he wants to 
base her/his toolkit on a set of ‘undifferentiated’ blanks or on a range of ‘differentiated’ blanks.568 In 
the first case, chaîne opératoires tend to be structurally fairly ‘simple’ (ibid.: 38), giving the impression 
of a rather ‘opportunistic’ reduction strategy. In this scena-rio, toolkit diversification is typically 
achieved through a combination of blank selection and secondary modification, which together deter-
mine the morphology and function of the resulting lithic tools. Retouch in this scenario is not fully 
determined by the available blank-types; instead, it remains the primary operation for transforming 
blanks into the desired tools and thus to ensuring diversity in toolkit morpho-functionality. This sce-
nario describes a confectioning solution.569  
In the second case, if the knapper opts for basing her/his toolkit on a ‘differentiated’ pool of 
blanks, she/he has two contraposing options (Perlès 1991b: 38). She/he can either adopt an ‘integrat-
ed’ production system characterised by a single and typically rather ‘complex’ chaîne opératoire 
(idem), or can adopt a ‘segregated’ production system propelled by several disjunct chaîne opératoires 
of varying complexities (ibid.: 39).570 In the former case, core reduction is generally ‘intense’ and thus 
typically ‘ramified,’ so that different blanks are available at different positions/stages in the reduction 
sequence. In the latter case, by contrast, blank differentiation tends to be a function of different reduc-
tion systems, whereby varying ‘inter-active’ and ‘synergetic’ relationships between these co-occurring 
chaîne opératoires are of course possible. The important point, however, is that toolkit diversification 
is not primarily a question of secondary modification (retouching), but instead becomes an issue of 
varying ‘finalities’ of lithic reduction methods; different methods may provide different blanks des-
tined for different tool functions. Therefore, concordance (« adéquation ») between blank-types and 
tool-types is generally fostered, often developing into a key dimension of the ‘technical logic’ of the 
respective contexts. The implication is that the ‘confection’ stage (« confection ») of the chaîne opé-
ratoire is no longer decisive in terms of imposing the required final morpho-functionalities; secondary 
modification is thus often less invasive and strives to enhance the ‘natural’ morpho-functionalities of 
                                                          
567 An important implication of this type of reasoning is that the ‘structure’ of the ‘macro-context’ itself, that is, the general diver-
sity of available or present technical sub-systems and their inter-relationality, emerges as an indicator of economic functioning. 
For example, Middle Palaeolithic contexts of lithic technicity stand out by hosting a great diversity of distinct technological 
systems with differential blank-production potentials and tool-kit implications; Upper Palaeolithic contexts of lithic technicity, 
by contrast, appear to be characterised by a much narrower set of co-occurring technological micro-contexts (mostly laminar in 
character). From a ‘contextualistic’ standpoint, this difference alone has far-reaching implications for the nature of economic 
needs and their mode of satisfaction in the two timeframes. 
568 Although Perlès (1980) was the historically influential piece, I have decided to use the updated and slightly more comprehen-
sive version here (Perlès 1991b); the ‘contextualistic’ inclination of the inquiry is the same; in terms of the general strategy of 
analysis and the main points put forward, it does not matter much which version of Perlès’ model is used. 
569 The term ‘confectioning solution’ derives from the French word « confection » (‘confection’/‘secondary modification’) which 
designates the stage of tool manufacturing in the chaîne opératoire. 
570 The perhaps most influential application of the ideal-typical distinction between ‘integrated’ and ‘segregated’/‘disjunct’ lithic 
production systems has been provided by Bon (2000, 2002, 2010). He discriminates between an ‘integrated’ techno-economic 
system of the Protoaurgnacian and the ‘disjunct’ production of blades and bladelets in the Early Aurginacian. Since Bon (2002) 
interprets the former as preceding the latter, he essentially offers a chronological account of Perlès generalised scheme of tech-
no-economic organisation within the grander scheme of the evolution of the Aurignacian in Southwestern France. 
188 
 
blanks rather than authoring entirely new ones.571 As a result, the ‘status’ and ‘role’ of secondary modi-
fication itself tends to be fundamentally different. Technical systems based on the production of a di-
versified range of blanks to support toolkit diversification thus typically engender flaking solutions. 
This distinction between ‘integrated’ and ‘segregated’ production systems has far-reaching im-
plications for the economic management of the available raw material substrates (Perlès 1991b: 40f.). 
‘Integrated’ and fairly ‘complex’ production systems that furnish highly differentiated blank reper-
toires typically rely on sophisticated knapping strategies (multiple re-organisation of reduction pat-
terns and/or core volumes, high investment in preparatory procedures, etc.) and/or a high degree of 
technical ‘anticipation’ (e.g., structured and well-planned provisioning of high-quality raw materials), 
whereas ‘segregated’ production systems yield a much greater potential to make differential but pro-
ductive use of varying raw materials. 
Ideal-typically,572 the general design of ‘integrated’ systems should buffer them against the ef-
fects of local variation in the quality and availability of raw material substrates.573 ‘Segregated’ systems, 
in contrast, are not effected by such variation to the same extent; they are typically capable of embrac-
ing the diversity and locally shifting quality of raw material spectra and exploiting them to their bene-
fit. Determination of the nature of an ‘integrated’ production system is therefore based purely upon the 
enchainment of technical actions, that is, the choices that knappers, consciously or unconsciously, 
make in the course of the knapping process. ‘Integrated’ lithic production thus usually pairs with what 
Perlès calls an ideal-typical « économie de débitage » (‘blank-production economy’). In comparison, 
‘segregated’ production systems are primarily governed by technical choices that pertain to the selec-
tion, acquisition, or management of distinct lithic raw materials – ‘segregated’ lithic production is thus 
typically associated with what Perlès refers to as an ideal-typical « économie de la matière première » 
(‘raw material economy’). 
These categories are interpretive aids to navigate a complex technological reality and as Perlès 
(1991b: 41f.) readily admits are rarely encountered in their ‘pure’ state. Rather, they are typically ob-
served in ‘mixed’ or ‘hybrid’ forms. Having said this, the key point is that different reduction structures 
are re-cast in economic terms, by evaluating different technical options and ‘intra-technological’ rela-
tionships bound to these structures. Technological ‘design,’ for example, is considered a question of 
                                                          
571 Since ‘tool’ is clearly understood in maximally inclusive terms here (the category of ‘tool’ is itself a context-dependent category 
and may or may not be defined by the presence of secondary modification), this may also imply that secondary modification 
ceases to be a necessary means to satisfy functional needs at all. In other words, maximally economic ‘flaking solutions’ (see 
supra) would lead to an almost perfect concordance between blanks and tools and therefore result in a toolkit consisting primar-
ily of un-retouched pieces. Hence, the economic corollaries of varying technical ‘textures’ not only have qualitative implications 
for the composition of lithic assemblages, but make a quantitative difference as well. We may wonder, for example, whether 
retouch-rich assemblages generally signal ‘confection solutions.’ In addition, we may expect that ‘flaking solutions’ re-negotiate 
the ‘role’ and ‘status’ of retouching altogether. Instead of being a means of tool individualisation, retouch may be used primarily 
to re-sharpen tools and/or to imbue lithic pieces with a particular culturally-mediated ‘style;’ retouch may also be used to differ-
entiate between tools used for immediate ‘domestic’ consumption and tools that are carried around in the landscape and require 
elevated levels of functional ‘versatility’ and/or ‘longevity’ – a differentiation that has obvious consequences for import-export 
dynamics, the fragmentation of blank pools, and the mobility of different tools. The predicated logic of reasoning is undoubtedly 
‘contextualistic’ since none of these techno-economic dimensions can be determined in isolation, that is to say, ‘absolutely’ or 
‘once and forever.’ 
572 We are indeed dealing with a classic case of ‘ideal-typical’ reasoning here. ‘Ideal-types’ are to be distinguished from ‘real-
types’ grounded in ordinary or ‘average’ empirical reality (the latter is typically important in ‘formism’) (e.g., Hillmann 1994: 
348). ‘Ideal-types’ are always constructed with some interpretive purpose in mind and are consequently often purely theoretical, 
rational, and/or logical constructions; they regularly ‘overdraw’ key aspects of reality in order to emphasise their relevance (a 
key difference to ‘real-types’). True ‘ideal-types’ are not just theoretical concepts that give a name to varying interpretations of 
the empirical evidence but also play a crucial role in the method of science itself – they bring forth a proper ‘method of ideal-
types’ which tends to be ‘hermeneutic’ in character (cf. e.g., Weber 1904, 1997; Gerhardt 2001). The method consists of carefully 
constructing a spectrum of ‘ideal-types’ to characterise, arrange, order, and/or differentiate specific areas of (social) reality; 
quite often, the aim is to determine the relationships between different ‘ideal-types’ and to analyse how these are manifested (if 
at all) in empirical reality. ‘Ideal-types,’ in other words, are typically constructed either to capture the ‘quality’ of targeted con-
texts or aid the understanding of their ‘texture.’ The ‘method of ideal-types’ is a methodological cornerstone primarily of the 
humanities and social sciences (cf. Gerhardt 2001). For an explicit discussion of the role of ‘ideal-types’ in French archaeology, 
see Boissinot (2011: 280). 
573 This general technological design may include a strong investment in setting-up highly specific core architectures before 
primary reduction begins; such a procedure not only reduces the risk of failure to produce the desired range of blanks but also 
introduces a distinction between blanks that arise during production and those that arise during extensive core pre-shaping 
(again, this is a technical affordance that can be exploited to sustain toolkit diversification). ‘Ramified’ production system are 
often interlinked with particular mobility strategies since the advancement of the reduction chain yields products of different 
formats and sizes so that the availability of these products must be ‘timed.’ Similar mobility-implications also play a role for 
technical investment relating to the installation of ‘fail-safe’ core architectures (cores that are ‘over-prepared’): in this case, it is 
likely that the pre-shaped cores themselves travel in geographic space rather than their products (this tendency is obviously 
inversed in ‘segregated’ production systems) – ‘integrated’ production thus often (although not always) leads to a spatiotemporal 
fragmentation of the technical process. 
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operational and decisional hierarchies, insofar as it is reflected in the ‘structure’ and ‘operation’ of 
lithic reduction systems. In general, the ‘status’ and ‘function’ of particular technical practices such as 
the application of lithic retouch are examined through the prism of the wider technical context in 
which they appear.  
All of this attests to a dynamic and ‘embedded’ mode of classification and interpretation char-
acteristic of a contextualistic approach to lithic data. This approach gives voice to the intuition that 
everything is influenced by everything else and coevally influences everything else; nothing, except for 
the context itself, is fixed. Again, the general strategy is to expose the ‘infrastructure’ of lithic technolo-
gy (e.g., various reduction systems sharing the same technical context) and to determine the ‘gram-
matical’ relationships that exist between the notable parts of this ‘infrastructure’ in order to infer the 
corresponding ‘finality’ or ‘function’ (fonction) of the technical context. This approach is economic 
insofar as it seeks to illuminate the opportunities and constraints tied to different types of technicity 
(i.e., technical contexts). Altogether, Perlès’ techno-economic approach thus exemplifies some of the 
key aspects of Pepper’s contextualistic world theory; since her work has opened up an entirely new 
angle of inquiry, its conceptual and historical significance to the French tradition cannot be overstated:   
Pelegrin’s Sur les débitages laminaires du Paléolithique supérieur (2011), alluded to in quote above, 
galvanises a similar logic of reasoning: the paper provides a recent extensive survey of Upper Palaeo-
lithic blade technology, proposing a four-part classification scheme based on previous research. The 
goal of this classification of lithic laminar systems in the Upper Palaeolithic is to organise technological 
variability in an economically meaningful way. Pelegrin distinguishes between at least four general 
types – types ‘A,’ ‘B,’ ‘C,’ and ‘D’ – of laminar techno-economic functioning (ibid.: 146; Fig. 38). The 
logic of distinguishing these four types again showcases that techno-economic research in France 
amounts to nothing less than interrelating ‘technical rationality’ and ‘economic rationality;’ the eco-
nomic purpose or ‘function’ of lithic systems is therefore generally as ‘situated’ as their technical or-
ganisation.  
Pelegrin’s (2011: 146) ‘type A’ is characterised by a single dominant method of laminar reduc-
tion; this method can be adapted to various different raw materials and is oriented towards the pro-
duction of a single generalised blank-type.574 The method brings forth a technical distinction between 
‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ products: while reduction is generally geared towards the production of the 
former, the latter typically arise during procedures of core initialisation, preparation, and/or mainte-
nance. Only the ‘primary’ products are preferentially transformed into a single dominant tool-class or 
a limited set of such dominant tool-classes. The by-products of this ‘primary’ production – the ‘sec-
ondary’ products – consequently furnish the ‘raw material’ for the rest of the toolkit. This technical 
orientation towards a single generalised blank-type, however, must not lead to a dominance of the 
same blank type in the blank repertoire. To the contrary, quite often and rather ironically, heightened 
economic investment in the products of ‘primary intention’ results in an over-abundance of ‘secondary’ 
                                                          
574 The emphasis here is on ‘orientation.’ The system does not, of course, exclusively furnish the blank-type it strives for. As 
already specified above, the ‘orientation’ of a system is its ‘function,’ ‘directedness,’ or ‘purposefulness’ and thus a system-level 
feature; it is evaluated by relating the ‘structure,’ ‘operation’ (fonctionnement), and ‘function’ (fonction) of a lithic technical 
system and theorising how ‘texture’ informs ‘quality.’ Strictly speaking, the ‘orientation’ of a lithic system comes into view only 
when its ‘quality’ has been understood, since only then can the internal diversity – the ‘infrastructure’ – of a lithic system be 
interpreted in light of its ‘operation.’ This, in turn, enables an assessment of the relative contribution of different ‘infrastructural’ 
elements to the overall ‘function’ of the system. To speak of the ‘orientation’ of a lithic system is to speak of nothing more than 
this matrix of inter-relationality. 
“The important point which I wish to stress here is that the articulation of the method of knapping 
with the tools and plain vestiges enables one not only to establish general rules of management: 
which morphological classes of blanks can be rediscovered in certain classes of tools; but also to 
recognise the priority or the priorities underlying these rules. One may therefore pass over from the 
diversity of knapping methods to the techno-economic diversity of lithic systems.” (Pelegrin 2011: 




products.575 The Châtelperronian (Pelegrin 1995; Roussel 2011) and the Lower Salpetrian (Boccaccio 
2005) are given as prime examples for this type of laminar reduction.  
Pelegrin’s (2011: 146) second variant, ‘type B,’ is also defined by a single constant method of 
reduction, but the produced blanks are even more rigidly defined. These blanks are almost exclusively 
fashioned and are thus typically numerically overrepresented in an assemblage. Whereas ‘type A’ 
yields ‘normalised’ blanks of a particular type, ‘type B’ supports highly ‘standardised’ blanks, charac-
terised by isomorphic affinity. These blanks are not just broadly similar in shape but appear to be al-
most identical in outline; size differences can be attributed mainly to the timing of blank extraction 
(temporal position) within the reduction sequence. The result is a ‘universal’ blank-type which is used 
to manufacture all required tool-types.576 This configuration has two consequences.  
First, lithic reduction depends on well-defined core architectures that can be stabilised 
throughout the reduction process (e.g., by means of ‘auto-preparation’),577 which is often achieved 
through the installation of easily maintainable core volumes (e.g., by a relatively high investment into 
the early stages of the chaîne opératoire).  
Secondly, criteria of blank selection become much more ‘subtle;’ they often concern the di-
mensionality of blanks or refer to blank features which are the result of varying reduction positions 
(e.g., thickness, curvature, platform configuration or relative twist).578 According to Pelegrin (idem), 
the prototypical example for this variant of laminar production is the Upper Magdalenian of the Paris 
Basin (Bodu 1994). 
Pelegrin’s (2011: 146) ‘type C’ also supports a single method of laminar reduction, but this time 
the production is oriented towards high quantities of dissimilar blanks. The only affinity that exists 
between these blanks is that they share a similar structural organisation; they differ in shape, size, and 
other technical qualities. This type of resemblance is called ‘homomorphism’ (idem). ‘Homomorphic’ 
production is thus an instance in which continued reduction keeps the structural organisation of 
blanks constant but yields blanks of different techno-functional details. This strategy appears to be a 
compromise between ‘type A’ and ‘type B’ reduction and the author stresses the possibility that ‘ho-
momorphism’ might indeed be an emergent result of executing ‘type B’ reduction systems in particular 
ways, rather than a preserved feature of the blanks themselves. In any case, differences in the geomet-
ric outline of blanks and their technical qualities constitute privileged loci of differentiation of the 
toolkit in this laminar system. Furthermore, ‘homomorphism’ of blanks is often a function of tempo-
rally well-structured reduction sequences, for instance, when distinct series of blank removal generate 
structure-preserving but morpho-geometrically distinct blank matrices. This type of laminar reduction 
can easily support ‘mixed’ strategies of blank selection and tool manufacturing. Pelegrin’s example for 
a ‘type C’ system of laminar reduction is the Lower Aurignacian from the Bergeracois (Le Brun-
Ricalens 1993). 
Pelegrin’s (ibid.: 147) fourth and last variant of laminar reduction, ‘type D,’ is less rigid and 
hosts a multiplicity of reduction methods. What is kept constant here is primarily the mode of setting 
up and initialising the core matrix, whereas the actual method of reduction may change as lithic knap-
ping progresses. In Pelegrin’s own terms (idem), the resultant production is ‘heteromorphic’ since each 
                                                          
575 The reason is that ‘primary’ products must fulfil certain quite demanding techno-morphological criteria and thus require 
extensive and regular preparatory interference. This produces a large amount of ‘secondary’ lithic material – a situation that 
may even lead to a quantitative over-representation of the latter. This is another reason that the ‘techno-economic’ approach is 
generally sceptical about the informational value of un-calibrated lithic quantification. 
576 This would account for a prototypical example of an ‘integrated’ production that obtains toolkit diversification primarily by 
confectioning blanks of a similar morpho-technical character (sensu Perlès 1980, 1991b). 
577 For instance, bi-directionally alternating laminar reduction with overlapping removals, if executed well, can constitute such a 
strategy of ‘auto-preparation.’ ‘Auto-preparation’ is nothing less than a form of ‘embedded’ preparation in which the gesture of 
knapping is not different from ‘primary’ production; in other words, ‘auto-preparation’ uses ‘primary’ removals to constantly 
rejuvenate the required surface convexities. If executed proficiently, ‘auto-preparation’ thus allows for exceptionally long and 
un-interrupted lithic reduction sequences. 
578 A potentially prominent selection criterion may be the ‘marginality’ of blank origin on the reduction surface. The key consid-
eration concerns the effects of surface convexity on the morphological and technical character of the retrieved blanks. The logic 
is ‘contextualistic.’ Blanks can be interrelated on a reduction surface so that they form a ‘geography’ (or ‘topology’) of reduction. 
Similar technical gestures may then have different effects on the details of lithic products depending on where these products 
have been detached. This is largely due to the effect of increasing convexities at the margins of the reduction surface: the more 
‘marginal’ the product has been knapped, the more twisted, off-axis, and generally asymmetrical in cross-section and longitudi-
nal view it becomes. Yet, different volume-configurations of cores have different effects on different reduction localities; it fol-
lows that these effects and the difference-making aspects of technology in terms of blank-choice can only be determined by 
‘contextualistic’ analysis, by examining the articulation of reduction position, core architecture, convexity management, knap-
ping techniques, and so forth. 
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method furnishes a series of characteristic blank-types or blank-spectra which serve to effectuate well-
delineated tool-types. Cores that are the product of ‘type D’ reduction systems therefore typically fea-
ture fairly ‘complex’ reduction histories which are difficult to decipher. An alternative way to imple-
ment ‘type D’ is to ‘outsource’ the diversity of reduction modalities and to apply different methods to 
different cores, for instance as a function of the initial volumetric structure of the exploited raw mate-
rials.579 The main difference between the two technical options seems to be that the first strives to ‘fix’ 
the starting conditions of volumetric exploitation by technical means, while the second regards mate-
rial starting conditions as determinative for technical means. The two versions of ‘type D’ laminar re-
duction systems further imply differential ‘anticipation’ of economic needs and the required technical 
investment.580 Pelegrin presents the evolved French Gravettian of the Corbiac-type (Pelegrin 2006a) 
as an example of the first version of ‘type D’ lithic laminar reduction. 
Altogether, Pelegrin’s (2011) classification of laminar Upper Palaeolithic technologies is a clas-
sic example of a contextualistic reading of the available lithic evidence. The interpretive focus is clearly 
placed on ‘intra-technological’ relations and interpretations critically dependent on the larger technical 
context. For Pelegrin, the key to understanding lithic techno-economies is the interaction between the 
methods of débitage, the resulting variability of blanks, and the organisation of the toolkit (including 
the ‘status’ of specific tool-types in relation to the available blanks). Almost all of the interpretive con-
cepts summoned to characterise the laminar systems are context-specific. Moreover, the total classifi-
cation only makes sense when each laminar variant is regarded as a ‘micro-context’ within the larger 
context of Western European Upper Palaeolithic laminar technicity (‘macro-context’); the identified 
differences between the systems are difference-makers only in this larger context.581  
With Pepper, we can conclude that Pelegrin’s four different laminar variants display a radically 
different ‘quality’ due to the differential articulation of the three mentioned technical domains (i.e. 
methods of core reduction, resultant blanks, and tools), which then simply describe the ‘infrastructur-
al’ building blocks of the identified technological variants. Their specific interlocking is thus re-cast as 
the ‘texture’ of the laminar systems in question. As a result, the laminar reduction ‘types’ themselves 
are rendered higher-level classifications based on the organisational logic of distinct relational enti-
ties:582  
A final example exposing the general contextualistic propensity of French techno-economic analysis is 
provided by Delagnes and Rendu’s oft-cited paper Shifts in Neandertal mobility, technology and sub-
sistence strategies in western France (2011). Their case allows us to address the issue of mobility and 
the fragmentation of chaîne opératoires in geographic space – two interrelated topics that have al-
ready been mentioned and that have been central to the French ‘techno-economic approach’ since its 
inception (e.g., Geneste 1985, 1988, 1991 [2010]: 427-429; Texier et al. 1998; Moncel 2003; Delagnes 
2010; Bachellerie et al. 2011; Moncel and Deaujard 2012; Thiébaut 2013).583  
                                                          
579 This strategy would conform to a ‘segregated’ production system trending towards a proper ‘raw material economy’ (sensu 
Perlès 1980, 1991b). 
580 Whether this second version really represents a sub-type or rather a fifth variant of laminar reduction is largely kept open. 
581 For example, the categories used to describe the ‘texture’ of laminar systems may have been very different if laminarity in the 
Levantine Upper Palaeolithic or the Indian Upper Palaeolithic had been targets of analysis and classification. 
582 This point is important because it shows that technological classification is not just ‘typology in disguise’ as some critics 
argue. 
583 These themes were partly foreshadowed by the influential paper Des buts, problèmes et limites de l’archéologie paléolithique 
(1972) co-authored by François Bordes, Jean-Philippe Rigaud, and Denise de Sonneville-Bordes. This paper is an interesting 
“[The technical system] results from the functional relations between the different constituent 
parts which can be considered as sub-systems. The functioning [‘operation’] can be defined not by 
the ‘rules of internal relations’ governing the lithic production alone, but also by taking into ac-
count the latter’s finality, which means its function – two concepts which are complementary and 
integrated […]. A lithic production is thus simultaneously organised by its relationships with other 
sub-sets of the technical system, by its finality (to make tools is the most evident), and by its 
means (material and intellectual).” (Valentin 1995: 24; my translation [the original French quote 
is provided in Appendix Q.14]). 
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Delagnes and Rendu (2011) attempt to relate Middle Palaeolithic technological functioning to 
mobility and subsistence, drawing on a vast corpus of lithic and faunal data from Western France. 
Their approach once again exemplifies the already outlined divide between ‘analytic’ and ‘synthetic’ 
modes of marshalling lithic evidence. They explicitly reject the idea that relevant techno-economic 
information on mobility and subsistence can be extracted by studying the aggregation and/or combi-
nation of discrete traits and/or attributes of individual lithic artefacts (ibid.: 1772f.). Techno-economic 
functioning – for them the key par excellence to reconstructing the interaction between lithic technol-
ogy, mobility, and subsistence – must be examined on the level of ‘technical systems.’ This reiteration 
is important since it helps affirm that, contrary to first impressions, their approach is not at all rooted 
in ‘Binfordian’ theory and its distinction between ‘logistic’ and ‘residential’ mobility. While the authors 
are, generally speaking, inspired by some of the relevant concepts – a point I will return to below – 
their interpretative approach to the lithic data is fundamentally different. 
Figure 39 exhibits the general framework of their reasoning. The guiding idea is that differ-
ent lithic technological contexts that co-occur between OIS 7 and OIS 3 define well-delineated techno-
economic systems which reflect varying ways of using the landscape and exploiting the animal envi-
ronment. Delagnes and Rendu assume 
They add that their approach  
In a manner consistent with the French approaches discussed above, the authors explore 
which behaviours, activities, and functions varying technological ‘infrastructures’ – the ‘textures’ of 
lithic systems – enable or block. The important point is that lithic technology is not only conceptual-
ised as a ‘problem-solver,’ but at the same time emerges as an equally important ‘problem-generator.’ 
The underlying conception is that Neanderthals (and other hominins for that matter) were necessarily 
– and before anything else – thrown into ‘pre-furnished’ technical worlds; they first had to deal with 
and make use of what these worlds provided them.584 Some of these ‘default’ technical repertoires, for 
example, provide means that are better suited for travelling long distances or for tracking down partic-
ular prey species, while others may be more flexible in coping with changing raw material situations. 
The important insight is that there is a fundamental trade-off between different aspects of techno-
economic performance and that each technologically-mediated opportunity also has its drawbacks. 
Delagnes and Rendu (2011: 1772, Fig. 5) emphasise three key sources of techno-economic 
trade-offs that help to make sense of technological performance and the interaction of lithic technology 
with mobility and subsistence. These are (i) the ‘duration’ and/or ‘depth’ of the lithic flaking and/or 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
historical document and showcases some of the enduring effects of the Binford-Bordes debate on French Palaeolithic archaeolo-
gy. 
584 We will return to this central notion in the second part of the chapter in more detail. It can already be said, however, that the 
concept of ‘pre-furnished’ technical worlds implies a criticism of tabula rasa ideas of human social and material existence. The 
contention is that hominins lived a fundamentally socially- and materially-mediated life and hominin biology therefore does not 
have logical priority. Hominins are always socially and materially predefined, just as they are biologically predefined – there is, 
in other words, a technological apriori that needs to be taken into account. This view has a number of implications which I 
cannot draw out here. Importantly, the world into which hominins are born is not conceptualised as an empty room – capable of 
adjusting to any external situation in an ‘optimal’ manner – but is instead regarded as a partially invested, decorated, and fur-
nished room (cf. e.g., Thévenot 2001). With Heidegger (2006 [1927]) we can say that lithic technology was always ready-to-
hand [Zuhanden] rather than constantly re-invented from scratch to face new challenges. In the language of ‘contextualism,’ this 
‘pre-furnished’ room constitutes the wider historical context of hominin technicity. We can say that the nature of ‘pre-furnishing’ 
likely differs between such contexts (as a function of ‘novelty’ and ‘change’); ‘pre-furnishing’ in this sense can be defined as a 
product of the inherent ‘spread’ of a relevant ‘macro-context,’ so that key ‘references’ of the whole are carried through its parts 
and thereby connect them in time and space. 
“[…] considers not only tool reduction, maintenance and recycling, criteria commonly used for 
assessing tool transportability, but also the duration, complexity and flexibility of the reduction 
sequences. Considering the whole reduction sequence rather than simply the end-products, it 
provides basic clues for understanding how the structure of the chaînes opératoires relates to 
specific mobility patterns. A similar dynamic approach related to meat acquisition strategies is 
considered here and combined with the technological record, resulting in a systemic reconstitu-
tion of Neandertal economies.” (idem) 
“[…] that a long reduction sequence duration combined with low blank versatility and a limited 
potential for tool maintenance or recycling suggest a low transportability of the whole produc-
tion, while shorter reduction sequences associated with high blank versatility and/or a high 
potential for tool maintenance would be diagnostic of a higher transportability.” (Delagnes and 




shaping sequences; (ii) the ‘versatility’ of the produced lithic blanks; and (iii) the technology-specific 
capabilities of lithic ‘tool maintenance.’585 It is generally expected that distinct technical systems will 
differ in their performance across these economic domains; it is in fact anticipated that divergent 
techno-economic configurations will be characterised by an unequal distribution of economic perfor-
mance between the three domains. Again, the main point, conforming to contextualistic logic, is the 
‘situated’ cross-configuration of these domains – their basic ‘inter-relativity.’ None of the three do-
mains can be taken in isolation. Rather, all of them must be examined together – in their trade-off 
structure – to indicate system-level principles of economic organisation.  
With Pepper we can say that the three domains act as sub-contexts (parts) of a larger economic 
whole, whose lithic technological corollaries must be determined empirically.586 That the interrelation-
ship between these domains – the ‘texture’ of the larger economic context – is expected to differ across 
varying contexts of technicity predicates the contextualistic categories of ‘novelty’ and ‘change,’ carry-
ing through the principle of radical context-dependency and the root metaphor of ‘situationality.’ The 
work of Delagnes and Rendu furnishes a number of examples which help to illustrate this contextualis-
tic condition of techno-economic inquiry. Their description and eventual comparison of Quina, Dis-
coid, Levallois, and MTA technical systems in terms of the three economic domains exemplify this 
condition. 
Quina reduction systems are described as ‘volume-consuming’ and as generally yielding a 
small range of rather ‘thick’ and often ‘naturally backed’ or at least ‘quasi-backed’ flake-blanks 
(Delagnes and Rendu 2011: 1777f.). These blanks are typically much wider than they are long. Blanks 
of this type – ‘Quina-blanks’ – are highly ‘versatile’ and, due to their rich ‘raw material reservoir,’ have 
the potential to be curated and re-sharpened over considerable timespans (idem). The lithic tools sup-
ported by this débitage system consequently afford long ‘use-lifes’ and intricate ‘object biographies.’ 
Because of its relatively ‘simple’ volumetric core structure, Quina technology requires only ‘low-
medium’ degrees of technical investment, yet promotes ‘long-term’ tool maintenance, plenty of oppor-
tunities for raw material recycling, and elevated levels of technical ‘ramification’ (idem). In the au-
thors’ own words:  
Discoid reduction systems, by contrast, tend to afford much ‘shorter’ cycles of tool-use, tool re-
organisation, and/or raw material re-cycling (Delagnes and Rendu 2011: 1778). Discoid technology 
authors more ‘differentiated’ blank-repertoires (one can distinguish four blank-types: ‘pseudo-
Levallois’ points, triangular flakes, elongated débordant flakes and relatively wide flakes). These 
blanks are less ‘massive’ in character and their potential role as raw material reservoir is clearly re-
duced; that is to say, intrinsic blank-volumes are much more quickly depleted (idem). In return, Dis-
coid methods can be executed rather ‘reliably’ in all sorts of raw material contexts and factors which 
are typically constraining, such as natural raw material formatting and/or quality, tend to be of mar-
ginal importance: Discoid systems perform equally well under different raw material conditions.  
Levallois reduction systems require ‘heightened’ technical investment since a specific core ar-
chitecture must be installed (hierarchy of two opposing asymmetric surfaces/hemispheres, etc.) before 
                                                          
585 Many of the interpretive categories that Delagnes and Rendu (2011) mobilise in their paper – e.g., ‘versatility,’ ‘curation,’ 
‘portability,’ ‘flexibility,’ etc. – are of course inspired by the Anglophone type-literature in the wake of Peter Bleed, Steven Kuhn, 
Robert Kelly, Lewis Binford, and others. However, this convergence – as I will detail below – is rather superficial and the way in 
which the authors bring these concepts to bear on the lithic evidence is inconsistent with Anglophone research. One should 
recall here that the mobilisation and application of specific concepts is only part of that which defines scientific approaches; 
more important is often how concepts are implemented and how they actually interact with data. This is precisely where the 
difference can be found here as well (see infra). 
586 Strictly speaking, this means that scholars must interrelate at least two part-whole complexes: first, part-whole articulations 
that characterise economic functioning are delineated; secondly, part-whole articulations that characterise the lithic technologi-
cal system and that have significance for the economic system are explored. Analysis of the relationship between these two 
systems provides information on how the two are imbricated into each other; this last step amounts to a higher-level examina-
tion, where the two systems are re-cast as parts of their own, so that their systemic articulation within a larger and unifying 
whole can be determined. When French scholars talk about ‘techno-economic’ systems, they essentially talk about this construct 
of a larger and unifying whole (above described as ‘macro-context’). 
“[I]n the Quina system, the flake is potentially multi-purpose since it can be exploited as a 
retouched or non-retouched tool, as well as alternately or successively as a core, following an 
order and priority that vary according to needs. In this case, recycling is not a casual practice, 
but a principle that determines the entire reduction sequence. The low elaboration of the flak-
ing process is balanced by a high tool curation rate.” (Delagnes and Rendu 2011: 1777) 
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primary production can even begin (Delagnes and Rendu 2011: 1773f.). In order to counterbalance the 
technical investment required (e.g., extensive preparatory procedures) and to reduce the risk of failure, 
Levallois systems typically have relatively ‘strict’ raw material requirements; they at least perform dif-
ferently under varying raw material conditions. Levallois technology therefore usually presupposes 
higher degrees of ‘planification’ and techno-economic ‘anticipation’ – although these factors of course 
depend on the precise method or modality of Levallois reduction employed (idem).  
As a result of the crucial importance of core initialisation and maintenance stages of the chaîne 
opératoire, Levallois systems tend to be ‘fragmented’ in geographic space and give rise to critical im-
port-export dynamics (e.g., of pre-shaped cores and/or blanks of ‘primary intention’). ‘Preferential’ or 
‘recurrent’ blank-products (especially those stemming from bidirectional-recurrent Levallois systems) 
provide a maximisation of cutting-edge, even (or especially) without being retouched (idem); con-
versely, the typical ‘by-products’ of Levallois reduction (e.g., backed or quasi-backed débordant ele-
ments and other shaping products) lend themselves to use ‘on the spot’ for immediate and relatively 
‘expedient’ domestic consumption (idem). Particularly large or ‘massive’ initialisation-products may 
even be exploited as core matrices to spawn independent production chains ‘on-flake’ (ibid.: Fig. 2).  
All of these features foster an internal structural division between relatively ‘mobile’ and rather 
‘stationary’ Levallois products. Moreover, the general organisation of Levallois technology affords the 
‘optimisation’ of patterns of blank-tool convergence (« adéquation »). The result is a highly ‘differenti-
ated’ spectrum of comparatively ‘specialised’ blanks, whose economic versatility remains rather ‘lim-
ited.’ Nevertheless, some Levallois production methods – e.g., selected ‘recurrent’ and ‘laminar’ modes 
of volumetric exploitation – yield blanks with an ‘intermediate’ potential for ‘tool maintenance’ (cf. 
Delagnes 2010).587 It is this particular configuration of opportunities and constraints that defines the 
economic signature of technical systems we call ‘Levallois.’ 
The MTA (Moustérien de tradition acheuléenne), finally, combines one or more of the de-
scribed débitage systems with a specific mode of bifacial production (façonnage) (Delagnes and Ren-
du 2011: 1774-1777); this production typically yields so-called cordiform ‘MTA bifaces,’ which clearly 
exhibit elevated levels of mobility as shown by the spatial ‘fragmentation’ of their production, re-
sharpening, and/or re-cycling (cf. Soressi and Hays 2003; Claud 2008). In the MTA, a relatively ‘high’ 
degree of ‘technical investment’ – attested to by the construction of the respective bifacial volumes 
(façonnage) and the maintenance of their morpho-functionality – is thus correlated with a generally 
‘high’ potential for ‘tool maintenance’ (Delagnes and Rendu 2011: 1778f.). Depending on the associated 
débitage system(s), this economic signature can be variously enhanced and/or supplemented – dé-
bitage systems may either ‘complement’ or ‘synergise’ with the existing bifacial production. The result 
is a highly ‘flexible’ super-system that buffers against mobility stress and enables a variable division of 
activities in space. The technical architecture of the MTA thus tends to be fairly ‘complex’ and this 
complexity should be reproduced by the general patterning of behaviour documented within this con-
text. 
The line of reasoning presented thus far encapsulates a ‘user-centred’ approach to lithic tech-
nology: technical systems are conceptualised as self-regulated complexes of economic trade-offs which 
allow their users to interact with the environment in particular ways.588 The important point is that 
these self-regulatory trade-off systems are used to define the economic performance characteristics of 
the technical systems in question. ‘Economic performance’ is therefore understood not simply in terms 
of specific lithic artefact properties and/or their ‘absolute’ instrumentality, but instead as a function of 
the systemic interaction between the ‘structure,’ ‘operation’ (fonctionnement), and ‘function’ (fonc-
tion) of a technical whole. This technical whole does not simply exist ‘passively’ in the world, ‘reacting’ 
to the economic needs imposed by external conditions (e.g., environmental, demographic), but active-
ly shapes the convergence of hominins and their exteriorities.589 Hominin-environment interactions 
                                                          
587 Delagnes and Rendu (2011: 1773) discuss Levallois methods and non-Levallois laminar methods in tandem because they are 
systematically associated with one another – a fact that I have omitted in the present reconstruction. 
588 It is no coincidence that the term ‘trade-off’ is rarely used in the French literature; instead, scholars tend to invoke the notion 
of « échange » in order to characterise the respective relationships among the parts of a technical whole. This again signals that 
‘trade-offs’ are really analysed in a ‘synthetic’ manner – as a result of particular part-whole dynamics – and that economic trade-
offs are simply regarded as a special type of inter-relationality typifying the ‘texture’ of a whole. 
589 This conception assumes two things: first, that technology has some sort of agency that established a bi-directional hominin-
technology dialogue, and secondly, that hominins will be ‘smart’ enough to quickly discover the potentials and drawbacks of a 
given technological system (see infra). 
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are regarded as technologically mediated.590 Lithic technology is essentially seen as an artificial ‘user-
interface’ which, if operated by experts, can be customised in a number of ways to solve a number of 
different problems; however, because the systems themselves tend to be rather ’complex,’ a portion of 
the issues to be solved is always home-made, that is, derives from the self-created constraints of par-
ticular user-interfaces.591  
The ‘pro-active’ dimension of technological problem-solving can be illuminated by the various 
‘opportunities’ provided by the interplay between technical ‘texture’ and ‘quality.’ These ‘opportunities’ 
may be characterised as technological affordances,592 defined as features, aspects, or sub-structures of 
a wider technological system that ‘invite’ users to take advantage of them to reach certain goals under 
certain circumstances. In other words, technical ‘affordances’ help theorise which part of a technical 
‘texture’ is good to accomplish x and thus to satisfy the need y if required. The notion of ‘affordance’ is 
thereby always a relational construct: its epistemic task is to sort, arrange, and signify other relations. 
It thereby opens the gates to a ‘soft’ ecology approach to lithic technology and is perfectly consistent 
with contextualism’s central tenets:593 
The next step in the analysis is to specify the relationship between the documented lithic sys-
tems and the corresponding subsistence practices. The goal here is two-fold: on the one hand, the 
technological findings are to be calibrated against the implications of the faunal record; on the other 
hand, the subsistence-implications of the technological conclusions are to be tested against the availa-
ble evidence. Again, this strategy conforms to a combination of ‘direct verification’ and ‘qualitative 
confirmation’ – modes of knowledge corroboration proper to contextualism.594 
The authors relate the structure of the technical systems to the structure of the associated fau-
nal assemblages to derive specific mobility profiles (Delagnes and Rendu 2011: 1772f.); these are in-
tended to capture the interaction between the former and the latter. Mobility is thus re-cast as a not 
directly observable parameter of past reality that must be inferred from two directions: from the tech-
nology-specific potential to support ‘increased’ or ‘decreased’ mobility, and from prey-specific etholo-
gies that call for these types of mobility and require specific hunting tactics. The authors thus seek to 
identify a mobility system (including activity and site organisation) that illuminates why and how prey 
mobilities – mapped on a spectrum from ‘mobile’ to ‘stationary’ – are regularly associated with partic-
ular technology-specific mobility potentials. As an auxiliary factor to help calibrate the respective 
technical ‘affordances’ against the relevant animal behaviours, a distinction is made between relatively 
                                                          
590 This moment of ‘mediation’ dispels overly ‘mechanistic’ conceptualisation since it undermines the idea of a direct ‘contact 
zone’ between lithic technology and environmental make-up. The rejection, explicit or not, of ‘mechanistic’ explanations that 
emphasise ‘final’ or ‘ultimate’ causes is at least symptomatic of a ‘contextualistic’ stance. 
591 This is the ‘curse’ of technicity to which we will return in the next part of the chapter. 
592 ‘Affordances’ are possibilities of action that do not arise from the intrinsic motivations and/or needs of the actors alone (Gib-
son 1977, 1979; cf. Withagen et al. 2012). The notion thereby links approaches that emphasise the ‘activity’ of material culture 
(‘agentivity,’ ‘potentiality,’ ‘materiality,’ etc.) to those that stress the importance of human motivation and choice; it paves the 
way for a user-centred approach to technology (Gaver 2001; Hutchby 2001), which can be contrasted to ‘actor-centred’ or ‘envi-
ronment-centred’ approaches. The following statement exemplifies a key aspect of an ‘affordance-based’ approach to technolo-
gy: “[i]n contrast to recent sociological emphases on the social shaping of technology, [I] propose[] and illustrate[] a way of 
analysing the technological shaping of sociality […] [I] argue[] for a recognition of the constraining, as well as enabling, materi-
ality of artefacts” (Hutchby 2001: 441). Although French chaîne opératoire approaches do not share all of these respective posi-
tions, some of the mentioned views and inclinations are implicitly embraced. 
593 For an illuminating discussion of the role of ‘affordances’ in « actions outilées » (‘tool-mediated action’) and the critical dis-
tinction between ‘natural’ affordances – grounded in the biology and physiology of organisms – and ‘artificial’ affordances – 
anchored in human-endowed technical worlds – see Sigaut (2012: 118-122). 
594 See Chapter 2 for details or refer to Pepper (1942: 272-278). 
“[…] The groups that favored the Levallois débitage method, or those that manufactured Quina 
scrapers or bifaces, would have been constrained by their technical traditions. In response to 
possible shortages of local, high quality raw materials in sufficient quantities (anticipated or 
not), they would have carried with them the minimal equipment necessary for short expedi-
tions and seasonal movements. Because their knapping method was more dependent on the 
quality and dimensions of available raw material volumes, these groups opted to transport part 
of their necessary equipment. At the other end of the spectrum, the groups who used the Dis-
coid sensu stricto method were less dependent on the quality and dimensions of available raw 
materials, and thus did not encumber themselves with such equipment when they moved 
across long distances. The flexibility of this débitage method thus freed these groups from the 





‘solitary’ and relatively ‘gregarious’ species.595 The examination of the associated faunal spectra estab-
lishes part of the wider context of lithic technology (its ‘macro-context’), which, in turn, guides the 
analysis of technological performance under varying animal circumstances.596 It follows that the as-
sessment of the differential capacity of lithic technology – its intrinsic ‘pros’ and ‘cons’ – to follow, 
intercept, and/or chase down particular animals requires serious evaluation of the ways in which the 
two ‘micro-contexts’ – ‘animal’ and ‘technical’ – co-produce each other.  
Drawing on Pepper, we can say that a successful ‘fusion’ of the technical and animal ‘micro-
context’ provides an explanation for why the two exist side-by-side. Only evidence for a shared super-
structural ‘quality’ of the two ‘micro-contexts’ can illuminate why they can be regarded as ‘micro-
contexts’ of the same ‘macro-context’ in the first place. To demonstrate that the two ‘micro-contexts’ 
condition each other consequently implies the elimination of all blocked ‘strands,’ which would have 
rendered their cohesiveness rather unintelligible. By relating the economic implications of the lithic 
context to the technological implications of the animal context, the authors show that the resulting 
super-context is ‘workable’ and advances our understanding of past reality; this approach is multi-
directional and resonates with contextualism’s proper theory of cognitive criticism. 
Delagnes and Rendu (2011: 1773-1778) identify four distinct mobility systems which they or-
ganise in two groups of two (Fig. 40). Levallois-laminar and MTA technical systems are interpreted to 
promote ‘non-selective’ hunting strategies, while Quina and Discoid-denticulate systems are consid-
ered to encourage more ‘selective’ hunting strategies.  
Levallois technology is shown to be typically associated with assemblages yielding a wide va-
riety of ‘non-migratory’ prey species; this likely indicates ‘low-medium’ mobility and that hominin 
movement was probably more strongly dictated by raw material requirements than by animal behav-
iour (Delagnes and Rendu 2011: 1774, Fig. 3). The MTA is interpreted as a sort of leapfrogging system, 
where hominin groups alternated between larger ‘multi-purpose’ campsites (involving high-
investment installations such as campfires) which have produced highly variable faunal assemblages 
(some of which indicate that even ‘solitary’ animals were occasionally targeted) (ibid.: 1777). The dis-
tinction between ‘stationary’ débitage systems and a ‘highly mobile’ façonnage system in the same 
context is thought to be consistent with the implied ‘intermediate’ level of mobility. 
In contrast, Quina technologies seem to be regularly associated with a ‘monospecific’ fauna, in 
which reindeer is the dominant prey (Delagnes and Rendu 2011: 1777f.). Here, selective hunting meets 
a ‘gregarious’ and fairly migratory species whose seasonal movements are largely predictable. The fact 
that Quina-bearing sites represent a mixture of true campsites and task-specific satellite-sites is seen 
as further indication that the corresponding mode of operating in the landscape was based on ‘high’ 
levels of mobility: hominins are depicted as ‘residential’ reindeer-followers who established ‘logistical’ 
camps around one or more seasonal basecamps (ibid.: Fig. 4). The presented arguments for liking 
Discoid-denticulate systems and their target prey mobilities are not much different. Discoid-
denticulate systems are typically associated with faunal assemblages dominated by bison and horse, 
two seasonally migrating taxa. This is regarded to reflect a selective hunting strategy which presuppos-
es elevated levels of mobility. The corresponding settlement profile is consistent with this evidence, 
also pointing to an interlinked system of campsites and more task-specific sites (ibid.: 1778). The re-
constructed ‘high-mobility’ pattern is thus broadly similar to that reconstructed for Quina systems. 
Both systems are consequently interpreted as largely equivalent solutions to similar economic prob-
lems. The resultant character and chronological positioning of the four techno-economic macro-
                                                          
595 Why is this categorisation not ‘dualistic’? Two answers can be given: first, the categories represent ‘ideal-types’ which are 
formulated for heuristic and methodological reasons, not to trace the ontological structure of reality (see supra); secondly, with 
Pepper one can state that the categories aim to capture the ‘qualities’ of their ‘micro-contexts,’ which are then translated into 
‘strands’ (and perhaps even ‘references’) to analyse their interrelationship in their resulting new ‘macro-context;’ ‘ideal-typical’ 
categories are hence nothing more than interpretive aids to determine the role of ‘micro-contexts’ in their ‘macro-context’ and to 
understand how ‘they tangle into one another’ (or do not) as ‘strands.’ The results do not need to be affirmative. ‘Disorder’ is an 
important category in ‘contextualism’ and ‘strands’ may be incompatible; as long as local ‘disorder’ explains global ‘operationali-
ty,’ this does not pose a problem.  
596 This reflects the fact, already alluded to above, that the ‘affordance’ structure of technical systems can only be evaluated in 




systems are regarded to refute simple and uni-directional models of Neanderthal behavioural evolu-
tion in Western France between OIS 7 and OIS 3 (ibid.: 1789).597 
All of this shows that Delagnes and Rendu’s total account is clearly characterised by descrip-
tive and explanatory ‘thickness.’598 The account is ‘thick’ because the boundaries between meticulous 
description and substantial interpretation are often blurred and the ordering of relationships turns out 
to be the authors’ core business.599 ‘Thickness’ is a contextualistic category and responds to the need to 
map the details of contexts and even super-contexts as comprehensively as possible; this, again, re-
quires consideration of each context’s ‘texture’-‘quality’ dynamics, both in terms of ‘novelty’ and poten-
tial ‘disorder.’ A consequence of this contextualistic ‘thickness’ is the multi-directionality of inference, 
categorisation, and interpretation that characterises Shifts. The emphasis clearly lies on articulations, 
co-constitutions, inter-constraints, etc. – specific relationalities that must be identified, arranged, and 
assessed.600 This is consistent with the idea of ‘weak’ determination and the consolidation of a multi-
plicity of potentially equally important factors to shape reality. The epistemological stance is hence 
anti-foundational, which again illustrates that contextualistic reasoning cannot accept the fixation of 
reality, not even a fixed structure of determination (e.g., a ‘ladder of causation’);601 contextualistic real-
ities tend to be entangled and messy. This conceptual orientation is made explicit by the authors 
themselves: 
Another observation is important: the positioning of any of the four technical systems in 
Delagnes and Rendu’s economic triangle depends entirely on the positioning of all other technical 
systems within it.602 The signification of system-specific trade-offs, in other words, is a comparative 
assessment and therefore always relative to the wider ‘context of comparison.’603 None of the three 
identified sources of economic variability can be described ‘absolutely’ – this fact is directly reflected in 
the relativist terminology applied (e.g., ‘high,’ ‘low,’ ‘increased,’ ‘decreased,’ ‘elevated’/’heightened,’ 
‘reduced,’ etc.). This not only confirms that lithic systems are conceptualised as sub-systems (‘micro-
systems’) which are examined internally and then compared to other sub-systems to determine the 
relevance of the discovered ‘infrastructural’ features, but also highlights again that everything remains 
context-dependent – i.e., nothing can be fixed before a context has been analysed. This pattern of 
thought is highly characteristic of French lithic research in general – it is predicated upon Leroi-
Gourhan’s « technologie comparée » (cf. Leroi-Gourhan 1949; de Beaune 2011; Soulier 2015: 25f.) and 
was later taken up by approaches in the wake of « Technologie préhistoire » (cf. Tixier et al. 1980; 
Audouze et al. 2018), the mother of lithic technological research in France. 
 A similar perspective is reflected in what has become the standard reading of the Mousterian 
techno-economic architecture of Western Europe (e.g., Bourguignon et al. 2006; Meignen et al. 2009; 
Dawson et al. 2012). The result is a cross-tabulation, in which the economic characteristics and trade-
offs of different technical systems are generalised (Fig. 41).604 This table is inherently comparative: it 
                                                          
597 The contention here is that a ‘multi-linear’ evolutionary scenario is much more likely given the chronological juxtaposition of 
Quina and Discoid-denticulate systems at the end of the chronological sequence (MIS 4-3). In addition, the authors explicitly 
ponder the question of whether Quina and Discoid-denticulate systems are to be regarded as two culturally distinct responses to 
very similar economic needs (Delanges and Rendu 2011: 1780). A linear or gradual evolutionary scenario is also problematic 
because the MTA is intercalated between the Quina and Discoid-denticulate complexes and it is not evident how the resulting 
sequence is illuminated by such a scenario (idem). 
598 See Chapter 2: Box 8. 
599 That interpretation, analysis, and description are somewhat blurred is signalled by the fact that lithic, faunal, and settlement 
data are presented and interrelated in a single paragraph for each techno-economic system.  
600 This inclination is in itself characteristic of ‘contextualistic’ inquiry. It is expressed in the fact that Delagnes and Rendu quasi-
symmetrically relate the structure of lithic assemblages to the structure of settlement organisation and faunal assemblages. It is 
also notable that the starting point of this analysis is largely arbitrary and one therefore typically starts from wherever the evi-
dence is richest (in other words: the fact that the authors embark on the analysis from the perspective of lithic technology is no 
argument for the general explanatory primacy of lithic technology). 
601 From a ‘contextualistic’ perspective, even ‘determination’ is confronted with ‘novelty’ and is thus potentially context-
dependent. 
602 Even the addition of a single technical system would change the larger context of technologies and thus potentially the signi-
fication of the relative features that define this larger context. 
603 In Shifts, this wider ‘context of comparison’ is simply the wider context of OIS7-3 Middle Palaeolithic technicity. 
604 This cross-tabulation can be interpreted as a specification of the structure of economic ‘affordances’ provided by each tech-
nical system. 
“[…] The picture that emerges from our data is more relevant to a complex and multicausal 
explanation of the diversity observed in the archaeological record than to a single explanation, 
whether cultural, functional, chronological or environmental.” (Delagnes and Rendu 2011: 1779) 
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juxtaposes ‘investment in core shaping and/or maintenance,’ ‘degree of predetermination of desired 
endproducts,’ ‘degree of normalisation of desired endproducts,’ ‘potential for blank/tool re-
sharpening,’ ‘degree of ramification,’ and ‘blank productivity’ of various technical systems. Taken to-
gether, the relative weight of these features, derived from the ‘infrastructural’ organisation of the re-
spective technical wholes, is thought to define to the economic ‘qualities’ of the latter.  
These ‘qualities’ are relative in a dual sense: each systemic feature is determined by its rela-
tionship to all other features of the same system, but the specific quality of each feature also depends 
on the quality of all other features of the same category that exist within the same wider context of 
technicity (in the present case:  the ‘Mousterian’ of South-Western France). This pattern of thought 
clearly reiterates what has already been found, namely that each technical system is typically identified 
as a context of its own (‘micro-context’), but also participates in the broader technical context of its 
period/epoch (‘macro-context’). To this effect, the tabulated economic features of the listed Mousteri-
an technologies are clearly context-sensitive. They are ‘objective’ insofar as each systemic configura-
tion of features is consistent with the system’s placement in the context of all other systems – the rela-
tive placement of each system, in other words, removes all interpretive obstacles and thus ‘works.’605 
Another field in which basic contextualistic assumptions feed into French lithic research is typology, 
which is a contested arena. The term conceals substantial variability in how types are constructed and 
interpreted. The main issue, as we have already seen in Chapter 2, concerns the role and function of 
classification and typology in knowledge-formation. Not all typology is the same in this respect. A cru-
cial issue is that typological reasoning in the French tradition appears to be largely ‘non-taxonomic,’ 
extremely dynamic, and highly flexible, and thus conflicts with the ‘formistic’ interpretation of types 
which prevails in most Anglophone lithic research. French scholars have come to reject the ‘catholicity’ 
of types, including the idea that typology represents a viable means of directly mapping intra- or inter-
assemblage variability.606  The reasons are manifold and partly historical, partly epistemological – yet, 
most of them are a consequence of the opposition drawn between ‘typology’ and ‘technology’ (cf. Otte 
1991).  
The ‘typology’/‘technology’ distinction reiterates the ‘synthetic’ proclivity of French lithic re-
search: ‘typology’ carves out discrete parts in the world, whereas ‘technology’ concerns the structure of 
wholes. The tension between ‘typology’ and ‘technology,’ characteristic of the wider French lithic dis-
course (e.g., Boëda 1991: 38-40; Forestier 1993: Fig. 16, 1998; Bourguignon 1997; Lenoir 2008; Valen-
tin 2008b), therefore reflects the ever-present struggle to come to terms with part-whole dynamics in 
lithic research. The implication is that ‘typology’ can never be the final answer to technological ques-
tions (cf. Boëda 1991: 38); ‘technology’ is always more than typology – accordingly, it cannot be re-
duced to a mere question of types. 
 The rejection of typology as the central method of lithic inquiry is inextricably bound to the 
‘technological revolution’ incited by André Leroi-Gourhan and Jacques Tixier between 1970 and 1990 
in Paris (Texier and Meignen 2011; Audouze et al. 2018). A key objective of the time was to overcome 
the interpretive impasse created by ‘La méthode Bordes.’ Before the ‘technological turnover,’ there 
were essentially two contesting lithic approaches, both built on a ‘Theory of Types.’ The first was 
grounded in classic ‘Bordian’ type-lists (Bordes 1950, 1961a, 1961b; Sonneville-Bordes and Perrot 
1954, 1955, 1956a, 1956b; Sonneville-Bordes 1960), the second in the ‘analytic’ methodology of 
Georges Laplace (1966a, 1966b, 1968, 1972). While the Bordian approach relied on a « typologie mor-
phologique » (‘morphology-based typology’), Laplace’s approach was based on a « typologie ana-
lytique » (‘analytic/trait-based typology’) (cf. Lippé 2012: 170; Demars 2011).607 However, Laplace’s 
                                                          
605 This again takes up the ‘soft ecology’ inclination of French lithic research. The ‘quality’ of each ‘micro-context’ is controlled by 
the ‘qualities’ of its immediate surroundings (other ‘micro-contexts’). Metaphorically, one may therefore say that the resulting 
relative economic positioning of each ‘micro-context’ corresponds to its ‘economic niche’ in a wider context of technicity. 
606 This does not preclude the use of typology as a ‘quick-and-dirty’ means to characterise and compare lithic assemblages; ty-
pology thereby acts as an initial ‘proxy,’ but the results require further empirical examination and corroboration. 
607 A strict opposition between Bordes’ « typologie morphologique » and Laplace’s « typologie analytique » is only partly ade-
quate since Bordian typology is not exclusively grounded in the morphological aspects of lithic artefacts, but also took into ac-
count some of their technical characteristics. Arguably, Bordes’ typology was grounded in a ‘synthetic’ appreciation of artefact-
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explicitly ‘atomistic’ and attribute-based approach to lithic typology – an example of ‘taxonomic’ rea-
soning as I have defined it in the previous chapter – was quickly marginalised by the Bordes and hence 
disappeared from the epistemic core of the French tradition (Bon 2009: 84-88; Lippé 2010; Plutniak 
and Tarantino 2016).608 Tixier’s (1976; 1980) forceful critique of the quantitative presupposition that 
had dominated most of the ‘Bordian era’ simply amplified this effect (cf. Perlès 2016), removing all 
seeds of ‘taxonomic’ or otherwise strongly ‘typological’ reasoning from the French lithic research en-
terprise (e.g., Perlès 1987, Boëda 1994). ‘Typology’ would now serve ‘technology,’ and not the other 
way around (cf. Geneste 1985: 171, 249-251, esp. Fig. 72).  
 The result is a pragmatic treatment of types. Their methodological role in French technologi-
cal research is restricted to casting light on the contours of varying chaîne opératoires. ‘Typology’ is 
used to enable the analysis of relationships among lithic types and thus to illuminate some ‘infrastruc-
tural’ features of lithic technology. Typology, in other words, has become a tool used to investigate the 
‘texture’ of technical systems rather than to characterise their ‘quality.’ Typically, typology either aids 
in charting the ‘structure’ (structure) or the ‘function’ (fonction) of a technical system (sensu Sigaut 
1991), but rarely captures aspects of them both; typology is generally regarded as only poorly equipped 
to address the problem of systemic ‘operation’ (fonctionnement). It is typically seen as capable of de-
scribing merely a part of the systemic articulation which French lithic experts seek to unveil.  
The idea, again, is that different ‘textures’ may support different lithic types and particular 
types may therefore only be useful for understanding particular technical systems. Different types 
may also elucidate different levels of technological organisation and types must thus always be cali-
brated against their whole. This ‘resonating’ linkage between the types that are mobilised and the 
wholes which the types are supposed to illuminate is characteristic of the use of typology in French 
technological research. It is a classic expression of the ‘inseparability’ tenet permeating contextualistic 
thought,609 motivating a somewhat ‘dialogical-dialectical’ mode of typology-making.610 It is therefore 
not surprising that types are regularly formed under ‘hermeneutic’ and ‘dialogical’ conditions of analy-
sis. Types are not simply inferred; their legitimacy must be defended by argument and interpretive 
rationality.611 
 From this perspective, the transition from the ‘typological era’ (Bordes) to the ‘technological 
era’ (Tixier) can be said to correspond to a fundamental shift in the role and status of typologisation in 
lithic research. The transition has considerably weakened the ‘semantic’ role of types and fortified their 
‘syntactic’ role in lithic inquiry. That the Bordian typological system is still widely used reflects a con-
cern with precise and consistent terminology (e.g., Brézillon 1968) – the aspiration of scholars to use 
the same expressions and even the same words. The distinction between ‘words’ and ‘language’ is sig-
nificant here. ‘Words’ fix a certain meaning, but some words are polyvalent insofar as their meaning 
depends on the sentence-context; speaking a ‘language’ implies knowledge of the rules that connect 
words and sentences in meaningful ways (grammar, syntax, narrative style, etc.), knowledge of the 
various semantic connotations, and the ability to render each utterance intelligible in its context. This 
is exactly the difference between ‘typology’ and ‘technology’ in French lithic analysis: ‘typology’ pro-
vides the words and sometimes parts of the sentences, while ‘technology’ constitutes the language in 
which they make sense (Fig. 42). ‘Types,’ in a similar vein as words, enable the pre-organisation of the 
lithic evidence and present a means of easy communication. Their role is ‘syntactic’ in this sense. But 
in order to elucidate aspects of technological organisation, types always require further contextual 
interpretation.612 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
wholes, while Laplace’s approach was strictly ‘analytic’ and as such mainly concerned with building up types in ‘bottom-up’ 
fashion, via the detection of patterned trait-associations.  
608 Instead, Laplace became influential in both Italy and Spain – Laplacian thought was literally exiled to other countries. 
609 See the description of ‘contextualism’ in Chapter 2. 
610 See Chapters 2 and 3 for the significance of this mode of analysis in lithic research guided by ‘synthetic’ world theories. 
611 The implication is that ‘Bordian’ typology primarily serves a descriptive purpose (e.g., Le Brun-Ricalens1993: 130f.), so it 
logically precedes technological interpretation. 
612 Guillaume Boccaccio (2005: 40), for example, explicitly contends that ‘technology permits the understanding of the morpho-
genesis of lithic types, while typology facilitates the comprehension of certain technological choices.’ This illustrates that the 




 The contextualistic orientation of typological practice in the French tradition is perhaps best 
reflected by the plurality of lithic type-concepts that are put forward.613 Classic ‘Bordian’ tool-types are 
thereby merely one way to employ typological reasoning, perhaps a rather marginal one. They are 
complemented by many other types, many of which are much more interpretive; these other types 
serve different analytic purposes and typically radicalise the aspect of context-dependency. This typo-
logical ‘context-dependency’ can be discussed from three different perspectives.  
First, ‘Bordian’ tool types may constitute the ‘macro-context’ of typologisation. The idea then is 
to look for technical, technological, and/or techno-functional distinctions within a given ‘Bordian’ 
type, in order to further divide it into potentially meaningful sub-categories – e.g., relative to the func-
tional potential of a cutting edge, the mode of manufacturing, and the volumetric structure or type of 
the original blank (e.g., Bonilauri 2010; Nicoud 2011: Chapitre 3.5; Weyer 2016). This practice estab-
lishes new ‘micro-contexts’ which can be related in turn to other ‘micro-contexts’ within the same 
technical system. The strategy is ‘dispersive’ and the aim is the proliferation of situated facts, so that 
the ‘texture’ of lithic technology comes into clearer focus. Instead of sub-dividing ‘Bordian’ categories, 
scholars may also aggregate types into larger, more generic types.614 The aim is the same: to link the 
constructed types to other ‘infrastructural’ features of the technical system in order to determine its 
internal organisation and regulatory principles.  
Similarly, other features of the chaîne opératoire may be defined as a ‘macro-context’ of typol-
ogisation; for instance, researchers may devise lithic types in relation to distinct stages of reduction – 
i.e., how many types are associated with a given stage and how they are characterised (cf. Boëda 1988) 
– or relative to different blank-matrices (e.g., Bourguignon 1997; Soriano 2000). Typology then de-
pends on the construction of other subordinate typolo -gies, and types which are considered techno-
logically meaningful are often found to be the product of the relationship between two or more basic 
types (e.g., blank-type, tool-type). The qualities and features relevant to grouping particular lithic arte-
facts together thereby depend entirely on their technical context (cf. e.g., Chevrier 2012: 154-160; 
Carmignani 2017: esp. Figure 13, 23f.; Fig. 43).615 Typology thus requires the specification of a con-
text, which is typically defined as a function of the ‘quality’ and ‘texture’ of the encasing chaîne opé-
ratoire. 
This strategy again reveals the radical ‘dispersive’ potential of French technological research 
since types may be multiplied endlessly, leading to an ever-increasing proliferation of fact. It follows 
that the construction of types cannot itself constitute the ultimate goal. Types are always means: ena-
bling features of inquiry which themselves say very little. A type is useful not because it embodies a 
statistically significant difference in the world, but because it allows scholars to make ‘infrastructural’ 
connections that are otherwise overlooked. Typology is consequently nothing more than a device to 
find consistent webs of intra-technological relations and to remove all interfering obstacles of interpre-
tation. Types are thus constructed and mobilised in a manner consistent with the mode of knowledge 
corroboration proper to contextualism. 
Secondly, assemblages, or the wider technical sphere of a given period or epoch (i.e. Mousteri-
an, Aurignacian, Western European Upper Palaeolithic, etc.), may delineate the ‘macro-context’ of 
typologisation. The objective here is to give structure to highly variable entities and to identify their 
constituting lithic ‘micro-contexts.’ In contrast to the foregoing variant of typology-making, the target 
is no longer lithic artefacts, but higher-level entities such as ‘technical systems.’ We may in fact say 
that the talk about different ‘lithic technologies’ in the French literature has its origin in this variant of 
typological reasoning. The respective ‘technologies’ or ‘technical systems’ are the ‘texture’-giving sub-
structures of assemblages or periods/epochs. Pelegrin’s (2011) four-part classification of Upper Pal-
                                                          
613 It is likely that it is precisely this plurality of type-concepts, all of which serve a distinct epistemological function (see infra), 
that has caused so much irritation and misunderstanding in the Anglophone world. The charge of ‘over-formalisation’ promi-
nently put forward by Bar-Yosef and Van Peer (2009) and the positive responses in the commentary section of their Current 
Anthropology paper only confirm this fact and show that the issue hit a nerve. In fact, it seems rather common-sense among 
many Anglophone lithic scholars to believe that ‘technology’ is merely some obscure sort of ‘neo-typology’ and thus ‘over-
formalises’ the available evidence to this effect (e.g., Tostevin 2011b: 352, 359-362, 2012: 94-97; Monnier and Missal 2014: 62). 
This assessment is ironic given the apparent ‘contextualistic’ architecture of French lithic typologies including the fact that 
‘types’ essentially help to unearth technical relationships and thus ensure that technological analysis works (see infra). 
614 Scholars may of course also aggregate types into macro-types and then subdivide them again based on some of the same 
features mentioned above. 
615 Cf. Chevrier (2012: 175-262, 304-377 433-534, 582-669) for a detailed application of ‘techno-type’-based classification of 
African and Levantine Acheulean bifaces. 
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aeolithic laminar reduction technologies in Western Europe is an example of this mode of typology-
making. More generally speaking, this meta-perspective on types also motivates scrutiny of the possi-
bly changing ‘status’ of typology in varying technical ‘macro-contexts’ (e.g., Valentin 2011: 47). It 
should be obvious that this inclination is deeply contextualistic since the role of typologisation itself is 
suspected to change relative to the ‘quality’ of different contexts. Even the utility of typology in 
knowledge-formation is thus thought to be mutable, that is, context-dependent.616 
Thirdly, specific production systems may be identified as ‘macro-contexts’ of typologisation; 
the aim is then typically to find lithic types that are ‘diagnostic’ of the respective systems. Their recog-
nition, consequently, depends on the ‘texture’ and ‘quality’ of the technical system of which they are a 
part, which are is often referred to together as the ‘finalities’ of the system (e.g., Valentin 1995: 25f.). 
Specifically shaped (i.e. convexity, twistedness, laminarity, etc.) and prepared (i.e., directionality, types 
of negatives, etc.) crested pieces might be regarded as such ‘techno-types.’ Techno-types are thus types 
that have been constructed with reference to their technological role and implication – they are pars 
pro toto.617 As such, they are distinct from ‘morpho-types’ which are primarily defined by their mor-
phological and shape-related attributes. Again, it is typically the interaction between ‘techno-types’ 
and ‘morpho-types’ which defines a particular lithic technology. 
Taken together, these three perspectives on context-dependent typologisation illustrate that 
‘typology’ in the French tradition depends on a global assessment of the technical context under con-
sideration; in the case of a lithic assemblage, ‘typology-making’ cannot therefore be separated from the 
technological reading (« lecture ») of the assemblage-totality (cf. Geneste et al. 1997). As such, typolo-
gisation is a ‘multi-stranded’ endeavour since various different types must be marshalled in order to 
determine the structure-giving relations making up lithic technologies. The lithic types that French 
scholars construct and analyse thereby reflect the general conception that technical systems are com-
plex and multidimensional entities (e.g., Forestier 1993: Fig. 1; Ducasse 2012: 151), which is largely at 
odds with the ‘analytic’ definitions of types that predominate in Anglophone lithic research.618 
 Generally speaking, the ‘technological approach’ (sensu Tixier et al. 1980; Pigeot 1983; Perlès 
1987; Pelegrin et al. 1988; Boëda 1994; Pelegrin 1995; Inizan et al. 1999 [1995]) sharply distinguishes 
between ‘Bordian’ types – largely restricted to tools, cores, and some special blanks – and ‘technologi-
cal typology’ in the wake of Tixier (2012 [1978]: 135f.). Whereas the former groups together lithic ob-
jects that share crucial aspects of their ‘artefactuality,’ the latter groups together objects that occupy a 
similar place or play a similar role in their chaîne opératoire. This is why ‘technological typology’ may 
be informed and/or solidified by experimental knapping (e.g., Roche and Tixier 1982; Binder and 
Pelegrin 1983; Boëda and Pelegrin 1983, 1985; Texier 1984; Geneste and Maury 1997). ‘Bordian’ and 
other classic typologies, by contrast, they tend to be indifferent to experimental knapping insights and 
typically don’t benefit from them. This difference represents another locus where French lithic typolo-
gies display their contextual constitution; if the construction of types can be easily and productively 
informed by general insights into the functioning of lithic reduction, it exhibits a critical ‘openness’ 
and contextual sensitivity.619 
                                                          
616 Boris Valentin (2011: 47), for example, invokes the possibility that the difficulty of typologically organising pre-Upper Palaeo-
lithic, especially Mousterian, lithic assemblages is rooted in the technological nature of these complexes; different technological 
contexts, in other words, may have different typological consequences. The fact that Upper Palaeolithic technologies support 
well-differentiated and recognisably distinct ‘types’ can then be seen as a result of their distinct techno-economic architecture. 
Types, then, become also much more susceptible to reflecting regional variation (e.g., Klaric 2007). See also the discussion by 
Slimak (2006) on the status of burins in Middle Palaeolithic assemblages. 
617 See for example Crassard’s (2007: 143-151) reconstitution of the ‘Wash’a’ débitage system of laminar production in Southern 
Yemen. 
618 ‘Analytic’ definitions of types, for example, stress that types are clusters of attributes (e.g., McPherron 1994: 42). Even the 
conventional ‘analytic’ distinction between ‘monothetic’ (types as clusters of objects) and ‘polythetic’ (types as clusters of attrib-
utes) typologies (cf. Adams and Adams 1991: 226) does not fully apply to the kind of typologising we regularly observe in French 
lithic analysis. 
619 This ‘openness’ of typologisation for experimental knapping insights is another reason why experimental knapping has tradi-
tionally occupied such a central place in French lithic research. It not only provides general knowledge about the process of 
knapping, but also has a ‘difference-making’ potential for how types are constructed and interpreted. ‘Technological typology,’ 
more often than not, is a typology calibrated against knowledge derived from experimental knapping; this last aspect indicates 
that typology-making often depends on an experimentally derived prejudice-structure of knowledge – on ‘pre-knowledge’ from 
another domain of practice. This general configuration carries a ‘hermeneutic’ undertone since technologically meaningful types 
can be constructed if, and only if, lithic artefacts are interpreted against the background (horizon) of subjective and inter-
subjective knapping experience. This ‘hermeneutic’ inclination is a strong indication for the ‘contextualistic’ nature of typology 
in the French tradition (see Chapter 2 for the link between ‘contextualism’ and ‘hermeneutics’). 
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 It is therefore the constant tension between classic typology and ‘technological typology’ – i.e., 
the interplay or incompatibility between the two – that turns out to be productive in French lithic re-
search (cf. Pessesse 2002; Lenoir 2008). An example is the concept of ‘D/discoid’ which can either 
have a strictly ‘typological’ or a strictly ‘technological’ meaning; ‘discoid’ is typically decapitalised in 
the first case and capitalised in the second case (‘Discoid’) to signify this important difference (Boëda 
1995a). Discoid cores in the ‘Bordian’ sense are morphologically defined, as cores that have a ‘dis-
coidal’ shape. As such, they do not always attest to the presence of the ‘Discoid’ method. The occur-
rence of ‘Discoid’ cores can only be evidenced by demonstrating the presence of a ‘Discoid’ technical 
system; ‘Discoid’ technology, as a consequence, is not reliably proxied by the mere presence of ‘discoid’ 
cores – especially if this presence has an anecdotal character – but requires scholars to convincingly 
show that ‘discoid’ cores are a systemic/regular feature of the assemblage and co-occur with the four 
main characteristic blank-types of ‘Discoid’ débitage systems (Boëda 1993, 1995a; Mourre 2003; Des-
champs 2017: 35).620 It is in this sense that ‘discoid’ cores can be said to designate polyvalent words, 
whereas ‘Discoid’ cores bespeak of the language of ‘Discoid’ technology.621 
A second example is provided by the polyvalent category of ‘Levallois points.’ Boëda (2013) 
and others have suggested that, in order to do justice to important differences in their technological 
signification, one must at least distinguish between two types of ‘Levallois points.’ The former (ibid.: 
132-138) generally discriminates between « typo-pointes Levallois » (‘Levallois type-points’) and 
« pseudo-typo-pointes Levallois » (‘Levallois pseudo-type-points’). These types are interpreted to re-
flect ‘two intentions tied to different production objectives’ (ibid.: 132). ‘Levallois type-points’ are typi-
cally produced from properly installed Levallois cores (i.e., two asymmetric hemispheres, etc.) and 
tend to occupy the distal part of a preferential Levallois blank-production series. ‘Levallois pseudo-
type-points,’ by contrast, can be manufactured from different production systems and typically derive 
from the outermost perimeter of two-hemispheric core architectures via ‘recurrent’ (non-hierarchical) 
reduction modalities (cf. Slimak 2003: 58f.). They are typically a product of ‘Discoid’ (Discoid sensu 
stricto) and ‘Discoid-like’ (Discoid sensu lato) technologies (cf. Deschamps 2014: Fig. 125).622 Quite 
often, this technological difference is reflected in blank-axialities (axis of detachment) and the type and 
degree of proximal investment/preparation. The signification of these differing qualities, however, can 
only be recognised if the ‘technical logic’ of the lithic technologies that host them is compared.623 The 
distinction conjures a contextualistic logic. 
As a third example, it is instructive to examine the contested category of burins. Burins have 
been interpreted as either tools or bladelet-cores – they represent a lithic category where typology-
technology relations are constantly re-negotiated (e.g., Perlès 1977, 1982; Ducasse and Langlais 2008; 
Chehmana 2009). The burin discourse in the French scene clearly shows that burin ‘types’ are not 
semantic categories per se – but, typically for contextualism, their potential status as semantic catego-
ries is also not categorically denied. The implication is that the signification of various burin ‘types’ 
must be demonstrated empirically rather than categorically predicated. Generally, burins are thus not 
understood as a homogenous technological category. Although all burins of course share some over-
arching features, different burin-types may have served distinct functional and/or technological needs. 
According to most researchers, the only way to determine their status is to analyse how different burin 
types interact with the assemblage-totality (cf. Le Brun-Ricalens and Brou 2003; Pesesse and Michel 
2006; Le Brun-Ricalens et al. 2006; Chehmana et al. 2007; Fig. 44). Burins, in other words, must 
always be contextualised with other artefacts of their assemblage-context in order to decide whether 
they served primarily as tools or as core-matrices (cf. Pesesse 2002). It follows that the interpretation 
                                                          
620 The disagreement between Tostevin (2000, 2012) and Boëda (1991, 1993, 1995a, 1995b) on the interpretation of ‘Dis-
coid’/’discoid’ technology in the Micoquian of Kulna cave can be reconstructed by reference to this difference. Tostevin (2012) 
constantly refers to ‘discoidal shape’ in his analysis while shape is not at all the main concern in the technological definition 
provided by Boëda (1995a). We may say that Tostevin speaks about ‘discoid’ while Boëda implies ‘Discoid.’ 
621 See also Bourguignon and Turq (2003) for an exemplary case of analysing the interplay between tool typology and Discoid 
technology. 
622 For a discussion of the difference between ‘Discoid’ technology sensu lato and ‘Discoid’ technology sensu stricto, see e.g., 
Mourre (2003: 9-11) and Deschamps (2014: 86, Fig. 30). 
623 The typological category of ‘Levallois’ (sensu Bordes 1961a/b) is generally approached with a certain dose of caution; for 
example, ‘Levallois blades’ may have a different ‘technological’ signification depending on whether they occur in ‘recurrent’ 
Levallois systems with a laminar tendency or in ‘non-Levallois’ systems of laminar production (cf. Révillion 1993). A detailed 
analysis of the relationship between the ‘typology’ and ‘technology’ of Levallois blades based on technological refits of the Middle 
Palaeolithic assemblages of Seclin and Saint-Germain-des-Vaux is provided by Révillion (1994). 
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of burin typology critically depends on technological organisation – the ‘function’ (fonction) of a burin-
type thus corresponds to its relative place within the ‘structure’ (structure) and ‘operation’ (fonction-
nement) of its technical context.624 A burin-type is simply conceived of as a node within a wider tech-
nical ‘infrastructure.’ 
The burin discussion shows that types are rarely ‘reified’ or ‘essentialised’ and must always 
prove their epistemic utility;625 types are primarily methodological operators that help to dismantle 
technical ‘textures’ and to reach out to technical ‘qualities.’ Types are not innocent, but highly mutable 
to this effect. The goal of technological analysis is generally to find those types that help to surmount 
the encountered interpretive obstacles – that is, to identify ways of typologisation which illuminate as 
many other co-present lithic artefacts as possible. To show that a burin-type signifies, pars pro toto, 
bladelet-production rather than tool-use, one would therefore need to show that the respective type 
helps to understand the presence of other lithic types in the same technical context – for example, that 
presumably bladelet-producing burins are associated with fitting bladelets (i.e., bladelets of a match-
ing morpho-technical character) and the respective by-products (i.e., matching preparatory ele-
ments)626 and that all of them, including the burins themselves, are non-anecdotal elements of their 
context (cf. Ploux and Soriano 2003: esp. Fig. 6).627 It must be said, however, that even the non-
satisfaction of one of these preconditions may not be enough to reject the core-hypothesis since schol-
ars may be capable to providing a satisfactory contextual explanation for this non-satisfaction (e.g., 
Faivre 2012).628 
All of this demonstrates that a lithic ‘morpho-type’ is not automatically co-extensive with a 
lithic ‘techno-type.’ Typology is a relational practice and cannot be successful if attributes and ‘traits’ of 
artefacts are cut-off from their contexts and marshalled exclusively ‘bottom-up’ – ‘technological typol-
ogies,’ the primary target of French typologisation, hence generally enshrine situated categories. This 
only confirms that the role of typology in French lithic research is to support contextualistic analysis 
and is often contextualistic itself.  
The interpretive primacy of technical contexts also permeates more recent work on lithic tech-
nology in France. Scholars now often devise morphometric sub-types – for example within the catego-
ry of laminar blanks – in order to relate these types to different ‘micro-contexts’ of technical systems 
(e.g., Langlais 2010: Figure 141, 145; Mevel 2017: Figure 116, 155). In other words: they assess the 
morphometric space of exploitable blanks based on the types of core-matrices encountered in an as-
semblage and use these expectations to explore the structure of metric data within the same category 
of blanks. The morphometric sub-types are thus dependent of knowledge on the nature of morpho-
metric constraints imposed by a particular type of core-reduction system (e.g., Pigeot 1991: Fig. 4).629 
It should be noted that these authors tend to speak of ‘classes’ rather than types, a habit that probably 
reflects the sedimented belief that types carve out reality in a more conclusive manner than classes 
do.630 The point, however, is that both ‘typologisation’ and ‘classification’ are highly dynamic practices 
                                                          
624 This implies that typology is often not an independent operation in French lithic analysis but fundamentally depends on 
technological inquiry and its fruits of knowledge; this situation marks a signature difference to ‘formism’ where typology typical-
ly constitutes an independent operation. 
625 Contra Tostevin (2011b: 359), Shott (2003: 100, 2010), and Shea (2013a: 154, 2014, 2017a). 
626 To show that the present bladelets or a sub-set of them is most parsimoniously explained by the presence of certain burins 
typically involves a negative argument about other potential sources of bladelet-production. This argument is relational since it 
situates burins relative to other potential and actual core-matrices. Where a particular blank-group originates from is therefore 
always a relative question. 
627 A typical ‘mechanistic’ objection is that the status of burins can only be determined by conducting use-wear analysis, echoing 
the ‘mechanistic’ intuition that similar types often result from different causal processes. This critique, however, misses the 
mark because the kinds of types devised and criticised in ‘contextualism’ have been constructed and secured contextually. Their 
‘truth’ is evaluated from within and therefore does not depend on external validation. The burin-core debate that has been wag-
ing for years in Palaeolithic archaeology is thus nothing more than a symptom of the ongoing clash between ‘mechanistic’ and 
‘contextualistic’ modes of reasoning. 
628 The ability to explain why something is significant even though it is not frequently or systematically present in a lithic assem-
blage is a ‘trademark’ of ‘contextualistic’ modes of inquiry; it reflects the ‘contextualistic’ credo that nothing can be denied and 
nothing can be presupposed other than that nothing is presupposable (see Chapter 2). 
629 Valentin (1995: 27) explicitly notes: “[t]his approach demands a faithful reconstruction of the objectives assigned to the 
chaîne opératoire as well as a detailed appreciation of the circumstances of its realisation (“the space of the possible”). When 
these circumstances are properly appreciated [and understood], the prehistorian is able to evaluate whether this or that modali-
ty is the necessary answer in a given situation (when “the possible space is closed” [Pelegrin 1995]) or if it is merely one of the 
anticipated solutions from a set of possible options. This is a difficult assessment, which necessarily requires a global under-
standing of the chaîne opératoire [….].” (my translation; original italics [for the original French quote, see Appendix Q.14]). 
630 But compare the discussion of the relationship between typology and classification offered by Perlès (1988: 1080): “[i]n any 
archaeological ensemble, there are pieces (combinations of attributes) or attributes (manufacturing techniques, shapes, raw 
204 
 
and necessarily anchored in co-constitutive technical relations. Their orientation is blazingly contextu-
alistic in Pepper’s sense. 
Éric Boëda’s work on the various methods and modalities of Levallois technology probably represents 
the most organicistic strategy in the French scene to understand lithic technology on the assemblage-
level.631 This approach is laid out comprehensively in Boëda’s (1986) influential doctoral dissertation, 
later published as a monograph under the title Le Concept Levallois: variabilité des méthodes (1994). 
Several other key papers about the same topic were published between these two landmarks, all of 
which explore the tension between the ‘unity’ and ‘internal variability’ of Levallois technology (e.g., 
Boëda 1988, 1990, 1991, 1993); they embody an approach that systematically distinguishes between 
‘technique,’ ‘method’ and ‘conception’ in order to illuminate Levallois diversity (Boëda 1988: 185).632 
Conceptually, the approach treats ‘diversity’ as the flipside of ‘unity’ – an interpretive preoccupation 
characteristic for organicism.633 Higher-level unity is thought to condition lower-level diversity – the 
two are viewed as being mutually dependent.634 Accordingly, Levallois ‘modalities’ are defined as low-
er-level technical variations, not violating the principles (and general technical rules) of a given Leval-
lois ‘method.’ All of the different levels of variability are specified in ‘volumetric’ terms (Boëda 1994).  
This meticulous analysis of the ‘Levallois phenomenon’ culminates in the seminal portrayal of 
Levallois as a ‘facial’ or ‘surface-extracting’ technology – a kind of technology that is regarded to be 
fundamentally opposed to ‘volume-extracting’ technologies (cf. Boëda 1990, 1988: Figs. 18.9-18.10).635 
According to Boëda (idem), the difference between these two types is rooted in their technical ‘struc-
ture.’ As it will become clear from the following exposition of Boëda’s characterisation of ‘recurrent’ 
Levallois systems based on the lithic material from Biache Saint-Vaast, presented in detail in Analyse 
technologique du débitage du niveau IIA (1988), ‘structure’ has not the same implications here as in 
‘contextualism.’ Instead, ‘structure’ is interpreted in organicistic terms, as ‘organic structure’ achieved 
through a specific ‘organic process’ that can be defined by its ‘progressive’ and ‘ideal’ categories.636 
 Boëda’s approach to Levallois technology and the identification of ‘recurrent’ methods in par-
ticular is guided by two key assertions: (i) each Levallois ‘method’ is conceptually discrete (i.e., be-
speaks of a distinct schéma opératoire); and (ii) each ‘method’ is characterised by a specific spatio-
temporal organisation of its corresponding chaînes opératoires (i.e., it makes room for a chaîne di-
recteur). Although his approach is generally based on a classic ‘technological reading’ (lecture) of the 
assemblage-totality, including the detailed examination of schémas diacritiques, and the ‘virtual’ re-
construction of technical artefact-interrelationships (‘mental refitting’) (Boëda 1988: 186; see previous 
part of the chapter), the way in which these two assertions are defended suggests that the analysis is 
governed by an organicistic logic.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
materials, etc.) considered characteristic of the whole [...]. It is for clearly pointing out differences (or similarities) that the pre-
historian elaborates a typology, or utilises an already existing typology. When developing a typology, based on groups of pieces 
(complex combinations of attributes), one necessarily performs a hierarchisation of features [...]. A typology is therefore very 
different from a classification since each piece could, strictly speaking, belong to several types [...]. But it is characteristic of a 
typology to bring to light those features which make it possible to solve specific archaeological problems [...]. In principle, a 
typology should be designed relative to the problem posed (which dictates the choice of relevant characteristics), and several 
typologies can be applied to the same whole to solve different problems. [...] Whatever may be our interest, a classification will 
always express a real structure within the studied material since it is based on its intrinsic properties. This is one of the differ-
ences with a typology where one instead chooses to privilege certain features, and to rank them according to the problem posed.” 
(my translation [the original French quote is provided in Appendix Q.15]; cf. Valentin 1995: 2, footnote 2) 
631 As we will see in this part of the chapter, ‘organicistic’ reasoning turns out to be correlated with a specific temporal perspec-
tives, it typically operates on higher-levels of analysis (see infra). 
632 For a good summary of this approach, see Chevrier (2012: 139-141). 
633 ‘Unity’ is interpreted as ‘integrity’ – specifying the external relatedness of the Levallois phenomenon – and ‘diversity’ is simp-
ly interpreted as the ‘structure’ of the integrated whole – specifying the internal relatedness of the whole’s parts. This conception 
is, first, ‘synthetic’ since it concerns the question of how parts are bound together by significant wholes and, secondly, ‘organicis-
tic’ since the identification/determination of ‘significant’ wholes is part of the basic epistemic task the analyst has to complete 
(cf. Chapter 2). 
634 We will return to this ‘organicistic’ key topos at a later stage in this chapter. 
635 These ‘volume-extracting’ technologies are typical for the Western European Upper Palaeoltihic, where they find their climax 
in developed prismatic blade technologies (Boëda 1990, 1994). 
636 See Chapter 2, and esp. Chapter 2: Box 9. 
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An organicistic orientation is already indicated by the strong emphasis on the idea of the ‘op-
erational scheme’ (schéma opératoire) and the outlined temporal structure of ‘recurrent’ Levallois 
technologies.637 The notion of the ‘operational scheme’ not only entails an emergent conception of 
technology – technical systems are viewed as ‘more-than-compositional’ (Boëda 1988: 185) – but also 
embodies an ‘ideal’ category itself, somewhat detached from the ‘progressive’ categories detectable via 
the ‘stigmas’ preserved on the given lithic artefacts (cf. ibid.: 185f.).638 The ‘progressive’ categories, 
those that delineate the space of description and thus a ‘significant’ whole, are found in the spatiotem-
poral structure of Levallois reduction. In particular, the strategy is to find a ‘structure’ that is capable 
to integrate the ‘progressive’ categories, clearing the view for the ‘ideal’ whole. Even though both spa-
tial (i.e., volumetric, geographic/topological) and temporal dimensions of technological organisation 
are considered, the crucial point is that it is primarily the temporal ‘structure’ of reduction which gives 
meaning to the observed spatial articulations of lithic artefacts and artefact-groups. Temporality is 
thus conceived as a superordinate category639 – a presupposition that is germane to organicistic 
modes of reasoning (cf. Pepper 1942: 308-310). 
The organicistic logic of Boëda’s technological reconstruction becomes especially evident when 
we retrace the spatiotemporal structure of ‘recurrent’ Levallois and examine how this ‘structure’ is 
empirically established. The first aspect to note is that the ‘recurrent’ method of Levallois – sub-
dividable into two modalities (uni- and bidirectional) – is characterised by a specific order of well-
separated technical ‘stages,’ each of which is defined by a specific articulation of artefacts and technical 
gestures/operations (Fig. 45). Each ‘stage,’ in other words, forms a sub-set of the material and non-
material ingredients that together form the technical system we call ‘recurrent’ Levallois – these ‘stag-
es’ are part of the ‘progressive’ categories of the latter. This general character of reconstructing tech-
nology reveals that the ‘synthetic’ constitution of a technical whole (part-whole interweaving) is inter-
preted temporally, which, in turn, illustrates that the variability and heterogeneity of a lithic assem-
blage is primarily resolved by shedding light on the integration of the assemblage-parts (primarily 
lithic artefacts) by a temporally extended process of volumetric reduction of high technical specificity. 
This process is shown to make sense, that is, to resolve the initially observed heterogeneity. It is in this 
sense that we can speak of an ‘organic process’ which is initially ‘concealed.’  
It is ‘concealed’ because the process is not immediately given or obvious in ‘phenomenal’ reali-
ty – that is, the ‘reality’ of physically scattered artefacts; it only becomes apparent through a careful re-
organisation of the lithic ‘fragments’ into qualitative units of time (i.e., reduction stages), so that the 
process of passing through the latter in the correct direction can be shown to integrate, that is, ‘unify’, 
all initial fragments in a single ‘organic whole.’640 The system Boëda calls Levallois ‘recurrent’ is noth-
ing less than such a unified ‘organic whole,’ which accordingly comes into view only through an under-
                                                          
637 ‘Scheme’ is not an innocent concept. Schéma is for example a key term in Piaget’s theory of developmental psychology and 
there are obvious conceptual affinities between the former and the notion of the ‘operational scheme’ (schéma opératoire) in 
French lithic analysis (cf. Schlanger 1994). A ‘schema,’ for Piaget, is a cluster of concepts used to represent the world, i.e., ob-
jects, scenarios, sequences of events, or relations. Piaget (1952, 1964 [1959]) famously distinguished between behavioural sche-
mata (organised patterns of behaviour guiding the representation and manipulation of objects and experience), symbolic sche-
mata (internal mental images and/or other systems of codification to represent and organise experience), and operational 
schemata (internalised mental patterns to deal with an operationalise problems). All of these strands are somewhat relevant for 
the reconstruction and interpretation of technological schémas opératoires. The concept gives voice to the idea that practice, 
representation, and cognition are deeply enmeshed in human technicity (cf. Pigeot 2011; see Boëda 1997: 12 for an explicit cita-
tion of Piaget’s work). The important point is that Piaget’s developmental theory is ‘organicistic’ in many regards – a circum-
stance that is perhaps best reflected in the fact that the ‘becoming’ of the human individual (its ‘genesis’) is thought to be 
achieved through a succession of distinct developmental ‘stages.’ 
638 The term ‘stigma,’ regularly used by Boëda himself, has – as already outlined in Chapter 3 – relationalistic implications. In 
addition, however, it signals the ‘fragmentariness’ of artefactual information insofar as lithic artefacts convey merely traces of 
the technical systems in which they originally participated. In the context of Boëda’s (1988) reconstruction of the ‘recurrent’ 
Levallois method, this can be taken as preliminary indication that artefacts are primarily understood as ‘fragments of experience’ 
– thereby confirming the ‘organicistic’ orientation of his approach. 
639 Time, in other words, is considered to be the supreme/superior ‘structure-giving’ force in nature. 
640 The centrality of a technical system’s temporal ‘structure’ – what in ‘contextualism’ would be referred to as the temporal 
‘spread’ of a technical ‘texture’ – makes it necessary to invoke qualitatively discrete elements that enable the analysis of a tech-
nical whole’s unfolding in time; one can therefore not content that the introduction of ‘reduction stages’ is a deliberate interpre-
tive decision here, fully under control of the analyst. Rather, we have to acknowledge that the introduction of ‘stages’ or ‘steps’ is 
required to render the offered account conceptually consequential as well as consistent. The resulting ‘staging’ of the lithic tech-
nological architecture can therefore not rejected by simply appealing to some selected facts; its rejection necessitates the rejec-
tion of ‘organicism’ altogether. The controversy between advocates of ‘discrete’ and ‘continuous’ reduction in lithic studies (see 
e.g., Baumler 1987, 1988; Baumler and Speth 1993; Dibble 1995a; Henry 1995; Shott 2010, 2017; and Shott et al. 2011 for a 
general defence of ‘continuous’ reduction scenarios) is thus likely to be the symptom of a more basic clash between ‘organicists’ 
and ‘non-organicists’ (especially ‘formists’ and ‘mechanists’). We will return to this point in Chapter 6. 
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standing of the underlying ‘organic process’ that determines its coherence and ‘technical reality’ (ré-
alité technique). This ‘organic process’ exhibits subtle but significant differences when we compare 
‘uni-’ and ‘bidirectional’ systems of ‘recurrent’ Levallois technology. Importantly, the emerging gap 
between Appearance and Reality is distinctive to organicism. 
 The basic strategy is to order the assemblage into ‘significant’ technical ‘structures’ and ‘sub-
structures’ and to show that all initially encountered ‘fragments of experience’ – lithic artefacts – can 
thereby be resolved into their respective technical wholes; the ‘structures’ and temporal ‘sub-
structures’ constructed are shown to be ‘significant’ due to their ability to enable this process of resolv-
ing.641 This is demonstrated by illustrating that only with the help of the respective ‘sub-structures’ it 
becomes possible to render their corresponding ‘structures’ temporally coherent.642 The two following 
aspects are important to consider in this regard.  
First, technical wholes (‘technical systems’) are conceptualised as ‘determinative’ forces, which 
is another way of saying that the taken approach is ‘integrative;’ it is ‘integrative’ because, on the as-
semblage-level, ‘relevant’ lithic artefact variability needs to be separated from ‘irrelevant’ variability – 
the specification of a ‘significant’ whole entails the definitive specification of artefacts belonging to the 
whole and artefacts not belonging to it. A single ‘organic process’ is then shown to explain why this 
must be the case; this process is ‘directed’ and ‘teleological’ insofar as it serves to satisfy one single 
‘ideal’ – the schéma opératoire. The resulting explanation is ‘economic’ since it saves all initial ‘frag-
ments of reality’ without any loss and thereby reveals their ‘unification’ through various temporally 
extended yet ‘significant’ wholes (sensu Pepper 1942: 306f.).643 This also implies that all lithic artefacts 
allocated to a ‘significant’ organic whole are shown to imply the whole, whereas the whole can be con-
sidered to transcend its fragments – this is the delicate balance between ‘implicitness’ and ‘transcend-
ence’ that is typical for organicistic inquiry (ibid.: 304f.). 
Second, the general strategy of analysis clearly exposes that knowledge claims are secured by 
demonstrating that each identified technical ‘structure’ can be coherently described by bringing to 
bear its ‘sub-structures’ and a specific ‘organic process’ that authors and organises them (sensu Pepper 
1942: 283).644 The initially observed ‘conflicts,’ ‘counteractions,’ or ‘contradictions’ between the ‘frag-
ments of reality’ (i.e., the lithic artefacts) are shown to dissipate in this way because the whole turns 
out to be temporally coherent with the totality of its parts, despite the material heterogeneity of the 
latter.645 This is the classic interpretation of knowledge corroboration in organicism – it confirms the 
presence of a ‘coherentist’ account of cognitive ‘veracity,’ stressing internal technological intelligibil-
ity.646 
 Boëda (1988) accordingly seeks to minimise all inconsistencies, contradictions, and explanato-
ry gaps on the assemblage-level, while at the same time maximising the cognitive economy of his ac-
count; epistemic virtues such as interpretive ‘elegancy’ and explanatory ‘simplicity’ are thus interpret-
ed through the lens of organicism, as the ability to provide a ‘progressive’ technical process that is ‘or-
                                                          
641 See the exposition of the proper ‘organicistic’ theory of cognitive criticism in Chapter 2. 
642 Boëda (1988) thereby acknowledges that lithic artefacts deposited together (lithic assemblages) do not necessarily belong 
together technologically. Thus, to identify those lithic objects which belong together and to separate them from all other objects 
emerges as a key task. In ‘organicistic’ terms, one can understand this as re-casting the lithic assemblage as a problematic whole, 
whose ‘organicity’ can only be verified by showing that all of its artefacts can be resolved in ‘significant’ sub-wholes (i.e., particu-
lar technical systems) without any loss. This is the ‘organicistic’ interpretation of the technical ‘infrastructure’ of a lithic assem-
blage. The same reasoning can also be used to evaluate whether or not assemblages are technologically coherent and hence 
whether or not they are likely to be mixed or not. This is why ‘organicism’ motivates an entirely different type of ‘source criti-
cism’ than ‘mechanistic’ which typically relies on ‘formation theory’ – a type of ‘source criticism’ that favours an ‘internalistic’ 
perspective and may be built exclusively on technological data. 
643 Boëda (1988: 213) explicitly names ‘conceptual unification’ as a goal of his analysis. 
644 Already Cresswell (1976: 6), one of the founder figures of French technologie culturelle, has noted: “[t]echnical chaîne opé-
ratoires have two essential characteristics: internal coherence and an organic relationship with the social structure.” (my trans-
lation; emphasis added [for the original French quote, see Appendix Q.16]; cf. Cresswell 1983). For the concept of ‘technical 
coherence’ (cohérence technique), see e.g. Nicoud (2011: 68). 
645 This is another way of saying that inconsistency and heterogeneity turn out to be rather ‘illusionary’ since they only persist if 
one approaches lithic technology as a ‘static’ and strictly ‘synchronic’ entity, not extended and somehow ‘distributed’ in time. A 
truly ‘dynamic’ account, by contrast, is capable – and ‘organicism’ interprets ‘dynamism’ primarily in temporal terms – to show 
that the respective heterogeneity vanishes if the temporal configuration of ‘distributed-ness’ and ‘interconnectedness’ are taken 
seriously into consideration. In Bergson’s (1907, 1922) classic formulation, this trail of reasoning entailed a basic epistemologi-
cal critique on human knowing, which was regarded to regularly fall prey to the phenomenological illusion that worldly objects 
are somehow ‘static’ and thus temporally fixable entities. It follows that the ‘real’ temporal existence of phenomena is generally 
difficult, if not impossible, to observe directly. 
646 See Chapter 2 and Pepper (1942: 308-314). 
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ganic’ and realises its inherent ‘ideal.’647 It is no surprise then that Boëda’s argumentation is multidi-
rectional, often rather intricate, and generally ‘dialectic’ – the account is ‘coordinative’ to this effect 
(i.e., it coordinates all lithic ‘fragments of reality’). However, it has to be noted that this ‘complexity’ is 
not so much a property of the offered explanation itself (which is in fact fairly ‘simple’), but rather an 
essential characteristic of the nexus of argumentation and embedded interpretation that is required to 
develop, present, and secure it. 
 The effective coordination of all original lithic artefacts, interpreted as ‘fragments of reality,’ 
via the postulation of relevant technical ‘structures’ and their ‘progressive’ categories – lithic reduction 
‘stages’ – is the organicistic corollary of the ‘contextualistic’ 4D-puzzle. But puzzle-solving is under-
stood as a reversed, directed process of organic growth. Each ‘stage’ of reduction is a logical conse-
quence of its preceding ‘stage’ and coevally determines the ‘stage’ that follows. We can say that each 
‘stage’ implies its past and is ‘pregnant of its future’ – a credo highly characteristic of organicistic 
thought. In the case the lithic assemblage of Biache Saint-Vaast IIA, the coordinative maximisation of 
explanatory economy leads Boëda (1988: 186) to identify multiple technical wholes exhibiting patterns 
of inversed technical growth that are specific to them (reduction schemes ‘A’ to ’E’). The proposition 
that these technical wholes correspond to distinct ‘concepts,’ ‘methods,’ and/or knapping ‘modalities’ 
is hence a largely unavoidable result of the taken approach.648 The ‘discreteness’ of the ‘stages’ them-
selves follows from the fact that their order is not arbitrary or interchangeable since each ‘stage’ has 
determinative significance – the totality of ‘stages’ is technically enchained (enchaînement technique) 
(cf. ibid.: 1987).649  
The point is not that a fundamental re-organisation of lithic reduction – e.g., successively em-
ploying different knapping strategies to a single core – is generally impossible, but that the costs would 
be unreasonably high. This leads to the conclusion that economic knapping behaviour would typically 
consist in the avoidance of knapping-pattern alternations – an insight that, ironically, is often opposed 
by ‘mechanists’ by calling upon Homo oeconomicus.650 The entire point of setting-up a specific volu-
metric core-architecture is to achieve its corresponding knapping ‘ideal’ through a specified set of ‘pro-
gressive’ operations; especially in the case of Levallois technology, where initial preparatory invest-
ment is generally high, it is therefore unlikely that the reduction strategy will experience major chang-
es during core reduction.651 In addition, if core re-organisation was a regular aspect of technological 
organisation at Biache, it can be expected to show itself after inter-artefact coherency is established.652  
                                                          
647 Apart from the notion of the ‘operational scheme’ (schéma opératoire), another conceptual locus where the ‘progressive’ and 
‘ideal’ categories meet is predicated by the idea of a ‘knapping plan’ (projet de taille) which is thought to connect the former with 
the latter (Boëda 1988: 185). 
648 This fact is probably responsible for the basic conflict between Boëda’s (1988) and Dibble’s (1995a) accounts of the lithic 
technology from Biache Saint-Vaast level IIA (see infra; cf. Chapters 1 and 3).  
649 ‘Organic’ lithic reduction leads to technical entrapment. It implies that specific lithic reduction trajectories open a space of 
technical options becoming more and more constrained as reduction proceeds, especially when initial technical investment was 
high (e.g., relatively cost-intensive early (preparatory) phases of a chaîne opératoire). Because of the specific technical conse-
quences of each trajectory, only a number of knapping solutions lead to acceptable knapping results, others punish the knapper 
(e.g., by an increased risk of knapping errors, etc.) (cf. Pigeot 1991: Fig. 4). To change the logic inherent to a given reduction 
trajectory, for example foreshadowed by a specific core set-up, often requires to re-set the entire core- and reduction-
architecture, a procedure that typically depends on renewed preparatory investment and is often non-economic (especially in 
terms of raw material consumption). Lithic reduction is path-dependent to this effect (cf. Boëda 188: 210). Boëda (1988: 210) 
himself maintains: “[…] [t]hey [the knappers of Biache Saint-Vaast level IIA] were, as it seems, prisoners of the limitations 
inherent to the volumetric conception of the Levallois core, which fixes a specific function for each of the two [reduction] surfac-
es.” (ibid.: 191f. [for the original French quote, see Appendix Q.17]). 
650 It can in fact be concluded that the ‘organicistic’ interpretation of the Homo oeconomicus underlines that ‘economic’ reduc-
tion behaviour is only possible if the interlink between the ‘progressive’ and ‘ideal’ categories of different knapping concepts is 
respected; the ‘economic’ potential of a knapping concept lies precisely in its capacity to fulfil its ‘ideal.’ If the chain of ‘progres-
sive’ categories is thus interrupted, a part of the knapping investment has been wasted – this can be viewed as ‘un-economic.’ 
The clash between ‘mechanism’ and ‘organicism’ consists thus in a fundamental disagreement on how to measure and objectify 
‘economic-ness’ – the former typically assesses economy in terms of ‘absolute’ and ‘external’ categories, while the latter exam-
ines it in terms of ‘relative’ and ‘internal’ categories. 
651 There is of course still the possibility that reduction patterns change because of some unforeseen events. Such events may be 
unrepairable knapping accidents that destroy the required volumetric structure, so that lithic reduction cannot continue as 
anticipated, or the depletion of the raw material matrix of a core. In the latter case, it becomes opportune and hence economic to 
extract as much further material as possible, no matter how.  
652 If inter-artefact coherency can be established without postulating a change in core management, one has little reason to 
invoke such a change. Again, this logic reflects the ‘organicistic’ interpretation of the simplicity principle: Okham’s Razor sug-
gests to minimise the number of reduction strategies that feature in a given explanation (cf. Sober 1988, 2015). Okham’s Razor 
is thereby interpreted ‘synthetically’ and thus diverges from the Razor that is typically invoked in ‘formism’ or ‘mechanism.’ In 
fact what ‘simplicity’ means is simply contested among these theories. 
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 To illustrate the main points outlined so far, it is useful to examine Boëda’s reconstruction of 
uni- and bidirectional « Levallois récurrente » in more detail, especially how distinct ‘stages’ of reduc-
tion are identified and characterised. In general, three discrete stages of débitage are pinpointed, all of 
which are defined by a specific articulation of groups of blanks and core configurations (Boëda 1988: 
186-196). The basic strategy is to understand the consequences of particular flake removals for the 
configuration of the corresponding cores and, conversely, the consequences of particular core configu-
rations for the structure of the corresponding flakes. The aim is to coordinate these consequences in 
such a way that extracted flakes explain particular core configurations and the core configurations 
explain particular flakes (e.g., ibid.: 198). Flakes and cores are considered to be potentially comple-
mentary ‘micro-structures’ which participate in effective ‘meso-structures’ (reduction ‘stages’) whose 
temporal enchainment gives birth to technological ‘macro-structures’ (technical systems) (ibid.: Fig. 
18.7; Appendix III.5: Fig III.6). The structure-giving features are different in all of the three cases.  
The relevant ‘stigmas’ on flakes are physical outline, spatiotemporal structure of dorsally pre-
served scars (i.e., scar-geography, scar-directionality, scar-chronology), angulations (i.e. profile, cross-
section, dorsal convexities, etc.), and the direction of detachment (Boëda 1988: 187). Based on these 
and other features, it becomes possible, given one has formed a general understanding of the architec-
ture of the cores from which these flakes most likely stem, to infer to effects of their removal on the 
convexity of the core-surface from which they have been extracted. These effects regulate future flake-
removals, and so forth. Relevant core ‘stigmas’ are represented by the physical outlines of fully pre-
served flake-negatives, the      spatiotemporal structure of flake-negatives on the reduction surface (i.e., 
scar-geography, scar-directionality, scar-chronology), and the general configuration of surface-
convexities (idem). Based on these and other features, it is possible to retrodict how the preceding 
flake-removals must have looked like and to anticipate how the next removal(s) would look like (ibid.: 
199-201) – the latter is basically a function of the nature of extraction-convexities on the core surface 
created through past removals (cf. ibid.: Fig. 18.2, 18.8-18.10).  
The distinction between ‘determining’ flakes (prédéterminé) and ‘determined’ flakes (prédé-
terminants) (Boëda 1988: 185) is a direct consequence of this logic of reasoning and enshrines the 
methodological impetus to assess flakes in light of cores and cores in light of flakes (ibid.: 198; cf. 
Boëda 1986: 181-252).653 Each artefact is viewed to conserve traces of past technical operations and to 
be pregnant with future operations (cf. Boëda 1982). 
With Pepper we can make sense of this in the following way: each single lithic artefact is iden-
tified as a ‘fragment’ of its technical reality (réalité technique) with a specific ‘nexus’ of technical po-
tentiality. This nexus is determined by a fragment’s ‘stigmas’ (see supra) and delineates the possible 
technical connections that the fragment may have maintained with other lithic fragments. A technical 
‘nexus’ thus constitutes a field of potential relations with other lithic artefacts. We can say, then, that 
Boëda compares the ‘nexuses’ of flakes with the ‘nexuses’ of cores in order to determine their meeting 
point(s).654 These meeting points are ways in which the lithic ‘fragments’ may complete themselves 
(sensu Pepper 1942: 291f.), by merging together with other fragments to form a larger technical ‘struc-
ture.’655 If there are no plausible meeting points, the fragments can be said to be ‘irrelevant’ for each 
other’s integration.  
                                                          
653 Cf. “[…] The study of cores must have priority. The core is the most important vector of information to determine the utilised 
concept of knapping, especially because it bears the stigmas of the employed methods or techniques. The analysis of predeter-
mined and predetermining flakes is secondary: it is from this study that the method or methods employed by the knapper will be 
definitively determined. This methodological articulation between nucleus and flakes must evidently take into account the in-
formational capacities provided by the artefacts of an archaeological site.” (Boëda 1988: 1985; my translation; for the original 
French quote, see Appendix Q.17). Even though Boëda insists on the analytical priority of cores here, this priority is essentially 
born out of interpretive convenience; cores and flakes are methodologically equals, but because cores typically preserve more 
information (each core usually corresponds to a number of flakes) they constrain the possible meeting points of ‘nexuses’ 
stronger than single flakes do. However, in order to know which cores belong together (i.e., form the fragments of a single reduc-
tion method/system), one already needs to have inspected all flakes in the same assemblage. The entry point of inquiry is thus 
generally arbitrary and a matter of convenience, rather than theory. This should not be surprising since argumentation and 
inference tend to be ‘dialogical’ and ‘multi-directed’ in ‘organicism.’ 
654 If there are multiple meeting points of the involved ‘nexuses,’ the criterion of total coherency decides which of the meeting 
points is most likely to be relevant in the current technical context. The question, then, is simply which of the meeting points 
positively articulates with the other so far determined meeting points of ‘nexuses’ in the organic whole. It is to this effect that the 
whole is of primordial importance in securing ‘organicistic’ knowledge. 
655 The ‘nexus’ of a fragment thereby simply drives home the ‘organicist’s’ conception that the whole has always been implicit in 
its parts, but at the same time necessarily transcends it (see supra). Each lithic fragment is ‘stigmatised’ by its chaîne opératoire 
to this effect (cf. Pepper 1942: 304). 
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This conception clarifies how ‘mental refitting’ is interpreted in organicism: as the coordina-
tion of ‘nexuses’ with the goal to integrate all lithic fragments in such a way that overall technical 
coherence is reached.656 ‘Mental refitting’ is thus simply the name for a procedure that seeks to deter-
mine the technical meeting points (if any) of various lithic artefacts sharing a ‘significant’ technical 
context (i.e., assemblage, technical system, etc.) (cf. Boëda 1988: 198). Accordingly, artefacts are com-
plementary from a technical point of view when their ‘nexuses’ meet. This way of ‘matching’ lithic arte-
facts and to determine which belong together and which not is clearly reflected in Boëda’s Fig. 18.16 
and Fig. 18.17, in which particular articulations of Levallois core and flake structures (i.e., their mutual 
implicatedness) are theorised (Appendix III.5: Fig. III.7, III.8; cf. Fig. 6A in Chapter 3). 
The identification of ‘uni-‘ and ‘bidirectional’ reduction methods as distinct variants of ‘recur-
rent’ Levallois reflects this organicistic orientation. A key difference between the two is that the unidi-
rectional ‘method’ requires constant monitoring and regular re-preparation of the distal core-
convexities, which otherwise deplete as a function of the general organisation of lithic reduction; the 
bidirectional ‘method,’ by contrast, through the alternating removal of a series of flakes from opposing 
platforms introduces a self-preparatory procedure (‘auto-preparation’), which ensures that distal core-
convexities do not deplete as quickly. Alternating bidirectional exploitation of the core-surface convex-
ities, in other words, provides a means to manage/control these convexities. This difference in core 
management has subtle but significant consequences for the nature of the corresponding flakes. The 
bidirectional, self-preparatory ‘method’ enables the extraction of slightly more elongated flakes (Boëda 
1988: 201f.) because the guiding ridges of bidirectional reduction create a less-pronounced, that is, 
‘smoother’ distal core-angulation which permits controlled ‘feathering’ (ibid.: 187).657 In addition, bidi-
rectional cores have two distal parts that both serve as striking platforms of their own – they are thus 
automatically monitored and prepared (ibid.: 201).658  
This articulation of bidirectional core-reduction and elongated flakes is confirmed by the met-
ric data. Levallois flakes with a bidirectional scar-pattern are generally more elongated than flakes with 
unidirectional scar-patterns. Importantly, metric differences between relevant flake-categories are 
interpreted as a consequence of distinct reduction methods (Boëda 1988: 202-207), and not the other 
way around; metric differences within these flake-categories, conversely, are regarded to reflect raw 
material size reduction generated by increasing reduction depth.659  
Since the resulting account delivers a coherent picture of the two methods, each of which is 
characterised by three logically-dependent reduction ‘stages’ – the first stage is ‘preparatory,’ the sec-
ond stage reflects ‘primary production’ of maximally-sized Levallois products, and the third stage rep-
resents ‘final extraction’ of size-reduced Levallois products before raw material exhaustion – Boëda 
concludes that there is no empirical reason to assume a mixture of Levallois reduction strategies – 
                                                          
656 By coordinating flake and core ‘nexuses,’ it becomes not only possible to recognise their co-constitution, but also to determine 
a flake’s precise location of removal as well as its date of removal, which in tandem allow an assessment of the flake’s temporal 
positioning and technical function in their chaîne opératoire. It is along these lines that a distinction between ‘preparatory’ and 
‘non-preparatory’ flakes can be made. In ‘organicism,’ knapping intentions are thus interpreted through the lens of ‘nexuses’ 
and their global structure. 
657 Bidirectional Levallois ‘recurrent,’ however, also has some technical disadvantages. According to Boëda’s (1988: 191) recon-
struction, when core size diminishes this method (Schéma B) is much more likely to yield extremely flat extraction-surfaces – 
the central surface convexities of the ‘active’ core hemisphere are more likely to exhaust at the end of a core’s biography. This 
explains why Schéma B cores are sometimes exploited along their lateral edges at the end of their use-life, generating strongly 
oblique detachments (ibid.: Fig. 18.8). What is thematised here again is the double-edged nature of technical systems: techno-
economic effectiveness (efficacité) may be counterbalanced by technical entrapment; technology is ‘boon’ and ‘bane’ at once. We 
will come back to this figure of thought at the end of this chapter. 
658 Another consequence is a structural asymmetry between aligned and opposed scars on the dorsal face of bidirectional Leval-
lois flakes (Boëda 1988: 201). 
659 The fact that ‘size’ is interpreted as a consequence of reduction method and the corresponding articulation of lithic fragments 
constitutes the primary reason why Dibble (1995a) and Boëda (1988) come to contradictory conclusions about Biache Saint-
Vaast level IIA. For Dibble (1995a), ‘size’ is a parameter fixed to dimensional time, which means that reduction depth can direct-
ly be proxied with its help – ‘size,’ in other words, is interpreted through the lens of the ‘field of locations,’ a structural category 
proper to ‘mechanism.’ For Boëda (1988), however, ‘size’ is a technology-mediated parameter of lithic artefacts and thus con-
tributes to an artefact’s ‘nexus,’ just like any other artefact-feature. The main point for Boëda is that ‘size’ is a highly polysemic 
category since it may not only be shaped by the relative positioning of an artefact in its corresponding chaîne opératoire, but 
may also be determined by the artefact’s location of detachment (e.g., products of initial centripetal preparation may be smaller 
than ‘primary products’ even though the former precede the latter in the operational sequence). From Boëda’s perspective, a 
central weakness of Dibble’s account is therefore that this possibility is not accounted for, that is, it is not explicitly tested as a 
competing hypothesis [it has to be emphasised here that the hypothesis of ‘size’ being a product of a lithic artefact’s origin from 
the corresponding surface of reduction does itself not depend on a particular world theory chosen; each world theory must be 
able to somehow examine it]. 
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each ‘method’ yields a specific set of ‘progressive’ categories furnishing a unique body of differentiated 
Levallois products. Lithic reduction is ‘recurrent’ because the second and the third ‘stage,’ grosso mo-
do, generate a large number of non-hierarchised Levallois-products (all of the flakes are ‘determining’ 
(prédéterminé) and ‘determined’ (prédéterminants) at the same time) (Boëda 1988: 202). Levallois 
‘recurrent’ differs in this regard from other Levallois ‘methods’ (cf. Boëda 1991, 1994). 
 It can be concluded that time acts as the primary integrator and its ‘structuring’ effects (i.e., 
the ‘developmental stages’ of lithic technology) help to organise the lithic facts; the analysis of Boëda’s 
pattern of reasoning has shown that as soon as the ‘correct’ temporal structure of the targeted chaîne 
opératoire has been identified, the lithic facts, so to speak, “organise themselves” (sensu Pepper 1942: 
291). The main strategy to secure corroborative truth is to ensure the coherence of assertive statements 
as they pertain to a technical process defined by its duration (durée). The handling of a core-matrix is 
pictured as an ‘organic’ yet determinative process which, once established, appears to be largely irre-
versible and path-dependent. Lithic technology is thereby defined by the ‘progressive’ categories it 
enacts; these, in turn, are specified by the ‘ideal’ categories to which they trend (i.e., the chain of ‘re-
duction stages’ serves the ‘knapping project’ and thereby fulfils the schéma opératoire). All of this 
leads to the conception that the ‘temporal structure’ of lithic technology is technology-specific; techno-
logical time itself is regarded to be ‘qualitative.’ It follows that different technical phenomena may 
navigate through time in a different manner and possibly at different speeds.660  
Having said this, the key preoccupation of Boëda’s account is the problematic status of exca-
vated artefactual realities (i.e., the scatteredness of lithic assemblages). The ‘essence’ of lithic technolo-
gy is not directly given and even regarded to be ‘obscured’ in this format of experience; human experi-
ence is viewed to merely grasp the fragments of lithic technology and these fragments themselves – the 
lithic artefacts – can thus not be trusted for they ‘conceal’ the true unity of ‘organic’ technical processes 
that propel lithic technology. This account is thus clearly organicistic on all levels of inquiry. 
« Paléohistoire » provides another glimpse into persisting tropes of organicistic thought in the French 
scene (cf. e.g., Audouze and Valentin 2010).661 « Paléohistoire » is the attempt to connect different 
temporal scales – ‘nano-‘ or ‘micro-historical’ (i.e., short-time occupations, knapping events), ‘meso-
historical’ (i.e., social structures, sociotechnical norms and values), and ‘macro-‘ or ‘hyper-historical’ 
(‘civilisations,’ periods, epochs) (sensu Valentin 2015) – in order to provide an integrated picture of 
long-term societal evolution (e.g., Pigeot 2004; Valentin 2005, 2008a, 2015; Bon 2009, 2010).662 The 
                                                          
660 The conceptualisation of time is of the essence and distinguishes ‘organicism’ from its ‘integrative’ sister ‘mechanism.’ If 
different technical phenomena travel through time in a different way, this implies that time affects different technical phenome-
na differently. Therefore, technological time cannot be measured by ‘fixed’ or a priori variables. In different technical systems, 
different variables may in fact turn out to be temporally sensitive (i.e., ‘time-indicative’) – the identification of ‘temporal varia-
bles’ is thus part of the empirical work that an ‘organicist’ has to do. This is exactly where Boëda (1988) and Dibble (1995a) 
disagree. Dibble’s critique of Boëda’s interpretation of the Biache Saint-Vaast IIA assemblage is based on an ‘objectivist’ account 
of time, according to which the relative chronology of reduction can securely be estimated by a fixed set of variables – a view that 
Boëda would clearly reject. For Boëda, time is to be measured differently when different ‘organic’ processes are at work. 
661 « Paléohistoire » is the name of a recently established umbrella-approach representing the crystallisation of various strands 
of theorising in the French scene since the late 1990s. It hosts two or three major branches of inquiry: first, what can be called « 
Paléohistoire » sensu stricto – based on the pioneering work of Jean-Pierre Fagnard (1988), Nicole Pigeot (2004), and Boris 
Valentin (2005, 2008a, 2015) – and, secondly, what may be termed « Paléotechnologie » in the wake of Éric Boëda (1991, 2005, 
2013) and others (see Appendix III.4 for more details). While the latter will be portrayed in the next section, the former can be 
subdivided into two sub-strands of inquiry. The first, building on the work of the ‘Late’ Leroi-Gourhan (1972, 1983a, 1984), 
Beatrice Schmider (1971, 1982, 1988; cf. Schmider and Roblin-Jouve 2008), Catherine Farizy (1990), Jean-Pierre Fagnard 
(1984, 1988) and others, foregrounds the sociological dimension of long-term population histories (see esp. Leroi-Gourhan et al. 
1976); this approach, recently further elaborated by the work of Boris Valentin (2008a, 2015) and François Bon (2009, 2015), 
stands on the shoulders of French « Sociologie préhistorique ». The second sub-strand, mainly represented by the work of Gré-
gor Marchand (2014, 2015), foregrounds dynamic human-environment interactions in writing the long-term history of past 
societies. 
662 The overarching ambition is to consolidate divergent strands of French ‘palethnological’ thought (cf. Valentin 2008a: 27, 33f., 
2015). Valentin (2008a: 28-32) re-casts this problem as an issue of divergent time scales and their specific temporality of obser-
vation. He argues that Leroi-Gourhan’s original « Palethnologie » carves out reality on a broadly ‘microhistorical’ scale – the 
relevant rhythms are tangible, they are often bodily and unfold in seconds, hours, and maybe days (lithic knapping, making fire, 
inhabiting a camp, etc.); « Paléohistoire », by contrast, carves out reality on a ‘macrohistorical’ scale – its millennium-scale 
rhythms are less tangible and their significance is thus different. The dialectical movement between the ‘micro’ and the ‘macro’ 
and how they are temporally imbricated and/or enfolded into one another that is of primary interest for ‘palaeo-historians.’ The 
theoretical corpus on which this conception draws – sometimes consciously, sometimes unconsciously – is vast and includes 
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key concern is to understand the interconnectedness of the various scales of observation which are 
available to prehistorians – all of these scales are regarded to bear a distinct temporal significance 
(Olive 2005; Olive and Pigeot 2006; Bodu et al. 2006: 723f.; Valentin 2008a: 18, 21; Audouze 2010). 
The target of such research are the specific ‘historical trajectories’ of past societies, thought to signify 
the genesis or ‘becoming’ of societies in the longue durée (Bon 2009, 2015; Valentin 2011). Inquiry 
thereby focuses on how the targeted societies navigate the depths of time and how they handle dura-
tion (durée) (Valentin 2008a: 21; Perlès 1998, 2013).  
Typically, research under the umbrella of « Paléohistoire » pays special attention to the ‘dia-
lectics’ between continuity and discontinuity in the palaeo-archaeological records (e.g., Fagnard 1988: 
125; Coudret and Fagnard 1997; Bodu and Valentin 1997; Valentin 2006; Jaubert et al. 2014).663 Con-
tinuity and change are regarded to be a function of different, at times counteracting temporalities and 
their interrelationships.664 Social evolution is conceptualised as a ‘concealed’ yet organic process, 
which in its temporal progression resolves any remaining ‘conflicts’ among its parts to come into view 
as an integrated whole. This reading of the evidence can build on traditional subdivisions of Palaeolith-
ic periods such as the Magdalenian comprising ‘Lower,’ ‘Middle,’ and ‘Upper’ phases, re-casting these 
phases as ‘stages’ of organic social evolution (e.g., Valentin 2008, Langlais 2010).665 « Paléohistoire » 
generally foregrounds the ‘active’ making of society as an interdependent and temporally ‘structured’ 
process.666 The approach is tied to a basic reconsideration of the nature of time and bound to an ongo-
ing, although often tacit, re-definition of Palaeolithic archaeology itself – as a discipline that offers a 
unique perspective on processes of the distant past that take time (cf. Perlès 1998: 17; Fig. 46). With 
Bergson – and following this line of reasoning further – one can maintain that no other discipline has 
direct access to this duration (durée) of human social evolution.667 
The organicistic conception of ‘stage’-mediated, path-dependent evolution, already encoun-
tered in the previous section, is directly reflected in one of the key tenets of « Paléohistoire »: the 
‘branching/dendritic paradigm’ (« paradigme buissonnant ») (Valentin 2015: 183, 2011: 108).668 This 
‘paradigm’ stresses the contingent nature of societal trajectories, that is, that there exists a plurality of 
pathways even though social evolution is directed and largely irreversible. Each societal whole – alt-
hough coming into view only in its duration – is defined by a specific exchange between culture and 
nature – or between ‘man and matter’ (sensu Mauss 2006 [1929/1930]; Leroi-Gourhan 1936a) – and 
hence by both its natural habitat and a set of traditions, technical norms, and values proper to it. A 
societal whole, accordingly, is characterised by its particular geographic place and its inner sociotech-
                                                                                                                                                                                     
thinkers such as Fernand Braudel, Henri Bergson, Gaston Bachelard, Marc Bloch, Carlo Ginzburg, François Furet, and Claude 
Lévi-Straus – to name but a few. 
663 Langlais (2010: 271), for example, explicitly speaks of ‘dialectic’ relationships in order to explain social evolution in the Mag-
dalenian. 
664 Continuity and change are understood as the result of ‘thesis-antithesis’ configurations that may or may not bring forth a new 
‘synthesis.’ The key point is that this ‘synthesis’ can never be guaranteed – a circumstance that gives voice to organicism’s ‘pro-
gressive’ structural categories of ‘conflict’ and ‘contradiction’ (sensu Pepper 1942: 292-297). 
665 The ambition of « Paléohistoire », following Boris Valentin (2006, 2008a: 30, 2015: 180), is to give meaning to the succes-
sion of these phases, i.e., to imbue them with a ‘palaeo-historical’ sense (« sens ») (cf. Bon 2009: 25). Valentin’s (2011: 121, 2015: 
182) vision of « Hyperhistoire » (‘hyper-history’) and the associated insistence to move beyond ‘chronometric’ practice and the 
tendency to write mere “compilatory histories” (Valentin 2008a: 30) reflect this emerging attitude. Establishing a ‘palaeo-
historical’ sense ultimately means to identify the ‘progressive’ categories of a sociohistorical whole and to analyse their contribu-
tion to the fulfilment of the whole’s ‘ideal’ categories. « Paléohistoire » is ‘genetic’ in this sense – it consists of ‘putting chronolo-
gy into perspective’ (ibid.: 28-34). This ‘palaeo-historical’ ambition draws explicitly on the work of François Furet (1975), who 
sought to overcome purely descriptive history-making and to bring what he called ‘problem-history’ to the forefront of inquiry 
(cf. Audouze and Valentin 2010: 35). « Paléohistoire » sensu stricto – in the wake of Valentin and others – therefore seeks 
continuity with French structural history. A key point is that this orientation reinforces the general ‘interpretive’ stance (in the 
sense of Verstehen) of French Palaeolithic archaeology. 
666 This ‘structural’ preoccupation of « Paléohistoire » is already anticipated by Valentin (2015: 177f.) who speaks of « Ethnog-
raphie structurale » (‘structural ethnography’) in order to characterise the ‘palaeo-historical’ endeavour of tying up divergent 
temporalities of observation. 
667 According to Bergson (1907, 1922), only duration enables a realistic, ‘dynamic’ account of existence and may thus counter-
balance the overly ‘static’ and ‘presentist’ representations of the world to which human minds are drawn. When French prehisto-
rians speak of their ambition to develop a ‘dynamic’ account of human social evolution, they typically draw on this general con-
ception (a conception not only held by Bergson of course). 
668 The « paradigme buissonnant » may be interpreted as a subtle re-surfacing of the Bordian ‘phyla model’ of lithic industrial 
evolution (Bordes 1961c, 1963, 1968). However, Bordes framed his ‘dendritic’ conception of lithic evolution in broadly phyloge-
netic terms, while Valentin’s concept is defined in strictly historical and, if you will, broadly ‘epi-phylogenetic’ terms (cf. Valentin 
2011: 108). In addition, the former is based on lithic techno-typology whereas the latter is firmly anchored in the ‘technological 
approach.’ Nonetheless, the usage of a similar terminology may signal that the ‘diachronic turn’ tied to « Paléohistoire » entails 
a forceful return to the ‘big narratives’ of the founding-figures of French prehistory including the Bordes. 
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nical constitution. These two poles are thought to ‘resonate’ with one another, unleashing the historical 
dynamics that inaugurate distinct evolutionary trajectories.669  
This conception relocates ‘particularism’ from spatiotemporal contexts to entire historical 
pathways (e.g., Valentin 2011: 122; Marchand 2014: 427).670 But the idea is not that these pathways are 
strongly predetermined. The determinative significance of ‘phases’ and ‘stages’ can only be diagnosed 
(and thus ‘retrodicted’), but can never exactly be predicted.671 The reason is that the whole exercises 
determinative primacy, not its parts, which means that the parts alone cannot tell us which role they 
play in the whole. ‘Organic’ evolution is viewed as a long-term management of contingency that in 
retrospect makes sense. This directly reflects how organicism interprets ‘integrativity’ – as the univer-
sality of developmental patterns realised in a multitude of different ways.672 Therefore, the develop-
mental patterns themselves may be anticipated, but not what creates them. This is precisely what is 
implicated by Valentin’s notion of the « paradigme buissonnant ». It corresponds to a concept of evo-
lutionary determination that is fundamentally opposed to ‘mechanistic’ readings where the cause-and-
effect chain generally proceeds in upward direction (‘bottom-up’).673 
 Valentin’s « paradigme buissonnant » (‘branching/’dendritic paradigm’) ultimately entails the 
conception that different societies, through their unequal development, travel through time in a differ-
ent way.674 It is only through mapping their particular temporal journeys, then, that one can come to 
an understanding of the various isolated facts which they leave behind. Each sociohistorical trajectory 
can be said to describe a specific temporal journey, unifying the disparate factual remains attached to 
it (i.e., site-locus, site organisation, settlement pattern, social networks). This temporal journey of a 
societal formation represents a ‘concealed’ organic process, whose various ‘fragments of experience’ 
can be observed and studied archaeologically. The integration of these facts, however, is only possible 
if one acknowledges their place in the temporal process. The palaeo-archaeological facts are interpret-
ed as ‘appearances’ and the object-specific temporal trajectories as the longue durée ‘realities’ that 
save and explain them. This, in turn, requires the recognition of the respective ‘nexuses’ and their 
meeting points – a mode of reasoning that, grosso modo, confirms the organicistic underpinnings of 
« Paléohistoire ». 
Reconstructing societal evolution in this manner relies on a general understanding of societies 
as temporal organisms, whose ‘modes of existence’ author particular ‘modes of becoming’ (historical 
ontogenies).675 Since the latter are object-specific, each societal organism largely self-determines its 
long-term history – societies, as temporally extended ‘structures,’ represent self-regulatory entities.676 
This aspect is crucial because the ‘tempo’ and ‘mode’ of social evolution consequently depend on the 
                                                          
669 This ‘resonating’ interface between nature and culture typically leads to the acceptance of ‘feedback loops’ and other ‘counter-
active’ effects. An example is Marchand’s (2014: 111) insistence on the role of « rétroaction » (‘retroaction’) in past human-
environment interactions.  
670 ‘Organicism’ re-interprets the ‘contextualistic’ categories of ‘novelty’ and ‘change’ in terms of the temporally extended ‘organ-
ic’ wholes it reconstructs. This gives way to the recognition of the inherent alterity (or ‘otherness’) of individual sociotechnical 
trajectories (see next section in this part of the chapter). The regulative role of ‘otherness’ – in contrast to ‘sameness’ – is for 
example reflected in Marchand’s (2014: 427) notion of the « insondable altérité » (‘immersurable alterity’) of past sociohistori-
cal configurations. Such conceptions embody an implicit critique of ‘Neo-Darwinian’ research agendas which often stress ‘pro-
gress,’ ‘modernity,’ ‘inevitability,’ and the ‘unity of history’ (cf. e.g., Valentin 2011: 5, 21). 
671 ‘Organicism’ is generally non-prescriptive. As Pepper (1942: 296) notes: “[…] [organicists] do not prescribe the path of 
knowledge. Nor do they believe they are prescribing anything at all; they are merely pointing out what actually goes on among 
the facts of the world. Their argument is through and through illustrative.” 
672 The credo is that time remains poorly understood as a single temporal arrow but rather consists of multiple ‘focused’ tem-
poral arrows. The claim that time itself is heterogeneous, suspiciously Bergsonian in orientation, is then no conceptual stretch 
anymore. The idea of temporal heterogeneity is of course difficult to reconcile with ‘mechanistic’ theories of time, which tend to 
‘objectify’ the latter – time is typically viewed as a structure-giving feature of the world, rather than being ‘structured’ itself. 
673 ‘Organicistic’ approaches such as « Paléohistoire » extend the ‘contextualistic’ notion of historicity – i.e., the necessary ‘situ-
atedness’ of a ‘historical act’ – to the longue durée and re-cast it as a feature of extended sociohistorical trajectories. In this way, 
historicity comes into view as a consequence of building up a temporally extended whole by striding through temporally en-
chained contexts of action (what in ‘contextualism’ would be seen as the ‘spread’ of a context). In ‘organicism,’ historicity in 
therefore means that different ‘situated’ contexts grow out of each other and thereby form a whole that is both ‘organic’ and 
‘situated.’ The guiding metaphor is life-theoretical – society is understood as a ‘living organicism’ that is born, growths, and 
ultimately dies. All of this reflects the ‘organicistic’ root-metaphor of the ‘living being’ (see Chapter 2; cf. Pepper 1942: 280).  
674 Cf. Testart (2012: Fig. 29). 
675 Note that notions such as ‘mode of being’ or ‘mode of existence’ are deeply buried in French intellectual history and have 
recently re-surfaced, for example in the work of Bruno Latour (1991 [1992], 1994, 2011, 2012 [2013]) and Isabelle Stengers 
(1988, 2003 [1997]). Similar ideas, although applied to aesthetics and technology, have already been developed by Étienne 
Souriau (2009 [1943]) and Gilbert Simondon (1958) at the turn to the second half of the last century. Especially the latter consti-
tutes an important historical source of terms/concepts – e.g., « réalité technique » (‘technical reality’) – that freely circulate in 
the French lithic scene (cf. Leroi-Gourhan 1993 [1964/1965]; Boëda 1993, 1997). 
676 See Chapter 2: esp. Box 9 for the signification for self-regulatory principles of explanation in ‘organicism.’ 
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society in question, on its existence in the durée. All societies emerge, rise, consolidate themselves, 
experience crises, and are ultimately wiped from reality, but they are regarded to set the note and to be 
their own rhythm-givers. The same holds true for their ‘significant’ parts, for the genesis of societies is 
viewed to be complicated by ‘conflict’ and counteractive forces – societal becoming is nothing less than 
an ongoing attempt to overcome the two (Pepper 1942: 290). For similar reasons, both wholes and 
parts are considered autonomous and ‘active’ in their own right;677 it is only when the ‘ideal’ of society 
(and thus the overall integration of parts) is reached that there can be no difference between the whole 
and its parts anymore. All of this leads to the pluralisation of time, to the delineation of distinct tem-
poralities tied to different phenomena and/or domains of reality – a signature disposition of organicis-
tic thought: 
Perlès’ symptomatic statement suggests that different aspects of reality (what organicists would identi-
fy as ‘significant’ wholes) are powered by different ‘organic’ processes and therefore engender their 
own temporalities (cf. e.g., Audouze and Valentin 2010: 34f.; Rocca 2013: 28 for a similar argument); 
they may even obey to different rules of development altogether. This idea is already outlined in the 
œuvre of the ‘Early’ Leroi-Gourhan, culminating in the latter’s account of technology-language co-
evolution in Le geste et al parole (1993 [1964/1965]). Leroi-Gourhan, too, proclaimed that human 
technicity has its own ‘mode of existence’ and is subjected to domain-specific laws and regularities of 
development (ibid.: 147).678 This domain-specific temporal behaviour was captured by his notion of the 
« tendance » (‘technical tendency’), which he opposed to the « faits techniques » (‘technical facts’) 
(Leroi-Gourhan 1943/1954; cf. Audouze 2002: 283; Stiegler 2009 [1994]: 69). The relationship be-
tween the two is that between a ‘concealed’ but directed organic process and its isolated ‘fragments of 
experience.’ This reiterates the organicistic conception that there is always unity to be found in diversi-
ty – i.e., that the unity of technology is made possible by the diversity of technical facts.679 We will re-
turn to this point in the next section.  
What is perhaps most important in the current problem context is that Leroi-Gourhan 
(1964/1965), based on these considerations, developed a general account of evolution, in which evolu-
tion was diagnosed to be governed by a plurality of distinct ‘cycles’ and ‘epicycles’ of becoming. This 
argument on the ‘cyclicity’ of time has been very influential and, at least tacitly, underpins the periodi-
sation of the Western European Upper Palaeolithic in terms of its temporal sequence of great ‘civilisa-
tions’ (civilisations)680 – i.e., ‘Lower’ vs. ‘Upper Perigordian,’ or the succession of ‘Aurignacian,’ ‘Gra-
vettian,’ Solutrean,’ and ‘Magdalenian’ (Leroi-Gourhan et al. 1976; cf. Bon 2009; Debout et al. 2012) – 
including their internal sub-division, typically into ‘archaic’/‘initial’/‘proto-,’ ‘developed,’ and ‘fi-
nal’/‘epi-’ phases respectively (e.g., Valentin and Pigeot 2000; Bon 2006, 2010; Langlais 2010, Klaric 
2013). All of these different ‘civilisatory trajectories’ are formed by the relationships between the tem-
                                                          
677 The notions of ‘object-specific’ and ‘object-inherent’ activity [Eigenaktivität] can be considered a typical result of refining the 
structural categories of ‘organicism.’ 
678 Cf. “[…] Technoeconomic determinism is a reality whose effect upon the life of societies is deep enough to bring into existence 
structural laws to govern the material world as firmly as moral laws govern the behavior of individuals toward themselves 
and their follow beings. We may recognize that thought has as much reality as the material world, we may even assert that the 
latter owes its being to the effects of the former, but the fact remains that thought is reflected in organized matter. It is the or-
ganization of matter that, in various ways, directly shapes all aspects of human life.” (Leroi-Gourhan 1993 [1964/1965]: 147, 
emphasis added) 
679 The difficulty to think of the world in its ‘wholeness’ [Ganzheit] while coevally acknowledging its diversity and ‘multiplicity’ 
[Vielheit] is a classic problem of ‘organicistic’ thought and can be traced back to the philosophies of Leipniz and Spinoza. 
680 ‘Civilisation’ is a key notion since it underscores the ‘pro-active’ dimensions of society-making. Society is seen as the product 
of a ‘civilising process’ (sensu Elias [1939] 1969) whose proper temporality is the longue durée. The concept of ‘civilisation’ will 
be discussed in detail below. 
“[…] But there is a double problem here: firstly, neither the time scale nor the nature of time are 
the same depending on whether we observe climatic changes (cyclical), plant evolution (linear 
and very slow), the evolution of faunas (also linear but much faster) ... There is not a time of 
prehistory, which is relevant for all phenomena studied, let alone for human phenomena. Sec-
ondly, the causes of change are also not the same: neither the variations of the Earth’s orbit, 
which are at the origin of the climatic cycles, nor the laws of sexual reproduction, at the origin of 
the transformations of biological species, can claim to explain the “evolution of bifaces” or the 
transition from an economy of predation to an economy of production. There is therefore an 
autonomous area of inquiry, that of the “cultural time,” of its nature and its rhythms.” (Perlès 




poral pathways of their ‘significant’ parts, by how these parts interact, possibly interfere or overlap 
with one another, or even fuse. In Le geste et la parole, Leroi-Gourhan explicitly introduces the idea 
that ‘technological time,’ at a certain point in human evolution, becomes critically detached from ‘cul-
tural time’ which is largely defined by the rhythms of art-making (cf. Bidet 2007). The ‘epicycles’ that 
govern the latter are argued to be distinct from the ‘epicycles’ that propel the evolution of lithic tech-
nology. 
The general conception of ‘offset’ trajectories of change, corresponding to different domains of 
reality or kinds of archaeological objects, has recently been re-invigorated by various French scholars. 
Naudinot and colleagues (2017b), for example, have called attention to the fact that at the far edges of 
North-Western Europe processes of ‘Azilisation’ – i.e., the gradual and persistent transition from the 
Final Madgalenian and Hamburgian to the latest glacial and early post-glacial human societies (Azili-
an/Federmesser) – have produced a marked ‘time lag’ between technical and symbolic developments. 
They present evidence suggesting that technical developments were much faster and have set the tone, 
whereas the evolution of ‘artistic’ expressions clearly lagged behind; the authors highlight that this 
decoupling of distinct material trajectories is of critical importance if we wish to understand the coa-
lescence of what is called the ‘Azilian’ phenomenon (idem; cf. Valentin 2008a). In an earlier paper, it is 
even alluded that the lithic developments leading to the Azilian likely have to be explained in terms of 
general ‘technical tendencies,’ rather than being the product of regional peculiarities (including eco-
climatic factors) (cf. Naudinot et al. 2017a). Different material trajectories may thus signify different 
aspects of past realities; it is their ‘individuation’ and temporal differentiation which is important to 
recognise and examine – otherwise, it remains impossible to understand whether similar ‘appearanc-
es’ have different significations in different evolutionary contexts.681 
A second example is the work of Teyssandier (2003, 2007) and Bon (2002, 2010, 2015) on the 
evolution of Aurignacian societies in Western and Central-East Europe. These authors have proposed 
that the emergence of the ‘Aurignacian package’ cannot properly described by a ‘revolutionary’ scenar-
io, but rather conforms to a gradual and step-wise process, in the course of which several distinct ma-
terial trajectories of change meet at different points in time (Teyssandier 2007; Bon 2010).682 The key 
concept is arrhythmicity. Historical processes of varying scales and temporalities are regarded to op-
erate asynchronously (Bon 2015: 11; cf. Discamps et al. 2014), cumulating developmental potential to 
perhaps merge into something new over time (cf. Audouze and Valentin 2010: 41-43).683 This account 
renders the Aurignacian the product of ‘organic’ social evolution, its organic structure is explained by 
invoking a number of developmental ‘stages,’ reflecting the temporal coalescence of the ‘effective’ ma-
terial parts (i.e., lithic technology, organic technology, hunting strategies, settlement organisation, 
ornamentation practice, art-making, etc.) (e.g., Teyssandier et al. 2010). The ‘coalescence’ of these 
parts is thought to be a consequence of each part’s own ‘logic of change’ – it consists in the coordina-
tion of the ‘nexuses of change’ which are proper to each part of the larger whole.  
This coordination of ‘nexuses’ is seen to entail ‘struggle’ and the fragments thus often persist in 
basic ‘conflict’ to one another – the integration of all parts, therefore, can only succeed in duration 
(i.e., as a function of the full sequence of Aurignacian development). This is why social evolution has to 
be heterogeneous, partly asynchronic, and multi-temporal. The impossibility of integration at one giv-
en point in time turns out to be the precondition for a successful integration at a later point in time.684 
This organicistic logic, namely that understanding ‘conflict’ is a necessary prerequisite for 
comprehending evolutionary ‘integration,’ issues a research mandate largely opposed to correlational 
epistemologies. Boris Valentin (2008a: 41) is quite explicit about this orientation. After reviewing the 
general epistemological situation of Palaeolithic archaeology, he advises its practitioners to pay prima-
ry attention not to similarities and vivid correlations, but to developmental discrepancies, inconsisten-
                                                          
681 The differentiation of time and the study of distinct temporal ‘structures’ is therefore an indispensable ‘organicistic’ instru-
ment for assessing the ‘equifinality’ of ‘appearances’ and parts of larger temporal wholes. 
682 The evolution of the Aurignacian in Western Europe is explicitly pictured as a ‘determined’ and ‘irreversible’ process (Bon 
2015: 11, 13) – two cornerstones of an ‘organicistic’ interpretation of social evolution. 
683 ‘Arrhythmic’ evolutionary scenarios have also been proposed by Langlais (2010: 283) in order to understand the development 
of lithic technology during the Magdalenian at the foothills of the Pyrenees. 
684 Cf. “[The] nexuses reach out from fragments like tentacles and encounter contradictions for the fragments. The progress of 
integration is not smooth and continuous, but is a buffeting of fragment against fragment, producing conflict and contradiction 
which is only resolved in an integration. The nexus of a fragment leads it inevitably into conflict and contradiction with other 
fragments.” (Pepper 1942: 292) 
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cies, and contradictions – to what he denominates « décalages » (‘mismatches’). These are often over-
looked because researchers are trained to search for ‘matches,’ yet their interpretive significance can-
not be overrated.685 This view comes in various degrees of radicality but it is usually tied to an explicit 
critique of the ‘heteronomic’ assessment of temporally unified contexts in terms of causalities and/or 
first-movers (idem; Marchand 2014: 111, 151).686 
A third example is provided by Perlès’ recent essay on the nature of archaeological time, enti-
tled Tempi of Change: When Soloists don’t play Together. Arrhythmia in ‘Continuous’ Change (2013). 
This paper examines the ornamental and lithic evidence from Franchthi cave (Greece) in order to as-
sess how the two domains of material culture change throughout the archaeological sequence. Perlès 
concludes that the two develop in fundamentally different ways and ultimately exhibit divergent 
‘rhythms’ of change; she even contends that their respective ‘modes of change,’ although clearly au-
thoring separate ‘focused’ arrows of time, can hardly be ‘objectified:’ 
The second part of the title – When Soloists don’t play Together – reassures us of the general 
autonomy of different material agencies but also introduces an illuminating metaphor – that of ‘music’ 
or ‘music-making.’ Why is this metaphor illuminating? First, because it is invoked to convey how dis-
tinct object-categories handle time and, secondly, because music is a prototypical example of an ‘or-
ganic’ phenomenon.  
‘Pure’ music is organic in a fundamental sense: it requires composition, creativity, and coor-
dination, especially when multiple voices and/or instruments take part in its making; pure music is 
also processually ‘organic’: its quality is bound to its temporal unfolding, most participating voices 
and/or instruments unequally contribute to this quality, and it is typically divided in determining 
‘scores,’ whose structure and nature cannot be changed without changing the quality of the musical 
whole. Furthermore, a piece of music has certain ‘synthetic’ qualities such as ‘melody,’ ‘pitch,’ ‘tonali-
ty,’ and ‘rhythm’ (cf. Scruton 1997: 1-79) which follow from the rules of the piece (Arewa 2014), but 
these qualities generally differ from the individual qualities of the instruments and voices that have 
engendered them. Music is therefore both ‘synthetic’ – it is ‘more than the sum of its parts’687 – and 
inherently temporal – it can only be appreciated in its duration.  
The music metaphor intuitively calls attention to concepts of ‘orchestration’ and ‘multivocality’ 
– to the dialectics between ‘coordination,’ ‘tension,’ and ‘suspense’ – which only in combination and 
over time give rise to a complex musical whole.688 Music is organised sound brought into existence by 
combining and connecting tones in a distinct order (e.g., Levinson 1980: 6);689 ‘melody’ is a result of 
                                                          
685 The key point, although not fully developed, may even be that conflicting and contradicting evidence must be regarded the 
status quo rather than the exception; to acknowledge this pristine fact, however, would of course imply a fundamental shift in 
the focus of inquiry. Away from the search for ‘matches’ towards the careful documentation of cases of unsuccessful correlation. 
686 ‘Heteronomy,’ in contrast to autonomy, is the conception that phenomena are ‘other-directed,’ or ‘shaped’ and ‘controlled’ by 
forces/agents external to these phenomena; ‘heteronomy’ denotes the belief that a phenomenon’s behaviour must be governed 
by something independent of the phenomenon. This principles implies the repudiation of ‘self-determination’ and ‘self-directed’ 
behaviour as features of explanation – both popular categories of ‘organicism.’ 
687 Surprisingly, the ‘synthetic’ quality of music is rarely addressed by theories of music. For an exception to this tendency, see 
Scruton (1997: 19-79, 2007) and Davies (2001: 47-71). 
688 Take the example of an orchestra, in which different instruments and musicians contribute to the final musical product. This 
‘musical whole’ is not merely the sum of its parts but is literally created through the ‘orchestration’ of all of its parts, a process 
that already presupposes the whole. Moreover, each configuration of instrument and musician is different and each group of 
instruments contributes something else; this ‘something else,’ however, must accord with the musical potential of each instru-
ment, for example with how the latter is able to build up, change, and maintain ‘melody’ and ‘rhythm’ and how this, in turn, 
chimes/resonates with the rest of the assemblage of instrument-musician hybrids. The resulting organic interaction therefore 
depends on the ‘musical reality’ of each of the participating hybrids. Needless to say, in reality the situation is typically even 
more complicated: there are, for instance, different ‘roles’ in an orchestra (e.g., groups of players, soloists, and a conductor). 
Clearly, this inherent complexity is another facet lending itself to ‘organicistic’ reconstructions. In order to make his point, the 
‘organicist’ would ask: how can we unify the heterogeneities among the parts in an extended process of orchestral music-
making? 
689 This definition of music focalises ‘structural’ aspects – a full-fledged definition of music, which is not the main concern here, 
would also need to take into account the ‘intentional,’ ‘historical,’ and ‘cultural’ dimensions of the same (e.g., Davies 2012). 
“If several tempi of change can be identified in single technical production[s] such as stone 
tools and weapons, others again if one introduces symbolic productions such as ornaments, 
how many different rhythms of change should we expect when whole societies are considered? 
In particular, why would societal transformations necessary follow a ternary temporality, just 
as we have – according to Occidental thought – a past, present, and future, and just as we tend 
– still in Occidental thought – to divide time into Early, Middle, and Late?” (Perlès 2013: 297) 
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the precise succession of tones and intercalated pauses within a fixed timeframe, from the ‘chord’ of 
tones of different pitch-levels (scales) ‘polyphony’ arises, and the relationships among the tones them-
selves define the ‘harmonics’ of a musical piece. To speak in organicistic terms, the ‘tones’ represent 
the ‘fragments’ which in isolation make little sense but through their order and location drive forth the 
temporally extended musical whole. Drawing on the music metaphor, ‘organic’ evolution can be ana-
lysed in terms of ‘rhythm,’ ‘multivocality,’ ‘harmonics,’ and global ‘melody.’ Perlès’ paper (2013) on the 
long-term evolution of material culture at Franchthi addresses at least the first three aspects while 
paying special attention to ‘multi-vocal’ developments – as indicated by the title-phrase. 
To conceive of technical evolution as a ‘music-like’ phenomenon690 implies to regard it as an 
internally structured process operating according to an ‘internal logic.’ This construal establishes a 
conceptual triad to shed light on long-term developments in the sociotechnical domain – it makes 
room for analysing organic evolution as the interplay between the ‘inherent rhythm’ [Eigenrhythmik], 
the ‘logic of development’ [Entwicklungslogik], and the ‘inherent dynamic’ [Eigendynamik] of a given 
historical trajectory (including its sub-trajectories). The nature of a temporal phenomenon becomes a 
question of its genesis, that is, how its parts ‘individualise’ the whole over time.691 The identification of 
technical evolution as ‘music-like’ generally implies to consider the technical sphere as temporally 
‘alive.’ Musical metaphors simply draw attention to the fact that sociotechnical developments may be 
better understood if the wholes that frame these developments are recognised as distinct quasi ‘living 
beings:’   
Apart from Perlès (2013), musical reasoning is clearly reflected in the recent work of Langlais 
et al. (2012, 2016). These authors mobilise musicological terminology in order to analyse the long-term 
development of lithic technology in the southwestern fringes of France; they invoke two concepts – 
‘metronome’ and ‘syncopation’ – to help interpreting the dynamics of sociotechnical evolution in the 
Magdalenian. The concept of the ‘metronome’ serves to characterise the ‘role’ of lithic technology in 
the evolution of the Magdalenian as a whole. It is argued that particular elements of lithic tool-kits can 
be used to measure the ‘tempo’ and ‘mode’ of Magdalenian social evolution (Langlais et al. 2016). The 
term ‘metronome’ thereby indicates that long-term developments in the lithic domain – especially 
those pertaining to systems of lithic weaponry – are structured into object-specific time intervals, in-
tercalated in such a way that they generate a highly diagnostic rhythmicity.692 The evolution of lithic 
technology is thereby thought to ‘set the tone’ because its directed ‘mutation’ creates new ‘opportunity 
niches’ (sensu Arthur 2009: 174-176) and the requirement to adapt other domains of society to them693 
– particular aspects of lithic technology – as pars pro toto – are considered to catalyse the whole of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Music, to this effect, is ‘more-than-just-structural’ – a point that Levinson (1980: 6) has insisted on and that is generally con-
sistent with a ‘synthetic’ view of music. 
690 It is possible that the music-like character of long-term technical developments represents a special case of ‘cyclic’ evolution 
(cf. Perlès 1998: 18). Taken some of the evidence presented below, one may legitimately ask whether musicality can be consid-
ered to capture part of the ‘organic’ domain-specificity of technical evolution. 
691 The ‘individualisation’ of a whole can be understood as its ontogeny, a process during which the whole develops its key fea-
tures and qualities and comes into view as something different. The ‘becoming’ of a whole, in other words, emerges as a key 
condition of differentiating wholes in ‘organicism.’ Differences between wholes are the result of divergent developmental trajec-
tories. Synchronic comparison, therefore, remains necessarily partial and inconclusive. Analysing and comparing the discrete 
‘shapes’ and ‘traits’ of lithic artefacts would be an instance of such practice; it is therefore unsurprising that ‘organicists’ typically 
see little merit in such an undertaking. 
692 See e.g., Valentin et al. (2004) for a similar reconstruction. 
693 The guiding concept is ‘internal adaptation,’ taking up the core intuition of society as a system. The general rationale can be 
illustrated by the example of the relationship between lithic domains and subsistence/hunting domains. The idea is simple: if 
lithic technology changes, it creates new opportunities to hunt animals – perhaps to hunt different animals, perhaps to hunt the 
same animals in novel ways. Lithic changes may also render long-hold practices untenable because they can no longer be ‘sup-
ported’ by the available lithic technologies. But this conflict must be discovered and the tension experienced. It nonetheless 
implies that some changes in the lithic domain will cause a re-organisation of the hunting domain – to ensure compatibility 
and/or to maximise synergies between the two. Synergetic co-evolution can for example be proposed to explain somewhat paral-
lel developments in the domains of lithic weaponry and organic implements (e.g., Langlais et al. 2012: 146). However, in order to 
know what is adapting to what and why, one generally needs to know the timing, tempo, and mode of changes in each domain. 
The evolutionary scenario is ‘organicistic’ since it emphasises transformational necessity (evolutionary ‘directedness’), contra-
diction and conflict among domains, and the gradual and sometimes delayed integration of these domains.  
“Slow or fast, calm or bumped, the possibly changing rhythm of this prehistoric history re-
mains to be measured much more finely, and the circumstances of its eventual upheavals de-
serve closer explications. This is what the palaeohistorical ambition aims for when it is firmly 
supported by palethnology.” (Valentin 2008a: 28f.; also cited in Bon 2009: 185; my translation 
[the original French quote is provided in Appendix Q.19]). 
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societal evolution. The latter is consequently often ‘irregular,’ ‘unsteady,’ and not fully predictable, 
even though sociotechnical evolution is generally pictured as a determinate process (cf. Langlais 2007, 
2010). 
The concept of ‘syncopation’ is more intricate. A ‘syncope’ is a musical figure conveying a 
rhythmic design which breaks with the prevailing schemes of accentuation, deliberately creating ‘ten-
sion’ and the potential for novelty. Processes of ‘syncopation’ can hence be described as tacit but irre-
versible transitions within a larger composition. Langlais employs the term to designate ongoing or 
sudden shifts in the ‘rhythm’ of lithic development as they unfold in time; ‘syncopation’ is effectively 
used to identify and describe ‘stage’-transitions in the larger evolutionary scheme of Magdalenian soci-
eties of southwestern France (Langlais et al. 2012: 146). The notion of ‘syncopation’ thus encapsulates 
a classic organicistic pattern of reasoning: it seeks to coevally capture the gradual and saltatory char-
acter of evolutionary transitions (cf. Perlès 1998: 21). For organicists this attempt is not paradoxical – 
to the contrary, it is regarded to do justice to the fact that each transition must necessarily be built-up 
but also brings qualitative novelty. In this way, ‘organic’ evolution brings forth stage-like but intercon-
nected temporal structures. Each novel stage of lithic development issues a new musical ‘score,’ yet all 
‘scores’ remain part of the same evolutionary composition. This attempt to think continuity and 
change together – as two aspects of the same process – is typical for organicism, in which ‘unification’ 
is generally reached by keeping the delicate balance between the ‘progressive’ and the ‘ideal.’694 
The conceptualisation of continuity and change as complementary characteristics of temporal 
wholes is common-place in the French specialist literature. It is, for example, reflected in the popular 
phrase ‘unity and diversity’ (unité et diversité), often found in titles and headings of lithic studies (e.g., 
Slimak 1998/1999; Bon 2000; Klaric 2003; Marchand and Tresset 2005; Teyssandier 2006; Bon et al. 
2006; Forestier et al. 2010; Bachellerie 2011; Bereiziat 2011; Tomasso et al. 2014). The slogan has al-
most assumed a signature status;695 it expresses an insight that only organicistic thought has come to 
embrace in its radicality: the fact that ‘conflict’ presupposes higher-level unity and the possibility of 
‘unity’ presupposes disintegration and scatteredness. Organicism recognises the basic contradictori-
ness of ‘unity’ and ‘diversity,’ but maintains that their contradictory nature is a result of a ‘static’ per-
ception of world affairs (e.g., Copleston 1994 [1974]: 181, 186). If we acknowledge time as a structure-
giving force, conflicting elements of reality can be integrated as time goes by. 
A ‘dynamic’ view of time, therefore, removes the difficulty and puts ‘diversity’ and ‘unity’ as co-
constitutive features of reality into perspective. ‘Unity’ is granted by an interconnected and temporally 
coherent ‘organic structure,’ diversity is sustained by the incompatibility of most of its ‘fragments of 
experience.’ Organicistic analysis demonstrates that the latter are ‘fragmented’ merely in experience 
and in reality turn out to be singularities of their past and multiplicities696 of their future.  
With Bergson (1934: 185), we can say that each ‘fragment’ and each configuration of ‘frag-
ments’ is a testimony of the entirety of its past, yet also entails the full potential of its future develop-
ment.697 This not only delivers a basic critique of ‘presentism’698 – that is, the attempt to derive general 
principles and/or laws of reality from an observation of the present – but also clarifies the signification 
of evolutionary mechanisms in organicism. An evolutionary mechanism is what explains the observed 
temporal organisation of fragments in light of the totality of their ‘nexuses,’ so that the past, present, 
and future of each fragment can come into view as one. When Valentin (2008a: 27, 33f., 2015) insists 
on the specification of historical mechanisms to explain long-term societal developments (cf. Audouze 
                                                          
694 To regard continuity and change as two sides of the same coin may easily result in ‘punctuated equilibrium’ models of evolu-
tion; it cannot overemphasised, however, that the types of ‘punctuated equilibria’ that ‘organicism’ typically advocates tend to 
differ from the ‘punctuated equilibrium’ models of evolutionary biology. The main reason is that ‘static-ness’ – as emphasised 
for example in Eldredge and Gould’s (1972) seminal paper on the issue – cannot be foregrounded in ‘organicism’ since the theo-
ry is basically motivated by a fundamental critique of ‘static’ perception. 
695 Complementary phrasings are ‘unity in diversity’ or ‘diversity in unity.’ 
696 The concept of ‘multiplicity’ calls attention to the fact that each ‘fragment’ embodies multiple developmental potentials. This 
potentiality is not fully determined, yet different ‘fragments’ yield different potentials. ‘Potentiality’ is a concept proper to ‘or-
ganicism’ and delineates the space of possible developments. It is notoriously difficult to analyse and typically requires a general 
understanding of the behaviour of certain types of ‘fragments’ and the constraining effects of specific fragment-context. 
697 Bergson’s (1907, 1922, 1934: 185) contention is that reality is ‘becoming’ and that everything necessarily exists in duration 
(durée). The past always persists in the present and the present is always carried over into the future (cf. Copleston 1994 [1974]: 
182, footnote 1). 
698 The critique on ‘presentism’ primarily targets research agenda’s that trust in ‘uniformitarianism’ and base their interpreta-
tions on comparative frames of reference, constructed in the here and now – two strategies that are regularly combined in ‘form-
ism’ and especially in ‘mechanism.’ 
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and Valentin 2010), he thus simply means to lay bare an initially ‘concealed’ organic process which 
coherently accounts for the global organisation of fragments. This call to mechanisms should therefore 
not be confused with the ‘mechanistic’ perseverance on causally-specific principles of explanation.699 
This organicistic conception of evolutionary determination is explicitly laid out in Valentin’s 
Jalons pour une paléohistoire des derniers chasseurs (2008a), the founding document of « Paléo-
histoire ». According to Valentin (ibid.: 13f.), if one wishes to comprehend a ‘palaeo-historical’ trajec-
tory and why the associated social systems change in the way they do, one has to study « préfigura-
tions » (‘pre-configurations’/‘anticipatory capacities’). The idea here is that each system state – each 
developmental ‘stage’ – of a sociohistorical trajectory is preconfigured through its preceding stage and 
configures its succeeding stage.700 This can be understood as a process of systemic inheritance – each 
system state inherits something from its past and passes on something in order to have a say on its 
future. This conception counters tabula rasa views on human history and maintains that each system 
state is defined by a particular set of material, social, and cognitive resources that are a function of its 
temporal position in the ‘palaeo-historical chain’ (sensu Valentin 2011: 80).  
Each system state, picking up a conception already encountered in the last part of this chapter, 
enters reality ‘pre-furnished.’ As we have seen, the mode of ‘furnishing’ proper to long-term trajecto-
ries is self-furnishing. The concept specifies what evolutionary self-determination amounts to in or-
ganicism. Since each system state is already pre-configured, its future development is constrained by 
the nature of the configuration. The study of « préfigurations » is thus nothing but the study of how an 
evolving social system pre-furnishes itself through time – with specific objects, practices, norms, con-
cepts, and needs.701 In the words of Audouze and Valentin (2010: 35), each evolving system embodies 
the “concretisation of a system of values,” reflected in a repertoire of « manières de faire » (‘ways of 
doing things’) and « manières de voir » (‘ways of seeing things’).702 The becoming of a ‘palaeo-
historical’ trajectory, in other words, corresponds to the crystallisation of societal resources specific to 
this trajectory. This is why different societal pathways inescapably inaugurate an « insondable altérité 
» (‘immersurable alterity’) (Marchand 2014: 427) – an alterity that can only be illuminated if the tra-
jectories are studied from the inside. This basic alterity is another reason why ‘universalist’ and/or 
‘externalist’ analysis is met with great scepticism: 
How a social system reacts to changing external conditions is then not only a matter of the external 
conditions themselves, but becomes a question of how the system can cope with these conditions. 
Whether and how particular external conditions can be dealt with depends on the resources and types 
of pre-configurations the system has inherited. Together, they specify the capacity of the system to 
modulate and, if necessary, re-organise its internal relations (cf. Marchand 2014: 13, 2017: 9). From 
this perspective, external conditions as such become secondary since their effects greatly depend on 
the available societal furniture – on what Bon (2009: 243) calls the ‘bark of the social tree’; the latter is 
‘primary’ because it constitutes a historical a priori. Human-environment interactions consequently 
                                                          
699 With Pepper, we can say that the insistence on certain determinative principles both in ‘mechanism’ and ‘organicism’ is the 
result of their shared ‘integrative’ commitment. The fact that this affinity turns out to be deceptive is the consequence of diver-
gent concepts of ‘truth’ and ‘assertibility’ adopted by both theories. 
700 The distinction between preconfiguring and configured is the conceptual equivalence of the distinction between determining 
and predetermined flakes discussed in the previous section – the two differ merely with respect to scale of the ‘organic’ wholes 
they seek to illuminate. 
701 This ‘self-furnishment’ is not necessarily ‘linear’ and ‘cumulative,’ specific practices and concepts may also be discarded, 
abandoned, and/or lost/forgotten. Logically, however, what can be forgotten must first be ‘furnished.’ 
702 For the distinction between « manières de faire » and « manières de voir », see esp. Pelegrin (1995: 35f.). For the distinction 
between « vouloir faire » (‘volition-to-do’) and « savoir-faire » (‘know-how’), see e.g. Ploux and Karlin (2014). 
“[…] During the Late Glacial period between 18,000 and 14,000 calBP, the archeological record 
of several different aspects of hunter-gatherer activities attest to an internal evolution between 
the Middle and Upper phases of the Magdalenian in the South-west of France. Throughout 
these four millennia, rapid changes are perceptible in hunting weaponry, which may be tied to 
the syncopation of techno-economic choices outlined above. Dynamic technical solutions, evi-
dent in these various forms of hunting weaponry, highlight the significant technological creativ-
ity and innovation inherent in these objects vital to hunter-gather groups. Understanding of the 
forces driving these changing trajectories still remains limited and can only be further advanced 
by integrating non-environmental factors such as personal ornamentation, mobiliary and parie-
tal art, or funerary practices, all of which were undoubtedly instrumental to these hunter-
gatherer groups […].” (Langlais et al. 2012: 146) 
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come into view as fundamentally mediated by larger sociohistorical trajectories. Not every society will 
react to the same external conditions in a similar fashion (Langlais 2010: 14) – a fact that is considered 
to generally undermine the ability of scholars to predict such reactions.703  Adaptation, in this view, is a 
question of ‘organic evolution’ rather than ‘cultural ecology’ (e.g., Bon 2009: 265, 324).  
This perspective entails a ‘not-everything-goes’ proposition of social change. The basic conten-
tion is that organic evolution decreases the ecological plasticity of societies – not every solution to an 
externally-defined problem is feasible or possible; the ‘space of response,’ in other words, is predefined 
by the nature of each evolutionary ‘stage’ and the entire evolutionary trajectory.704 Although the re-
spective concepts are hardly used by French practitioners, we may conclude that different social for-
mations are considered to be differentially resilient against or vulnerable to different external trans-
formations.705 Additionally, different sociohistorical trajectories are expected to create their own, 
sometimes contingent internal problems (captured by the structural categories of ‘conflict’ and ‘con-
tradiction’). Again, evolving societies are not only pictured as problem-solvers, but equally emerge as 
problem-generators – many of the internal conflicts, inconsistencies, and difficulties an evolving soci-
ety has to deal with and solve may be self-generated. In general, this view combines well with technol-
ogy-push conceptions (sensu Freeman 1994)706 of sociotechnical evolution. It redirects the explanatory 
focus to the internalities of past societies and their longue durée trajectories. 
 The emphasis of internally evolving ‘palaeo-historical’ trajectories has somewhat inversed the 
allocation of relative ‘passiveness’ and ‘activeness;’ societies, as a function of their ‘organic’ long-term 
development, are now regarded to represent the primary pole of activity – they are pictured as ‘ever-
moving,’ self-organising entities imbued with creativity and a certain degree of ‘animacy’ – whereas 
environmental conditions, even though capable to enact certain obstacles, appear to be relatively pas-
sive contributors to societal developments (see esp. Bon 2009: 243 [introductory quote of this chapter; 
cf. Appendix Q.5]). This not only introduces yet another level of potential tension and ‘conflict,’ but 
shows that change and transformation are really viewed as the modus operandi of ‘societal existence.’ 
Societies change constantly of their own accord – transformation and alteration are regarded as an 
essential part of the nature of society. This again confirms the ‘inherent activity’ [Eigenaktivität] of 
sociotechnical realities, past or present. The corresponding mode of ‘being alive’ is often captured by 
the mobilisation of two complementary concepts: technical invention and mutation. Typically, these 
two concepts target the self-organisational capacities of varying ‘technical milieus’ (milieus techniques) 
(sensu Leroi-Gourhan 1943/1945; Gille 1978).  
Already the ‘Early’ Leroi-Gourhan – in Évolution et techniques (1943/1945) – has insisted on 
the fact that each society harbours its proper ‘technical milieu’ equipped with the ability of deliberate 
expansion (cf. Audouze 2002: 285). ‘Technical milieus’ are defined by continuity with themselves and 
                                                          
703 As discussed in Chapter 2, ‘organicism’ and ‘mechanism’ do not see eye to eye in the question of ‘prediction.’ Although both 
believe in relatively strong determinacy, they have come to reject each other’s interpretation of the latter. Whereas ‘mechanism’ 
departs from assumptions of ‘simplicity,’ ‘universality,’ and ‘uniformity,’ ‘organicism’ commits itself to the analysis of determina-
tion in terms of ‘complexity,’ ‘particularity’ and ‘heterogeneity.’ Despite the occasional mobilisation of similar terms, both modes 
of cognition therefore conceptualise determination in vastly different ways – a fact that has important consequences for as-
sessing the role of ‘prediction’ in lithic research. 
704 The idea of a ‘space of possible responses’ can be clarified with the concept of « bricolage » (‘bricolage’) (Lévi-Strauss (1966 
[1962]: 19). ‘Bricolage’ is a praxis-oriented concept which maintains that problem-solving in traditional societies can only poorly 
be understood by invoking the metaphor of the ‘engineer.’ According to this popular conception, problem-solving is a process of 
independent design – problem-solution designs are typically developed from scratch and seek to be optimally efficient. ‘Brico-
lage’ is an alternative strategy according to which problem-solving is most likely to be successful when it actively builds on the 
pre-existing cognitive and material resources of a society. These can then be recombined or further developed in such a way that 
the respective problem can be overcome. 
705 Valentin (2008a: 19f.) explicitly draws attention to Lévi-Strauss’ (1966 [1962]: 233f.) dichotomy between ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ 
societies. These two types of society differ in how they relate to their own historicity. ‘Cold’ societies try to conceal internal en-
tropy and disorder in order to prevent change (often by means of equating historical time with mythical time). ‘Hot’ societies, by 
contrast, cultivate entropy and encourage change (which typically produces inequality). The distinction draws attention to the 
interlinkage between a society’s ‘deep structure’ and its temporal development. We can say that the two society-types are differ-
entially resilient against/vulnerable for changes in their external environment(s). 
706 The rivalling position favours a ‘demand-pull’ conception of technological change, according to which technical changes 
primarily occur when external conditions necessitate such changes. Although both ‘technology-push’ and ‘demand-pull’ concep-
tions are somewhat ‘mechanistic’ in their basic logic (they are based on the ‘push-and-pull’ metaphor), the former is often re-
flected in practical applications under the banner of ‘organicism’ while the latter is typically favoured in ‘mechanistic’ approach-
es. If one speaks of ‘technology-push’ in the context of ‘organicism,’ one should of course not interpret push in overly ‘mechanis-
tic’ terms; ‘organicistic’ push is always also a question of creativity and ingenuity. We will return to this crucial point below. 
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temporal coherence (Leroi-Gourhan 1973 [1945]: 344).707 This notion of the ‘technical milieu’ – which 
often makes its appearance in disguise of terms such as « sous-système technique » (‘technical sub-
system’) or « realité technique » (‘technical reality’) – remains highly influential in French lithic re-
search (e.g., Pelegrin 2004), conveying its basic organicistic orientation. Based on Leroi-Gourhan’s 
foundational writings, one can assert that the inherent ‘animacy’ of the ‘technical milieu’ is a function 
of its inner drive to achieve internal technical coherence. This, in turn, is another way of saying that 
technical integration is typically achieved through ensuring compatibility between various techniques 
and technological sub-domains (cf. Leroi-Gourhan 1973 [1945]: 39f.) – such compatibility can be tech-
nological, functional, and/or conceptual. Even though the ‘Early’ Leroi-Gourhan did not pay particular 
attention to aspects of social compatibility (Latour and Lemonnier 1994: 12-16), the main point is 
clear: societies cannot simply be forced by external circumstances to adopt particular technical solu-
tions. We might say that a ‘technical milieu’ can only bring forth what it can creatively envision and 
what it is ready for.708 
This conception of society as an irreducible evolutionary agent in its own right – as a ‘protago-
nist’ of social evolution – is already encapsulated in the idea of « civilisation » (sensu Leroi-Gourhan 
1936; Leroi-Gourhan et al. 1976),709 which for many, especially Upper Palaeolithic, researchers has 
become an important surrogate for the concept of ‘culture’ (e.g., Taborin 1993, 1994; Bon 2009, 2010: 
117; cf. Wisniewski 2003: 9-11).710 In point of fact, the term ‘civilisation’ embodies an organicistic cri-
tique of contextually or otherwise narrowly defined concepts of culture; it expresses the organicistic 
dissatisfaction with an overly ‘static’ construal of the latter. While the classic idea of ‘culture’ places 
strong emphasis on fixed regulations and carries a ‘destinatory’ connotation, « civilisation » empha-
sises the processual and ever-developing nature of culture (cf. Braudel 1949; Mauss 2006 
[1929/1930]).711  
The employment of ‘civilisation’ is thus also an attempt to sidestep ‘emphatic’ or ‘idiographic’ 
understandings of culture, which are both considered to neglect the most basic, that is, everyday as-
pects of culture-in-the-making.712 « Civilisation », by contrast, depicts social becoming as an effort and 
puts the life-practical building blocks of society (praxis, techné) centre stage. By freeing human actors 
from the shackles of their inevitable cultural destiny, the concept of ‘civilisation’ brings into focus that 
societies are capable of forging their own future.713 ‘Civilisations’ unfold in the longue durée and accu-
mulate means to pro-actively relate to their environments, rather than merely buffering themselves 
against them (Ramírez Galicia 2016: 12, footnote 11; cf. Bon 2015: 11f.). The process of civilisation is 
hence a ‘creative' process in which aspects of the environment (milieu naturel) are gradually integrat-
ed into the cultural repertoire of a society (e.g., via specific ways of working natural materials, depict-
                                                          
707 Cf. “[…] An essential property of the milieu technique is its coherence and continuity, resulting from the permanent relation-
ship of each element with the totality of other elements and from their perpetual interactions […] Covariations [therefore] con-
stantly occur […]” (Audouze 2002: 285). 
708 This conception takes up Margaret Miller’s famous statement “[...] a culture takes in what it is ready for [...]” (1997: 243), 
resulting from her research on cultural contact and exchange in the ancient Mediterranean. 
709 For a basic exposition of the concept of ‘civilisation,’ see esp. Elias (1969 [1939]) and Febvre (1988). 
710 Contra Straus (2002b: 1, 2005: 12). 
711 For helpful summaries of the idea of the ‘civilising process,’ see Hahn (2013: 26) and Law (2015: 278-280). 
712 ‘Emphatic’ and ‘idiographic’ conceptions of culture foreground ‘art,’ ‘music,’ and ‘architecture’ as key features of cultural 
architectonics (cf. Geyer 2010). They are often criticised to be ‘eurocentric’ since the core of their culture definition is based on 
what Europeans had long regarded as ‘high culture’ [Hochkultur]. Having said this, ‘idiographic’ understandings of culture often 
play a key role in general narratives of human evolution; Robert Kelly (2016), for example, has recently renewed this inclination. 
In his The Fifth Beginning: What Six Million Years of Human History Can Tell Us about Our Future, he distinguishes between 
the biological beginnings of humanity, which he associates with the dawn of stone technology (Chapter 3), and the cultural 
beginnings of humanity, which he identifies with the emergence of ‘beads and stories’ (Chapter 4). His account (ibid.: 36) attests 
to an ‘idiographic’ definition of culture which is inconsistent with the more inclusive conception of ‘civilisation’ instigated by 
basic techniques such as stone knapping. 
713 Tim Ingold (2016 (1983): 62) has paraphrased this history-making capacity of human society in the following way: “[h]istory 
[…] does not just happen, it is made through the intentional activity of conscious purposive subjects – by people […] as historical 
agents, we act from within, as participants in our own creation: Collectively, ‘man makes himself’. And although every individual 
agent has a transitory existence (as each of us, unconscious of the event, must make his entry and his exit), the history that we 
make, and that is made in us, transcends the bounds of our particular experience. It is […] nothing other than the process of 
social life. Moreover, this process cannot apprehended as an accumulated series of discrete, empirical events. Our subjective life 
is not contained within events but is conducted through them: It is a continuous, creative movement, like a task that is never 
complete.” (original emphasis) 
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ing animals, modifying natural spaces such as rocks and caves, etc.). Natural environments thereby 
come into view as ‘last’ movers, rather than ‘first movers.’714 
‘Technical invention,’ as an antonym to Neo-Darwinian ‘adaptation,’ simply takes up what 
Leroi-Gourhan described as ‘the capacity of the technical milieu to expand deliberately’ (see supra). A 
‘technical invention’ is the adoption of a technical novelty that can be integrated into an inherited 
‘technical milieu’ – it spotlights the self-generative potentiality of the latter (cf. de Beaune 2008, 
2012). The emphasis of ‘invention’ as a function of the creative potential proper to each technical con-
text resonates with the ambition of French lithic experts to ‘re-humanise’ the Palaeolithic past, to bring 
more clearly into focus the anthropological dimensions of technicity (e.g., Tixier 1980; Perlès 1991a; 
Inizian et al. 1999 [1995]).715 Radically put, the concept of ‘technical invention’ adds an element of 
serendipity to the character of human evolution – ‘inventions’ can be interpreted as the product of 
unanticipated events or processes proving future utility.716 A ‘technical invention’ in this sense can only 
be retrodicted – that is, diagnosed in retrospect – but hardly be predicted in all of its details.717 Con-
ceptually, it balances the determinative nature of the past and the creative potential of the present in 
light of a coming future, which is highly characteristic of organicistic thought. Clearly, the overall con-
figuration of reasoning reflects a conception of evolution that is more Bergsonian than Darwinian.  
For Bergson (1907), ‘invention’ is a key term, reflecting the capacity of evolutionary processes 
to break out of their developmental necessities. In Évolution créatrice, he defends a conception of 
becoming explicitly opposed to Darwin’s (1859) evolution by means of natural selection. He highlights 
the centrality of creativity both in natural and human evolution – a fact that is reflected in his concep-
tion of the « élan vital » and his definition of Homo faber (Copleston 1994 [1974]: 198; Hussain, forth-
coming). For Bergson, most importantly, human technicity is therefore primarily defined by technical 
creativity, opening up an almost inexhaustible space of combinatory possibilities718 - it follows that ‘the 
universe is not made, but is being made continually’ (Bergson 1907: 255). The basic argument, later 
further elaborated by many other thinkers, is that technical objects (artefacts), in contrast to natural 
objects, are always created and invented, that is, they always contain a human gesture (Schick 
2018).719 
Bergson’s critique on Darwin is reiterated by Bernard Stiegler (1994), one of the most influen-
tial voices of French technological thought today. Stiegler (2005) argues that selection in the technical 
world operates via ‘adoption’ rather than Darwinian adaptation (cf. Moore 2013: 18, 24f.). ‘Adoption’ is 
internally-directed and consists in the process of changing and/or adding technical means to an al-
ready pre-existing technical domain; it creates an evolving ‘technical world’ and thus a new logic of 
existence – what Stiegler identifies as the basic technological condition of humanity. ‘Adoption,’ ac-
                                                          
714 This rejection of the role of the environment as ‘first mover’ gives way to the repudiation of ‘mechanistic’ theories of social 
evolution altogether. Yet, it also leads to a refusal of ‘formistic’ theories that explain observed patterns by means of invoking the 
environment as a ‘subsistent’ category. 
715 This ‘re-humanisation’ of the Palaeolithic past is for example reflected in the fact that « Paléohistoire » scholars have recently 
begun to convey time in human generations (e.g., Valentin 2008a: 11-14, 2011: 3; Marchand 2014: 14). This manoeuvre signals 
that society-making is understood as an active ‘civilising process,’ as the cumulated efforts of human individuals organised in 
generations. These generations are linked – that is, ‘enchained’ – via long-term historical trajectories. 
716 This conception of ‘technical inventions’ as creative and sometimes spontaneous discoveries which only later turn out to be 
beneficial or otherwise functional is typically not shared by Anglophone experts, especially not by those working under the 
‘mechanistic’ paradigm. An example is the faithful rejection of ‘technical inventions’ as evolutionary driving forces by Kuhn and 
Clark (2014). Apart from rejecting the concept altogether, the only alternative seems to discuss ‘technical inventions’ in the 
context of ‘demand-pull’ models of technological change (see supra), according to which invention is virtually forced upon a 
given technical context since external factors render it inevitable: “[...] In general, technological innovation is most likely under 
conditions where risk is high because that is where people have the most to gain from effort invested in new technologies.” (Kelly 
2013: 122; cf. Fitzhugh 2001) 
717 This difficulty to predict a ‘technical invention’ is also a consequence of the possibility that different technical domains and 
sub-domains, as a function of their domain-specifity, may engender different rates of innovation, perhaps even different logics 
of discovery. Valentin (2011: 31) anticipates this problem: “[…] [the] general division of the Later Palaeolithic only imperfectly 
accounts for the documented regional and historical variations, and especially for transitions operating with different rhythms 
not only in varying regions but also relative to different fields of invention” (my translation; emphasis added [the original 
French quote is provided in Appendix Q.20]). This quote clearly shows that particular ‘inventions’ are thought to emerge at 
the intersection between ‘man’ and ‘matter,’ by recognising the particularities of them both – human ingenuity and creativity 
meets specific matter-potentials. The resulting interactive scenario which unfolds in the longue durée substantiates the view that 
the basic research orientation is ‘organicistic’ here. 
718 In all of his works, Bergson insists on an important element of human freedom (cf. Copleston 1994 [1974]: 187f.), but this 
freedom is not regarded to be unconstrained since it is enfolded in duration and can only persist through temporal continuity. 
719 Sigaut (2012) also draws attention to the importance of ‘invention’ in understanding human tool-use. He maintains that the 
human tool is never simply an organic adaptation, but always represents an irreducible and original creation and as such an 
‘invention’ in the literal sense (ibid.: 18). 
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cording to Stiegler (2004b: 15), enables humans to constantly re-invent themselves on evolutionary 
time scales; ‘adoption’ and ‘invention’ are key processes of a fundamental ‘techno-logical’ mode of 
existence. 
Bon (2009: 337), citing Maurice Godelier, ushers in a similar critique by emphasising the 
common bond between human life, technological production, and technical innovation, crucial for 
understanding the ‘social morphology’ (sensu Durkheim 1894)720 of past societies: 
The concept of technical ‘mutations’ (mutation), regularly found in French lithic literature,721 
expresses a similar logic. Perhaps even stronger than technical inventions, however, ‘mutations’ call 
attention to auto-poeitic processes of societal change.722 The ancient Greek notion of poeisis implies an 
‘activity through which something is brought into existence which did not exist before.’ The term ‘mu-
tation’ indicates such an activity; it accounts for the poeitic capacities of organic processes of becoming 
to self-stipulate change; organic development is auto-poeitic in this sense. The notion of ‘mutation’ can 
hence be understood as the organicistic interpretation of the structural category of ‘novelty,’ originally 
proper to ‘contextualism.’ The added ingredient is the specific organicistic interpretation of time. ‘Mu-
tations’ balance continuity and change. We realise this point when considering what initially appears 
to be the paradox of mutations.  
This paradox consists of the fact that mutations themselves are generally difficult to predict – 
no single mutation is per se necessary to happen at a given moment in time – but entire organic sys-
tems are bound to mutate with relative certainty; we can thus say that although we are incapable to 
precisely anticipate when and how a system mutates, we are not surprised that it mutates at all. In 
addition, even though mutations may introduce something entirely new, these mutations always de-
pend on what was there before. Put differently, there must be a pre-existing something that mutates – 
a ‘substrate of mutation’: 
Hence, ‘mutations’ appear to be paradoxical only when time is reduced to static simultaneity. They 
presuppose duration and temporal interconnectedness; they bind together past, present, and future 
and justify the discontinuity of continuously structured temporal wholes. Furthermore, ‘mutations’ 
echo the organicistic conception of determination insofar as they are always preconfigured by their 
preceding substrate and remain strongly determined by the temporal growth-patterns of their organic 
wholes. In theory, we should thus be able, for example, to determine the rate of mutation of specific 
wholes with a good amount of certainty723 – thus, determination is clearly defined ‘synthetically.’ The 
fact that the frequency and perhaps even the nature of mutations may depend on the organic whole in 
which the respective mutations occur simply reiterates the organicistic preoccupation with the object-
specifity of distinct objects of reality. Technical ‘mutations,’ in a similar way as ‘inventions,’ thus typi-
                                                          
720 Inquiry in the tradition of « Paléohistoire » is strongly influenced by the work of ethnologist Alain Testart (1982, 2005, 2012), 
who is regularly cited by Bon, Marchand, and Valentin. Testart builds a conceptual bridge to traditional French sociology in the 
wake of Durkheim and others. This tradition often considers society as a quasi-living superorganism – as a developing organic 
whole that is more than the combination of its parts. Testart’s role cannot be underestimated since it was probably him who 
brought ‘social evolution’ to the agenda of French anthropology and, more recently, Palaeolithic archaeology. He was one of the 
last great thinkers in the tradition of comparative « Sociologie générale ». In a similar way as « Ethnologie générale » in the 
wake of Leroi-Gourhan has influenced the development of « Palethnologie », Testart arguably played an important, although 
perhaps not yet fully developed role in the emerging strand of « Sociologie préhistorique » (cf. Bon, in the future). 
721 The term ‘mutation’ is for example mobilised by Bodu and Valentin (1997), Marchand (1999a), Valentin et al. (2004), 
Teyssandier (2007), Naudinot (2010), Langlais (2010), Pesesse (2010), and Bon (2015) – to name but a few. 
722 Autopoeisis is the ability of a living or quasi-living system to re-create itself. For a comprehensive definition and application 
of the concept, see e.g. Varela et al. (1974). For its role in the general theory of ‘social evolution,’ see esp. Luhmann (1984, 1990). 
723 From an ‘organicistic’ point of view, a relatively constant rate of mutation – always an emergent property of the whole – gives 
rise to a particular ‘rhythm’ of change. The notion of ‘mutation’ is therefore logically linked to the concept of developmental 
rhythms – an idea characteristic of the French tradition as we have seen. 
“[H]umans are not only beings who adapt, they are beings who invent themselves. Humans are 
beings who are incapable of living in a society without providing or receiving from their birth 
the capacity to produce this society in order to live.” (Godelier 2007: 189; my translation [the 
original French quote is provided in Appendix Q.21]) 
“[…] What drives these observable changes [connected to the Madgalenian-Azilian transition] 
in material culture? How did this [Azilian] mutation operate on the Magdalenian substrate? 
[...] The precise connections between, on the one hand, climatic and ecological upheavals of 
the Late Glacial, and, on the other hand, other substantial mutations in the domain of symbols 
and techniques, naturally sit at the heart of all debates [...].”(Marchand 2017: 9; my translation 
[the original French quote is provided in Appendix Q. 7]). 
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cally emerge as a product of ‘civilising processes.’ Because organicism detects various degrees of ‘ani-
macy’ in the phenomena it investigates, mutations are not confined to specific domains of reality, let 
alone to the realm of biology. ‘Mutatability’ is re-cast as a universal feature of evolving wholes, but the 
nature of mutation is considered to greatly differ among different kinds of wholes. The concept of 
technical ‘mutation’ (mutation) reflects the constitutive organicistic tension between regularity and 
particularity. 
The third window into organicism has recently been opened by the ‘techno-genetic’ paradigm, devel-
oped by a small group of scholars around Éric Boëda (1997, 2005, 2013) in Paris-Nanterre (e.g., So-
riano 2000, 2001; Forestier 2010; Nicoud 2011; Chevrier 2012). This paradigm is based on what has 
been termed the ‘techno-genetic approach’ (approche techno-génétique). This approach seeks to fill 
the void of classic chaîne opératoire analysis – to understand the ‘finality’ (fonction) of tools724 – and 
to place both tools and the systems of their production into long-term processes of ‘organic’ lithic evo-
lution. The emergence of the techno-genetic paradigm can be understood, on the one hand, as a reac-
tion to Tixier’s deliberate neglect of functionality, especially in the domain of lithic tool technology,725 
and, on the other hand, as a re-appraisal of the ‘Early’ Leroi-Gourhan’s ‘technological vitalism’ (sensu 
Delitz 2015), including the latter’s interest in the gestural and morpho-functional aspects of tool-
utilisation (cf. Leroi-Gourhan 1968).726  
As a result, the focus of techno-genetic research lies, often exclusively, on technical objects 
themselves rather than on past societies. This clearly separates the ‘techno-genetic approach’ from 
« Paléohistoire » sensu stricto – the latter departs from the ‘Late’ Leroi-Gourhan and his ‘palethnolog-
ical’ legacy, whereas the former takes inspiration in the Leroi-Gourhan of Évolution et techniques. 
Since the techno-genetic endeavour is mainly pre-occupied with the evolution of lithic technology per 
se, we may speak of « Technohistoire » (‘Technohistory’) or « Paléotechnologie » (‘Palaeotechnology’) 
depending on the emphasis of inquiry.727 
 The techno-genetic approach entails a number of conceptual and methodological reorienta-
tions in how lithic technology is to be studied. The perhaps most important change in perspective con-
cerns the conception of lithic tools themselves (cf. Boëda 1997: Chapitre 8, 2013: 45-53). Tools are no 
longer regarded to be the mere output of technical systems – i.e., the products of the ‘confection’ phase 
of the chaîne opératoire – but are taken into consideration as systemic entities in their own right 
(Chevrier 2012: 147).728 They come into view either as technical ‘micro-systems’ or as ‘sub-systems’ of 
larger lithic production structures (cf. Lepot 1992/1993: Planche 87).729 Tixier’s ‘anarchism’ in terms of 
technological finalities has thereby motivated, first, the study of interactions between tool-systems and 
lithic production systems (Boëda 1991, 2005: 59-61, 2013: 35) and, second, the re-examination of the 
structure and morpho-functionality of tool-systems themselves. The latter has given rise to what is 
known as the ‘techno-functional approach’ (approche techno-fonctionelles) (Lepot 1992/1993; Boëda 
1997, 2001; Bourguignon 1997; Soriano 2000; Soressi 2002; Pagli 2009; Lourdeau 2010; Bonilauri 
                                                          
724 For the distinction between ‘structure’ (structure), ‘operation’ (fonctionnement), and ‘function’ (fonction) (sensu Sigaut 
1991), see the previous part of this chapter. 
725 Cf. esp. Tixier (2012 [1978]: 33). 
726 Leroi-Gourhan’s interest in tool-mediated ‘modes of action’ has given rise to an entire strand of research – commonly 
grouped under labels such as gestural anthropology or « Technologie ». This trajectory of sociotechnical thought leads from 
Mauss over Leroi-Gourhan to Haudricourt (1987) and Sigaut (1991, 2012), converging with some noticeable branches of sociolo-
gy which investigate the status of sociotechnical systems (Rabardel 1995). The legacies of all of these thinkers have, to various 
degrees, shaped the techno-genetic paradigm – its motivations, methods, and goals. 
727 Techno-genetic reasoning represents a more definitive departure from ‘contextualism’ than « Paléohistoire ». While the latter 
embraces the multiplicity of developmental agents and trajectories shaping societal evolution, the former regards it as self-
sufficient to address technological evolution sui generis. This has led to a shift in emphasis and research interest away from the 
ambition to write a proper ‘palaeo-history of societies’ towards the vision of writing ‘palaeohistories of knapped stones.’ This 
conceptual shift is for example notably reflected in the subtitle of Boëda’s most recent book, Techno-logique & Technologie. Une 
Paléohistoire des objets lithiques tranchants (2013) – a key document of the ‘techno-genetic’ project. 
728 The recognition of the lithic ‘tool’ as a systemic entity automatically re-directs analytical attention to the problematic relation-
ship between ‘artefacts’ and a ‘tools’ (e.g., Chevrier 2012: 135-138; see infra). Tools are generally regarded to be ‘more-than-just-
artefacts,’ mirroring the ‘synthetic’ re-definition of the tool concept in this branch of French lithic research. 
729 The domain of lithic tools is considered to delineate yet another ‘compartment’ within the wider technical system – represent-
ing another building block of the « système technicien », to speak with Jacques Ellul (1977). [For an explicit citation of the latter, 
see Chevrier (2012: 98)]. 
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2010; Koehler 2011; Bodin 2011; Nicoud 2011; Chevrier 2012: 148f.; Rocca 2013; Leroyer 2016; Weyer 
2016).730  
Techno-functional inquiry is regarded to complement, and sometimes substitute, the func-
tional and typological analysis of lithic tools (e.g., Boëda 2001; Soriano 2005; Boëda et al. 2015).731 A 
tool is seen as a technical microcosm to be studied in its technological ‘structure’ (structure), ‘opera-
tion’ (fonctionnement), and ‘function’ (fonction) (sensu Sigaut 1991; cf. Boëda 1991, 1997: 30f., 2005: 
47, 2013: 60f.)732 – just like any other technical entity. Pivotally, the material ‘appearances’ of tools – 
which have largely been the target of analysis prior to the dawn of techno-functional inquiry – are 
viewed to ‘conceal’ much of a tool’s ‘structural,’ ‘operational,’ and ‘functional’ complexity – an organi-
sational complexity which is regarded to be crucial to decipher (Boëda 1997: 36, 110; Forestier 2010; 
Chevrier 2012: 12, 87, 99, 146). 
 The techno-genetic paradigm utilises the insights gained from techno-functional analysis to 
place varying tool-systems into their broader evolutionary context (Boëda 1997, 2013). This evolution-
ary context is identified with long-term technical trajectories regarded to reflect the organic ‘becoming’ 
of lithic objects sui generis (Boëda 2005). Accordingly, the primary evolutionary context of lithic ob-
jects comes into view as an extended temporal whole, perceptible only in the durée (‘duration’). The 
key concept is the ‘technical lineage’ (« lignée technique »).733 Each ‘technical lineage’ encases a par-
ticular chain of technical developments, in which a technical object passes through a succession of 
technical ‘stages’ (Fig. 47). 
The basic idea – although often spelled out rather vaguely – seems to be that ‘technical line-
ages’ host a multitude of different and temporally dispersed technical objects sharing a basic set of 
relevant techno-functional principles (cf. Boëda 2013: 49f.).734 Thus, the conception appears to be that 
‘technical lineages’ organise aspects of the observable ‘structural’ and ‘operational’ variability of lithic 
objects to the point that the genesis (the ‘becoming-concrete’) of a ‘functional’ schematic becomes dis-
cernible – a schematic that ultimately unifies all the different objects.735 The dynamic evolution of as-
pects of ‘structure’ (structure) and ‘operation’ (fonctionnement) is thus rendered intelligible by illumi-
nating their role in the emergence of a relatively stable and well-defined ‘function’ (fonction). The im-
plication is that the ultimate finalities (fonctions) of lithic objects – whether they are tool-systems or 
even larger technical systems – can only be assessed if the corresponding ‘technical lineage’ is identi-
fied and analysed. Techno-genetic reasoning is ‘synthetic’ in this sense – technical objects can only be 
understood if placed into their ‘significant’ evolutionary wholes, that is, into their respective ‘technical 
lineages’ (« lignées techniques »). 
With Pepper, we can clarify the organicistic status of this style of reasoning. To this end, it is 
useful to distinguish between ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ technical contexts: ‘secondary’ technical con-
                                                          
730 An alternative label for the same research enterprise is ‘techno-morpho-functional’ inquiry (étude techno-morpho-
fonctionelle). 
731 See e.g. Soriano (2000: 6-8) for a summary of what is seen as the core difficulty of lithic use-wear analysis and why it is re-
garded to be of limited value in pre-Upper Palaeolithic contexts of technicity. See also Lepot (1992/1993: 134), Jaubert (1999: 
57f.), and Boëda (1997: 107, 2005: 48, 2013: 29): “[…] [t]he arguments are to be derived from the coherence of the technical 
system by means of the techno-functional approach and not by means of traceological analysis which merely confirms the pres-
ence of hafting, without informing us of its specificities.” (Boëda 2013: 229; my translation [the original French quote is provid-
ed in Appendix Q.22]). 
732 The differentiation between ‘structure,’ ‘operation,’ and ‘function’ broadly corresponds to Rabardel’s (1995) distinction be-
tween ‘artefact’, ‘scheme of utilisation,’ and ‘instrument’ on which Boëda (2013: 50-55) and his students draw (e.g., Soriano 
2000: 119, 134). 
733 The concept of the ‘technical lineage’ has been proposed by Simondon (1958) and further developed by Deforge (1985). See 
also Tinland (1977), Stiegler (2004a), and Guchet (2008). For a summary of its core meaning and a discussion of its role in 
Palaeolithic research, see Chevrier (2012: 100f., 111-113). 
734 The notion of the ‘technical lineage’ embodies the ‘organicistic’ preoccupation with the tension between unity and diversity. 
In Palaeolithic research, the concept is typically defined as a structural family-resemblance – different objects of the same 
family of lithic structures are analysed in their becoming (cf. Chevrier 2012: 157). The ‘technical lineage’ is thereby the unifier 
and the aim is to show that at least a part of the natural diversity of technical objects can be resolved by invoking the concept 
(see next footnote).  
735 We may say that the identification of a basic functional scheme through the analysis of ‘technical lineages’ plays a somewhat 
similar role as, say, the identification of the schéma opératoire in the analysis of lithic assemblages. Moreover, the examination 
of the latter typically provides critical clues about the former. The spatiotemporal organisation of lithic assemblages and situated 
technical systems simply represent a ‘stigma’ of the ‘technical lineage’ they are a product of. In the same sense as chaînes opé-
ratoires specify the status of each lithic artefact in a given lithic assemblage, ‘technical lineages’ specify the status of each chaîne 
opératoire in its attendant evolutionary chain. We may say that the ‘ontogeny’ of a lithic technical system is informative about its 
relative ‘phylogenetic’ position. However, this assertion does not imply that ‘technical ontogeny recapitulates techno-functional 
phylogeny,’ but merely underscores the fact that each technical system is a result of its past and points to its future. 
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texts are lithic assemblages, technical systems, tool-systems, and/or a combination of them all; ‘prima-
ry’ technical contexts are the ‘technical lineages’ in which the ‘secondary’ technical contexts make their 
appearance. One can then say, first, that the ‘primary’ context dynamises the associated ‘secondary’ 
contexts on the temporal plane and, secondly, that the totality of ‘secondary’ contexts defines the set of 
‘progressive’ categories individualising the ‘primary’ context, which therefore embodies the ‘ideal’ cat-
egories of the total temporal whole.  
The evolution of lithic objects, in this view, is determined by the ‘dialectical’ movement be-
tween the ‘primary’ context and its ‘secondary’ contexts and consists in the ‘progressive’ movement 
towards the ‘ideal.’ The divergent character of the ‘secondary’ contexts make clear that lithic evolution 
is a ‘staged’ process and that evolutionary time can be differentiated only qualitatively, not quantita-
tively.736 The organic process that ‘progressively’ leads to the ‘primary’ context is initially ‘concealed’ 
since what is given in experience are only isolated ‘secondary’ contexts. The ‘secondary’ contexts come 
thereby into view as ‘fragments of reality’ and their succession, although initially ‘concealed,’ turns out 
to be directed and irreversible. All ‘contradictions’ and/or ‘conflicts’ between the ‘secondary’ contexts 
are resolved by unifying them through their ‘primary’ context. 
The resulting research mandate seeks to identify ‘primary’ contexts and to determine which 
‘secondary’ contexts belong to them. The overall goal of lithic inquiry is thus to detect the nature of the 
organic process that arranges the ‘secondary’ contexts in time and gives shape to the ‘progressive’ cate-
gories that lead to the ‘ideal.’ It remains an empirical question to specify which evolutionary mecha-
nisms, principles of development, and/or phylogenetic laws can be said to underpin this organic pro-
cess. This endeavour typically comes down to determining the logic of change between the develop-
mental stages and to assess whether or not this logic changes through time (that is, whether other 
stage-transitions in the same whole conform to the same logic). Conceptually, interpretations juxta-
pose the evolutionary fact of ‘techno-genesis’ (« techno-genèse ») with the ‘techno-logic’ (« techno-
logique »)737 of lithic development (cf. Boëda 2013: 87f.). It should be clear that this strategy generally 
predisposes techno-genetic inquiry to spawn qualitative accounts of lithic evolution – it is simply un-
clear how one would study the ‘logic of change’ in purely quantitative terms. 
 As already indicated before, organicistic conceptions of evolution are by no means new in the 
French scene but have already played an important role in the ‘ancestral’ and ‘formative’ periods of 
Palaeolithic research. Garbiel de Mortillet, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, and the ‘Early’ André Leroi-
Gourhan, for example, remain exemplary cases of theorising the grand scheme of technical evolution, 
while Henri Breuil can be mentioned as a model case of interpreting the development of Palaeolithic 
art from an organicistic perspective. Mortillet coined the term ‘palaeoethnology’ (« paléoethnologie ») 
– not to be confused with the « Palethnologie » developed by the ‘Later’ Leroi-Gourhan and his team – 
to denote an integrated ‘new science of prehistoric man’738 and subdivided the Palaeolithic period into 
several ‘ages’ – from the Acheulean to the Tourassian (today’s Azilian). These ‘ages’ were considered 
‘stages’ of a directed evolutionary sequence. For Mortillet, as subsequently for Leroi-Gourhan, the Pal-
aeolithic constitutes an indisputable part of human history (cf. Junghans 2014 [1987]: 47) – an im-
portant window into « histoire générale » (‘general history’) or what Marc Bloch later termed « his-
toire totale ».  
Mortillet’s long-term history was already a history of alternating ‘civilisations’ (ibid.: 54). Yet, 
the basic organicistic idea, namely that human history can only be understood as a continuous but 
                                                          
736 The fact that time, if one resists its ‘spatialisation,’ can only be differentiated qualitatively was also a main conclusion of Berg-
son’s Évolution créatrice (1907; cf. Copleston 1994 [1974]: 186). With Pepper, we can add that the ‘spatialisation’ of time results 
in the conception of a ‘field of temporal location’ typically tied to an ‘objectivist’ account of time stressing its homogeneity. This 
account corresponds to the classic ‘mechanistic’ reading of time and thus signifies an important locus of divergence between 
‘mechanism’ and ‘organicism.’ 
737 ‘Techno-logic’ (« techno-logique ») is a difficult concept and regularly, I believe, confused with other affiliated terms. The 
term for example needs to be distinguished from the notion of ‘technical logic’ (« logique technique ») which seems to be a 
category of ‘contextualism.’ This ‘technical logic’ captures the organisational, that is, ‘infrastructural’ logic of technical contexts, 
i.e., technical systems, periods, or sub-periods. ‘Techno-logic,’ by contrast, appears to target the structural organisation of an 
organic temporal whole, conveying especially the nature of the various ‘stage-transitions’ that can be observed as the whole 
unfolds. Both concepts therefore pinpoint relational configurations of ‘significant’ wholes: ‘technical logic’ pictures the relational 
configuration of contexts – the wholes of ‘contextualism’ – and ‘techno-logic’ portrays the relational configuration of organic 
structures – the wholes of ‘organicism.’ The concept of ‘techno-logic,’ proper to an organicistic interpretation of technological 
evolution, thereby reproduces the indubitable topos of ‘unity in diversity’ – it expresses the belief that different developmental 
stages can be unified through a common principle of becoming. 
738 Cf. Junghans (2014 [1987]: 53f.). 
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creative movement of ‘man’ and ‘matter’ giving rise to successive stages of lithic development, was 
perhaps carried to the extreme in the writings of Teilhard de Chardin (1955, 1956; cf. Schiwy 2006).739 
 It was the ‘Early’ Leroi-Gourhan, however, who set the lasting agenda for French techno-
organic reasoning.740 His distinction between « faits » (‘facts’) and « tendance » (‘tendency’) – already 
alluded to in the last section – holds the key for understanding the recent return to the roots of lithic 
organicism in the French scene (cf. Boëda 2013: 23). For Leroi-Gourhan, « fait » was a means of ex-
pressing that the same global tendencies of technical development can be tangibly instantiated in a 
number of different ways; each society typically supports its unique instantiation(s) of technicity. This 
conception was considered to offer a solution to the undeniable fact that there is much technical varia-
bility even though technical evolution appears to be directed.741 Arguably, Leroi-Gourhan never fully 
abandoned the distinction between ‘facts’ and ‘tendency’ but relocated his attention in the course of his 
career. While the ‘Early’ Leroi-Gourhan of Évolution et techniques was preoccupied with the grand 
narratives and, as a consequence, focussed on the ‘tendencies’ of technical evolution, the ‘Later’ Leroi-
Gourhan, branded by the Pincevent experience, prioritised studying the situated facts (« faits ») of 
particular sociocultural contexts.742  
From this perspective, the tension between ‘facts’ and ‘tendency’ motivates a distinction be-
tween ‘evolution’ and ‘history’ (cf. Boëda 2013: 231). ‘History’ becomes a category proper to distinct 
evolutionary ‘stages’; it can be taken to describe those aspects of lithic technical variability which are 
unnecessary for effectuating the transition to the next ‘stage.’ History, if you will, is then the creative 
variation of a necessary theme. ‘Evolution,’ for this reason, comes into view as a process that trans-
cends historical contingency and is ‘transcultural’ in a fundamental sense (ibid.: 23, 223-236). The 
distinction between historical and evolutionary factors therefore turns out to be an empirical precondi-
tion for techno-genetic reconstructions. Methodologically, the characterisation of a ‘technical lineage’ 
– which presupposes the identification of the latter’s effective evolutionary features – should therefore 
enable the discrimination between cultural and non-cultural variation in the associated lithic technol-
ogies (ibid.: 146, 167).743 This interpretive dichotomy between ‘history’ and ‘evolution’ seems to be 
another important discriminator between the ‘techno-genetic approach’ and « Paléohistoire » sensu 
stricto, which does not discriminate between these two concepts. 
For techno-genetic approaches, history and evolution represent different games that are 
played with different rules on different temporal scales. If « Paléohistoire » can be described as a prac-
tice of ‘hyper-history’ (cf. Valentin 2011), ‘techno-genesis’ (« techno-genèse ») would be concerned 
with ‘hyper-evolution.’ Strictly speaking, the latter’s main concern lies not with the longue durée, but 
with the très longue durée. What it shares with « Paléohistoire », however, is the ‘dendritic paradigm.’ 
Yet, this is also where it voices some quiet critique on Leroi-Gourhan. Techno-genetic research is 
based on the recognition that there is not only a single global technical ‘tendency’ but instead multiple 
local ‘tendencies.’ The reasons for this are manifold: for one thing, each ‘lineage’ develops in its proper 
‘natural milieu’; for another thing, contingent developments and random factors (including rare 
events) at an early stage of a ‘lineage’ may have irreversible and direction-giving effects on the evolu-
tionary trajectory of the ‘lineage’ as a whole – technical lineages are path-dependent to this effect. Be-
cause a given lineage can be called ‘cultural’ only in this twofold sense – or, alternatively, because it 
differs from other ‘lineages’744 – techno-genetic accounts tend to be techno-deterministic. The space of 
cultural variation is preconfigured by larger technical trajectories, some of which may leave little lee-
way for lithic cultural variation: 
                                                          
739 Boëda (2013: footnote 20 [35]) explicitly invokes Teilhard de Chardin as an ideational forefather. 
740 The key role of Leroi-Gourhan is also acknowledged by Boëda (2013: 28). 
741 Leroi-Gourhan’s ‘tendency’ (tendance) represents an appropriation of Bergson’s « élan vital » (cf. Gazagnadou 2008: 46). For 
the many ‘Bergsonisms’ in the work of Leroi-Gourhan, see Schlanger (2004, 2015). For the role of the concept in lithic techno-
genetic research, see esp. Boëda (2013: 35, 223). 
742 From this perspective, Leroi-Gourhan’s Le geste et la parole (1964/1965) amounts a transitory work. The passage from the 
‘Early’ to the ‘Late’ Leroi-Gourhan may in fact correspond to a research-historical transition from an initial ‘organicistic’ orienta-
tion of inquiry towards a full-blown ‘contextualistic’ inclination. In retrospect, we can say that this ‘Late-contextualistic’ Leroi-
Gourhan was born in Pincevent. Clearly, however, more historical groundwork is needed to confirm this affirmation. 
743 Contra ‘mechanism,’ the contention here is that the discrimination between ‘functional’ and ‘non-functional’ factors in rela-
tion to a given temporal present is always short-sighted. ‘Non-functional’ factors can only be identified if the evolutionary func-
tion of effectuating change in a given direction has already been excluded. 
744 The plurality of possible technical ‘lineages’ delivers only an indirect argument for the ‘cultural load’ of these lineages. This 
problem, however, is openly acknowledged and has motivated the discussion of technical convergence in an ‘organicistic’ context 
of inquiry (cf. Boëda 2005). 
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Another reason for the plurality of technical trajectories is that technical ‘tendencies’ – Boëda’s 
« lignées » – may be object-specific (Boëda 1997, 2005, 2013). This potential object-specificity of tech-
nical trajectories marks the input of a second key source of techno-genetic thought – French philoso-
phy of technology and its cybernetic heritage. Boëda (2005, 2013) and his students (e.g., Nicoud 2011; 
Chevrier 2012; Rocca 2013) specifically draw on the work of Gilbert Simondon, one of the most influ-
ential technologists of 20th century France. His central text is Du mode d’existence des objets tech-
niques (1958). This work, which is foremost technological and only secondarily anthropological 
(Barthélémy 2015), suggests that technical evolution can only be properly understood by examining 
the genesis of technical objects – their ‘becoming’ (Simondon 1958: 19f.); Simondon considers the 
evolution of technology to be guided by structural laws proper to the technical domain. Accordingly, 
technical objects possess a specific ‘mode of existence’ (cf. Boëda 2013: 28, 88; Nicoud 2013: 51). 
Technology is viewed as a ‘quasi-living’ force capable of self-regulation and evolutionary self-
determination. How this general capacity is realised, however, always depends on the technical object 
in question: 
Following Simondon (1958, 2014), a technical lineage fulfils the functional potential of a tech-
nical object as the object passes through time, typically by increasing the latter’s internal ‘inclusive-
ness’ and/or ‘organicity’ in such a way that the object’s functionality is optimised – each systemic ele-
ment then implies any other element and only all elements together ensure the total functionality of 
the object (cf. Simondon 1958: 50-55). The functional potential that is thereby carried through by a 
technical lineage is called ‘technical essence’ (Simondon 1958: 41f.). This ‘technical essence’ describes 
the ‘ideal’ of a technical lineage in light of its ‘progressive’ categories (see supra); it corresponds to the 
already introduced notion of a ‘functional schematic’ holding a technical lineage together in time. The 
continuous re-adjustment between a ‘technical essence’ and the lineage that lives up to this essence 
generates the ‘laws of evolution’ proper to the lineage. 
Boëda (1997, 2013: 40) adopts Simondon’s (1958: 19-22) ideal-typical distinction between ‘ab-
stract’ technical objects (« objets abstraits ») and ‘concrete’ technical objects (« objets concrèts ») to 
develop a new perspective on how lithic technology evolves. Discriminating between the two establish-
es a spectrum of developmental stages from the relative starting point of a technical lineage to its rela-
tive endpoint (ibid.: 23-49, 61-64). This spectrum is thought to deliver a universally-valid scheme of 
technical development which, in turn, can be used to assess the relative position of lithic objects in 
their evolutionary chain(s).745  
‘Abstract’ stages describe a condition in which the contribution of each technical part (if any) 
to the overall functionality of the technical whole is independent of other parts – ‘abstract’ technical 
stages harbour compartementalised systemic entities. ‘Concrete’ stages, by contrast, can be character-
ised by a condition in which the parts are interdependent and only in concert produce the functionality 
of the whole – the contribution of each part has become inseparable from the contribution of all other 
                                                          
745 Again, it has to be emphasised that ‘universality’ is only granted to the general progression from more ‘abstract’ to more 
‘concrete.’ Which stages are taken, which are perhaps skipped, and how the stages are precisely instantiated, is an empirical 
question and potentially differs between various object-matters. We may thus more properly speak of a general developmental 
frame of reference rather than a universal scheme (cf. Chevrier 2012: 103f.). 
“Technique, just like magic or religion, is a way of being in the world. Th[e] cultural evaluation 
of technical reality entails the investigation of the technical nature of an object, rethinking the 
object from the perspective of its technicality and reconsidering the technical object as structur-
ally coupled with the human, itself becoming. This notion of coupling necessarily implies a co-
evolution of human[s] and technique[s], the latter being governed by ‘laws of evolution.’” (Boëda 
2013: 28; my translation [the original French quote is provided in Appendix Q.22]) 
 
“[…] [I]n the case of ‘Type Pyramidal E2,’ several methods permit to produce uniquely blades 
or, contrarily, a mixed technique may deliver triangular blade removals including Levallois 
points. In the case of the [D]iscoid as of the pyramidal, however, the direction of detachments 
has no value in differentiating the methods. In the case of the [D]iscoid, it is effectively neces-
sary to change the direction of removal in order to proceed from a first exploitable volume to a 
second one; in the case of the pyramidal, it is necessary to obtain detachments from the same 
direction. In opposition to what we will see for the Levallois core and certain Upper Palaeo-
lithic cores, changing or uniform directionalities represent more a structural necessity than 
the expression of a cultural character.” (Boëda 2013: 146; my translation [the original French 




parts. In this second case, the parts can be said to form an integrated ‘organic whole’ while in the first 
case their ‘being-one’ (‘one-ness’) is implicated but not (yet) realised. In order to identify a technical 
lineage and by means of this lineage explain all objects found in it, one needs to show that the actual 
(ideally: observed) temporal enchainment of objects can be rendered intelligible as a succession of ever 
more ‘concrete’ systemic entities.  
Simondon (1958, 1964, 1989) names this passage from the relatively ‘abstract’ to the relatively 
‘concrete’ a process of concretisation or individuation. One can speak of ‘individuation’ because evolv-
ing objects, by becoming more and more ‘concrete,’ literally find to themselves – to their ‘technical 
essence.’ Technical evolution comes into view as a process of self-identification and, perhaps more 
importantly, self-adaptation (Simondon 1958: 50-55).746 Technical objects, if you will, transition from 
a state of inner ‘schizophrenia’ to a state of internal indifference (cf. Boëda 2013: 40).747 To overcome 
the schizophrenic state of organisation means to realise the technical ‘ideal.’ Again, technical evolution 
is regarded to be inherently creative because its organic processes have to resolve the tension [Span-
nung] between the parts of a (yet) ‘un-concrete’ whole (cf. Schick 2013: 153).748 Creativity, then, is 
defined as the evolutionary fact of resolving technical ‘conflict,’ which presupposes developmental 
potentiality rather than predetermination. 
The categories of ‘abstract’ and ‘concrete’ are logical refinements of the ‘ideal’ category of the 
‘organic structural whole’: ‘concrete-ness’ refers to completely realised ‘organicity,’ whereas ‘abstract-
ness’ specifies the exact opposite – a state of ‘in-organicity.’ The two notions are purely theoretical; 
they open a space of developmental potential to proceed from ‘abstract’ to ‘concrete’ wholes. The latter 
state is rarely reached in reality because achieving the ‘ideal’ would imply eternity and the end of evo-
lution (cf. Appendix II.2). Even though the realisation of the ‘ideal’ is somewhat paradoxical, it does 
offer an explanation for why technical lineages may collapse sui generis: fully realised organicity typi-
cally implies evolutionary inflexibility since the re-organisation of parts, without sacrificing key func-
tionalities, becomes practically impossible. The inability of an ‘ideal’ system to adapt to novel circum-
stances therefore enables a new technical lineage to emerge (cf. Boëda 2013: esp. 230-236). This is the 
organicistic interpretation of lineage extinction and/or succession. This perspective underlines ‘cyclici-
ty’ (sub-cycles, cycles, epi-cycles) as a key feature of technical evolution. 
The focus on categories implied by the ‘ideal’ leaves the ‘progressive’ categories of technical 
evolution largely undefined. According to organicism, this should be seen as an advantage since it is 
consistent with the idea that wholes set the evolutionary tone and parts are instantiated by the necessi-
ty to realise them. The ‘progressive’ categories are therefore whole-specific and have to be determined 
empirically. This is where typology comes into play. ‘Effective’ types – typically identified with what 
has been coined techno-functional types – are considered to instantiate the ‘progressive’ categories of 
their wholes. The role of typology is to facilitate the detection of technical objects that belong to a given 
technical lineage and to somehow encapsulate the arguments for attributing the respective objects to 
the lineage. The result is a sharp distinction between ‘effective’ and ‘ineffective’ lithic types – the for-
mer help to chart technical lineages, the latter only cloud the view for them.749 Based on the aforemen-
                                                          
746 Simondon (1958) sometimes also invokes terms such as auto-correlation or self-convergence because ‘individuation’/ ‘con-
cretisation’ amounts to a ‘structural’ and ‘operational’ match between the parts of a whole that ensures the latter’s global func-
tionality. 
747 The tendency of technology to adapt its parts to itself provides a general evolutionary mechanism to explain technical becom-
ing (Boëda 2013: 40). The concept of ‘self-adaptation’ thereby implies a new interest in synergetic relations – a key topos of 
French technological research in general. The interpretive manoeuvre in techno-genetic research is to re-direct the attention to 
system-internal synergies instead of mainly concentrating on the complementarities between distinct yet co-occurring technical 
systems (i.e., between débitage and façonnage systems). An important consequence is that Darwinian adaptation becomes a 
secondary phenomenon at best. 
748 Conversely, if there is no tension or structural conflict, the evolutionary ‘impulse’ is dramatically reduced. At the extreme, 
there is no evolution at all because there is no ‘abstract-ness’ left. This implies that full-blown organicity – the ‘ideal’ – may mark 
the end of evolution and typically ushers in a state of developmental stasis or collapse. The ‘saturation’ of an evolutionary lineage 
– its complete ‘concretisation’ – is therefore likely to be the beginning of the end of this lineage. It is in this sense that ‘organi-
cists’ may speak of the natural ‘death’ of technical linages. 
749 The distinction between ‘effective’ and ‘ineffective’ lithic types is a consequence of the inherent ‘integrativity’ of ‘organicistic’ 
explanation. Since ‘organicism’ presupposes a relatively high degree of worldly order and because determination is considered to 
be ‘focused,’ some facts turn out to be irrelevant and can even be thrown into the ‘unreal.’ This general inclination engenders a 
core difference to ‘contextualistic’ practices of lithic typology. As shown in the last part of this chapter, ‘contextualism’ tends to 
pluralise typology in order to capture different levels of typological organisation; these levels of typological variability are later 
related to one another in order to clear the view for the verticalities and horizontalities of technical ‘infrastructure’ – the strategy 
is inclusive and ‘dispersive.’ In ‘organicism,’ by contrast, some typologies – those which fail to help illuminate their temporal 
wholes – are simply discarded. They are identified as ‘deceptions of appearance.’ This basic difference explains why lithic ‘organ-
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tioned, it becomes then clear that ‘effective’ types must take into consideration the ‘structure’ of lithic 
technical objects, rather than their form (cf. Forestier 2000: 544).750 
The classificatory systems developed by proponents of the techno-genetic approach reflect this 
realisation (cf. e.g., Soriano 2000; Forestier 2010; Chevrier 2012; Boëda and Hou 2011; Nicoud 2011, 
2013; Rocca 2013; Nicoud et al. 2016; Chevrier et al. 2017). Classifications are guided by the objective 
to identify different part-configurations and the relationships between the lithic parts and their tech-
nical whole. We can distinguish between two complementary approaches to characterise these ‘tech-
nical structures’ and to examine the associated processes of systemic integration: the first is centred on 
the analysis of tool structure (Boëda 2013: 54f.), the second on the evaluation of structures of volu-
metric core exploitation (ibid.: 89-97). The general interpretive categories developed by these two 
angles of investigation furnish the principal resources to devise the ‘progressive’ categories required to 
chart the evolution of lithic systems from their ‘abstract’ to ‘concrete’ states. The fact that these catego-
ries appear to be case-sensitive – especially that they fundamentally differ when reduction-systems 
and tool-systems are compared (cf. ibid.: 28, 88) –  underscores the organicistic pre-occupation with 
object-specificities.751 
The first strand of techno-functional inquiry, taking into account the evolutionary becoming of 
tool-systems, is based on the identification of techno-functional units, or UTFs (Unités techno-
fonctionnelles) in French (cf. Boëda 1997: 107, 2001, 2013: 39, 54f.; Soriano 2000: 123f.). The meth-
odological and interpretive resources to analyse UTFs (henceforth ‘UTF-analysis’) have been devel-
oped collaboratively, even though Michel Lepot’s (1992/1993) théorie artisanale de l’outil (‘non-
industrial theory of lithic tool production’) was a key contribution. Lepot (idem) developed a basic 
toolkit to characterise the functional parts of lithic tools in order to compare their organisational struc-
ture (cf. Boëda 1997: 107-109; Fig. 48). The examination of a tool-system’s UTF-structure is generally 
based on the morpho-technical character of the modified and non-modified edges, their chronological 
and topological relationships, and their contribution to the total functional design of the system (cf. 
Pagli 2009; Bonilauri 2010; Forestier 2010; Donnart 2010; Lourdeau 2010; Bodin 2011; Chevrier 
2012).  
In contrast to traditional wear studies, UTF-analysis pays primary attention to the potentiali-
ties of tool-use rather than empirically attested tool functions (if any); it explores the functional ‘effica-
cy’ (efficacité) of making tools in particular ways (cf. Lepot 1992/1993: 119). The basic idea is that not 
every edge configuration can serve every possible tool-function (e.g., Lepot 1992/1993: 26-88, Planche 
4-23; Soriano 2000: 119-135, Annexe 2 [411-416]). Specific tool-functions impose specific functional 
requirements on the tool-edges supporting them. One can therefore study the ‘functional morphology’ 
of tool-edges in order to isolate aspects of the original ‘functional intention’ motivating their creation. 
The general conception is that ‘a tool exists only in action’ (sensu Leroi-Gourhan 1964/1965, 1968) and 
is always adapted to a specific tool-aided gesture (cf. Boëda 2013: 46).752 Moreover, a tool-system’s 
past (process of manufacture) can be said to have led to its present (current state of structural organi-
sation), only to point to the tool’s future (possible usage). There is thus an inseparable link between the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
icists’ tend to be much more hostile against ‘Bordian’ and other classic types than ‘contextualists’ (cf. e.g. the recurrent critique 
on ‘typology’ by Boëda). The key difference to ‘mechanistic’ typologies has to do with the ‘synthetic’ nature of types in ‘organi-
cism.’ In opposition to ‘mechanism,’ in which lithic types are also treated ‘integratively,’ ‘organicistic’ types are rendered ‘effec-
tive’ through the specificity of their relationship with organic wholes, their epistemic ‘effectiveness’ only indirectly relies on 
other types/parts. 
750 The reliance on structure-based types is perhaps the main reason why lithic ‘organicists’ do not come to grips with ‘formists,’ 
who base their types on patterns of part-driven forms, often paying exclusive attention to shape-based artefact attributes. 
751 The fact that the progression from more ‘abstract’ to more ‘concrete’ developmental stages is regarded to instantiate itself in a 
myriad of different ways generally reveals how ‘organicism’ interprets the ‘operationalisation’ of general theory. If Simondon 
(1958) provides a general theory of technical becoming, Boëda (1997, 2005, 2013) is concerned with how the categories of this 
theory (relative ‘abstract-ness’ vs. relative ‘concrete-ness’) are to be interpreted in different lithic domains. This application of 
general theoretical categories to object-specific, empirically explorable domains conforms to the ‘operationalisation’ of these 
categories. This may indicate a fundamental difference between ‘organicism’ and ‘mechanism’ since the former – as we have 
seen – seeks to translate general categories into object-specific categories whereas the latter typically translates general catego-
ries into quantifiable and testable categories (these are object-specific only insofar as the tested features and feature-
constellations must of course be measurable). ‘Operationalisation’ is therefore unequally interpreted, reminding us of the strong 
conceptual tension between ‘organicism’ and ‘mechanism.’  
752 The insight that tools are crystallisations of human gestures, again, refers back to Haudricourt (1987) who maintained that 
tools can be defined as adaptations to human gestures (« L'outil est adapté au geste et non inversement »; cit. Haudricourt 
1987: 158). For a similar contention, see Leroi-Gourhan (1968). 
230 
 
production, structure, and function of a lithic tool – a link that can be explored and studied (cf. Nicoud 
2013: 45).  
The functional potential of lithic tools may be analysed on two levels. First, each edge configu-
ration generates its own ‘nexus’ of possible instrumentalisations (if any). Second, each tool-system as a 
whole also creates its ‘nexus’ of possible instrumentalisations (if any), but this ‘nexus’ is determined by 
the meeting point(s) (if any) of all or some of the ‘nexuses’ of its effective functional parts. Differentiat-
ing between these two levels motivates to distinguish between ‘tools’ (outils) and ‘artefacts’ (artefacts) 
for the two may not be identical (e.g., Chevrier 2012: 135-138).753  
Although the distinction between ‘artefacts’ and ‘tools’ is often confused, the basic idea seems 
to be that the former should be regarded as material placeholders for the latter and, depending on the 
tool-system in question, may accommodate either a single ‘tool’ or multiple ‘tools.’ In the latter case, 
each artefact-edge with functional potential may constitute a ‘tool’ of its own – the artefact itself then 
represents a ‘pluri-tool’ (sensu Boëda 2013: 63-64, Fig. 16, 19, 20; cf. Chevrier 2012: 265-275; Fig. 
49). Alternatively, all artefact-edges with functional potential are integrated into a single ‘tool’ – we 
may then speak of ‘mono-tools,’ ‘true tools,’ or proper ‘artefact-tool identities’ (cf. Boëda 2013: 63-64, 
Fig. 17, 18; Nicoud 2013: 48f., Fig. 3B; Fig. 50).754 This strategy is clearly organicistic. The resultant 
categories serve to delineate relatively ‘abstract’ from relatively ‘concrete’ tool-states: ‘pluri-tools’ are 
defined as non-organic entities – the functional ‘nexuses’ of all relevant artefact-edges are difficult to 
coordinate; ‘true tools,’ by contrast, are defined as highly inclusive entities whose functional parts have 
been successfully coordinated – they embody a functional equilibrium of the ‘nexuses’ of their parts.  
The routinely employed distinction between the ‘transformative’ part of a tool-system (partie 
transformative/coupe de CT), its ‘prehensive’ part (partie préhensive/coupe de CP), and its ‘transmis-
sive’ part (partie transmettrice/coupe de CR) (Boëda 1997: 107-110, 2013: 54-55, Fig. 11; cf. Chevrier 
2012: 147; Fig. 51)755 hence establishes a classification of tool-areas based on the coordination (and/or 
non-coordination) of the ‘nexuses’ of all relevant technical elements, especially the edges, of the system 
in question. This classification takes into account that not every potential tool-edge, whether modified 
or unmodified, necessarily serves as a ‘cutting-edge’ in the tool-system. Different edge-treatments may 
signal the differential status of artefact-edges and the artefact-parts they belong to.  
The tripartite differentiation between CTs, CPs, and CRs thus aims to illuminate the ‘function’ 
(fonction) of varying tool-parts in bringing forth the ‘structure’ (structure) and ‘operation’ (fonction-
nement) of a tool-whole. CTs signify the ‘active’ tool-parts (proper cutting-edges), the areas where the 
tool is designed to come into direct physical contact with the worked material; CPs denominate the 
‘passive’ tool-parts (‘false’ cutting-edges) which primarily serve to received and/or absorb the energy of 
utilisation – ‘passive’ parts may also define the ergonomic qualities and the grip characteristics of the 
tool-system; CRs, finally, facilitate the flow and transformation of energy between the ‘active’ and ‘pas-
sive’ tool-parts – their role is ‘mediative.’ Each tool-system may harbour multiple UTFs of each type 
                                                          
753 The distinction between ‘artefacts’ and ‘tools’/’instruments’ is also propagated by Rabardel’s (1995) theory of tool-use. 
754 Nicoud’s (2011, 2013) doctoral research on the evolution of bifacial technology in the Western European Acheulean can be 
cited as an example for the identification of ‘integrated’ and ‘disintegrated’ schemes of tool construction. Nicoud (2011: esp. Fig. 
126) distinguishes between three types of bifacial configuration: (i) ‘false bifaces’ which turn out to be bifacially exploited core-
matrices (galets à enlèvements bifaciaux), (ii) ‘bifacial blanks’ which serve as tool-matrices for future modification (pièces bifa-
ciales supports d’outil(s)), and (iii) ‘true bifaces’ which represent the only truely integrated bifacial tools (pièces bifaciales-outil) 
(cf. Nicoud 2013: 45-51, Fig. 3). Two aspects of this scheme are of particular importance: first, the author shows that some arte-
facts only ‘appear to be’ bifaces, but after close inspection turn out to be bifacially-worked cores – they represent an ‘ineffective’ 
category which has to be (at least partly) explained away; secondly, the distinction between ‘bifacial blanks’ and ‘true bifaces’ is 
based on an analysis of artefact-tool relations from the perspective of the latter’s becoming (sequencing of the manufacturing 
process). The difference between the two is that in case ii the construction of the bifacial volume is independent of (and in fact 
precedes) the construction of active tool-edges, whereas in case iii both are formatively intertwined. While the generated bifacial 
volume of ii – literally a ‘bifacial-blank’ – may support a number of different tool-edges, the construction of the volume in iii 
anticipates the global tool-functionality. The former hence represents a ‘disintegrated’ tool-system, the latter an ‘integrated’ one. 
Noteworthy is especially that technical ‘integration’ and ‘disintegration’ are conceptualised in temporal terms and that the de-
terminative effects of creating either the artefact or the tool(s) are considered. ‘Bifacial blanks’ simply represent an object cate-
gory in which the ‘nexus’ of the artefact is not coordinated with the ‘nexus’ of its future tool-edges – the artefact determines its 
‘tool-ness’ rather loosely. ‘True bifaces,’ by comparison, exhibit a high level of coordination between the ‘nexus’ of the artefact 
and the ‘nexus’ of the future tool(s) – the construction of the artefacts determines the future tool-state fairly well. Nicoud’s 
approach demonstrates that interpretive categories are based on a consideration of how past, present, and future interpenetrate 
each other in within a given technical object. 
755 Lepot (1992/1993) originally proposed a slightly different terminology. He (ibid. : 123) differentiated between « contact 
transformatif » (CT) (‘transformative part’), « contact préhensif de l’outil » (CP) (‘prehensive part’), and « contact réceptif de 
l’énergie » (CR) (‘transmissive part’). 
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(not all types need to be represented though) and each type may be instantiated in a number of differ-
ent ways.756  
The point is that the intentional modification of an edge cannot – by default – be taken to im-
ply its ‘active’ role as primary cutting-edge. Similar types of modification may contribute differently to 
the ‘operation’ of dissimilar tool-system; their function may vary due to disparate structural tool-
configurations (cf. Chevrier 2012: 135f.), reflecting the classic organicistic interpretation of ‘equifinali-
ty’ – that similar forms or partial configurations may be instantiated by varying structural wholes (Fig. 
52). 
The determination of the functional techno-morphology of potential tool edges and non-tool 
edges relies on the meticulous description of retouch types (i.e., marginal, scalariform, denticulated), 
edge morphologies and cross-sections, relationships between the intersecting surfaces creating the 
edges (i.e., plano-convexity, semi-convexity, biconvexity, etc.), and the angulation of edges, including 
the characterisation of edge outline and ‘route’ (Fig. 53). In general, the assessment relies on a lecture 
of the present micro- and macro-detachments and their technical, spatial, and chronological relation-
ships. This approach is firmly rooted in the core principles of chaîne opératoire analysis (cf. Lepot 
1992/1993: 26-88; Bourguignon 1997; Soriano 2000; Nicoud 2011; Rocca 2013), including the recon-
struction and evaluation of schémas diacritiques (cf. Soriano 2000: 119-135, Annexe 2 [411-416]).757 
Analogously to studying the ‘technological morphology’ of lithic artefacts (sensu Tixier 2012 [1978]: 
125-132), the goal is to establish the ‘functional morphology’ of lithic tools and tool-systems (cf. Boëda 
and Hou 2011). 
This ‘functional morphology’ not only seeks to convey the functional potential of particular 
edge-configurations, but also takes into account how these edges are situated in the tool-system, for 
instance whether they possess an opposing ‘non-active’ edge shaped in a different manner, exhibiting a 
natural/artificial back or not.758 Ultimately, all of these relational aspects serve as ‘fragments’ of a func-
tional tool-reality – they need to be resolved in their systemic totality. Each ‘fragment’ is compared to 
its appendant ‘fragments’ in order to evaluate whether or not the respective ‘nexuses’ meet – the pres-
ence of certain tool-functionalities can thus be reconstructed as a successful meeting of ‘nexuses.’ 
Moreover, the resulting configurations of positively resonating ‘nexuses’ of tool-parts provide a base-
line for isolating the ergonomic and energetic affordances a tool-system provides.759 The totality of 
these functional affordances, in turn, can be interpreted to reflect how tool-systems are adapted to 
their utilisation. The functional potentiality of tools and tool-systems is thereby thought to imply a 
crystallised human gesture.760 
In this way, the relative ‘integration’ or ‘disintegration’ of various UTFs and their ‘functional 
pregnancy’ can be taken as a measure for the relative ‘abstract-ness’ or ‘concrete-ness’ of lithic tool-
systems. This, in turn, allows researchers to discuss whether the functional potential of particular tool 
structures has been exhausted or whether there is potential for refinement and optimising change 
(e.g., Nicoud 2011: 400-403, esp. fig. 131; Chevrier 2012: 725-733; Rocca 2013: Chapitre XIII; Moncel 
et al. 2016a, 2016b, 2016c; Fig. 54, 55). The identified tool-structures – interpreted as a functional 
present – are therefore used to project their possible further-developed instantiations into the future. 
                                                          
756 The lack of a major UTF-type may be taken as positive evidence. An example is the apparent lack of an UTF de CP (‘prehen-
sive part’) which may signal that a tool-system was originally hafted, that is, has been part of a more complex super-system 
involving organic elements (cf. Boëda 2013: 73-75). Again, the lack of a particular UTF-type is seen to change the configuration 
of ‘nexuses’ and, as a consequence, to disclose the potentiality for hafting. One may even argue that in order to respect the sys-
tem’s global ‘operation’ (fonctionnement), one has to infer that the tool-system was, in fact, hafted. This would be an argument 
from necessity which depends in its validity entirely on the global articulation of the ‘effective’ tool-parts. 
757 For a discussion of chaîne opératoire analysis and its key operations, see the last part of this chapter. 
758 This holistic interpretation of edge-configurations provides new meaning to long-standing lithic tool concepts such as a 
‘knife.’ It may also shed new light on the question of whether or not particular tool-edges can be said to be more versatile or 
more specialised than others. While some edges, as we have seen, may be not functional at all (i.e., due to their extreme bi-
convexity), some may be ‘razor-like’ (i.e., due to their relatively flat plano-convexity) and some may be ‘saw-like’ (i.e., due to 
their denticulated step retouch). These and other differences pave the ground for new ways of classifying tools and their parts. 
This mode of classification highlights ‘integration’ and the contribution of features to the ‘organic’ functioning of their whole(s). 
759 For an explanation and discussion of the concept of ‘technical affordances,’ see the last part of this chapter. 
760 It should be emphasised that the interpretation of functional potentialities is generally independent from the question of 
whether or not these potentialities have actually been realised by past users or not. UTF-analysis does not necessarily assume 
that these past users have always exploited the full functional potential of their tools. It typically does assume, however, that the 
functional potential of tools is inseparable from how tools had to be conceptualised before they were created. Strictly speaking, 
not even this assumption is necessary since particular tool-manufacturing decisions may lead to unanticipated functional poten-
tials which may drive the long-term evolution of these tools yet not always impact their actual utilisation at a given point in time. 
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Insights on the potentials for refinement and optimising change helps to connect particular tool-
instantiations with other tools succeeding them in time. If no absolute chronology is available, tool-
structures can be ordered in such a way that maximally parsimonious – that is, coherent – technical 
trajectories are retrievable;761 this provides an indirect measure of the relative chronology of different 
tool-instantiations belonging to the same technical trajectory.762 
The second strand of techno-functional inquiry, addressing the issue of the functional integra-
tion of lithic blank production structures in technical evolution, examines the differential treatment of 
core-matrices in order to assess the relative ‘organicity’ of core-reduction processes (cf. Boëda 1997: 
30f., 2013: 89-97). Analogous to the techno-functional analysis of tool-systems, the strategy is to iden-
tify ‘significant’ core-parts and to investigate their changing functional role. In general, the ‘significant’ 
parts of core-reduction systems not only consist of the physical components of exploited core-volumes, 
but may also comprise non-lithic aspects such as knapping techniques and utilised knapping supports 
(i.e., striking tools). For the present purpose, however, it is sufficient to concentrate on aspects of the 
exploited core-volume itself. 
Boëda (1997: 30f., 2013: 89-97) distinguishes between ‘additive’ structures (structures addi-
tionelles) and ‘integrated’ structures (structures integrées) of lithic reduction. The basic question is 
whether an exploited volume is used globally, in which case the entire volume is rendered functional, 
or whether the volume is only used partially, in which case at least one portion of the core-matrix has 
limited functionality in the reduction process.763 The concept of the « volume utile » (‘utilised volume’) 
reflects this logic of reasoning: the ‘utilised volume’ may be identical with the core-matrix or it may 
qualify only a proportion of it.764  
The concept of the « volume utile » may be understood rather narrowly or more inclusively. In 
the first case, the ‘utilised volume’ is defined by the configuration of the reduction surface and its ca-
pacity to yield particular blanks. In the second case, the ‘utilised volume’ not only specifies the poten-
tial volume of primary production, but also includes those parts of the core-matrix that facilitate this 
production – these parts may be constructed and maintained or not.765 Core features such as striking 
platform(s), core flank(s), and/or core back(s) may then be identified as potentially functional or ‘ef-
fective’ elements of reduction systems. 
The logic is similar as in UTF-analysis: some of these elements and parts may play an ‘active’ 
role during volumetric reduction, others a more ‘passive’ or ‘regulatory’ one. When all of these parts 
                                                          
761 This indirect arrangement of tool-systems in time presupposes the ‘synthetic’ understanding of a ‘functional schematic’ (or 
‘technical essence’) which is carried through by the respective technical lineage. Tool-structures which are not included must be 
shown to realise another ‘functional schematic.’ 
762 The approach is ‘integrative’ because the specification of relevant lithic objects is part of the interpretive task. Disentangling 
synchronic technological contexts to extract meaningful diachronic trajectories emerges as a central undertaking in techno-
genetic inquiry. Sampling, therefore, is typically highly selective and rarely takes all lithic objects in an assemblage-context into 
account. What needs to be studied in its entirety is not the lithic assemblage itself but the technical lineage. As a consequence, 
everything that doesn’t belong to the targeted lineage(s) needs to be (at least temporally) explained away. Even sampling strate-
gies, for this reason, cannot be separated from world theory commitments, and it is not surprise that UTF-driven analysis is 
often based on sample sizes that ‘mechanism’ and especially ‘formism’ would regard as insufficient. 
763 This concept can also be applied to tool-system. Tools may then be analysed in order to determine whether the entire tool-
volume is ‘functional’ or whether some parts remain ‘non-functional’ in some specified sense. The conception of the ‘pluri-tool’ 
(see supra), for example, often implies an ‘additive’ tool-structure (cf. Chevrier 2012: 158) – tool-edges are simply added to an 
artefact-matrix and can theoretically be removed at any time without unmaking the entiry tool-system. 
764 Boëda’s (2013: 41) notion of hypertélie (‘hyperdevelopment’/‘overdevelopment’) can be interpreted as the tendency of ‘organ-
ic’ technical evolution to remove unnecessary or redundant elements; reducing hypertélie (sensu Simondon 1958: 50f.) thus 
opens another pathway towards ‘concretisation.’ According to Boëda, the trend to abolish hypertélie in technical evolution leads 
to the well-known phenomenon of miniaturisation, both in lithic core and blank domains. This lithic ‘miniaturisation’ is nothing 
else than the gradual elimination of ‘non-used’ parts of the volume (‘non-utilised volume’) and a more tight spatial/volumetric 
integration of the remaining parts, which ultimately results in increased levels of lithic specialisation. 
765 The inspiration for distinguishing between ‘additive’ and ‘integrated’ reduction structures probably derives from the classic 
Boëdian dichotomy between ‘facial’/‘surface-exploiting’ and ‘volumetric’/‘volume-exploiting’ technologies – ideal-typically 
identified with Levallois reduction and volumetric blade production of Upper Palaeolithic type respectively (cf. Boëda 1990). 
Classic Levallois reduction systems offer a welcome example to illustrate what is at stake when one applies the distinction be-
tween ‘utilised’ and ‘non-utilised’/‘residual’ volume-parts in lithic technological analysis. In the case of the classic tortoise-like 
Levallois core, the constructed hierarchy between the two distinct hemispheres (often asymmetric) creates one part which is 
‘active’ – that is, serves as the volume-matrix to retrieve Levallois blanks during primary production – whereas the other oppos-
ing part remains ‘passive’ – its role is limited to indirect convexity-regulation. However, by serving as the basis for re-preparing 
the perimeter and controlling the striking platform etc., the surface also has an in undeniable role to play in the reduction sys-
tem as a whole. Even though this role is not ‘active’ in the sense that the volume is used for blank extraction or something simi-
lar, it has a well-defined system-level function – it helps to bring forth the desired blanks. This clarification is important if we 
wish to apply Boëda’s (2013: 89-97) interpretive categories: if one defines the idea of the ‘utilised volume’ too narrowly, the 
Levallois core appears to be only partially used; if one defines the concept more inclusively, however, the Levallois core comes 
into view as a globally used volume-body. 
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are integrated – that is, only in concert ensure the overall efficacity (efficacité) of the reduction process 
– and the entire volume can be utilised, one faces a relatively ‘integrated’ reduction structure. Other-
wise, one has identified a lithic reduction structure situated more towards the ‘additive’ end of the 
spectrum of possible structures. Again, each element is considered a ‘fragment’ of a larger technical 
reality and it is through the analysis of each fragment’s potentiality of integration (defined by its ‘nex-
us’) that the relative ‘organicity’ of core-reduction structures can be determined. ‘Additive’ structures 
tend to be ‘abstract’ because the synergetic potential of the parts has not been realised yet. Conversely, 
‘integrated’ structures tend to be ‘concrete’ for the opposite reasons.  
A complete integration of core reduction processes, however, also requires temporal coher-
ence. Boëda (2013: 90-92) introduces the distinction between ‘homotetic’ and ‘non-homotetic’ core 
reduction to address this issue. ‘Homotetic’ core reduction (caractère homotétique) is when the reduc-
tion structure, once installed, can be kept constant during the entirety of the reduction process. ‘Non-
homotetic’ core reduction (caractère non homotétique), by contrast, is when the reduction structure 
has to be re-created or altered at least once during the reduction process. Consequently, lithic reduc-
tion can only develop high levels of inclusivity when a ‘homotetic’ character is assumed since it is only 
then that the temporal organisation of reduction is ‘harmonised’ or ‘synchronised’ with its spatial or-
ganisation.766 
 Boëda’s (2013: 100-174, esp. Fig. 97) six-tiered evolutionary scheme, identifying a general de-
velopmental progression from ‘Type A’ to ‘Type F’ reduction structures, attempts to order core exploi-
tation systems according to these criteria. The scheme epitomises classic organicistic reasoning and 
presents a single technical trajectory thought to incrementally strive towards the ‘organic’ ideal of core 
reduction (see esp. ibid.: 147, 151-174).767 ‘Organicity’ is thereby simply the measure for the relative 
technical coherence between the structural key features of different core exploitation systems outlined 
above. 
 All of this clearly demonstrates that the techno-genetic paradigm is powered by the structural 
categories of organicism and its particular logic of ‘world making.’ This infusion of techno-genetic 
thought with life-oriented metaphors and concepts is not least reflected in a prevailing pre-occupation 
of the lithic discourse with « mémoire oubliée » (‘lost memory’) (e.g., Lepot 1992/1993: 28; Bonilauri 
2010) and « altérité technique » (‘technical otherness’) (e.g. Chevrier 2012: 11, 87; Weyer 2016: 23)768, 
terms which prominently feature in many techno-genetic accounts and play an key role in Boëda’s 
Techno-logique & Technologie (2013). The two conceptions can be interpreted as a refinement of basic 
organicistic categories – i.e., heterogeneity, subjectivity, object-specificity, and alterity – revealing 
some of the larger implications of approaching lithic technology form an organicistic perspective. Both 
concepts are best understood in tandem (ibid.: 42) – as a product of the specific, yet often tacit, an-
thropological agenda of techno-genetic investigations. 
 The techno-genetic approach arguably conveys a radical anthropological impetus. Its techno-
deterministic orientation paves the ground for a radical anthropology of technology. Although this 
assertion initially sounds paradoxical, it turns out to be the logical consequence of how humans and 
lithic technologies are conceptualised. The core idea of techno-genetic reasoning is that technology, in 
                                                          
766 The cardinal example of ‘homotetic’ reduction with elevated levels of ‘organicity’ is Upper Magdalenian blade production of 
the Paris Basin. The often large blade-cores are carefully and extensively prepared, so that their initial appearance mimics a 
bifacially worked piece with biconvex outline. These ‘pre-cores’ are then exploited bidirectionally, by using a rather redundant 
flaking algorithm, alternating serial blade-removals from both striking platforms. The result is the potential to quickly exploit 
almost the entire volume of the cores. The main reason for discarding cores is not their ‘non-functionality,’ but rather their 
incapacity to produce blanks of particular sizes – the residual cores are simply too small to fulfil certain blank-requirements. The 
fact that the cores are not fully exploited is therefore not the result of structural constraints but instead reflects particular human 
selection preferences. The main point, however, is that the core structure, including exploitation strategies, can be kept fairly 
constant during the entire reduction process, once it has been installed by extensive preparation. Moreover, almost all structural 
features of the reduction process support each other in their functionality. For example, tangential soft hammer percussion 
yields en éperon prepared blanks smoothly extending down the exploitation surface while keeping the central surface convexi-
ties rather intact. Additionally, alternating series of blade-removals from two directions introduce an element of ‘auto-
preparation:’ they balance the amount of material removed from both sites and thereby auto-regulate the structure of the pri-
mary extraction-convexities. The dynamics of the system hence establish self-organisational principles – principles which are 
also considered characteristic for living and quasi-living systems. Because many technical elements work together in these and 
similar ways, the total reduction system can be said to be relatively ‘organic.’ 
767 According to Boëda (2013: esp. Fig. 97), ‘Type A’ to ‘D’ represent relatively ‘abstract’ reduction structures, while ‘Type E’ and 
‘F’ exhibit relatively ‘concrete’ reduction structures. 
768 See esp. the research project L’altérité technico-culturelle du continent asiatique durant la préhistoire: peuplement et 
changement culturel (2010-2013) sponsored by the French National Research Agency (ANR) and directed by Hubert Forestier 
and Éric Boëda. 
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contrast to proper living systems, constitutes a semi-autonomous life-form (cf. Chevrier 2012: 100). 
The reason is of course that although technology is capable of self-determining its direction of devel-
opment,769 it always needs to be created, reproduced, and/or maintained – it thus generally depends 
on hominins and their societies to survive. Hominins, however, are also not in full control. Following 
the ‘Early’ Leroi-Gourhan and others, it has to be admitted that these hominins, before anything else, 
live in an ‘internal milieu,’ part of which is the ‘technical milieu,’ and only secondarily, through media-
tion, come into contact with their external (natural/non-technical) milieus (Boëda 2013: 223). As a 
consequence, they can only survive by being receptive to the requirements of their technical surround-
ings and by consulting the latter’s possibilities. 
The resultant conflict between hominins and their technologies creates both leeway and con-
straints for technical evolution – both agencies, although very different in nature, have to be coordi-
nated. Arguably, this is precisely the scenario that is implied when proponents of the techno-genetic 
approach insist on human-technology co-evolution (cf. Boëda 2005: 47, 2013: 22-23, 42). This em-
phasis on the ‘co’ entails a methodological symmetrisation of human and technological domains, re-
casting Homo faber as Homo coordinans (sensu Schick 2018).770  
The specificity of human life, in this view, consists of the fact that it is irreducibly bound to 
self-created technical worlds.771 Humans, as a consequence, cannot escape but have to deal with this 
world and to coordinate their actions with it – different technical worlds thereby imply different pos-
sibilities of coordination.772 Thus, the human comes into view as a being fundamentally defined by its 
technological condition – a situation that Bernard Stiegler (1994 [2009]: 201f., 2003) has character-
ised as the distinctive ‘pharmacological condition’ of humanity.773 
 The organicistic logic of this account is pervasive. First, a distinction is drawn between two 
‘modes of existence’ – one anthropological, the other technological – only to reveal that there is devel-
opmental ‘conflict’ between them. Secondly, it is shown that the conflict can be resolved by finding a 
new synthesis between the two. In order to make the synthesis happen, thirdly, the two conflicting 
parties have to converge their developmental potentials in order to establish a new stable state of rela-
tive symbiosis. This new stable state, realising one or more meeting points of the appendant ‘nexuses,’ 
inevitably forces both parties to change. The conclusion is that change must be understood as an or-
ganic co-evolutionary process.  
If organic co-evolutionary processes are realised by long-term technical trajectories, these tra-
jectories convey human-technology configuration which are specific to them. They can be interpreted 
as a distant voice of past humans and past technologies. Techno-genetic approaches therefore typically 
define themselves in direct opposition to any kind of sociocultural reductionism.774 The critique is pri-
marily voiced against lithic ‘contextualism’ which tends to re-cast each historically situated context as a 
                                                          
769 Audouze (2013: 18), for example, explicitly speaks about technological ‘vitality’ to describe the quasi-autonomy of lithic tech-
nology. 
770 As indicated by the preceding sentence, this ‘symmetrisation’ can only be methodological since humans and technologies 
exhibit different ‘mode of existence.’ They legislate over their respective other in very different ways and potentially at different 
temporal scales. The involved ‘power-relations’ are thus asymmetrical, but it remains difficult to say who is actually ‘in the driv-
er’s seat.’  
771 The subtle but important difference between ‘contextualistic’ and ‘organicistic’ readings of the evolutionary significance of 
human-created worlds is notable here. The former typically emphasise the inextricable enmeshment of humans and their 
worlds, crystallising in the conception of the Maussian l’homme total (see also Appendix II.3), whereas the latter tend to un-
derscore the ontological difference between humans and their artificial material worlds. From an ‘organicistic’ perspective, 
human-created technical worlds may accordingly acquire a status as semi-independent forces in human evolution. 
772 Because this technical world evolves, whether humans want it or not, it provides a resonating resistance to human action, 
creating existential ‘conflict’ and thus also the potential for solving it. Each such solution therefore implies coordination and 
development, sometimes even creativity and innovation (see supra). 
773 According to Stiegler (1994, 2004a), living in a technical world is a double-edged affair: on the one hand, technology is an 
enabling force and allows us to do certain things; this is what we normally refer to as the inherent instrumentality and potential-
ity of technology. On the other hand, however, technology also constrains and/or channels human action and narrows down the 
available options; this is the inevitable techno-deterministic dimension of human technical existence. Stiegler captures this 
duality with his notion pharmakon. Technics, in his view, are always both ‘cure’ and ‘poison’ at the same time, both humanity’s 
potential salvation and its doom and ruin (Stiegler 2010). The technological nature of human existence thus simultaneously 
frees and condemns. For Stiegler (2009 [1994]: 201-202, 2006: 115), this ‘pharmacological condition’ is the sine qua non of 
what it means to be human. 
774 In France, there are currently some efforts underway to re-establish ‘anthropology’ as a separate discipline with its own sub-
ject-matter (e.g., Piette 2010, 2011). These efforts are bound to the recognition that the ‘anthropological’ cannot properly come 
into view if it is reduced to the ‘social’ or ‘cultural.’ In general, this endeavour seeks to define a new (and somewhat radical) 
anthropology, in which anthropological and not merely sociological or ‘culturological’ questions can be investigated – the goal is 
to free anthropology from ‘the tyranny of sociology and ethnology’ (Piette 2017). This approach also stresses the critical object-
specificity of anthropological research (Piette 2016). 
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singularity. Having said this, the critique may also apply to some branches of « Paléohistoire » sensu 
stricto where social evolution is volitionally foregrounded (e.g., Bon 2009, 2015). Taken together, we 
may conclude that the techno-genetic endeavour seeks to establish a proper techno-logical anthropol-
ogy of the deep past – an anthropology where technology has a crucial say. 
 The notions of « mémoire oubliée » (‘lost memory’) and « altérité technique » (‘technical oth-
erness’) bespeak of this anthropological significance of technical lineages. The first concept – « mé-
moire oubliée » – focalises the non-material dimension of co-forged trajectories – the fact that they 
are the product of specific forms of mind-matter interaction, as such storing a particular sociotechnical 
memory.775 Since most technical lineages went extinct long ago and have no connection to the present, 
the memory that they record is ‘lost’ and cannot be retrieved from the technical inscriptions of the 
modern world anymore (Boëda 2013: 226-230).776 The second concept – « altérité technique » – is 
both a consequence and a precondition of the first (ibid.: 42); it reflects the conviction that the specific 
coordinative accomplishments [Koordinationsleistungen] that have incrementally given shape to a 
technical lineage are to be interpreted as a convergence of mind and matter never achieved in this par-
ticular manner again in human evolution. The particular technicality that ‘fossil’ lineages convey there-
fore expresses an irreducible anthropological ‘otherness’ – it provides evidence for alternative human-
ities to have existed in the deep past.  
The study of long-term technical trajectories in the Palaeolithic is hence also the study of how 
we could have been. It opens the gates for a fundamental inquiry into human life itself, with the intent 
to re-map its inherent developmental potentiality.777 In general, it is therefore not surprising that tech-
no-genetic research has paid much attention to disconnected geographic areas (e.g., Boëda and Hou 
2004; Li et al. 2009; Forestier 2010; Forestier et al. 2010; Boëda and Hou 2011; Boëda et al. 2013a, 
2013b, 2014, 2015; Nicoud et al. 2016; Wei et al. 2017; Chevrier et al. 2017). The aim is to identify and 
characterise local evolutionary trajectories and to compare them on a global scale (e.g., Chevrier 2012; 
Moncel et al. 2016a, 2016b, 2016c; Weyer 2016). The focus lies on ‘technical alterity’ in its chronologi-
cal and geographic dimensions. This focus, grosso modo, issues the antithesis to research agendas 
seeking to uncover behavioural modernity in space and time – agendas that are predominantly pur-
sued by Anglophone scholarship. Techno-genetic analysis is interested in technical ‘otherness’ and its 
implications, not in the question of ‘modernity.’ 
To conclude, the techno-genetic paradigm is built on concepts and ideas which are predomi-
nantly organicistic. These concepts not only feed into general theories of evolution, but have left a deep 
mark on the concrete methodologies devised to understand the ‘structure’ of lithic technology them-
selves. This notion of ‘structure’ differs from the signification of the same term in ‘contextualism’: it 
serves a much greater purpose – namely, to reconstruct technical lineages – and is primarily analysed 
                                                          
775 Boëda (2013: 223f.) draws on Stiegler’s (1998, 2004a, 2009 [1994]: 234-236) notion of « épiphylogénèse » (‘epi-phylo-
genesis’) to clarify the nature of ‘lost’ sociotechnical memory. This memory is primarily ‘material,’ but is cultivated and created 
by processes of ‘epi-phylo-genesis.’ The latter describes, as Stiegler points out himself, a fusion of Leroi-Gourhan’s (1964/1965) 
concept of ‘exteriorisation’ and Bergson’s (1896: xi) idea that ‘memory’ forms the natural point of intersection between mind and 
matter (cf. Copleston 1994 [1974]: 190). The core idea is rather simple: the long-term co-evolution of humans and technologies 
nurtures specific bodies of practical and theoretical knowledge in need of being stored outside of biological organisims, that is, 
‘epigenetically.’ Technology itself is a suitable extra-somatic carrier information because of its longevity and its consequential 
ability to bridge past, present, and future. For Bergson (1896: 294), memory is formed in duration and generally yields “a syn-
thesis of the past and the present in view of the future.” Such a synthesis can only be provided by ‘technical lineages,’ which 
thereby come into view as products of ‘epi-phylo-genetic’ evolution. The « mémoire épiphylogénètique » (‘epi-phylo-genetic 
memory’) embodies by varying such lineages is different from Halbwachs’ (1925, 1950) « mémoire sociale » (‘social memory’). It 
primarily concerns inscriptions of practical, cognitive, and technical significance. These are thought to precede the social and 
symbolic inscriptions of the « mémoire sociale ». The externalised memory of technical lineages sheds light on the becoming of 
general constellations of « manières de faire » (‘ways of doing’), « manières de voir » (‘ways of seeing’), and « manières de vivre 
» (‘ways of living’) (sensu Stiegler 2009 [1994]: 145; cf. Boëda 2013: 226-230). 
776 Because the modern world is a product of its own lineage-ecology, extinct – that is, ‘fossil’ – lineages and the knowledge they 
convey cannot be illuminated by drawing on the present. This trail of reasoning implies another forceful critique on universalis-
tic accounts basing their explanatory principles on observations in the present. In the context of lithic research, a prime target of 
this critique is ‘Middle Range’ theorising, practiced both by lithic ‘formists’ and ‘mechanists,’ as well as ‘uniformitarian’ reason-
ing, mainly advocated by ‘mechanists.’  
777 The fact that different ‘technical lineages’ are thought to realise differential facets of the human evolutionary potential shows 
that ‘plasticity’ and ‘elasticity’ are granted only on hyper-evolutionary timescales. Plasticity, for example, consists not in the 
ability to adapt to particular environmental circumstances as optimal as possible, but rather in the capacity to accumulate a 
myriad of different sociotechnical outfits to live in a generally difficult world in a myriad of different ways. Human plasticity, in 
this view, can only properly be studied if divergent long-term trajectories of human-technology co-evolution are compared. Put 
differently, within a given technical lineage plasticity is often critically reduced, yet the juxtaposition of different technical line-
ages reveals that human technicity, on a general level, turns out to be highly plastic indeed. 
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to determine the relative ‘organicity’ and self-regulatory capacity of different technical entities. Tech-
no-genetic research has thereby adopted a view of technical evolution that foregrounds internal ‘or-
ganic’ development and integration – a view inspired by life-theoretical currents of technological and 
cybernetic thought in France. Some of the respective ideas have led to a basic reconsideration of the 
nature of lithic technology and its role in early human evolution.  
An important result of this reconsideration has been the re-cultivation of the classic concept of 
the Homo faber (‘technical man’), placing renewed emphasis on the primacy of human technicity and 
the difficult becoming of coupled ‘anthropo-technical systems.’778 This accentuation of the Homo faber 
is tied to a vision of human evolution inspired more by Bergson than Darwin.779 After all, it was Berg-
son who initially coined the concept of the Homo faber and it is – perhaps unsurprisingly then – Berg-
son who is cited at the very beginning of Boëda’s latest book (2013):  
                                                          
778 See Hussain (2018) for a more detailed discussion on the role of the Homo faber in French lithic research, including the 
significance of ‘technicity’ as a concept. 
779 For Bergson’s critique on Darwinian evolution, see e.g. Miquel (2007). 
“[…] If we could stray ourselves from all pride, if to define our species we would strictly adhere to 
what history and prehistory present to us as the constant characteristic of man and intelligence, 
we would perhaps not say Homo sapiens, but Homo faber instead.” (Bergson 1959 [1907]: 613; 
cited by Boëda [2013: introductory citation] and original emphasis; my translation [the original 
French quote is given in Appendix Q.22]) 
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The comparison of the various lithic approaches adopted by French and Anglophone researchers 
(Chapters 3 to 5) has shown that the two groups draw on fundamentally different cognitive resources. 
Based on Stephen Pepper’s world hypotheses theory, it has been established that much of this results 
from a differential reliance on world theories – that is, theories of a global scope concerned with the 
fundamental constitution of the world (Chapter 2). The fact that divergent strands of French and An-
glophone lithic research are based upon unequal ‘world hypotheses’ has important ramifications for 
“You can disagree without being disagreeable” 
– Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
 
“[…] The point is that we now have, and are likely to continue to have, 
no fully adequate world theory, but a number of alternative rather 
highly adequate world theories, each of which is able to describe or 
interpret any presented fact, criticized or uncriticized, but each of 
which contains some internal ulcer of self-contradiction.” 





the quality and nature of the French-Anglophone divide. On the one hand, it shows that conflicting 
knowledge claims emerging at the French-Anglophone interface (Chapter 1) are likely rooted in the 
‘underdetermination’ of the available evidence through world theories. On the other hand, the success-
ful application of Pepper’s conceptual categories to the French-Anglophone divide clearly suggests that 
the division is about more than a local clash of methods or imperatives of inquiry. Instead, we have to 
come to grips with the circumstance that the divide signifies a global bifurcation of knowledge produc-
tion in lithic research. The three instances of interpretive conflict outlined in Chapter 1 must therefore 
be understood as the consequence of the deployment of substantially different conceptions of worldly 
order and the fabric of reality. 
 On a general level, the present study clearly suggests that French and Anglophone lithic ex-
perts are typically divided by their vision of the primary goals and interests of scientific research: while 
the former tend to conceive of lithic inquiry as a ‘synthetic’ endeavour, the latter define it mainly in 
‘analytic’ terms. The ‘analytic’ conviction considers parts as basic and wholes as the derived features of 
the world; the ’synthetic’ counterpart, conversely, regards wholes as basic and parts as the derived 
features of the world. Chapter 3 has shown that this basic opposition is already reflected in how lithic 
assemblages are prepared, studied, and recorded. Pepper’s ‘analytic’-‘synthetic’ dualism dictates the 
nature of the lithic research enterprise on both sides of the French-Anglophone divide and affects re-
search designs, patterns of inference and argumentation, strategies of visualisation, and the character 
of the interpretive concepts brought to bear. The nature of lithic data and their relationship with the 
realm of theory similarly depend on whether one adopts an ‘analytic’ or a ‘synthetic’ mode of reason-
ing. 
 While the French-Anglophone divide in lithic analysis can be rather consistently described as 
an expression of the basic difficulty to cross the ‘analytic’-‘synthetic’ boundary, the internal diversity of 
French and Anglophone approaches cannot sufficiently be accounted for by invoking its categories. We 
have seen that this internal diversity can be reconstructed as a give and take between ‘dispersive’ and 
‘integrative’ world theories – in the French case by a ‘synthetic’ pair, in the Anglophone case by an 
‘analytic’ pair. As a result, French lithic research tends to be either ‘contextualistic’ or gravitates to-
wards an ‘organicistic’ perception of past realities; Anglophone lithic approaches, contrarily, tend to be 
either ‘formistic’ or to rely on a ‘mechanistic’ conception of worldly affairs. Although this general 
framework may not explain all the facets of internal variability, the successful application of the theo-
ries’ structural categories to the selected case studies (Chapters 4 and 5) suggests that it is at least able 
to capture the main strands of investigation in the two research spheres. The fact that the selection of 
case studies was based on a careful historical survey of French and Anglophone lithic traditions sup-
ports this conclusion (cf. Appendix III.4).  
It can therefore be generally concluded that Pepper’s four-tiered landscape of Western thought 
allows us to capture both how French and Anglophone lithic approaches are externally related and 
how they are internally structured. The first aspect clarifies the nature and the stakes of the French-
Anglophone divide; the second aspect helps to explain why much internal friction persists on either 
side. Much of the originality of the two approach families, accordingly, stems from the fact that their 
‘dispersive’ and ‘integrative’ categories interact in particular ways (or not). The dynamic interplay of 
these categories produces much of the ‘discursive space’ proper to both French and Anglophone lithic 
research. This interplay further elucidates the types of eclecticism regularly encountered in both do-
mains of lithic research. 
Judging from what has been found in Chapters 4 and 5, it seems that the more ‘integrative’ 
strands of each research sphere – ‘organicism’ and ‘mechanism’ respectively – often draw on the sys-
tems of classification and typologisation established by their ‘dispersive’ sparring partners – ‘contextu-
alism’ and ‘formism.’ The reason is that the latter are naturally more concerned with organising the 
totality of the available lithic evidence, to deal with the ‘broadside’ of evidence, and to broaden their 
classificatory schemes. Expanding and proliferating the lithic evidence as well as grouping it is hence 
much more important for these world theories. This tendency, of course, is particularly pronounced in 
‘formism’ which strongly relies on what Pepper names the ‘Theory of Types.’ Yet, the ‘integrative’ 
strands do not draw on these ‘dispersive’ categories uncritically. A typical strategy is to analyse the 
respective categories and to establish their ‘effectiveness’ or ‘ineffectiveness’ in providing focussed 
explanations. This intricate relationship between ‘integrative’ and ‘dispersive’ research orientations is 
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expressed by the ‘mechanistic’ tendency to muster ‘formistic’ types and/or typologies and to analyse 
their causal/functional significance or their formation history. Similarly, it is reflected in the ‘organi-
cistic’ inclination to draw on the ‘contextualistic’ foundations of chaîne opératoire analysis and to re-
arrange the derived categories in order to assess problems of evolutionary becoming. These kinds of 
borrowing may lead to a mixture of world theory orientations, even motivating proper eclecticisms. An 
example is « Paléohistoire » sensu stricto which tends to examine its lithic evidence primarily in ‘con-
textualistic’ fashion, but seeks to interpret the findings according to a logic proper to ‘organicism.’780 
At the same time, the findings of Chapters 4 and 5 appear to suggest that the more ‘dispersive’ 
lithic approaches often import basic ‘integrative’ conclusions to render the relationships, distributions, 
and patterns they detect significant. General ‘integrative’ explanations such as the ‘mechanistic’ insist-
ence on the fact that different lithic types may represent the physical manifestation of different tem-
poral locations on a continuous spectrum of reduction are invoked to enrich ‘dispersive’ accounts 
and/or to illuminate some of their documented data structures. For this reason, ‘integrative’ insights 
easily become role models of explanation for ‘dispersive’ research; they are more readily regarded as 
‘simple’ or even ‘best’ explanations, helping ‘dispersive’ approaches to overcome their difficulties with 
a relatively unconstrained space of interpretation (cf. Appendix II.2). A good example is ‘formism,’ 
which often turns the most potent causal factors identified by ‘mechanism’ into its ‘subsistent’ catego-
ries. This strategy regularly results in a broad discussion of the many potential ‘subsistent’ categories 
furnished by ‘integrative’ research, comparing them to the available lithic data in terms of (dis-
)similarity. 
Generally speaking, we rarely encounter any of the four relatively adequate world theories in 
their ‘pure’ state. This may not be surprising, however, since lithic practitioners are often pragmatic 
about their research781 – research which is not only constrained by cognitive factors.782 Moreover, lith-
ic research – as most other types of scientific investigation – is a rather difficult undertaking, and its 
socio-political context often complicates matters. Another important factor to consider is history. Alt-
hough Palaeolithic archaeology, compared to other fields, has a rather short disciplinary history, its 
research similarly depends on the cumulative efforts of preceding generations of scholars. 
In addition, once established concepts, terms, and/or interpretations are often difficult to 
eliminate and may entrench themselves in the discursive space even if they embody a logic of inquiry 
which is no longer compatible with the latest instalments of research. An example is the role of ‘Bordi-
an’ types in the French scene: they are a vestige of a ‘formistic’ intermezzo in lithic research – the ‘Bor-
dian era’ (sensu Sackett 1991) – but have now become indispensable since they greatly facilitate schol-
arly communication and enable the quick description of morphological tool-variability.783 For these 
and similar reasons, it is more than likely that disciplinary history remains a potent source of eclectic 
tendencies in both lithic research spheres. 
Given these trends for eclectic excesses, the demonstrated capacity of Pepper’s metatheoretical 
framework to explain many, if not all, of the major axes of divergence between French and Anglophone 
lithic practice and to shed new light on the internal organisation of the two should convince even the 
last sceptic that the four relatively adequate world theories are significant for understanding the 
French-Anglophone divide. Although it has to be admitted, as indicated before, that this new perspec-
                                                          
780 On a relative scale, one may say that « Paléohistoire » sensu stricto seems to be characterised by a delicate balance between 
‘contextualism’ and ‘organicism’ whereas the ‘techno-genetic approach’ leans much stronger towards ‘organicism.’ This is for 
instance reflected in Boëda’s (2013) six-tiered scheme of lithic technological evolution (‘Types A to F’), representing a reorgani-
sation of basic ‘contextualistic’ technical entities based on explicit ‘organicistic’ considerations (see Chapter 5). 
781 Taking into account Anglophone lithic research, one cannot help but get the impression that in the more recent past ‘formism’ 
has become the preferred mode of investigation when lithic reports are authored; ‘mechanism,’ by contrast, is the preferred (or 
at least most successful) mode of investigation when peer-review papers are designed and written. This trend of course also 
reflects the particular format of these two types of publication: ‘formism’ for instance, due to its ‘dispersive’ nature, easily sup-
ports large numbers of tables and figures including extended appendices; ‘mechanism’ by contrast provides a ‘focused’ treatment 
of the lithic evidence and is thus much more compatible with high-profile peer-review journals of limited scope. To give an 
example, Dibble and McPherron (2018: xv) explicitly invoke the notion of lithic ‘metadata’ to justify the ‘report mode’ of han-
dling lithic information – they also contrapose this mode of presenting data with lithic data treatment in specialised journals. 
The general pattern, if robust, may indicate another way of conceptualising the cognitive division of labour at the interface be-
tween ‘formism’ and ‘mechanism.’ 
782 Publication-pressure, for example, is an important institutional factor leading to increased output rates. This increased out-
put typically also increases the likelihood and motivation to embrace eclectic tendencies – eclecticism offers a relatively easy 
road to recombining and reinterpreting already available evidence. 
783 The fact that ‘Bordian’ types are, strictly speaking, no longer fully compatible with French technological analysis is also re-
flected in the fact that they are slowly but surely abandoned by the emerging ‘organicistic’ strands of research (see Chapter 5). 
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tive may play down some nuances of the prevailing research variability, the gains clearly outweigh this 
minor disadvantage. The structure of the four world theories not only clarifies why French and Anglo-
phone lithic approaches tend to disagree on all levels of inquiry, it also provides insight into the inter-
nal dynamics that shape them; this, in turn, helps to understand the dominant eclectic tendencies in 
both spheres of inquiry. The world theory perspective balances understanding and complexity – it 
offers a relatively simple explanatory scheme while providing high degrees of insight. 
By invoking some basic concepts from the philosophy of science, one can acknowledge that 
French and Anglophone lithic practitioners adhere to hardly overlapping research ‘paradigms’ (Kuhn 
1996 [1972]), typically pursue diverging ‘research programmes’ (Lakatos 1970, 1977) and take part in 
distinct ‘communities of thought’ (Fleck 1936, 1979 [1935]) promoting dissimilar ‘styles of reasoning’ 
(e.g., Fleck 1979 [1935]; Hacking 1985). The precise relationship between these tokens of lithic re-
search, in turn, appears to be regulated by the cognitive resources supplied through varying world 
theories (Pepper 1935a, 1942). 
In many regards, the argument converges with Perlès’ (2016) recent review of French-
Anglophone relations in lithic scholarship. She concluded that French technologie lithique and Anglo-
phone lithic analysis, geographically divided by two major water bodies (the Atlantic Ocean and the 
English Channel), are currently experiencing the consequences of a “full divorce” of approaches al-
ready initiated in the second half of the last century. The results of the present study are in general 
accordance with this assessment. Yet, it cannot be overemphasised that especially in the French scene 
the full potential of the ‘divorce’ has only taken shape in recent years, with the development of well-
defined ‘organicistic’ research tendencies. From a world theory perspective, it is only consequential 
that ‘synthetic’ modes of lithic inquiry gradually differentiate themselves into somewhat antagonistic 
strands of lithic ‘contextualism’ and lithic ‘organicism.’ I would therefore argue that even though the 
‘divorce’ has undoubtedly ancient roots, it has been completed only relatively recently. 
 Before we can turn to the wider implications of the French-Anglophone divide, it seems useful 
to re-visit a number of old thorny issues, plaguing research in Palaeolithic archaeological for many 
years. This provides the opportunity to demonstrate that the previously developed perspective can 
greatly enhance our understanding of these problems and may help lithic practitioners to better navi-
gate them. 
The recognition of the French-Anglophone divide as a manifestation of the basic conflict between ‘ana-
lytic’ and ‘synthetic’ perspectives in lithic research throws new light on old difficulties. Although I can-
not provide a comprehensive coverage of research issues emerging at the French-Anglophone inter-
face, a few examples can be given to illustrate the benefits of employing Pepper’s world hypotheses 
theory. World theory differences can for instance be invoked to apprehend (i) the long-established 
dissonance between chaîne opératoire analysis and the lithic ‘reduction sequence’ approach, (ii) tacitly 
acknowledged discrepancies in the operationalisation of concepts of ‘evolution’ and ‘adaptation,’ and 
(iii) the often dissimilar employment of dualistic reasoning. The fact that the last point is only rarely 
recognised in lithic scholarship as a source of interpretive tension clearly demonstrates that world 
hypotheses theory cannot only re-construct known issues, but is also capable to identify hitherto un-
recognised conceptual problems. This should be taken as an additional indication for the cognitive 
potency of the theory. The following exposition tries to avoid the introduction of new elements of dis-
cussion and should be understood as a problem-oriented confrontation of some of the key findings of 
Chapters 3 to 5. 
The conflict between French chaîne opératoire research and Anglo-American ‘reduction sequence’ 
approaches has a long history (Bleed 2001; Perlès 2016). Both chaîne opératoire and ‘reduction se-
quence’ analyses embody distinct perceptions of lithic technology, amalgamating aspects of lithic 
method and theory. Even though the two have often been said to focalise similar aspects of research 
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(e.g., Shott 2003, 2007), they differ fundamentally in their epistemological make-up. Drawing on the 
conceptual structure of the French-Anglophone divide established previously, we can clarify some of 
the pending issues and develop a new perspective on the two approaches. 
 The basic difference between the French chaîne opératoire and the Anglophone ‘reduction 
sequence’ is that they are based on a divergent conception of part-whole relations. In chaîne opé-
ratoire analysis, originally developed within a ‘contextualistic’ climate of research (see Chapter 5, first 
part), lithic artefacts are typically identified as parts of a larger technical context (assemblages, tech-
nical systems). This technical context ultimately legislates over the parts and hence determines the 
technological significance of individual lithic artefacts. Chaîne opératoire approaches target the ‘infra-
structure’ – the ‘texture’ – of selected technical contexts and consequently analyse the spatiotemporal 
relationships between individual artefacts in order to delineate or contrast various technical ‘struc-
tures’ and ‘sub-structures’ (i.e., groups of artefacts, reduction modalities/methods). Characterising the 
‘texture’ of a technical context thereby helps grasping the ‘spread’ of its ‘quality.’ The particular config-
uration of lithic ‘infrastructural’ organisation and technical ‘quality’ defines lithic technology. Chaîne 
opératoires are qualitative entities in this particular sense. 
 By contrast, the ‘reduction sequence’ approach typically regards lithic technology as a compo-
sitional whole to be derived without loss from its parts. Parts are identified as lithic artefacts which 
may also be analysed in terms of their compositionality. The consequence is a strong reliance on gener-
ic features and well-defined traits or attributes of individual artefacts – lithic technology is ultimately 
what comes into view as a result of the careful analysis of these lithic ‘parts.’ Through the optic of 
‘mechanistic’ lithic inquiry, reduction sequences are identified as specific ‘fields of locations’ in which 
each effective part – lithic artefacts or their discrete features and traits – occupies an exact position. 
Lithic technology – as a ‘reductive’ process – establishes a spatiotemporal field in which the relations 
of parts determine the nature of the reduction process (see Chapter 4, second part).  
The reconstruction of reduction sequences typically relies on ‘objective’ time measures, upon 
which each part can be localised in the larger ‘field of locations’ (dimensionality and cortex propor-
tions are often primary measures of time). Specific constellations of part-features are thought to indi-
cate different technical operations associated with the progression from core selection to core aban-
donment or tool manufacturing/use. The emphasis, therefore, tends to be on the chronology of reduc-
tion.784 Since parts are considered to act on other parts by means of directed causality, different parts 
may be rendered ‘effective’ explanatory categories by specifying their position in particular transfor-
mational sequences (i.e., lithic types may represent different ‘locations’ on a continuum of lithic reduc-
tion). The classic distinction between ‘pattern’ and ‘process’ thereby regularly leads to the identifica-
tion of lithic patterns as distinct, yet progressive stages within a unified reduction process.785 The point 
is that the underlying process is thought to be recognisable by its correlated pattern, allowing scholars 
to establish relatively stable pattern-process correspondences. The ‘Reduction Thesis’ (e.g., Dibble 
1987; McPherron 1994) is a sensible expression of this general research configuration. 
 ‘Formistic’ approaches tend to regard lithic ‘reduction sequences’ as loosely determined ‘stone 
soups.’786 The structure of lithic technology is described as the relationship between different ‘particu-
lars’ (lithic artefacts) and/or ‘characters’ (artefact features, traits) participating in specific patterns. 
These patterned regularities help practitioners to determine the ‘norms’ and ‘laws’ under which matter 
is transformed into particular forms. Alternatively, different patterns or different configurations of 
patterns come into view as expressions of relevant ‘subsistent’ categories (e.g., ‘population,’ ‘social 
transmission,’ ‘cognition,’ ‘tradition,’ ‘cultural adaptation,’ etc.). The basic contention is hylomorphic – 
that is, different technical actions are thought to bring forth matter in varying forms. This is why form-
                                                          
784 When ‘mechanistic’ approaches discuss the relationship between chaîne opératoire and ‘reduction sequence’ they tend to 
reduce the former to a format only compatible with the latter, namely that reduction primarily consists of a directed succession 
of knapping behaviours starting with the anticipation of a need (raw material selection) and terminating with the satisfaction of 
a need (core discard, tool use, etc.). This vision foregrounds the chronological coordinate of lithic reduction and tends to mar-
ginalise the spatial (‘geographic,’ ‘volumetric’) aspects of the latter. 
785 Cf. “[…] It is important to note here that the use of the word “stage” in the context of the reduction strategy does not imply 
that these stages were somehow recognized by the makers of these artifacts. The word stage is substituted for the word type only 
to emphasize the connection between them and the idea of a single process. Still, the stages, like the types, are completely arbi-
trary constructs, and there is absolutely no intention to argue that these stages correspond to actual stages that may have been 
recognized by the makers of the artifacts (cf. Newcomer 1971). They are simply a heuristic device and no more.” (McPherron 
1994: 39) 
786 The term ‘stone soup’ is not my invention but can for example be found in Tostevin (2012). 
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based classification and typologisation are so central for approaching lithic reduction sequences in 
‘formism.’ Relevant forms are either identified with specific patterns or with distinct artefact 
types/classes. The determination of signature patterns characterising specific reduction sequences 
remains typical for this approach.787 As in ‘mechanistic’ research, lithic analysis is largely a part-centric 
endeavour. In total, ‘formistic’ perspectives on reduction sequences seem to foster descriptive concep-
tions of lithic technology. 
 This reconstruction not only shows that the term ‘reduction sequence’ conceals much internal 
variability, but also substantiates the claim that chaîne opératoire research is grounded in a ‘synthetic’ 
interpretation of lithic technology, while reduction sequence approaches derive and handle lithic data 
‘analytically.’ Another important benefit of recasting the lasting schism between the two approaches in 
‘Pepperian’ terms is that we can now understand why the two struggle so much with finding a basic 
consensus about the nature of lithic reduction. The various examples presented in Chapter 1 make it 
amply clear that a key source of conflict is the debate on ‘discrete’ vs. ‘continuous’ reduction. We have 
seen that Anglophone scholars strongly gravitate towards a ‘continuous’ conception of knapping be-
haviours, whereas French lithic experts actively embrace ‘stage-based’ perceptions of the same. In-
deed, key aspects of the documented interpretive polarities appear to be a product of the thorny di-
chotomy between ‘discrete’ and ‘continuous’ processes of lithic reduction.  
Based on what has been concluded before, it can be argued that this dichotomy seems to be a 
consequence of the intrinsic constitution of the various world theories at work. ‘Contextualistic’ and 
‘organicistic’ approaches to lithic technology both exhibit a strong disposition for advancing a ‘discrete’ 
vision of technological organisation, but for different reasons. The optic provided by lithic ‘contextual-
ism’ enables the exposition of situated artefact relations and their arrangement into sub-units of tech-
nical wholes; this sorting of inter-artefact relations by means of delineating technical structures and 
their sub-structures greatly motivates a ‘discrete’ reading of chaînes opératoires. Technical wholes 
come into view as a ‘fusion’ of various technical ‘sub-contexts’ succeeding each other in time. These 
‘sub-contexts’ are endowed with ‘novelty’ and necessarily bring ‘change’ – the temporal axis of the 
‘infrastructure’ of technology appears to be textured.  
In the eyes of ‘organicism,’ the ‘discrete’ character of lithic technology is even more aggravated. 
The ’organicistic’ categories uniquely stress the discontinuous continuity of temporally extended re-
duction structures (see Chapter 5, second part). Lithic reduction, as a ‘concealed’ organic process, is 
conceptualised as a step-wise movement of parts towards the fulfilment of their structural ‘ideal’ – the 
temporal ‘integration’ of lithic reduction structures is mediated by distinct ‘stages.’ 
‘Formism’ and ‘mechansim,’ in comparison, tend to motivate ‘continuum’ approaches to lithic 
reduction. This is already foreshadowed by the fact that both enterprises are mainly guided by the 
question of how lithic parts produce their whole(s) rather than how these parts serve their whole(s). 
‘Mechanistic’ approaches, moreover, conceptualise reduction sequences as ‘fields of locations’ imply-
ing that each part – typically a lithic artefact – holds a single spatiotemporal position which, in turn, 
forbids other parts to occupy the same location. Since lithic technology inaugurates its own ‘field of 
locations’ and since each lithic artefact fills a particular spot on the field somewhere between the be-
ginning and the end of the reduction ‘stream,’788 the result is a continuous stringing together of differ-
ent lithic artefacts in time. Most lithic ‘mechanists’ are also nominalists who, incentivised by mustering 
primarily quantitative data, generally reject what they consider ‘essentialised’ categories (e.g., Shott 
2010; Shea 2014) and believe that there are only tendencies in the world which can be abstracted at 
best (cf. Chazan 1997: 720; Marwick 2008a). 
In ‘formism,’ the rejection of ‘stage-based’ views of lithic technology may be even more funda-
mental. In the extreme, ‘formistic’ interpretations recognise only ‘subsistent’ categories or exemplified 
‘laws,’ ‘norms,’ and/or ‘regularities’ as ‘discrete’ features of reality – the realm of ‘existence,’ by con-
trast, cannot be ‘discrete’ in the same sense. Items of ‘existence’ are always mere realisations of origi-
nal ‘discrete-ness’ – the objects of ‘existence’ generate a spectrum of forms, by definition variations of 
common themes (Chapter 4, first part). This entails a basic inclination to examine lithic reality in its 
                                                          
787 Tostevin’s (2000, 2012) analysis of ‘knapping domains’ is a good example for a ‘formistic’ approach to lithic reduction se-
quences. The author seeks to derive and compare different signature patterns from different lithic assemblages. Each ‘knapping 
domain’ is defined by a specific constellation of lithic parts. By combining all ‘domains’ one can reconstruct the ‘stone soup’ 
corresponding to an assemblage and confront it with other ‘soups.’ 
788 The term ‘reduction stream’ is for example used by Henry (1989b; cf. second part of Chapter 4). 
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proliferated but continuous constitution.789 Although artefact-types participating in the same patterns 
may of course be interpreted as exemplifications of particular reduction phases, but these phases 
would remain generic and somewhat fixed;790 they would express the ‘subsistent’ phasing of all lithic 
technologies of a similar type.791 In addition, if the respective patterns are constructed based on a tacit 
‘theory of sets,’ there is by definition substantial overlap and hence much continuity in reduction pro-
cesses.792 
For all of these reasons, Anglophone ‘analytic’ lithic research trends towards ‘continuum’ con-
ceptions of lithic reduction (e.g., Baumler 1987; Henry 1989b, 1995; Rolland and Dibble 1990; Dibble 
1995; Shott 2007, 2017; Scott 2011; Shott et al. 2011; White and Pettitt 2012: 272), whereas French 
‘synthetic’ inquiry typically heralds ‘stage’ conceptions (e.g., Geneste 1985; Boëda 1986, 1988; Bour-
guignon et al. 2004). The crucial lesson is that the dichotomy between ‘discrete’ vs. ‘continuous’ is 
difficult to place on neutral grounds – lithic scholars rarely come up with convincing means to evaluate 
the alternative to their preferred view. Whether practitioners accept the ‘continuum’ conception or the 
‘stage’ view of lithic reduction seems to depend primarily on the conceptual resources and the types of 
lithic data they can deploy. Lithic ‘contextualists’ would in fact challenge the entire discussion because 
for them the nature of lithic reduction is not a question of natural laws or other universal regularities, 
but simply depends on the technical context itself – some technologies may be more ‘stage-like,’ others 
may support ‘continuous’ reduction. 
This raises the classic issue whether all questions are productive questions. The clash between 
proponents of ‘continuum’ approaches and advocates of ‘stage’ approaches at least seems to show that 
the answer must be negative. Until an approach is found rendering both contending positions poten-
tially ‘true,’ the debate remains a ‘no-debate.’ Arguments to support or dismiss either position, as it 
seems, currently depend strongly, if not entirely, on the conceptual structure of the adopted world 
theories. 
The general point that emerges from this discussion is that some lithic debates may be point-
less. The more fundamental the debate the more likely this seems to be the case. Critical practice in 
lithic analysis, as I have outlined in Chapter 1, would require to pay more attention to potential ‘no-
debates’ and the pitfalls of overestimating one’s own conceptual resources. Coordination between 
world theories on the discursive level can thus only be successful if both the potentials and limits of 
diverging conceptual repertoires are taken into consideration – an aspect we will return to again later 
in this chapter. For now, it is sufficient to note that some lithic debates, especially the emotionally 
charged, may simply reproduce irreconcilable differences in how one can understand the nature of 
reality (and technology) more generally. The challenge, therefore, is not to resolve these issues, but 
rather to initiate debates that promise to be more productive. ‘Pepperian’ world hypotheses theory is 
clearly able to offer guidance in this difficult project. 
‘Evolution’ and ‘adaptation’ represent key interpretive concepts for many lithic scholars, especially for 
Anglophone researchers who tend to rely more explicitly on evolutionary theory. Chapter 4 and 5 have 
shown that even though similar terms may be applied in French and Anglophone lithic research in this 
context, the underlying conceptions often greatly differ. Some of these differences echo the structural 
polarities retraced in the previous section. This has a positive and a negative side: positive is that it 
                                                          
789 See for instance the case of Lycett (2009, 2010) and Archer et al. (2015, 2016) discussed in the first part of Chapter 4. 
790 A recent example showing the difficulties of mass-analytical methods to detect and characterise ‘discrete lithic reduction 
trajectories’ is provided by Scerri et al. (2016). Although their study intends to show that ‘discrete’ knapping modalities can be 
quantified and detected by multivariate statistical analysis of selected artefact attributes, the results actually support a more 
sceptical conclusion. First of all, it is shown that not all methods thought to be reliable actually turn out to be equally effective in 
discriminating between different knapping modalities determined by physical refitting prior to the analysis – different techno-
logical modalities may in fact be detectable by different methods; secondly, the paper re-emphasises the basic difficulty to de-
termine the correct combination of attributes in order to effectively discriminate knapping modes before one already knows 
which flake belongs to which mode. In the end, multivariate statistical tests may thus support assertions of ‘discrete’ technical 
entities after they have been established by other means, but their ability to inductively infer them remains generally limited. 
791 A generic conception of technological phasing is also reflected in the common characterisation of ‘reduction sequences’ as the 
succession of predefined steps of lithic reduction such as ‘raw material acquisition,’ ‘preparation,’ ‘primary production,’ and 
‘discard’/’tool use,’ corresponding to particular technical behaviours. 
792 Cf. Conard et al. (2004); see Chapter 4. 
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reveals the redundant nature of the structural differences, further corroborating their significance; 
negative is that structural redundancy paves the way for a certain monotony of analysis and argument. 
This monotony, however, only points to the stability of some basic patterns of reasoning, stressing 
their importance in the production of lithic knowledge. 
From a ‘formistic’ point of view, ‘evolution’ revolves around lithic parts and consists of the se-
lection and recombination of these parts through time. Lithic evolution is a chronological pattern of 
assemblage signatures; evolution, in other words, is when the aggregated part-signatures of a given set 
of lithic assemblages participate in a well-defined long-term pattern (cf. Chapter 3). Whether the pat-
tern is intact or whether it is violated and, if so, at which point of the sequence is typically determined 
by similarity measurements. The observable evolution of technology is thought to be the product of 
some constant ‘subsistent’ category, for example social transmission, population, demography, hom-
inin species, geography, behaviour, or cognition. Detectable ruptures in a chronological sequence of 
technological signatures can then be identified with changes in the otherwise constant ‘subsistent’ 
categories.  
A first example is Grahame Clark’s (1969) seminal pattern of five technological modes (‘Mode 
1-5’) – recently revised into a ‘Mode A-I’ scheme (Shea 2013b) – that has inspired lithic scholars since 
its inception to propose various ‘subsistent’ categories in order to explain it.793 Foley’s (1987) attempt 
to correlate technological modes with hominin species, Mithen’s (1996) proposal of cognitive evolu-
tion, and, lately, Shea’s (2017a, 2017b) suggestion of evolving lithic tool dependency (‘occasional’ > 
‘obligatory’ > ‘habitual’) represent some of the better known expressions of this research orientation.  
A second example is Gilbert Tostevin’s (2000, 2012) comparative lithic research of the Middle-
to-Upper Palaeolithic transition in Central Europe and the Levant (Chapters 1 and 3). The decisive 
point is that the author analyses his lithic data in terms of a ‘generational stream of social transmis-
sion,’ comparing distinct lithic assemblage-signatures in order to determine whether there was conti-
nuity or discontinuity in learnt knapping behaviours. The three basic hypotheses he is testing against 
the lithic data (‘Innovation,’ ‘Diffusion,’ ‘Combination’) are refinements of the similarity/dissimilarity 
criterion specified before. 
‘Adaptation’ in ‘formistic’ lithic research is broadly defined as the co-variation between envi-
ronmental and lithic patterning – some lithic ‘characters,’ in other words, have to consistently partici-
pate in certain environmental patterns. For this reason, adaptation is often contrasted with ‘history’ 
since the latter implies continuity in the stream of lithic evolutionary developments (verticality), 
whereas the former introduces a discontinuous element (horizontality) – the constant stream of lithic 
signatures is altered by an external force. Lithic research tends to be guided by a general interest in the 
‘normality’ and ‘abnormality’ of lithic developments. Adaptation may also be considered a potent ‘sub-
sistent’ category, enabling scholars to explain patterned differences among lithic parts. As a ‘subsist-
ent’ category, adaptation plays an important role especially in comparative lithic research, when differ-
ent environmental settings are juxtaposed in order to assess possible effects on lithic assemblage com-
positions. 
The ‘mechanistic’ perspective on lithic evolution is typically ‘Neo-Darwinian’ and draws on 
various bodies of theory that have emerged in recent years under its umbrella (cf. Kuhn 2004a; 
Goodale and Andrefsky 2015; see Chapter 4, second part).794 The main concern is to specify causal 
principles or constraints that shape lithic technological make-ups on evolutionary time scales. Evolu-
tion is defined as a bundle of underlying processes producing largely predictable patterns in lithic 
parts. ‘Mechanistic’ approaches therefore tend to author ‘hard ecology’ accounts of lithic evolution, 
identifying mechanisms such as ‘selection,’ ‘adaptation,’ and/or ‘time budgeting’/’risk’ as primary driv-
ing forces of lithic development.  
Adaptation is conceptualised as a set of strategies to cope with particular external conditions 
(e.g., Bousman 1993; Kuhn 1995). This approach seeks to deduce lithic consequences from an invento-
ry of possible behavioural strategies and to relate them to the prevailing external conditions, either in 
the environmental or some other non-lithic domain. Lithic technology is typically analysed as a ‘de-
rived’ phenomenon brought into existence by the more basic segments of past cultural systems such as 
                                                          
793 See Chapter 3 for other ‘formistic’ modalities of hierarchical artefact-classification. 
794 For a basic overview of concepts and approaches of evolution in archaeology, see Shennan (2008). 
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‘mobility/settlement’ or ‘subsistence.’795 The direction of adaptation – that is, what must be adapted to 
what – is largely preconceived and follows the ‘chain of determination’ that holds together reality. The 
‘effective’ features of lithic assemblages are shown to represent adaptations to specific mobility and/or 
hunting strategies which, in turn, are argued to represent ecological adaptations themselves. Although 
lithic adaptations are thus often regarded to be mediated by some society-internal features, these fea-
tures are usually reconstructed as a product of ‘cultural ecology’ (e.g., Binford 1962, 1972; Butzer 1971; 
Jochim 1998) or, alternatively, ‘behavioural ecology’ (e.g., Winterhalder and Smith 2000; Shea 2011b; 
McCall 2015). These perspectives tend to presume a great deal of ‘adaptive plasticity,’ allowing lithic 
technology to rapidly respond to new external challenges (cf. Plummer 2004; Barker et al. 2007: 259; 
Braun 2013: 342; Roberts et al. 2016: 314; see also Chapter 4, second part).796 
‘Contextualistic’ lithic evolution is typically characterised by a chain of rather abrupt transi-
tions between different technical contexts; each technical context (‘period,’ ‘civilisation,’ etc.) is succes-
sively re-organised to constitute a qualitatively novel context. Evolution is the recognition that some 
technical contexts can no longer be maintained – change is based on the simple fact that the temporal 
‘spread’ of a context is restricted. The upshot is a tendency to picture evolution as a rather loose suc-
cession of distinct technical contexts in time. The passage from one context to the next corresponds to 
a fundamental shift in lithic technological organisation – lithic evolution is defined as the advance-
ment from one « logique technique » (‘technical logic’) to the next. Since ‘contextualistic’ research, as a 
consequence, often advocates a discontinuous picture of the lithic past, the term ‘evolution’ may be 
replaced by concepts of ‘historicity.’ Evolution, one might say, is ultimately identified as a process that 
cultivates developmental contingency rather than necessity. 
An instructive application of this logic of evolution is Renard and Ducasse’s (2015) examina-
tion of the Solutrean-Badegoulian transition in Southwestern France (Chapter 5). The authors identify 
the Solutrean-Badegoulian succession with a total reconfiguration of human behaviour, technical or 
otherwise, affecting all aspects of past social life. They argue that the l’homme total (‘total man’) of the 
Developed Solutrean was fundamentally different from the l’homme total of the Early Badegoulian. 
‘Adaptation,’ in ‘contextualistic’ inquiry, comes into focus as a context-dependent process. 
Adaptive context-dependency implies a minimally tripolar relationship between lithic technology, the 
‘technical milieu,’ and natural environment(s). As a consequence, technological adaptation is seen as 
necessarily mediated by its ‘technical milieu.’ The latter forms the primary society-internal environ-
ment for technological existence, legislating over the possibilities of technical change with regard to 
external natural environments. This is the ‘contextualistic’ interpretation of what I have characterised 
as the ‘not-everything-goes’ stance in French lithic research. The implication is that ‘technical milieus’ 
effectively impose strong constraints on the ‘malleability’ of technical systems.  
Moreover, since both the ‘quality’ and ‘novelty’ of a technical context result from the specific 
constellations of material and social resources as well as the dominant regimes of practical (savoir-
faire) and conceptual knowledge (connaissance), adaptive lithic behaviour signifies the ability to mus-
ter these available resources to a society’s advantage. It does not always or necessarily imply to adapt 
‘optimally’ to any given circumstances insofar as optimality is defined simply in absolute or objective 
terms. Instead, technological adaptations are at best ‘optimal’ solutions in light of the available materi-
al and immaterial ‘capital’ (sensu Bourdieu 1979). Adaptation therefore depends on the capacity of a 
                                                          
795 Even though influential Anglophone scholars such as Lewis Binford (1962, 1972) and David Clarke (1968) repeatedly at-
tempted to establish a system-theoretical fundament of lithic analysis, their conceptions of ‘systems’ differ greatly from its coun-
terpart in French lithic research. The main discrepancy between the two is that ‘processual’ system theories emphasise the ex-
ternal relatedness of system elements (i.e., ‘sub-systems’), while French system thinking, inspired by cybernetics and general 
systems theory (sensu von Bertalanffy 1973), concentrates on the internal workings of particular bounded system elements (e.g., 
‘technical systems’). Relating these working system elements to one another is merely of secondary importance. Binford’s theory 
of cultural systems, by contrast, was explicitly motivated by Julien Steward’s (1937, 1955, 1968) theory of cultural ecology, in 
which cultural systems are analysed in terms of their functional relationships with environmental systems (cf. Flannery 1968). 
Whether the environment can be identified as a part of the same systemic whole as human society remains an open question for 
many French scholars and is typically seen with scepticism. Since French research rests on a ‘synthetic’ footing and the identifi-
cation of wholes therefore precedes the specification of part-significances, the exclusion of the natural environment from the 
primary systemic context of human society weighs heavy. 
796 An interesting case in point is Roberts’ (2016) notion of technological ‘metaplasticitiy,’ borrowed from Malafouris (2010) 
‘material engagement theory.’  The author, opposing the dominant ‘behavioural modernity’ narrative, argues that human cogni-
tion is exceptionally plastic and therefore able to deal with all sorts of environmental conditions. This trail of reasoning leads 
Roberts (2016: 11f., 15-17) to conclude that material culture, including lithic technology, is highly sensitive to its ecological fram-
ing, re-casting ‘metaplasticity’ in terms of environmental tethering. The result is a reversal of the arrow of determination from 
cognition to environment but the link between the two remains foundational. 
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‘technical milieu’ to innovate – ‘adaptation’ and ‘innovation’ are not necessarily antagonistic concepts 
as in ‘mechanism.’797 Technical adaptation, strictly speaking, is conceived of primarily as an inward 
directed procedure – a conception also reflected in the tenet that ‘a tool is primarily adapted to its ges-
ture or mode of action’ and only secondarily to its function (Leroi-Gourhan 1968; Haudricourt 1987). 
From the vantage point of ‘organicism,’ lithic evolution is a directed, irreversible process 
through which the technical ‘ideal’ of a whole becomes manifest in step-wise fashion. Evolution hap-
pens because inconsistencies and conflicts between lithic parts have to be resolved by long-term organ-
ic processes; evolution happens until each part has been fully integrated into its associated structural 
whole. As shown in the second part of Chapter 5, lithic ‘organicism’ advertises a conception of evolu-
tion in which ‘creativity’ and developmental ‘potentiality’ are put centre stage. Although evolution is 
regarded as a determinative process, the nature of determination can only be diagnosed in retrospect, 
after having analysed and understood the becoming of a ‘significant’ whole. Radical evolutionary con-
tinuity is opposed and imperfectability and disharmony are stressed; evolution is pictured as a com-
plex attempt to find new ways of coordinating old lithic parts to create something new; evolutionary 
continuity is guaranteed only insofar as each substantial evolutionary novelty inaugurates a new de-
velopmental ‘stage’ which is determined by its preceding ‘stage’ and coevally determines its succeeding 
‘stage.’  
The result is a tendency to recognise multiple temporalities of change and object-specific pat-
terns of evolutionary becoming (see Chapter 5, second part). This configuration either leads to the 
reconstruction of lithic evolution sui generis – as a ‘quasi-living’ force in its own right, potentially pro-
pelled by domain-specific principles of development and change – or the identification of lithic trajec-
tories as active participants in a ‘civilising process’ (sensu Elias 1969 [1939]). Lithic evolution, in this 
latter view, is a part of the social evolutionary struggle to cultivate and maintain human « civilisa-
tions ». This process focalises the evolutionary fact of ‘society-in-the-making’ and pays primary atten-
tion to the at times conflict-driven articulation of sociogenesis, psychogenesis, and technogenesis.798 
A good example of scrutinising creative lithic evolution sui generis is Boëda’s (1997, 2005, 
2013) inquiry into ‘technical lineages’ (lignées techniques) of the earlier part of the European and Near 
Eastern Palaeolithic (Chapter 5, second part). The author identifies a number of distinct ‘families’ of 
technical objects (i.e. façonnage or débtiage systems), discusses the technical ‘status’ of particular 
lithic objects (i.e. their relative ‘staging’), and arranges these objects in an evolutionary sequence based 
on their degree of internal, structural integration. The evolutionary history of different regions is final-
ly pictured as an alternation of distinct technical trajectories. 
‘Adaptation’ in lithic ‘organicism’ is mainly conceptualised as self-adaptation. There are two 
complementary reasons for this: first, processes of technical evolution are likely to generate new prob-
lems while they try to find pathways of integration; the result is the ever-lurking possibility of unantic-
ipated and ‘homemade’ obstacles of development. In the long-run, technical evolution consequently 
has to adapt to its own past doings and thus tends to produce technical means which not only solve 
but also generate problems. Secondly, the evolutionary becoming of extended technical wholes – their 
structural ‘integration’ – requires the coordination of lithic parts and the optimisation of part-
interactions. This is another way of saying that all parts need to adapt to their specific part-
environment in order to realise ‘organic’ wholes. Technological evolution is defined as a process of 
‘auto-correlation’ or ‘self-adaptation.’ At the extreme, ‘organicistic’ concepts of adaptation may thus be 
completely self-referential, and no external entity is required to justify them. Adaptation – including 
                                                          
797 The ‘contextualistic‘ point is that they may or may not depend on each other and whether they do or not in turn depends on 
the larger context at hand. The relationship between ‘innovation’ and ‘adaptation’ therefore primarily poses an empirical prob-
lem, not so much a theoretical one. This logic of reasoning is relational and captures the regulative idea of context-dependency. 
798 According to Norbert Elias (1969 [1939]), ‘civilising processes’ consist of the continuous generation of social relations result-
ing in particular figurations of social agents (i.e. extended social networks). This ongoing process of social efforts is called socio-
genesis (cf. Law 2015: 278). For Elias, the process of social becoming balances compulsion and human agency and thereby 
reflects the creative yet determinative nature of social evolution so characteristic for ‘organicistic’ conceptions. Each process of 
sociogenesis, according to Elias, is inextricably bound to a process of psychogenesis since socialisation has inevitable psycholog-
ical implications – psychogenesis means the development of a ‘second-nature habitus’ (idem). This evolutionary coupling of 
social and psychological aptitudes mirrors the holistic conception of evolution underpinning the concept of ‘civilisation.’ Even 
though Elias himself did not elaborate on this issue, with him we can further assert that sociogenesis is not only bound to a 
process of psychogenesis but also makes room for a particular technogenesis – it is the evolutionary concert of all three fields of 
becoming that ultimately characterises a specific ‘civilising process.’ 
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aspects of ‘adaptive efficiency’/‘optimality’ – may hence be conceptualised as a purely domestic pro-
cess. 
Alternatively, if lithic evolution is considered an active participant of an all-encompassing ‘civi-
lising process,’ adaptation consists of a constant negotiation of relationships between psycho-socio-
technical realities and their natural environments. The link between environment and technology, 
again, is indirect – it is always mediated by the social and psychological peculiarities of the ‘internal 
milieu’ created by the ‘civilising process’ (Chapter 5, second part). Natural environments merely oper-
ate “on the bark” of a society (Bon 2009: 243). In this view, the concept of technological adaptation, if 
used at all, mainly calls attention to the ‘catalytic’ nature of environmental impacts on evolutionary 
time scales. Natural environments act as catalysts of transformation rather than as ‘stimulants’ of the 
same. The specificity of a ‘catalyst’ is its largely ‘passive’ behaviour until some context-specific circum-
stances occur that initiate its activity (cf. Morsink 2018).799 This tacit ‘catalytic’ conception of the role 
of the natural environment in human sociotechnical evolution elucidates that adaptation in lithic ‘or-
ganicism’ is typically defined by the dialectic co-adjustment of technology and ecology by means of an 
extended temporal process.800 
Because ‘organicism’ generally emphasises evolutionary possibilities and creative coups de 
theatre, technological adaptation may even be considered an overly banal concept, bearing little ex-
planatory significance. Since lithic technology is generally regarded to be ‘pregnant with possibilities,’ 
it is by definition rich in functionality – even if this potential is not always realised. The ‘functional 
richness’ of technical systems complicates attempts to establish one-to-one relationships between par-
ticular technical functions and specific environmental requirements. There is always an entire spec-
trum of varying ecological conditions under which a given technology may perform exceptionally 
well.801 Most lithic technologies appear to be ‘adaptive’ for this reason alone – scrutinising technologi-
cal adaptations, in turn, becomes almost redundant from this perspective. 
Altogether, this synoptic confrontation of prevailing interpretations of ‘evolution’ and ‘adapta-
tion’ demonstrates that French and Anglophone concepts mirror their world theory affiliation. The 
recapitulation also shows that similar terms do not need to reflect the same concepts and that similar 
concepts may play a different role in different cognitive environments. These differences – sometimes 
subtle, sometimes more substantial – are key sources of miscommunication and interpretive conflict. 
They illustrate what has come to define the French-Anglophone divide in lithic studies. As the synthe-
sis has further demonstrated, the structural categories of the four world theories – ‘formism,’ ‘mecha-
nism,’ ‘contextualism,’ and ‘organicism’ – can considerably clarify the nature of the observable dis-
crepancies, affirming their significance for understanding the bigger picture of the French-Anglophone 
divide. 
Finally, the identified differences also help to trace some of the internal fault lines characteris-
ing both research constellations. In the French scene, diverging conceptions of ‘evolution’ seem to 
animate the lasting tension between ‘neo-catastrophic’ or ‘punctuated’ perspectives on long-term lithic 
developments on the one hand (‘contextualism’), and ‘transformational-genetic’ perspectives on the 
other (‘organicism’). Within the latter, we can observe a continuing struggle about the relative primacy 
of societal (Bon 2009, 2015; Valentin 2008) and technological (Boëda 2005, 2013) regimes of evolu-
tion. In Anglophone lithic research, differential understandings of ‘evolution’ and ‘adaptation’ are per-
                                                          
799 Bon (2009: 243) explicitly characterises the natural environmental context of human social evolution as a “passive” factor of 
change (cf. Appendix Q. 4). This conception becomes only understandable, I believe, if we introduce the idea that natural 
environment are ‘catalysts’ of social evolution rather than its protagonist. 
800 The metaphor of the ‘catalyst’ in human-environment relations is insightfully discussed by Morsink (2018). The ‘catalytic’ 
view acknowledges the inductive power of environments to influence the course of human evolution but avoids an eco-
deterministic conception. According to Morsink (idem) ‘[a] catalyser is an integral part of the process of transformation; it facili-
tates and accelerates courses of change without being changed itself.’ A key point is that the function or role of a ‘catalyser’ is 
never fixed but remains strongly determined by its context. A ‘catalyser’ therefore manipulates directionalities of change without 
being fully responsible for the initiated direction of evolutionary processes. From this perspective, the contribution of the natu-
ral environment tends to be subtle and less obvious than often considered. 
801 Moreover, the functional potential of lithic technology is thought to depend fundamentally on its interaction with other socie-
tal domains, including systems of mobility and subsistence; in the eyes of ‘organicistic’ inquiry, it cannot be presumed that the 
relationship between these domains and lithic technology is always complementary or even fully synergistic. Instead, partial 
conflicts, counteractions, and contradictions are at least equally possible. The functionality of lithic technology, however, de-
pends on its own ‘integration’ into this societal whole. Considered in tandem with the general functional richness of almost any 
technical system, our ability to predict ‘adaptive’ lithic parameters from particular ecological conditions (and to distinguish them 
from ‘non-adaptive’ parameters) seems to be limited at best. 
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haps best expressed by the numerous heated discussions burgeoning in the aftermath of the ‘Binford-
Bordes debate’ – when varying chronological (e.g., Mellars 1969, 1970, 1996: 315-342) and functional 
explanations (e.g., Freeman 1966; Binford 1973; Rolland 1977, 1981; Dibble 1984; Rolland and Dibble 
1990; Dibble and Holdaway 1990) of Mousterian inter-assemblage variability famously clashed (cf. 
Szmid 2003), grosso modo reproducing the conflict between ‘formism’ and ‘mechanism.’ 
As a final example of the revelatory power of world hypotheses theory, we can consider the role of du-
alisms and conceptual dichotomies in the production and vindication of lithic knowledge. Dualistic 
reasoning can hardly be underestimated as an important source of conflict in lithic analysis; its exam-
ple is invaluable since its changing status, to the knowledge of the author, has never been fully recog-
nised nor investigated. Arguably, however, the many facets of dualistic reasoning open an important 
window into basic conceptual disparities anchoring different research projects. The ability of world 
hypotheses to confidently point to these differences and to help unpack them is therefore a major asset 
of the theory, also revealing its productivity in mapping hitherto uncharted territory. 
 The fact that different world theories tend to assemble different modes of dualistic reasoning is 
already expressed at the juncture between ‘analytic’ and ‘synthetic’ approaches. In the part-centric 
endeavour of ‘analytic’ lithic research, dualities tend to be constructed in order to relate lithic parts 
externally. Antipoles are hence devised to analyse their relationship in terms of similarity and correla-
tion, or simply to infer one pole from the other. The implication is that conceptual dichotomies need to 
be upheld if lithic knowledge is to be gained and secured. From a ‘synthetic’ standpoint, by contrast, 
dualisms are generally invoked in order to overcome them. The objective of whole-centric lithic ap-
proaches is to either demonstrate that the dualities in question pertain to lithic parts and disappear 
when these parts are placed into their wholes or to show that the dichotomies help to grasp some iso-
lated features of lithic reality but hinder the determination of lithic wholes. It therefore seems that 
‘synthetic’ research tends to attest dualities only to tear them down again. 
 ‘Contextualistic’ approaches typically examine two or more contraposing ‘micro-contexts’ to 
establish that they actually stick together and co-determine each other.802 An example in French lithic 
research is the analysis of technology in terms of its ‘domestic’ and ‘hunting’ (cynégétique) compo-
nents, regarded to be complementary but variably organised nodes of technological ‘infrastructure’ 
(see Chapter 5, first part). Alternatively, distinct ‘micro-contexts’ may be regarded to mirror each oth-
er in their configurational logic; this is usually taken as a sign of the circumstance that each fact shapes 
all other facts and is shaped by all of them. The holistic understanding of the chaîne opératoire as em-
bodying technical, cognitive, and social facts at the same time is evidence enough for this stance. It is, 
nonetheless, equally reflected in many approaches that seek to interrelate lithic technology, mobility, 
settlement organisation, prey behaviour, and/or social values (e.g., technological valorisation) (see the 
first part of Chapter 5 for a number of complementary examples).  
‘Organicistic’ lithic research identifies dualities as ‘conflicts’ of becoming; they are either inter-
preted as obstacles of evolution resolvable only in the durée (‘duration’) or as an expression of domain-
specific behaviours. In the latter case, dichotomies motivate the investigation of evolutionary self-
determination and processes of autopoiesis. In UTF-analysis, for example, tool-systems are analysed 
in terms of their internal dualisms to establish their degree of functional integration (Chapter 5, sec-
ond part). Interpretive dualities are established, first, between ‘form’ and ‘structure,’ and, second, be-
tween ‘structure’ and ‘function.’ Duality indicates a lack of integration and thus comes into view as a 
means rather than an end of lithic evolution. A second topos of ‘organicistic’ thought is co-implication. 
Since ‘organic’ processes of becoming depend on the long-term coordination of supposedly counteract-
ing poles, evolutionary trajectories can be interpreted as imbrications of these poles. A good example 
is Boëda’s (2013) reading of ‘technical lineages’ (lignées techniques) as specific evolutionary constella-
tions of mind and matter, materially conserving the ‘lost memory’ (mémoire oubliée) of ‘fossil’ socie-
ties. 
                                                          
802 ‘Contextualism’ relies here on the ‘pound-cake model’ [Rührkuchenmodell] of cultural reality (sensu Hahn 2013; cf. Chapter 
2; Appendix II.3, Fig. II.1). 
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In lithic ‘formism,’ duality is mainly negotiated through the analysis of part-co-variations and 
the mutual participation of parts in patterns of polarised domains of reality. Most commonly, however, 
dichotomies are interpreted as inferential relations. If one side of the polarity can be studied factually, 
the other side may be invoked as a ‘subsistent’ category to explain it. The mind-matter duality is regu-
larly treated in this way. In the case of the ‘handaxe debate’ for example (see Chapter 4, first part), 
material configurations – that is, patterns and associations of lithic parts – are discussed as indica-
tions of hominin cognitive capacities. In general, this management of antithetical poles is already fore-
shadowed by the ‘formistic’ theory of cognitive criticism based on the concept of ‘correspondence.’ The 
basic strategy is to devise lithic categories (e.g., classes, types) rooted in discrete artefact features – 
often paying special attention to shape-related attributes – and to examine their regularities and/or 
patterned associations – the established categories may then be explained in light of each other. Par-
ticular ‘laws of association,’ specifying the inferential link between polar categories, may be discovered 
in this way. 
‘Mechanistic’ approaches are the unrivalled guardians of dualistic thought – they expound an 
‘analytic’ strategy heavily relying on ‘Cartesianism.’ The reasons for rejoicing polarised conceptions of 
worldly affairs are largely structural. All ‘mechanisms’ share the conviction that the ‘primary’ qualities 
of the world – categorically distinct from the ‘secondary’ qualities – are foundational for the latter. 
Similarly, dualistic reasoning in ‘mechanism’ is motivated by the ambition to bridge ‘observable’ and 
‘unobservable’ features of reality and to neatly discriminate between ‘theory’ and ‘data’ (see Chapter 3).  
The classic ‘mind-body’ duality, for instance, is often reconstructed as the problem of the ‘ef-
fective’ primary qualities of reality and their correlated, yet ‘ineffective’ secondary qualities (cf. Ap-
pendix II.2). ‘Mechanists’ may then infer cognitive correlates from hominin physiological or material 
(lithic and non-lithic) make-ups.803 That the hominin bodies are typically re-cast in exclusively materi-
al terms is a consequence of this situation.804 Alternatively, ‘mechanistic’ approaches may regard cog-
nition as an entirely ‘ineffective’ category, motivating strongly ‘behaviouristic’ research agendas (e.g., 
Binford 1972: 168).805 The fact that ‘culture’ is regularly dismissed as an interpretive category in lithic 
research similarly indicates its conceptualisation as an ‘ineffective’ quality in this context (cf. Kelly 
2016: 20-35). The nature-culture dichotomy provides a constant incentive for discussion – whether 
lithic technology belongs to the realm of human nature or human culture is prominently debated (e.g., 
Shea 2017a; Chapter 4, second part). Another example is the basic distinction between ‘style’ and 
‘function’ (e.g., Jelinek 1976; Dunnell 1978; Bettinger et al. 1996), regularly incentivising lithic scholars 
to consider the former as a ‘derived’ and hence ‘ineffective’ quality of past realities.806 
The ‘mechanistic’ recognition of a ‘laddered’ structure of worldly affairs, ejecting directed 
causal interactions between categorically distinct domains of reality, further motivates the centralisa-
tion of lithic-nonlithic relationships (cf. Chapter 4, second part).807 The distinction between the ‘mate-
rial’ (lithics) and the ‘social’ (society) thereby often facilitates the deduction of the latter from the for-
mer by invoking some general principles of constitution. The reconstruction of specific chains of de-
                                                          
803 A prototypical example is the ‘Social Brain Hypothesis’ (SBH) originally developed by evolutionary psychologist Robin Dun-
bar (1992). SBH has recently become a major resource of sociocognitive research in the wake of Clive Gamble, John Gowlett, and 
others (cf. Gowlett et al. 2012; Gamble et al. 2014); it uses direct and indirect data of hominin braincases to infer neocortex 
ratios, which, in turn, are regarded to predict effective hominin group size (cf. Steele 1996). The latter is taken as a proxy of past 
social organisation and/or complexity. Although Gamble and colleagues ground their wider narratives of human evolution, 
including lithic technological developments, on a largely ‘mechanistic’ theory, their research tends to be ‘formistic,’ since SBH 
primarily serves to define the relevant ‘subsistent’ categories and to motivate the analysis of co-variation between hominin brain 
evolution and the evolution of lithic technology. For a ‘mechanistic’ investigation of ‘finite social space’ in human evolution, see 
e.g. the classic study by Foley and Lee (1989, 1996). 
804 Since the hominin ‘body‘ is recognised primarily as a physical/biological entity, bodily aspects of technology, thematising for 
example the social and technical body, are difficult to envision for ‘mechanistic’ approaches. This embodied perspective on 
technological behaviour, however, is constitutive for French ‘contextualistic’ approaches (Chapter 5, first part). From the per-
spective of disciplinary history, the Anglophone focus on the ‘physical body’ to the expense of the ‘sociotechnical body’ of hom-
inins is likely a result of the ‘palaeoanthropological’ heritage of major parts of Anglophone Palaeolithic archaeology, relying on 
intellectual exchange with both physical and biological anthropology. 
805 This ‘behaviouristic’ research orientation often shows itself by the rejection of what it identifies as palaeopsychology (cf. 
Conard 2009: 118). 
806 The ‘Binford-Sackett debate’ on the nature of lithic types in American archaeology (cf. Tostevin 2012: 29-41) exemplifies 
some of the tangible research consequences prompted by strictly dichotomising between ‘style’ and ‘function.’ Sackett’s (1973, 
1982, 1986) somewhat forgotten ‘isocrestic’ notion of style can be interpreted as a ‘formistic’ alternative to the ‘mechanistic’ 
duality between ‘style’ and ‘function’ advocated by Binford (1989) and many of his followers (see also Jelinek 1976; Dunnell 
1978, 1989; Bettinger et al. 1996). 
807 ‘Mechanism’ relies here on the ‘layer-cake model’ (Schichttortenmodell [German]) of human reality (sensu Hahn 2013; cf. 
Chapter 2; Appendix II.3, Fig. II.1). 
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termination, for example running from the natural environment (e.g., topography, habitat structure) 
over mobility (e.g., site function, logistic/residential mobility) to lithic technological organisation (tool 
curation, cortex ratio, size distributions, raw material signatures) (e.g., Kelly 1988; Henry 1989b), il-
lustrates this general tendency of drawing on polarised categories. ‘Hard ecology’ approaches to lithic 
technology, whether based on HBE808 or similar research paradigms, typically rely on dualistic reason-
ing in this sense (see Chapter 4, second part). They make positive use of dichotomisation by casting 
reality into distinct compartments – in this way, the conceptual segregation of reality turns out to be a 
precondition for re-assembling it again. Insight literally consists of the re-construction of part-
configurations. 
As a final but highly informative aspect of the ‘mechanistic’ reliance on dualities, we can con-
sider the ‘problem of transition.’ Dichotomisations are often used to facilitate the identification, char-
acterisation, and/or examination of key transitions in early human evolution. Although not discussed 
in detail in the previous chapters, research into ‘cultural’  or ‘behavioural modernity’ relies entirely on 
a polarisation of research categories, resulting regularly in oppositions such as ‘complexity’ vs. ‘non-
complexity,’ ‘symbolic’ vs. ‘non-symbolic,’ ‘human’ vs. ‘primate,’ ‘modern’ vs. ‘premodern’/’archaic,’ 
‘cultural’ vs. ‘biological,’ and so forth. These oppositions are then charted and mapped chronologically 
– they are analysed in terms of an evolutionary ‘field of locations.’  This conceptual configuration di-
rectly motivates the quest for origins-questions, originally proper to ‘mechanistic’ thought.809 
To conclude, the status and purpose of conceptual polarities in lithic inquiry depends on the 
world theory background. Similar oppositions may convey multiple standards of research. For in-
stance, the duality between ‘mind’ (res cogitans) and ‘matter’ (res extensa) shows that lithic approach-
es under the ‘analytic’ banner tend to inferentially exploit dichotomies while ‘synthetic’ lithic research 
typically tries to dismantle them. It follows that lithic discussions bridging world theory boundaries, 
especially the ‘analytic’-‘synthetic’ divide, and targeting concepts which participate in prominent oppo-
sitions (e.g., ‘cognition,’ ‘complexity’) may easily result in futile discussions and talking past each oth-
er. 
The divergent role of conceptual dualities in the four world theories clearly hampers cross-
theory communication and makes it necessary that practitioners are somewhat attentive to these dif-
ferences if they wish to avoid senseless controversies. Again, some debates may be fairly ‘artificial’ – 
nothing more than artefacts of world theory mistranslation(s) – rather than productive or informative 
about the past; these debates are unlikely to contribute to the advancement of lithic knowledge. As laid 
bare in this section, the examination of the diversity of lithic approaches by means of world theory 
categories is able to track down and unpack some of these ‘errant’ debates. 
Having reviewed the key results of the preceding chapters, we are now in a confident position to assess 
their epistemological significance. Again, Pepper’s World Hypotheses (1942) turns out to be an inval-
uable asset in this undertaking. The recognition that main tendencies in French and Anglophone lithic 
research can be fruitfully characterised and confronted by referring to Pepper’s four-tiered framework 
of world theories ultimately supports the idea that the relationship between the former is of a broadly 
similar nature than the relationship between the latter. Drawing on Pepper’s discussion of world theo-
ry relationships (Chapter 2), we can now reliably make the following assertions about the status of 
diverging strands in French (‘contextualism’ and/or ‘organicism’) and Anglophone (‘formism’ and/or 
‘mechanism’) lithic research: 
 
(i) their lithic knowledge claims rely on incompatible metaphysical theories of the 
world 
(ii) they are insular and fully autonomous  
(iii) all of them are relatively adequate, yet equally defective and fallible (each ap-
proach threatens to undermine itself) 
                                                          
808 ‘Human Behavioural Ecology’ (see Chapter 4). 
809 See Chapter 2 for an exploration of for why especially ‘consolidated’ variants of ‘mechanism’ tend to chart structural singu-
larities (cf. Chapter 2: Box 7). 
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(iv) although their scope is global, each offered perspective remains somewhat incom-
plete 
(v) they are the result of a historical and supra-individual research endeavour 
 
Assertions (i) and (ii) imply that the types of ‘contextualistic,’ ‘formistic,’ ‘mechanistic,’ and/or 
‘organicistic’ perspectives on lithic technology encountered in Chapter 3 to 5 cannot be reduced to one 
another or translated without loss into the interpretive vocabulary provided by any of the other per-
spectives. Each perspective departs from disparate positive standards of lithic knowledge.810 This also 
means that there is little hope to fully integrate all perspectives – to the contrary, their global integra-
tion appears rather unappealing since the cognitive originality of each perspective stems from its insu-
larity. Although we have seen that there are tangible ways in which the four lithic perspectives can 
productively interact, it therefore has to be concluded that they are largely incommensurable.  
Assertions (iii) and (iv) suggest that despite their great cognitive adequacy each lithic perspec-
tive faces major difficulties in ensuring its internal consistency (cf. Pepper 1935a: 370; see Appendix 
II.2 for the detailed reconstruction of the basic structural predicaments) – overall, each perspective is 
similarly problematic. Since each perspective, furthermore, relies on its distinct vantage point (its ‘root 
metaphor’) and the particular standards of lithic knowledge formation and evaluation that go with it, it 
necessarily skews, distorts, and/or biases a part of the lithic evidence available to it. We must be pre-
pared to acknowledge that each perspective remains somewhat fragmentary.811 Because the relation-
ship between the structural categories of a world theory and its evidence is reciprocal (Chapter 2), each 
perspective may even command dissimilar types of lithic evidence. With Pepper one can say that each 
of the alternative relatively adequate perspectives offers a ‘different and irreconcilable description of 
the same “fact”’ (ibid.: 371).  
Furthermore, assertions (iii) and (iv) elucidate that there is no ground for any of the four lithic 
perspectives to claim cognitive superiority. In the grand scheme of things, they have to be treated as 
equals – as equally valid and equally fallible perspectives on the lithic record. Since they act as the 
primary, concrete positive standards of lithic knowledge (sensu Pepper 1942: 328), we dispose of no 
overarching, ‘neutral’ standard from which they could fairly be judged.  
 This last point is of critical importance since it makes unmistakably clear that the French-
Anglophone divide cannot be resolved by determining which side or perspective generally offers the 
more promising or favourable cognitive resources. Since the various repugnant strands of lithic re-
search draw on different world theories (sensu Pepper 1942), there simply is no such privileged posi-
tion. We have to accept that various lithic research orientations legitimately co-exist. French and An-
glophone lithic approaches can hence be interpreted as the product of two different socio-historical 
formations occupied with the development and refinement of a distinct set of equally valid research 
options. 
 Assertion (v) supports this reading and clarifies the status of world hypotheses in lithic re-
search. World hypotheses have an existence of their own and are not just in the heads of individual 
scholars (cf. Pepper 1942: 115-118, 337f.) – world hypotheses entail the cumulative efforts of many 
generations (ibid.: 339).812 Chapters 4 and 5 reinforce this view and show that different lithic research-
ers may participate in different cognitive projects. This fact alone might be evidence enough for the 
differential prolificacy of world hypotheses in lithic research. The attendance of the same researcher in 
the project of advancing different world hypotheses may be entirely pragmatic, strategic, and/or an 
outcome of changing scholarly trajectories.813  The results are consistent with the idea that Palaeolithic 
                                                          
810 Cf. Pepper (1942: 328) 
811 In Pepper’s (1935a: 371) own words: “[p]resumably each [hypotheses] gives some sort of information about the world the 
others garble.” 
812 Pepper (1942: 166) explicitly notes: “[i]t must be recalled that we make a sharp distinction between world theories and the 
men who develop them and write them out. The maxims of the previous chapter suggest ways by which eccentricities of authors 
may be separated from the development of the theories themselves. It is not what any author thinks about his theory that counts 
in determining its inadequacy, but what the theory itself in terms of its own logic thinks of itself.” 
813 The biographic development of individual scholars sometimes leads to a change in their basic research orientation. In the 
French scene for example, two central figures – André Leroi-Gourhan and Éric Boëda – exemplify this possibility. Whereas 
Leroi-Gourhan started his scientific career with an ‘organicistic’ approach to human evolution and technology – the ‘Early’ 
Leroi-Gourhan of Évolution et techniques – and later transitioned into ‘contextualistic’ modes of inquiry – the ‘Late’ Leroi-
Gourhan of « Palethnologie » – Boëda began his research as a Parisian ‘contextualist’ in the heyday of the ‘technological ap-
proach’ but recently turned to full-fledged lithic ‘organicism’ in order to understand long-term technical trajectories (Chapter 5, 
second part; cf. Appendix III.4: Fig. III.5). 
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archaeology represents foremost a social and historical endeavour in which varying scholarly figures 
may play different and at times contradictory roles.814  
Recovering the cognitive significance of the French-Anglophone divide in terms of a basic entrench-
ment of approaches in divergent world theories permits the recognition of scientific pluralism in lithic 
research (Box 10). The status of the different lithic perspectives that play a part in the divide is of such 
a nature that direct comparisons between data, methods, and results are considerably complicated 
because each perspective brings forth separate positive standards of knowledge, including its own the-
ory of knowledge criticism and corroboration (cf. Chapters 2, 4, and 5). The cognitive value of each of 
the four larger orientations of lithic research – ‘formism,’ ‘mechanism,’ ‘contextualism,’ and ‘organi-
cism’ – is defined by their unique capacity to reciprocally refine their evidence and their structural 
categories. The cognitive standards established to ensure the relative ‘adequacy’ of this process are 
intrinsic to the respective world theory orientations (Chapter 2). Since world theories are strictly insu-
lar, no common standards of knowledge criticism are readily available. 
Due to this lack of common standards, conflicts and discrepancies in lithic research rooted in 
world theory differences can only be pointed at but are ultimately difficult to resolve. Any attempt to 
resolve them typically leads to one viewpoint encroaching all other perspectives. The contradictory 
nature of lithic knowledge claims presented in Chapter 1 and the often dissonant significations of simi-
lar research concepts summarised above are symptoms of this situation. They bespeak of viewpoints 
which are difficult to compare – even the same lithic ‘facts,’ if equally recognised, are often described 
in different ways. Since there is no neutral position from which these viewpoints can be judged and 
since all of them are based on world theories equipped with relative cognitive adequacy, no viewpoint 
can be discredited in principle by the others. We have to acknowledge that all of them may represent 
equally ‘admissible’ lithic standpoints.815  
The plurality of approaches at the French-Anglophone interface gives voice to the pluralistic 
condition of lithic inquiry. This pluralism comes on two levels: there is a basic pluralism of ‘analytic’ 
and ‘synthetic’ approaches on the one hand, and a pluralism of ‘formistic,’ ‘mechanistic,’ ‘contextualis-
tic,’ and ‘organicistic’ readings of the lithic record on the other. All of these perspectives stand on par 
with one another. With Pepper (1942: 330) we can maintain that for pragmatic reasons and matters of 
serious discussion none of them can be safely discarded or neglected. At the same time, all of the asso-
ciated standpoints appear to be somewhat biased. Therefore we cannot elevate any and ‘wish to benefit 
from all of their evidence, concepts, and modes of corroboration’ (idem). Since even the standards of 
‘rationality’ differ among these perspectives, we must be reasonable and treat them as equal contend-
ers of lithic knowledge (idem).816 Each perspective may tell us something about the lithic record no 
other perspective can. A retreat to ‘scientific’ appeals does not help here because each relatively ade-
quate world theory promotes its own conception of science (Chapter 2).817 
If we wish to avoid undesirable dogmatism, we must be mindful to the judgments and 
knowledge claims of all of the obtainable highly adequate viewpoints (cf. Pepper 1942: 342). As Pepper 
                                                          
814 This is to say: what these individuals wanted to contribute, had hoped to achieve, or how they conceptualised their own re-
search endeavour may not always be congruent with their historical contribution. Generally speaking, it is a strength of science 
as a collective process not to depend entirely on the dealings, intentions, and fates of its practitioners. 
815 It has to be stressed that the general admissibility of different world theory-based readings of the lithic evidence does not 
automatically render their knowledge contents immune to critique. The point is rather that these contents cannot simply be 
criticised by knowledge standards on which they do not rely in the first place. Knowledge claims must consequently be criticised 
internally – a point we will discuss in detail in the next section. 
816 Pepper (1942: 330f., 342) signifies this manoeuvre as ‘post-rational eclecticism,’ because rationality-standards can only be 
internally defined by world theories. Rationality therefore only helps us in recognising that there are multiple strands of ration-
ality. We must hence be reasonable and accept them all as alternative positions since we wish not to miss any highly adequate 
judgements. Neglecting any of them would mean to fall back into dogmatism (ibid.: 342). Pepper (idem) adds: “[a]s to the objec-
tion that the weighting of the different judgements of different world theories for practical action would open the way for preju-
dice and caprice, the answer is that the ignoring of these diverse judgements would be still more prejudicial and capricious.” 
817 The entire debate about ‘scientific’ and ‘non-scientific’ approaches (the so called ‘demarcation problem;’ cf. Dupré 1993) 
misses the point from this perspective. For the most part, this debate reflects the difficulty to navigate the ‘analytic’-‘synthetic’ 
boundary and often fails to recognise that even generally shared standards of scientific conduct  such as ‘objectivity’ are inter-
preted differently by different cognitive projects. What remains is a debate about the formal definition of science rather than the 
nature of science. 
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(1942: 331) rightly insists: just as we would make any other rational decision in cases of serious disa-
greement, we shall wish to first consult all modes of lithic knowledge before forming a final opinion (cf. 
Pepper 1963: 9; Stroud 2015: 284).818 This pragmatic pluralism would require a fair and mindful en-
gagement with the ‘other’ in lithic research; it presupposes a basic understanding of the ‘other’ and its 
cognitive qualities, but also entails the realisation that a ‘unity’ of lithic knowledge may be unattainable 
and undesirable. The detailed examination of the French-Anglophone divide (Chapter 3 to 5) is con-
sistent with this conclusion. It provides strong evidence for the fact that there is much underrated dis-
unity in processes of lithic knowledge formation and evaluation – a disunity that is only expected to 
gain in weight if other lithic research traditions are also taken into consideration. 
 Regarding ‘disunity’ as a profitable feature of lithic research and to assume a ‘pluralistic 
stance’ helps to deflect three major pitfalls (sensu Kellert et al. 2006: xii): (i) to marginalise and/or 
discount marked differences between research orientations in the hope to defend a monolithic concep-
tion of knowledge, objectivity, and/or truth; (ii) not to take sufficiently into account approaches, posi-
tions, and/or perspectives that lie outside of what is perceived as the ‘mainstream;’ and (iii) to greatly 
exaggerate the explanatory importance of approaches situated in this ‘mainstream.’ As shown in Chap-
ter 1, the French-Anglophone divide exhibits at least the two last characteristics: both sides consider 
their own practices as ‘mainstream’ expressions of lithic inquiry, don’t take each other’s viewpoints 
sufficiently into account, and tend to overestimate their own interpretive importance. The first charac-
teristic – the marginalisation of research differences – only sometimes applies (e.g., in discussions 
about the relationship between the chaîne opératoire and the ‘reduction sequence’).819 It is frequently 
expressed, however, by the basic hesitance to quote or refer to the respective ‘other.’ 
 These and similar tendencies are troublesome since they indicate that the French-Anglophone 
divide creates a cognitive barrier preventing practitioners from interrogating the full spectrum of rela-
tively adequate perspectives on the lithic record. Currently, it is not even clear whether basic research 
convergences with topics or interpretive trends could be recognised and synergistically exploited. Even 
though global convergence is difficult to conceive, partial research concurrences are clearly possible. 
Indeed, since we wish to base lithic knowledge on all of the disposable highly adequate perspectives we 
would want to be attentive for such structural convergence of insight, even if we cannot count on it. 
The goal must therefore be to develop strategies that help to circumvent these long-established and 
deeply entrenched cognitive barriers – only then is it possible to benefit from the identified diversity of 
lithic approaches. 
 The first step must be to recognise the alleged cognitive adversary as a highly competent ex-
pert. It has to be acknowledged that this adversary may well be expressing a real problem or pinpoint-
ing a blind spot in need of being addressed; one has to resist the impulse of simply obliterating non-
shared viewpoints by polemical critique. Although not a simple task, the courage to respect and value 
opposed views is crucial for the success of pluralistic science. As sociologist Antonio Gramsci (1971: 
343f., 433) convincingly argued, in intellectual disputes opponents need to be engaged where they are 
strongest; non-shared theoretical positions, similarly, can only be criticised if their most respected 
advocates are addressed (cf. Law 2015: 9).820 In intellectual battles, there can be no easy victories since 
each engagement with the cognitive ‘other’ is both a struggle and an effort and one therefore needs to 
take sincerely into account what this ‘other’ believes and why. According to Gramsci (1971: 344, 421), 
only mutual reverence for different ‘intellectual cultures’ provides an effective remedy against ending 
up in a ‘prison of ideologies.’821 Disputants have to assume that their opponents are proficient scholars 
                                                          
818 This point can be extended by Lakatos’ (1970) important argument, originally developed to defend a pluralism of ‘research 
programmes,’ that we cannot risk to dump any rationally justified perspective since we do not know exactly what this perspec-
tive may contribute in the future. Pepper (1942: 148) clearly anticipates this argument when he insists that “[…] to sacrifice the 
insights into fact which any of these [world] theories give would be to sacrifice cognitive values possessing a degree of value 
which we have no means of estimating. For only the completely adequate world theory could provide that means.” 
819 If important differences between lithic research orientations are not marginalised and/or discounted, this is often because 
scholars wish to level basic criticism at them (what I will identify as ‘signature critique’ below). 
820 Cf. “A new science proves its efficacy and vitality when it demonstrates that it is capable of confronting the great champions 
of the tendencies opposed to it and when it either resolves by its own means the vital questions which they have posed or 
demonstrates, in peremptory fashion, that these questions are false problems.” (Gramsci 1971: 433). 
821 Gramsci (1971: 344) explicitly notes: “[…] [t]o understand and to evaluate realistically one’s adversary’s position and his 
reasons (and sometimes one’s adversary is the whole of past thought) means precisely to be liberated from the prison of ideolo-
gies in the bad sense of the word – that of blind ideological fanaticism. It means taking up a point of view that is “critical”, which 
for the purpose of scientific research is the only fertile one.” 
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who have good reasons to do what they do and are largely resistant to appeals to cognitive authority or 
virtue.  
These considerations certainly apply to the French-Anglophone divide in lithic analysis. The 
structured diversity of incompatible approaches justifies a pluralism of knowledge in lithic research 
and calls for a bona fide approach towards the ‘other.’ The ‘Pepperian’ reconstruction of the structure 
and nature of the divide puts Gramsci’s reasonable considerations into nuanced perspective. The main 
cognitive adversaries that make their appearance at the French-Anglophone interface are different 
world theories. They are the principle cognitive ‘others’ that have to be engaged and properly ad-
dressed. The parallelisation of world theory discrepancies with the structure of the French-Anglophone 
divide clarifies the nature of the ‘other’ in lithic research and exposes the canon of conceptual re-
sources which it exploits. The elucidation of the structural building blocks of the four principal lithic 
stances that contend for lithic knowledge and generate the divide (Chapters 3 to 5) therefore provides 
a great deal of conceptual transparency which can only promote mutual respect and understanding. 
This ‘Pepperian’ pluralism of lithic approaches encountered at the French-Anglophone bound-
ary is consistent with the idea of conceptual relativity developed by Hilary Putnam and others. Put-
nam (1987, 1994) persuasively argued that varying conceptual systems may turn out to be ‘cognitively 
equivalent’ – that is, strictly incompatible but nevertheless equally tenable. According to Putnam 
(2001), each of these systems does justice to the evidence precisely as an alternative theory – there is 
no independent standard forcing us to favour or select a single system to the detriment of all others. 
The basic contention – perfectly consistent with Pepper’s reading of world theories – is that ‘there 
exists no fact of the matter on the basis of which one could say that one description is right, and the 
other is wrong’ (Dell’Utri 2017: 509).822 This reiterates the insight, shared by Pepper, that there can be 
no impartial description of ‘facts,’ and equivalent cognitive systems therefore tend to report the same 
‘facts’ in a different manner (cf. Putnam 1987: 97).  
At the same time, however, it cannot be overemphasised that the idea of ‘conceptual relativity’ 
does not deny that scientific tenability depends on the behaviour of phenomena different from the 
researcher. Accepting the lurking ‘conceptual relativity’ of approaches does therefore not imply that 
scientific research is merely a game of conceptual schemes and/or language – conceptual relativity 
does not imply relativism in science (cf. Chang 2012: 261-264). Instead, we need to acknowledge that 
‘the nature of dependence’ changes as practitioners delve into different conceptual systems (Putnam 
1994: 309). This last point is crucial since it secures the circumstance that ‘facts’ are still discovered 
and not merely “legislated by us” (Putnam 1988: 114).  
‘Pepperian’ world theories, interpreted as equivalent cognitive systems, are hence generally 
capable of interacting with the evidence creatively; they leave much leeway for the latter to shape the 
promoted knowledge claims, so that one rarely finds what one expects.823 The type of pluralism that 
comes into view is thus not an untamed ‘anarchic’ relativism, but rather a moderate and reasonably 
constrained variant of ‘multiplism’ (sensu Krausz 1993: 4, 2007)824 – the pragmatic refusal of the idea 
that to any valid question there can only be a single legitimate answer (cf. Stroud 2015). 
In total, Pepper’s metatheoretical framework allows us to re-cast the French-Anglophone di-
lemma as an epistemic opportunity. The structured diversity of equally powerful approaches defining 
the divide simply demonstrates that we already know a great deal about the lithic record; it also indi-
cates how much more potential for lithic knowledge there generally is.825 We have four highly promis-
ing strands of lithic research at our disposal; all of these different angles of inquiry are closing in upon 
the world of lithic technology. With Pepper (1942: 332), we may declare: “[p]aradoxically, our very 
insistence on the autonomy of these modes of corroboration renders their mutual cooperation clearer 
and more effective than it would otherwise be, for thus they cease to neutralise each other or to get in 
                                                          
822 For the argument of ‘cognitive equivalence,’ we can also refer to Richard Bernstein’s (1985: 11f.) often-cited insistence that 
“[t]here is no substantive overarching framework in which radically different and alternative [cognitive] schemes are commen-
surable.” 
823 Cf. Wylie (2002: xiv). 
824 ‘Multiplism’ is a concept coined by art historian and philosopher of science Michael Krausz. It is the antithesis to ‘singular-
ism’ which is based on the idea that knowledge is ‘monolithic’ and there can hence only be a single valid answer to each valid 
question (cf. Norton 1995). In a world of ‘multiplism,’ there are multiple equally admissible answers to a single valid questions 
and scholars face the difficulty to negotiate these answers without falling back to dogmatic positions. As Krausz (1993: 50) him-
self stresses, this view is consistent with a constrained relativism of scientific knowledge: “[…] incommensurability does not 
entail irrationality or arbitrariness.” 
825 See Pepper (1942: 331f.) for the general philosophical argument. 
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each other’s way.” The identification of the fundamental pluralism of lithic approaches on the level of 
world theories hence enables the recognition of the ‘specialised’ nature of the four main lithic perspec-
tives participating in the French-Anglophone divide.826 None of these cognitive specialisations is dis-
pensable if we wish to advance lithic knowledge at large. If we wish to base our knowledge on the “wid-
est possible empirical base” (Pepper 1963: 9), we should call upon as many perspectives as possible. To 
paraphrase Chang (2012: 260), the aims of lithic research are overall probably better served if we 
hedge and cultivate multiple systems of practice. 
The pluralistic interpretation of the French-Anglophone divide in terms of ‘Pepperian’ world hypothe-
ses prompts the question of cross-theory communication. Chapter 1 has shown that this aspect practi-
cally represents the sore point of French-Anglophone relations to the effect that even basal forms of 
cross-fertilisation are recurrently inhibited. Scholars are regularly ‘lost in translation,’ often without 
even recognising it. In this context, it has become nearly impossible to genuinely honour the ‘other’ as 
a highly competent interlocutor and to generally respect the significance of viewpoints supplied by 
radically different world theories. Although I do not wish to endorse the somewhat naïve conception 
that all miscommunication in science is harmful,827 some types of miscommunication clearly are.  
Miscommunication tends to be hazardous if cognitive ‘others’ are systematically misrepresent-
ed, caricaturised, and misused for straw-men arguments or if their cognitive achievements are ren-
dered almost inaccessible. The first three types of miscommunication promote unnecessary hostilities 
towards the ‘other’ while the last type undermines the prospects of drawing from the full spectrum of 
highly adequate research perspectives. All of them are baneful, however, if we wish to cultivate a cli-
mate of ‘critical practice’ in which cognitive adversaries are respected for what they can do best and in 
which contending perspectives work each other into the ground only to become stronger. 
 As illustrated in Section 6.2, disastrous miscommunication between French and Anglophone 
lithic practitioners may be avoided if we learn to respect the cognitive architecture of contending world 
theories. Eliciting the nature and structure of world theories at least helps to get to some of the sources 
of destructive miscommunication. The key is to understand that the significance of each concept or 
statement put forth by a specialised cognitive framework depends on its status and function within 
that framework. With Pepper, we can define serious scientific miscommunication as a defiance of the 
basic cognitive terms under which a concept or knowledge claim has been formed. 
Miscommunication can easily occur when basic standards of knowledge formation, evaluation, 
and/or corroboration collide. In this case, assertions or knowledge claims are dismantled by showing 
that they don’t withstand one’s own mode of corroboration. This sort of critique typically misses the 
mark because it fails to respect the cognitive terms under which the statement has been constructed.828 
Strictly speaking, the critique doesn’t target the lithic assertion itself, but its repudiated world theory 
basis. 
Another type of serious miscommunication may arise when concepts are cut off from their 
original cognitive environment and are transplanted into a new environment. In this case, part of the 
initial significance of the concept – i.e. the sum of extensional and intentional features required to do 
                                                          
826 We therefore discover a mode of indirect interaction between the four relatively adequate world theories, authorising a loose-
ly defined but nonetheless significant complementarity of incommensurable perspectives on the world theory level. This loosely 
defined complementarity can be interpreted as an expression of a basic ‘cognitive division of labour,’ anticipating some of the 
arguments brought up by later philosophers of science such as Philip Kitcher and others. Kitcher (1990, 2001) famously argued 
that science is successful primarily because of its social nature: (a) knowledge and data can easily be shared both horizontally 
(peers) and vertically (students); (b) scholars are able to co-develop ideas and borrow freely from each other; (c) research com-
munities establish their own currency systems (reputation etc.) based on internalised standards of research; and (d) the social 
organisation of science supports a cognitive division of labour. With Pepper, we can conclude that (a) to (c) presuppose a shared 
world theory background whereas (d) has a dual meaning. There is ‘cognitive division of labour’ both within the boundaries of 
world theories and between distinct world theories but the function of labour-division is different in the two cases. In the first 
case, the way labour is divided typically reflects the relative specialisation of the theory – the internal scholarly specialisations 
support the overall performance of their affiliated world theory. In the second case, by contrast, division of labour is a conse-
quence of cognitive specialisation on the world theory level. The resulting tension between scholarly specialisation and world 
theory specialisation further complicates cross-theory interactions. 
827 For a critique on purely functional views of scientific communication, see Coupland et al. (1991). 
828 Cf. “By the maxim of autonomy, we know that one world theory cannot be legitimately convicted of inadequacy by the judge-
ment of another.” (Pepper 1942: 115; cf. Appendix II.2) 
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its original work – may be lost. Thus, this type of miscommunication concerns the appropriation of 
research concepts. When concepts travel from one cognitive environment to another, they are typically 
re-interpreted in light of the structural categories proper to the new environment. Quite often, the 
concept is then simply reduced to its skeletal meaning in order to facilitate the transition. From the 
perspective of the concept’s original advocates, the results frequently attest ‘reductionism’ and ‘over-
simplification.’  
The prime example for the appropriation of a lithic research concept is the chaîne opératoire. 
When this concept is summoned by Anglophone scholars, it is typically recast in terms of a ‘formistic’ 
or ‘mechanistic’ version of the ‘reduction sequence.’ The chaîne opératoire is thereby regularly re-
duced to a ‘field of locations’ or to a generalised succession of generic and largely fixed reduction phas-
es (cf. Sellet 1993: 106; Tostevin 2000: 62), stripping it entirely from its ‘contextualistic’ qualities – 
most notably, its ‘volumetric’ and ‘geographic’/‘topological’ infrastructure.829 Odell’s (2001: 80) para-
digmatic statement, already cited in Chapter 1, that ‘chaîne opératoire research is almost mystical in 
its ramifications’ and therefore ‘requires a more practical operationalisation’ reflects this general atti-
tude. Through this optic, it is not particularly surprising that specifically Anglophone researchers have 
tried to level the use of ‘reduction sequence’ and chaîne opératoire in lithic analysis (e.g., Shott 2003, 
2007; Odell 2008: 81; but see Tostevin 2011b).830 As we have seen before, this practice obstructs more 
than it clarifies (see Section 6.2).831 
Another example is the French appropriation of lithic research concepts from Anglophone de-
sign theory. We have seen in the first part of Chapter 5 that the ‘techno-economic’ approach makes use 
of concepts initially developed by Anglophone theoretical work within the ecological paradigm. No-
tions such as ‘versatility,’ ‘durability,’ and/or ‘maintainability’ (Bleed 1986; Nelson 1991; Bamford and 
Bleed 1997; Kelly 2013) are deployed to shed light on ‘provisioning strategies’ (Kuhn 1995) and/or 
modalities of land-use and mobility (cf. Delagnes and Rendu 2011). The basic shared conception is that 
certain design features of lithic technologies are bound to specific ways of exerting these technologies 
in the landscape. When such concepts are incorporated into French technological approaches, howev-
er, their signification is altered. They are re-interpreted ‘synthetically.’ Design concepts are no longer 
utilised to derive correlates of lithic part-configurations, but are brought up to portray the design char-
acteristics of technical wholes (i.e. ‘Quina reduction systems,’ ‘Levallois reduction systems,’ etc.). De-
sign is re-cast as an emergent property of technical systems and the respective concepts are employed 
to capture the ‘quality’ of the latter (cf. Chapter 5, first part). Although this appropriation of Anglo-
phone research concepts is prima facie not obstructive, it can easily lead to the misconception that 
French lithic experts have begun to work with original conceptual resources of the Anglo-American 
tradition.832 
Miscommunication that brings down the original standards of knowledge formation raises the 
issue of signature critique. ‘Signature critique’ typically combines misrepresentation and caricaturisa-
tion of the ‘other’ with a fundamental rejection of its epistemic ideals and/or standards of inquiry. 
Such criticism is rather widespread and one of the most common types of scholarly engagement en-
countered at the French-Anglophone interface. Since the range of examples for this practice is vast, it 
will be discussed in some detail in the consecutive sub-section. ‘Signature critique’ allows us, generally 
speaking, to make sense of some of the basic forms of interpretive conflict defining the French-
Anglophone divide in lithic research. 
Although these enumerated variants of miscommunication cannot always be avoided and can 
sometimes be used to clarify the issues at hand or to provide creative incentives for innovation, ‘critical 
practice’ requires lithic practitioners to be somewhat attentive and reflexive about them and their pos-
sible pitfalls – the plurality of equally tenable lithic approaches cautions against the aggrandisement of 
                                                          
829 As already outlined in Section 6.2, the most tangible effect of translating the chaine opératoire to a ‘reduction sequence’ is the 
de-emphasis of spatial aspects of intra-technological organisation. This de-emphasis is a consequence of the shift from artefact 
relationalities to ‘effective’ chains of artefact-causation and artefact-participations in patterns. 
830 According to Odell (2008: 81), for example, chaîne opératoire analysis merely delivers “warmed-over reduction sequences.” 
831 To be perfectly clear, the translation of foreign research concepts into one’s own structural categories may also be an im-
portant source of epistemic creativity. Conceptual exchange is therefore generally desired. We have to be aware, however, that 
each process of translation almost inevitably entails conceptual alteration. 
832 An example of a non-obstructive but somewhat confusing translation of ideas from French to Anglophone lithic research is 
the appropriation of ‘techno-genetic’ concepts by Michael Chazan (2016). The author adopts the notion of ‘technical lineages’ 
and re-interprets it in light of Darwinian evolutionary theory. As it becomes clear from the second part of Chapter 5, this ma-
noeuvre substantially alters the original ‘life-philosophical’ signification of the concept. 
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one’s own interpretive position. As stressed in Chapter 1, ‘critical practice’ implies a self-critical atti-
tude impelling scholars to constantly monitor their contact and mode of engagement with the ‘other.’ 
Cross-theory criticism and discourse can only be successful if we recognise that different lithic ap-
proaches may base their findings on different world theories and hence respond to different ‘theories 
of cognitive criticism’ (Chapter 2; cf. Stroud 2015). A ‘pluralistic stance’ forbids us to simply dismiss 
these divergent terms. Instead, we have to learn to live with the intricacies of criticism at cognitive 
boundaries and the ineliminable pluralism of knowledge standards that goes with it.833 ‘Critical prac-
tice’ calls for the non-dogmatic navigation of these difficulties: 
Signature critique’ gives voice to general threads of disagreement between the four world theories. It 
addresses the ‘regular, or traditional, difficulties found in this or that type of theory’ and consequently 
captures many of the ‘perennial problems’ of Western philosophy found in textbooks and introductory 
chapters (Pepper 1942: 117f.). Signature critique commonly aims at ‘architectural’ features of non-
shared worldviews (i.e. structural categories or the concepts embodying them). The critique is ‘signa-
turesque’ because we recurrently encounter the same types of criticism expressed by proponents of the 
same type of theory to denunciate a particular type of rival theory; the critique reassures us of the insu-
larity of world theory positions and helps to identify the relative inadequacies of other positions.834 
Even though this capacity is not unimportant, it makes clear that signature critique must be treated 
with a great deal of caution. Signature critique preferentially targets the weak spots of the cognitive 
‘other’; it therefore sabotages any aspiration to engage the adversary where she/he is strongest. More-
over, signature critique is often levelled in order to devastate and demolish the ‘other’ – it frequently 
confesses itself guilty of ‘theory-baiting’ (sensu Law 2015: 8-10). 
 A second reason for the problematic status of signature critique is its effects. Rather than 
stimulating discussion, the fruits of advancing it are often communicative ‘muteness’ and ‘ignorance.’ 
The alternative seems to be an endless exchange of signature critique between two or more opposing 
critics. Evidently, the productivity of this undertaking is highly questionable. In general, signature 
critique tends to poison the climate of discussion and fosters disrespect rather than respect of the cog-
nitive ‘other.’ Because it dismantles the foundations of competing viewpoints, their advocates have 
nothing left where they can retreat to and may thus be prepared to launch a similarly destructive coun-
ter attack. In the worst case, signature critique may therefore nurture pointless debates and imprison 
interactive potential (cf. Section 6.2). For these reasons, signature critique must be deployed very care-
fully if the pluralistic discourse is to be maintained.835 
 There are multiple variants of signature critique in the French and Anglophone expert litera-
ture. Some of these voices have already been examined in Chapter 1, but we are now in a much better 
position to understand their cognitive significance. Arguably, the fact that signature critique seems to 
permeate the French-Anglophone interface should be viewed as evidence enough for the gravity of the 
cognitive gulf created by the latter. The documented instances illustrate profuse stereotype-casting of 
                                                          
833 Stroud (2015) argues that Pepper’s ‘evidentiary pluralism’ enables the development of a critical yet rhetorically engaged 
pluralism (sensu Stroud 2014). This pluralism recognises the possibility of conceptual overlay and allows ‘one to both respect 
and argue with other critics’ and/or cognitive adversaries (Stroud 2015: 282). This pluralism allows for interaction and does not 
inevitably result in cognitive seclusion. 
834 A pragmatic strategy to identify ‘signature critique’ in applied research is therefore to compare the content of the critique with 
the sources of structural inadequacy in the four relatively adequate world theories (Appendix II.2). 
835 Although this point will not be developed here, I admit that ‘signature critique’ also has a positive role to play in the concert of 
conflicting world theories (see supra). As Pepper (1942: 115) himself contends, ‘competent men and women’ will come to agree 
on the basic structural inadequacies of the four different world theories and these inadequacies will likely be reflected in the 
main variants of ‘signature critique’ – even if these are dogmatically motivated. These critical voices may provide some guidance 
in how each position can be refined in order to more satisfactorily respond to its critics. 
“The reality of criticism is that various interpretative communities govern the activities of their 
critics differently […] there is no single way to marshal evidence and assemble critical claims. All of 
these activities implicate a hypothesis of the world and its structure, and out of these commitments 
flow ideas and methods of gathering evidence […] The pluralism that Pepper proffers is an engaged 
pluralism, since it encourages flexible habits of criticism that not only strive to account for objects 
[…], but also realize that overly fixated commitments to one’s own metaphysical stance connected 
to criticism could harm the social concerns that critics ought to be sensitive to.” (Stroud 2015: 285) 
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the cognitive ‘other,’ often risking to profoundly misrepresent it. We will first recapitulate the prevail-
ing types of signature critique in the Anglophone literature before turning to the French cases. 
Anglophone researchers tend to criticise French technological research in terms of its apparent lack of 
‘objectivity’ (e.g., Dibble 1995; Tostevin 2000: 64f.; Steenhuyse 2008: 255; Bar-Yosef and Van Peer 
2009: 107f.; Scott 2011: 12)836 and ‘replicability’ (Tostevin 2011b), regularly accusing chaîne opératoire 
approaches of being somewhat ‘speculative’ and/or relying on ‘intuitive’ judgement (cf. Chazan 1997; 
Pettitt 2003: 38; Shea 2011a: 49, 2017: 29; Monnier and Missal 2014: 61) or empathetic ‘immersivity’ 
(Odell 2008: 81). A widely-held and complementary view is that chaîne opératoire analysis tends to 
‘conflate description and interpretation’ (e.g., Monnier 2009: 122; Bar-Yosef and Van Peer 2009: 
124f.). As becomes clear from Chapter 3, all of these criticisms target the hallmarks of ‘synthetic’ 
modes of reasoning. 
The Anglophone impression that French lithic analysis relies on “flashes of intuition” (Chazan 
1997: 728) is a result of difficulties to recognise the ‘synthetic’ fact that technical wholes are more-
than-compositional entities – ‘intuition’ is attested where French scholars reach out to these wholes in 
order to understand the signification of their parts. Likewise, the rather smooth transition between 
description and interpretation is simply a consequence of the ‘dialectic-hermeneutic’ character of anal-
ysis and argumentation in French lithic research (Chapter 3). The supposed ‘immersive’ quality of 
chaîne opératoire reconstructions derives from a mode of lithic knowledge production which is ‘un-
derstanding-based’ rather than ‘explanation-based’ (idem).837 Since knowledge is corroborated with 
the help of an ‘operational theory’ or a ‘coherence theory’ of cognitive criticism (see Chapters 2 and 5) 
– both inconsistent with the dominant ‘analytic’ modes of corroboration – lithic utterances seem to 
lack ‘objectivity.’ However, strictly ‘objectivist’ readings of the evidence – implying generic standards 
of ‘replicability,’ ‘predictability,’ and the context-independent ‘comparability’ of lithic results (cf. esp. 
Tostevin 2011b: 359) – are intrinsic features only of ‘analytic,’ especially ‘mechanistic,’ research orien-
tations. They cannot be seen as universally-valid standards of lithic knowledge production: 
Other lines of signature critique issued by Anglophone practitioners address the purported 
‘over-complexification’ of lithic inquiry in the French tradition (e.g., Scott 2011: 13; Shea 2013a: 154; 
2017a: xvii); its Durkheimian ‘obsession with self-movers’ (e.g., Shennan 1993: 58), its ‘essentialist’ 
and/or ‘reificationist’ tendencies (e.g., Shott 2010; Tostevin 2011b: 359; Shea 2014, 2017a: 192), lead-
ing to an ‘over-formalisation’ of research (Bar-Yosef and Van Peer 2009); and its ‘overemphasis on 
issues of intentionality’ (e.g., McPherron 1994; Sandgathe 2004; Dibble et al. 2017; cf. Wragg Sykes 
2009: 88)838. By taking up some of the key insights from Chapter 5, we can easily see that these charg-
es are the consequential result of criticising ‘synthetic’ approaches from a self-assertive ‘analytic’ view-
point.  
                                                          
836 Cf. “[…] A technological typology is as valid as any other, but it is imperative that the characteristic products resulting from 
the application of the reduction methods we choose to define can be clearly identified. The validity of any typological system 
relies entirely on the clarity and objectivity of its classification criteria. It can be seriously questioned whether this condition is 
fulfilled in the [chaîne opératoire] approach […].” (Bar-Yosef and Van Peer 2009: 10) 
837 Pepper (1942: 100) himself points out that there is likely disagreement among world theories to what degree a fact represents 
a ‘pure’ fact directly retrieved from the word or whether it must already count as a highly ‘interpreted,’ i.e. cognitively digested, 
fact. Varying descriptions of the same ‘fact’ may hence entail varying interpretations about the ‘purity’ of the encountered fact 
(cf. Stroud 2015: 274). Part of the work that a world hypothesis does is to specify which sort of ‘facts’ directly corroborate a claim 
and which do not or only do so indirectly – Pepper’s (1942: 48) distinction between ‘data’ and ‘danda’ serves to clear up this 
issue. When Anglophone practitioners depict chaîne opératoire approaches as yielding overly ‘interpretive’ accounts of the lithic 
evidence, this clearly indicates that both groups gauge the status and value of some ‘facts’ differently. The reason is of course 
that French researchers generally draw rather confidently on ‘synthetic’ lithic data while Anglophone scholars tend to concen-
trate exclusively on ‘analytic,’ part-related lithic data. For the former, the data of the latter often appear to be somewhat ‘lim-
ited;’ for the latter, conversely, the data of the former seem to be inherently ‘subjective.’ 
838 Admittedly, lithic ‘intentionality’ constitutes a locus of ongoing debate also among lithic ‘mechanists’ (the question of whether 
cognition has causal efficacy) and, perhaps more prominently, between lithic ‘mechanists’ and lithic ‘formists.’ 
“Critics under Pepper’s scheme of criticism would realize that their practice of criticism does 
imply a metaphysical scheme and its standards of evidence but that this scheme is not the only 
decisive metaphysical scheme.” (Stroud 2015: 285) 
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The first issue – the perceived ‘over-complexification’ of lithic research – has two dimensions. 
As we have seen in Chapters 3 and 5, French lithic research is based on an ‘anti-foundational’ attitude, 
eschewing ‘reductionism’ and embracing ‘emergentist’ perspectives on lithic technology; its strictly 
‘synthetic’ definition of technicity favours the investigation of internal principles of technological or-
ganisation. The implicated systemic approach to lithic technology considers complexity as a key axis of 
analysis (see esp. Chapter 3) – ‘contextualism’ investigates ‘textural’ complexity while ‘organicism’ 
charts the complex articulation of parts and wholes in temporally-extended organic processes (see esp. 
Chapter 5).839 At the same time, in ‘synthetic’ thought complexity is typically viewed as an ontological 
feature of reality, specifying how the world generally hangs together (Chapter 2). This often translates 
into complex ways of how the world ought to be reconstructed.840 Both ‘contextualism’ and ‘organi-
cism’ tend to steadily redefine lithic parts as wholes and wholes as parts in order to coordinate their 
evidence and to provide a comprehensive picture of lithic object-matters.841 In lithic ‘organicism,’ as 
amply demonstrated by the ‘techno-genetic approach’ (sensu Boëda 1997, 2005; Chapter 5, second 
part), complexity easily becomes an issue of epistemology because multiple scales of analysis have to 
be interrelated in order to examine organic evolutionary processes. The same is true for « Paléo-
histoire » (sensu Valentin 2008, 2015) which explicitly seeks to integrate several evidentiary domains 
in the longue durée. Clearly, this research orientation clashes with the Anglophone insistence on the 
cognitive virtues of ‘simplicity’ (cf. e.g., Kuhn 1995; Winterhalder and Smith 2000: 52).842 
Critique of the ‘self-mover’ conception reveals a similar clash of research standards. Shennan 
(1993: 58), for example, conveys this type of criticism by attacking the “Durkheimian insistence on 
explaining the social in terms of the social.” Explaining the social in terms of the social sounds indeed 
somewhat circular from the perspective of ‘analytic’ science. This circularity impression, however, 
derives from the circumstance that ‘analytic’ approaches identify parts in the world and externally 
relate them in various ways to infer their wholes (Chapter 1 and 3). The resultant inclination of Anglo-
phone lithic researchers to endorse ‘externalist’ explanations has been attested in Chapter 4. French 
‘synthetic’ inquiry, however, seeks to internally relate parts in order to grasp technical wholes. Parts 
and wholes may hence be of the same kind. The result is a strong commitment to object-specifity. This 
orientation seems to be strongest in ‘organicism’ where object- and/or domain-specific behaviours 
create path-dependencies and conflicts of becoming (Chapter 4, second part). Since these accounts are 
dynamic rather than static, explanatory circularity is avoided. 
 Finally, critics who call attention to issues of ‘reification’ and ‘over-intentionalisation’ are not 
doing much more than pointing to some basic structural characteristics of ‘synthetic’ approaches. The 
structural categories of ‘contextualism’ provide a convenient means of illustration. In lithic ‘contextu-
alism,’ technical wholes are analysed in terms of their ‘infrastructure’ (‘texture’) and characterised in 
terms of their ‘quality’ (see Chapter 4, first part). Since the objective is to determine what can be cir-
cumscribed as the ‘immanent total meaning’ of a whole, practitioners are inclined to talk about wholes 
in largely qualitative terms. The charge of ‘reification’ or ‘essentialisation’ therefore simply takes up 
the fact that ‘contextualistic’ approaches seek to isolate distinct lithic qualities. The related accusation 
that this type of lithic research often produces ‘over-formalised’ systems of classification misidentifies 
‘contextualistic’ typologies as ‘analytic’ taxonomies843 – ‘contextualistic’ classification, as shown in 
                                                          
839 Shea (2013a: 154), by contrast, argues that the internal complexities of varying flaking technologies are largely irrelevant for 
the bigger picture of human evolution. If such complexity denotes anything, it has to do with ‘culture-history’ rather than with 
the grand schemes of the evolutionary process (idem). He (ibid.: 3) even argues that his approach is able to show that “much of 
the perceived complexity of the lithic archaeological record reflects archaeological theory, method, and practice, rather than the 
intrinsic underlying complexity of the stone tools themselves.” 
840 Indirect evidence for the French tendency to champion more ‘sophisticated’ and ‘lengthy’ accounts is provided by Chapter 5 
which is not just coincidentally more extensive than its Anglophone counterpart. 
841 Shea (2017a: xvii) dismisses this coordinative endeavour as a “constant tinkering” to devise “ever more complex” narratives of 
the human past. 
842 Pepper (1942: 147f.), anticipating this general point of friction, notes that “there is nothing that […] a formist so enjoys as 
tearing down and into small pieces the “muddled” and “psychologized” logic of the organicist.” 
843 The strongest critique of ‘over-formalised’ technological typologies to date comes from Bar-Yosef and Van Peer (2009). These 
authors argue that chaîne opératoire analysis, despite its ‘often elaborate systems of description,’ has largely ‘failed to provide 
consistent definitions of its research categories’ (ibid.: 107, 113). They further show that systematic core-refits produce divergent 
results from a technological ‘lecture’ approach (conducted by themselves!). From this comparison they conclude that chaîne 
opératoire research faces serious problems of interpretation and is often unable to reconstruct lithic technology realistically. 
Their paper is a good example of the real-world difficulty to navigate dissimilar standards of research. Whether their argument 
is valid depends entirely on the quality of their technological ‘lecture’ (i.e., on the interpretive standards they employ). They, 
however, base their ‘lecture’ on a rather simplistic examination of technological types (ibid.: 108-110, Fig. 2 and 3). These types 
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Chapter 4, is fundamentally elastic and mutable.844 After all, it is precisely because of the inherent 
mutability of their interpretive categories that lithic ‘contextualists’ have to invest so much effort into 
(re-)organising their evidence. 
In order to unpack the issue of ‘over-intentionalisation’ – or what has generally been denunci-
ated as a practice of “chasing the rainbow” (Thomas 1986: 247) – we need to compare two extreme 
readings of the lithic evidence; the first is inspired by consolidated variants of ‘mechanism,’ the second 
by refined versions of ‘contextualism.’ From the point of view of the former, ‘intention’ remains a sus-
picious category since it may constitute a ‘derived’ and thus largely ‘ineffective’ feature of the world – 
‘mechanism’ tends to occupy minimalist positions with respect to the ‘intentionality’ of lithic technolo-
gy. The dismissive talk about palaeopsychology is a classic expression of this basic orientation (e.g., 
Binford 1972: 168). ‘Mechanists’ typically assume a ‘materialistic’ or ‘behaviouristic’ attitude when the 
question of cognition is prompted in lithic research (cf. Section 6.2).  
From the perspective of refined ‘contextualism,’ the world is stitched together in such a way 
that each fact is co-fashioned by all other facts. The consequence is that all relevant categories of reali-
ty both imbricate and implicate each other.845 This view directly leads to the classic interpretation of 
the chaîne opératoire (sensu Mauss, Leroi-Gourhan, Balfet, Cresswell, and Lemonnier) whose distinct 
materiality is thought to connote gestural, social, and cognitive aspects of human technicity alike (cf. 
Perlès 1991a; Bon 2009: 137f., 143). Alternatively, ‘technical intentions’ may be addressed by disclos-
ing the structural principles defining the internal organisation of technical wholes. The distinction 
between ‘structure’ (structure), ‘operation’ (fonctionnement), and ‘function’ (fonction) – central to 
French technological analysis – typically serves this particular purpose (Chapter 4, first part). ‘Inten-
tionality’ is therefore investigated by determining how lithic artefacts ‘act in context’ and how the 
above-mentioned structural domains of technology work together to secure distinct technical ‘quali-
ties’ (see esp. first part of Chapter 4 for a detailed exposition). 
Taken together, all of the presented examples can count as unambiguous instances of ‘signa-
ture critique.’ They confidently call into question basic pillars of alternatively tenable yet incommen-
surable perspectives on the lithic record. The nature and extent of defiance towards these ‘other’ cogni-
tive terms suggests that the critics regard lithic scholarship as agreeable enough to populate a single 
discursive space. Most critics presuppose ‘singularism’ in lithic research (sensu Krausz 1993) – an 
assumption that is inconsistent with the practical reality of inquiry as we have seen. That different 
standards of research may govern different cognitive projects seems to be almost inconceivable. This is 
a highly unfortunate situation since the ‘other,’ as a result, is portrayed primarily as an inferior figure 
rather than a competent expert. There is thus a real danger that the pragmatic reality of disagreement 
becomes overshadowed by essentially dogmatic claims. Having said this, similar types of criticism can 
of course also be found in the French literature, but they are not as pervasive there. As stressed in 
Chapter 1, discussions at the French-Anglophone interface sometimes appear to be surprisingly ‘ster-
ile’ and ‘unilateral’ – ‘signature critique’ is at least not as commonly levelled in press by French au-
thors.846 The few critical voices that have been printed (see Chapter 1) will be discussed in the remain-
der of this section. 
 
French scholars have traditionally criticised the interpretation of lithic typology in terms of ‘taxonomy’ 
or ‘systematics’ (e.g., Tixier 2012 [1978]; Perlès 1987; Valentin 1995; Boëda 1997), reaching a prelimi-
                                                                                                                                                                                     
are clearly not developed by means of a careful analysis of artefact inter-relations, they are based on an ‘objectivist’ theory of 
types. Their classification remains ‘analytic’ rather than ‘synthetic’ (let alone ‘contextualistic’). Therefore, they fail in their criti-
cism, because they do not meet the required standards. Rather ironically, they may have even shown that ‘analytic’ strategies of 
classification rather than ‘synthetic’ ones have basic difficulties with capturing distinct reduction sequences. The main reason 
why these authors identify the chaîne opératoire approach as a ‘typological procedure in disguise’ (ibid.: 113) seems at least that 
they have re-cast ‘synthetic’ classification in ‘analytic’ terms – the ‘Theory of Types’ being one of the latter’s classic manifesta-
tions.  
844 Contra Tostevin (2011b: 359) 
845 The term ‘imbrication’ is for example explicitly used by Pigeot (2004: 351) or Bon (2009: 213) to describe the interpretative 
value of chaîne opératoire reconstructions. 
846 French ‘signature critique’ is much more difficult to detect since it is often hidden in lengthy monographs and typically func-
tions to legitimate the account or narrative developed there. We rarely encounter specialised papers dedicated to the levelling of 
profound ‘signature critique.’ 
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nary apex in the resolute rejection of the ‘dogma of hylomorphism’ (Boëda 2013: 28f., 38).847 They 
have similarly come to repudiate what is perceived as deus ex machina explanations of Anglophone 
‘hard ecology’ approaches (Marchand 2014: 103), placing primary emphasis on a set of determinative 
environmental factors to illuminate the lithic record (cf. Perlès 1993; Bon 2009: esp. 119f., 179, 182; 
Langlais 2010; Boëda 2013: esp. 22, 42, 178, 223, 228).848 This line of ‘signature critique’ comes in 
many facets and includes the rebuttal of ‘ahistorical,’ ‘passive-reactive,’ and/or ‘non-creative’ concep-
tions of past hunter gatherer groups (e.g., Valentin et al. 2005; Valentin 2008; Bon 2009: 120; Valen-
tin and Bon 2012; Marchand 2014: 100-102); the proclamation of general concerns about notions of 
human-environment ‘autoregulation’ (Langlais 2010: 103); and the tendency to ridicule the ‘explana-
tory obsession with extra-societal and/or extra-technical forces of evolution’ (e.g., Boëda et al. 2001: 
27; Boëda 2005). The latest episode of this prevailing line of criticism has been ignited by leading fig-
ures of « Paléhistoire » currents. It expresses a growing unease with matters of ‘correlationism’ and 
fundamentally questions the cognitive value of chasing patterns of evolutionary co-variation (Valentin 
1995: 791, 2008: 41; cf. Marchand 2014: 109f.) – these voices try to overturn what they recognise as 
the ‘dogma of heteronomy’ in lithic studies. Based on the findings of Chapters 3 and 4, we can quickly 
see that the main thrust of this critique is similarly structural and targets ‘architectural’ features of 
‘analytic’ modes of lithic research. 
Reading typology in terms of ‘taxonomy’ or ‘systematics’ is a logical consequence of exalting a 
part-centred approach to the lithic evidence. From an ‘analytic’ perspective, lithic ‘types’ are primarily 
descriptive devices to capture the patterned structure of reality. ‘Types’ may also be purely ‘instrumen-
tal’ but in order to be significant they must be precisely definable by a set of discrete part-features (i.e. 
artefact ‘characters,’ ‘traits,’ ‘attributes,’ etc.). The standard approach is to define lithic types ‘mono-
thetically’ – as clusters of objects – or ‘polythetically’ – as clusters of attributes (cf. Clarke 1968: 37; 
McPherron 1994: 42; Gamble 2001: 54, 128-130). This cognitive orientation is strongest in ‘formism’ 
where the ‘Theory of Types’ (Chapter 2) motivates scholars to organise the available evidence on the 
basis of formal similarities between lithic parts (Chapter 4, first part). Yet we have seen that ‘mecha-
nistic’ approaches equally draw on ‘formistic’ categories to test their hypotheses; they thus practically 
rely on a similar treatment of evidence. The central strategy in ‘mechanism’ is to isolate the categories 
that are ‘effective,’ that is, help answering specialised lithic research questions. Finally, the issue of 
‘hylomorphism’ simply points to the ‘formistic’ distinction between ‘existence’ and ‘subsistence’ (Chap-
ter 2), capturing the idea that objects are configurations of form and matter yet form and matter must 
be kept apart since form is ‘shaped matter’ and thus necessarily created by something else than matter. 
The charge of ‘externalism’ and ‘ecological determinism’ touches upon the very foundations of 
establishing, evaluating, and corroborating knowledge claims in Anglophone lithic research. The first 
point is that ‘analytic’ inquiry is generally conducted by relating lithic parts externally. This not only 
leads to the identification of groups of parts, part-patterns, and other kinds of part-configurations, but 
feeds directly into the conception that categories or domains of reality – conceived as higher-level 
parts – also need to be externally related. In ‘formism,’ this is commonly captured by relating the cate-
gories of ‘existence’ to their ‘subsistent’ categories, whereas lithic ’mechanism’ seeks to uncover causal 
relationships and to map ‘secondary’ qualities onto ‘primary’ qualities.  
The talk about ‘causation,’ ‘constraining’ and/or ‘triggering’ factors, ‘mechanisms’ of change, 
and ‘first movers’ reflects this basic constitution (Chapter 4, second part). The insistence on the 
‘specifity of response’ and the ‘inevitability’ of effects inaugurates a strong principle of ‘heteronomy,’ 
but since order is conceived as categorical this heteronomic constitution of reality is captured by ‘lad-
der-like’ models (see Section 6.2). The particular modes of corroboration – centred on notions of ‘cor-
respondence’ and ‘causal-adjustment’ (Chapters 2 and 4) – characterise ‘analytic’ perspectives on lithic 
technology as creating a ‘correlationist’ obligation.  
When French scholars like Bon (2009: 179) criticise the ‘mechanical relationships’ (relations 
méchaniques) that come into view in this way, their critique pigeonholes the totality of ‘mechanistic’ 
perspectives. The refusal of ‘correlationism’ by Valentin and others (see supra) is similarly one-sided. 
All of these critics readily dismiss structural features of perspectives they don’t share, but overlook that 
                                                          
847 Boëda (2013) draws explicitly from Gilbert Simondon (1964: Chapitre 1) who has presented one of the most elaborate and 
forceful criticisms of the Aristotelian scheme of ‘hylomorphism.’ 
848 For a general overview of French prudence in the face of ‘environmental determinism,’ see also Perlès (2016). 
262 
 
these perspective have cognitive merit and offer equally tenable readings of the lithic past precisely 
because of these features. Their critique naturally follows from the standards of the world theories they 
have accepted but remains ‘hollow’ for the cognitive other because it undermines the entirety of their 
knowledge base – it remains destructive rather than being constructive. 
Langlais’ (2010: 103) scepticism about ecological ‘autoregulation’ signifies a similar clash of 
different world theory readings. Since French ‘contextualism’ and ‘organicism’ presuppose ‘disorder’ 
and ‘conflict’ and consider human-environment relations as necessarily mediated by the ‘technical 
milieu’, they conclude that there must always be at least residual tension between lithic technology and 
natural environments (see Chapter 5, second part). Anglophone ‘formism’ and ‘mechanism,’ by con-
trast, typically view technology as an ‘adaptive interface,’ regulating the reconciliation of human socie-
ties and external ecological conditions. Binford (1962: 218, 2001), for example, promoted a systemic 
view of the past in which coupled culture-environment systems are charted – the guiding assumption 
is that human ‘cultural systems’ directly articulate with natural ‘ecological systems.’ Interpretive no-
tions borrowed from ecological theory such as the ‘human niche’ (sensu Henry 1995; Shea 2003) have 
further solidified this view (cf. Kelly 2016: 29, 32).849 Through the prism of Neo-Darwinism and evolu-
tionary economics, the relation between organisms and their environment involves a set of equilibri-
um conditions (e.g., Collard and Foley 2002).850 In ‘mechanistic’ lithic research, ‘Deductive Equilibri-
um Methodologies’ (Van Huyck et al. 1990) can consequently be utilised in order to model and predict 
the link between technologies, societies, and natural environments (cf. e.g., Collard et al. 2005).  
All of this demonstrates that ‘signature critique’ is a major issue at the French-Anglophone 
boundary. The critique is equally devastating for both sides and there is no reason to believe that any 
side may emerge victorious.851 Many of the discussion points appear to be meaningless for the cogni-
tive ‘other’; the critique misses its mark since it fails to respect alternative cognitive standards in lithic 
knowledge production. As the present analysis has amply demonstrated, most issues cannot even be 
debated on strictly empirical grounds since they strongly feed into metaphysical quarrels about the 
world and how it hangs together. The encountered ‘signature critique,’ therefore, tends to raise largely 
irresolvable issues which can easily promote partisanship, lead to overly narrow or dogmatic cross-
theory interaction, and/or create a wide range of potential ‘no-debates.’ 
If we wish to return to meaningful and productive modes of interaction between French and Anglo-
phone practitioners, the rhetoric of lithic criticism has to be re-considered. Practitioners need to find a 
way of conveying their critique without demolishing the ‘other.’ This at the very least requires the 
translation of issues into a language the other can understand. Ideally, we would want to devise cri-
tique in such a way that the ‘other’ is in principle able to refine their position to deflect it. The implica-
tion is therefore not that contending viewpoints are immunised against all critique. Pepper’s world 
theory framework simply helps to recognise which types of critique are more likely to be productive. It 
offers a means to better determine ‘the bearings and validity of criticisms’ (Pepper 1935a: 374). 
 The prevailing ‘signature criticism’ at the French-Anglophone boundary reveals the limits of 
critical engagement. Following Scott Stroud (2015), we can enunciate that lithic practitioners need to 
realise these limitations and must develop a self-conscious attitude towards them. Proliferous critique 
can only be deployed if one is aware about its limits. Being amenable to the limits of oneself presup-
poses acquaintance with the cognitive proficiency of others. If we wish to base lithic knowledge on the 
broadest possible empirical foundation, the gates of cross-theory communication must generally be 
kept open. This is why ‘signature critique’ should be avoided whenever possible or realistic. Such cri-
                                                          
849 ‘Eco-Cultural-Niche-Modelling’ (ECNM) can count as a prominent expression of this ‘mechanistic,’ niche-based view of past 
techno-cultural realities (cf. Banks et al. 2006). 
850 The key is to understand that ‘equilibrium reasoning’ targets external relationships in ‘analytic’ research. This is important 
because we have seen in Chapter 5 (first part) that equilibrium considerations may also play a role in French technological anal-
yses but are typically evoked there to comprehend the internal regulatory principles of technical systems (‘texture’). ‘Equilibrium 
reasoning’ therefore tends to be ‘externalist’ in the Anglophone world while it is typically ‘internalist’ in the French tradition. In 
the former it is used to relate parts while in the latter it is used to understand the ‘operation’ (fonctionnement) of wholes. 
851 Since the four world theories are similarly adequate and equally fallible at the same time (cf. Appendix II.2), there is no 
independent standard available for identifying intellectual ‘victories’ in the first place. 
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tique tends to belabour and ‘ideologise’ a type of scholarly communication that is already difficult 
enough. ‘Signature critique’ usually opens a route of no return – it lances discursive one-way streets (« 
cul-de-sac ») which only lead to a cognitive nowhere. This type of criticism is thus unlikely to contrib-
ute to the substantial advancement of lithic knowledge: 
The pluralism of lithic approaches at the French-Anglophone boundary requires the cultivation of ‘crit-
ical practices’ that cheerfully recognise the cognitive significance of multiple equally admissible yet 
incompatible standards of knowledge and criticism. The subsequent section will take up this desidera-
tum and sketch a possible path towards the synergetic exploitation of world theories that crosscuts the 
‘analytic’-‘synthetic’ boundary. 
There is much to be gained at the French-Anglophone interface. The clash of incompatible but similar-
ly tenable approaches to the lithic evidence offers perhaps a singular opportunity to bring diverging 
lithic perspectives into fruitful dialogue. The pluralism of lithic knowledge production epitomised by 
the French-Anglophone divide calls for laying dogmatic hostilities to rest and respecting cognitive 
‘others’ as highly competent experts. However, a truly ‘pluralistic stance’ in lithic analysis – basically 
without any alternative if we wish to avert undesirable dogmatism – can only be cultivated if lithic 
scholarship begins to concern itself more seriously with the epistemological foundations of its diverse 
practices. This concern must transcend well-established cognitive boundaries and try to incorporate as 
many of the existing lithic approaches as possible. We cannot content ourselves with being reflexive 
only about ‘analytic’ research for example. The theory and epistemology of lithic analysis needs to take 
the full spectrum of tenable research perspectives into account. Arguably, the importance of this last 
point has hitherto often been overlooked. A basic reason is that the very notion of ‘science’ remains as 
contested as in any other field of inquiry. Through the lens of the pluralism developed here, we can 
recognise that scientificity can only be negotiated in maximally inclusive terms since its various con-
ceptions flow out of internalised standards of lithic research, and these standards may fundamentally 
differ between approaches and research traditions. 
 Pepper’s metatheoretical framework of four equally adequate world hypotheses not only helps 
to clarify the sources and signification of research conflicts at the French-Anglophone boundary, it also 
explains why it remains so difficult to find meaningful ways of engagement and communication to 
bridge the divide. The organisation of lithic research into ‘synthetic’ and ‘analytic’ compartments – 
further subdivided either into ‘contextualistic’ and/or ‘organicistic’ strands on the French side or into 
‘formistic,’ and/or ‘mechanistic’ strands on the Anglophone side – illuminates the circumstance that 
varying approaches respond to distinct theories of corroborative truth and cognitive criticism. Each of 
the four perspectives supplies itself with particular standards of inquiry not shared by the other per-
spectives. The negotiation of research conflicts at the French-Anglophone boundary therefore premis-
es the positive acknowledgement of these differences. Since all of the four major angles of inquiry are 
capable to provide equally valuable viewpoints on the lithic record, scholars are encouraged to further 
cultivate and refine them. By laying bare the basic conceptual canon of the four world theory positions, 
Pepper’s perspective may provide critical assistance in this undertaking. 
 If we wish to draw from the full spectrum of lithic facts – as Pepper would clearly re-commend 
– lithic practitioners have to invest some effort and try to find more effective ways of learning from 
each other. This at least compels us to reflect about possible ways of framing cross-theory engagement 
more effectively. I can only advise to alleviate the intuitively strong aspiration to search for common 
methodological and/or theoretical research coordinates in order to bring scholars from both sides 
together again. In light of the present study, it seems much more promising if lithic scholars would 
“For the sort of evidentiary pluralism enunciated here, we must find a way to engage others, and 
that way seems to be in pursuing criticism while realizing the limits of one’s approach. That is 
easier to say than to practice, of course. […] If one must [engage in reasoned criticism] in con-
cert with others, and if one recognizes the cognitive shortcomings to simple and forceful parti-
san dogmatism, then one ought to follow Pepper’s lead and find a pluralistic way to orient one’s 
self to the claims of self and other, even when they actually or potentially disagree.” (Stroud 
2015:  288) 
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seek out potential ‘topical’ rapprochements. A partial topical integration of French and Anglophone 
strands of lithic research is more likely to be successful because it can accommodate the fact that simi-
lar concepts or ideas are often put to work differently. Arguably, some axes of topical convergence are 
already identifiable in the expert literature.  
Examples of practically pre-established meeting points are the ‘design’ aspects of lithic tech-
nology (Bleed, Binford, Pelegrin, Delagnes); issues of mobility and the spatial organisation of technical 
needs (Kelly, Binford, Kuhn, Geneste, Perlès, Bon, Marchand, Audouze, Soriano, Renard and 
Ducasse), ‘landscape learning’ (Davies, Kelly, Rockman, Mevel, Anderson et al.), the ‘life-history’ or 
‘biography’ of different technical objects (Dibble, McPherron, Kuhn, Bon, Soressi, Bourguignon, 
Boëda), mimetics and technical borrowing (Tostevin, Roussel, Soressi), the technicity of children and 
the question of apprenticeship (Spikins, Nowell, Shea, Zubrow, Pigeot, Ploux, Audouze),852 the long-
term trajectories of lithic evolution (Marks, Monigal, Kuhn, Shea, Pigeot, Chevrier, Boëda), human-
cognition-technology co-evolution (Gowlett, Stout et al., Pigeot, Roche, Pelegrin), and ‘material pre-
furnishing’ or ‘ecological inheritance’ (Barton, Riel-Salvatore, Valentin). Since human-environment 
relations have lately received a lot of attention by French scholars (Marchand, Valentin, Langlais), we 
may add this general theme as another emerging ‘trading zone’ (sensu Galison 1997).853 The conceptu-
al examination of these newer French research currents indicates that ‘resilience’ and ‘sustainability’ 
may be considered an additional future meeting point (Chapter 5, second part).854 All of these exam-
ples are encouraging and suggest that pragmatic topical interaction may be the way to proceed. Future 
epistemological work should focus on the identification of similar vectors of realised or unrealised 
topical overlap. Again, Pepper’s optic of four world theories should provide critical guidance in this 
task. 
Another promising future perspective may be developed out of the relative complementarity of 
the four major research orientations competing in the French-Anglophone divide. (These considera-
tions are naturally abstract and remain fairly general, but they nonetheless point to the practical bene-
fits of analysing research conflicts in terms of Pepper’s four relatively adequate world hypotheses.) The 
idea would be to creatively make use of the core tenets of particular world theories to the advantage of 
other theories that do not normally profit from them. This approach is necessarily somewhat experi-
mental, but it promises to unlock new facts, ideas, questions, arguments, and perhaps even entire are-
as of inquiry. The contention here is simply that styles of reasoning sponsored by distinct world theo-
ries can be expected to have unique strengths and capacities in spawning or refining relevant concep-
tual resources (cf. e.g., Chang 2012: 255). 
An example in the present context is knowledge about technical ‘textures’ and ‘qualities’ sup-
plied by lithic ‘contextualism.’ The respective insights may be transferred into discrete data points 
(‘characters,’ ‘traits,’ attributes, etc.) and then examined in terms of the categories of ‘formism’ and/or 
‘mechanism.’ Interpretive concepts furnished by ‘contextualism’ may also be considered potential ‘sub-
sistent’ categories for ‘formistic’ approaches. ‘Mechanism’ may profit from the two ‘synthetic’ theories 
by adding their insights to its list of competing hypotheses. This would help to circumvent the issue of 
unconceived explanatory alternatives (sensu Stanford 2001, 2006; cf. Chapter 1) and potentially 
strengthen ‘mechanistic’ arguments. Personally, I believe that more explicit tests of spatial (i.e., ‘volu-
metric,’ ‘geographic, or ‘topological’) explanations of lithic intra-assemblage variability could be par-
ticularly beneficial here. ‘Organicism,’ on the other hand, may especially take advantage of the experi-
mental angle of ‘mechanistic’ research since controlled tests under (quasi-)laboratory conditions 
should contribute to a better understanding of technical ‘nexuses’ and supplement information derived 
from personal knapping experience. An analogous argument can be made for the potential role of sim-
ulation in ‘organicism.’ Likewise, ‘synthetic’ lithic perspectives may borrow specific quantitative meth-
                                                          
852 See for example Shott and Tostevin’s (2015: 379f.) explicit discussion of French technological concepts (technique, méthode, 
savoir-faire, connaissance) in the context of ‘analytic’ research perspectives on ‘bipolar technology’ around the globe. 
853 According to philosopher of science Peter Galison (1997: 783), with the help of ‘trading zones’ even scientists who pursue 
radically different research paradigms may work together and exchange ideas if they can define local coordinates of conver-
gence: “[…] [t]wo groups can agree on rules of exchange even if they ascribe utterly different significance to the objects being 
exchanged; they may even disagree on the meaning of the exchange process itself. Nonetheless, the trading partners can ham-
mer out a local coordination, despite vast global differences. In an even more sophisticated way, cultures in interaction frequent-
ly establish contact languages, systems of discourse that can vary from the most function-specific jargons, through semi-specific 
pidgins, to full-fledged creoles rich enough to support activities as complex as poetry and metalinguistic reflection.” 
854 See Gunderson (2000) for an overview of ‘resilience’ research in ecology. 
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ods from ‘analytic’ research, especially ‘formism,’ to provide an even denser account of wholes and 
their ‘infrastructures’ (and to further back up their whole-interpretations).855 ‘Analytic’ approaches, in 
turn, would certainly benefit from paying more attention to the interpretation of non-correlations and 
domain-specific behaviours. 
All of these reflections suggest that an ‘engaged pluralism,’ if taken seriously, can greatly facili-
tate the advancement of lithic knowledge. Following Pepper’s lead, we can hold that students of lithic 
analysis who aspire balanced, preferably complete, and multi-angled lithic knowledge should be recep-
tive to all of the four world theory perspectives. Respecting the pluralistic condition of lithic knowledge 
and its criticism means renouncing all forms of lithic dogmatism. This is admittedly more easily said 
than done – the general ‘evidentiary deficiencies’ of the lithic record from the deep past easily foster 
the ‘ideologisation’ of research (see also Chapter 1): 
The French-Anglophone divide in lithic studies is both a blessing and a curse. The disad-
vantage is that the sociological and historical processes which have consolidated specific modes of 
cognition on both sides and thereby created the divide currently hamper meaningful communication 
and generally undermine a crossing of research perspectives. The advantage is that this ‘sealing of 
discursive spaces’ provides an immense opportunity to develop and refine alternative research orienta-
tions in a highly focussed and problem-oriented manner. We can only hope that this and other plural-
isms in lithic research can be conserved. 
 A final but important insight seems to be that the ‘analytic’-‘synthetic’ opposition characteris-
ing much of the French-Anglophone divide must not be a role model for lithic research at large. Scien-
tific communities are not necessarily bound to cultivating either an ‘analytic’ or a ‘synthetic’ research 
agenda. Even though the distinction makes sense as an organisational principle at the French-
Anglophone interface, alternative world theory combinations may be developed to throw light on the 
lithic record. Other research traditions – e.g., Italian, Spanish, German, or Russian Palaeolithic ar-
chaeology – are likely to cultivate other world theory configurations. This opens up an important com-
parative perspective on the conceptual foundations of varying research communities disputing the 
lithic evidence: 
Only future research can map these credible alternatives and compare them with the findings of the 
present study. A broader comparative perspective should make it possible to assess the originality and 
creative potential of different world theory configurations in lithic research. This, in turn, would per-
haps enable a better management of the available conceptual resources in lithic analysis. 
 
                                                          
855 One may argue that this logic of integrating ‘analytic’ procedures is already recognised. Some circles of lithic research in 
France, especially an emerging new generation of scholars working outside of Paris, are increasingly integrating quantitative 
methods into their predominantly qualitative accounts. There is a real potential here to finally bring home some of the lost sons 
of the French tradition – François Bordes and Georges Laplace – for they may offer an affordable entry point into quantitative 
reasoning. The Bordeaux school with its natural history legacy may play an important role in this undertaking. It is important to 
note, however, that it is not likely that quantitative reasoning will assume a primary role in casting the lithic evidence in the 
French tradition any time soon. From the perspective of ‘synthetic’ research, quantitative analysis may contribute to the under-
standing of intra-whole configurations but it cannot help in reaching out to these wholes directly since this would simply trans-
form lithic inquiry into an ‘analytic’ endeavour. 
“A tendency to resort to dogmatism is particularly noticeable in situations where the supply of 
evidence is scarcest, which in itself should be evidence enough against such claims.” (Pepper 
1942: 317) 
 
“It is one of the most important tasks in comparative epistemology to find out how conceptions 
and hazy ideas pass from one thought style to another, how they emerge as spontaneously gener-
ated pre-ideas, and how they are preserved as enduring, rigid structures [Gebilde] owing to a kind 
of harmony of illusions. It is only by such a comparison and investigation of the relevant interrela-





In World Hypotheses (1942), Pepper openly expressed his personal inclination to regard ‘mechanism’ 
as the more potent ‘analytic-integrative’ world theory, and ‘contextualism’ as the more pregnant ‘syn-
thetic-dispersive’ theory: 
This preference remained fairly intact until the end of his life and resulted in the late Concept and 
Quality (1976) where Pepper sought to fuse both theories in order to forge a fifth, more powerful world 
theory – ‘selectivism.’ Although this attempt is widely regarded to have been unsuccessful, his world 
theory preferences remain noteworthy and can be compared to my own impression of the pros and 
cons of varying world theories, as they come to view in lithic research. 
I generally think that the exposition of world theory ramifications in lithic analysis shows that 
the role and function of world hypotheses is flexible and depends on the socio-historical context of 
research. Tapping into the same world theory has not always the same research effects. World hypoth-
eses therefore shape discursive formations but are also shaped by them. The relationship between the 
cognitive resources provided by a world theory and the discursive context of scientific investigation is 
reciprocal. The consequence is that the cognitive efficacy of a world theory may differ significantly 
between subjects, fields, and/or disciplines. The assessment of world theories in particular scientific 
contexts can therefore only be successful if we take into account how they resonate with other theories 
and specific object-matters. Personally, I believe that the differential contribution of world theories to 
the establishment of productive ‘discursive spaces’ (sensu Foucault 1972) is an interesting venue of 
investigation. The upshot seems to be that the value of world theories depends entirely on their practi-
cal application and there is no reason to believe that any of them should be generally preferred to any 
other. 
A good example is the ‘synthetic’-‘analytic’ duality at the French-Anglophone boundary. As 
Pepper himself admits (see supra), we are inclined to assume that the ideal combination of world the-
ories would exploit the complementary specialisation of ‘analytic’ and ‘synthetic’ stances. The French-
Anglophone divide, however, demonstrates that this is only half the truth. The simplest way to main-
tain relative cognitive coherence within a shared discursive space is to specialise either in ‘analytic’ or 
in ‘synthetic’ reasoning. Communication is greatly facilitated if one does not need to bridge the thresh-
old between ‘analytic’ and ‘synthetic’ thought. The ‘Binford-Bordes debate’ (see Chapter 1) is a classic 
case in point. This debate could become a proper debate only because ‘formistic’ reasoning meant 
something to both French and Anglo-American lithic researchers at the time. The two disputing par-
ties, in other words, could at least agree on the basic terms of discussion. 
An additional realisation is that even the ‘integrative’ theories may assume a different status in 
varying research contexts. The direct comparison of French and Anglophone lithic research at least 
suggests that ‘mechanism’ and ‘organicism’ play an almost inversed role in their discursive spaces. 
Whereas ‘organicism’ typically builds on ‘contextualistic’ data and seeks to put these into the perspec-
tive of the durée, ‘mechanism’ tends to provide basic insights for ‘formism’ which then interprets larg-
er lithic data-sets based on these insights. ‘Mechanism’ seems to be strongest on the micro-level of 
‘integrative’ analysis (experimentation, simulation, etc.) while ‘organicism’ appears to be strongest at 
the macro-level of ‘integrative’ analysis (synoptic outlook, big narratives). This, in my view, reflects the 
‘over-specialisation’ of the former into the examination of horizontal relationships, and of the latter 
into charting vertical relationships. 
“It almost seems as if the four hypotheses drew together and had a tendency to pull cognitively 
toward the center, as if most cognitive adequacy lay somewhere between mechanism and con-
textualism. This appearance is strengthened by our previous comments to the effect that form-
ism seems to be the weaker of the analytical theories, and organicism the weaker of the synthet-
ic theories. This leaves mechanism as the stronger analytical and integrative theory, and contex-
tualism as the stronger synthetic and dispersive theory. We are tempted to surmise that whatev-
er system there is in the world is of a mechanistic type, and whatever dynamic vitality, of the 
contextualistic sort.” (Pepper 1942: 148) 
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It may be argued that the relationship between the ‘dispersive’ theories – ‘formism’ and ‘con-
textualism’ – is of a complementary nature. ‘Contextualism’ seems to be strongest where the object of 
research (e.g., assemblages, periods) can easily be defined; ‘formism,’ by contrast, is more proliferate 
in how it handles evidence and seems strongest simply where it is successful in amassing large 
amounts of lithic data. We may therefore conclude that the former is stronger on the micro-level of 
‘dispersive’ analysis, whereas the latter is stronger on the macro-level of the same. It may then not 
surprise that in the Anglophone tradition the larger narratives about human evolution have tradition-
ally been supplied by ‘formistic’ inquiry. 
All of this indicates that the give and take between the various world theories is much more 
complex than Pepper’s statement suggests – a fact that even he himself admits (cf. Pepper 1942: esp. 
148). As a consequence, it is impossible to know the pros and cons of different world theories in differ-
ent research contexts before one has analysed them empirically. Distinct objects of science may lend 
themselves to different modes of analysis and make it easier for some world theories to be successful, 
underscoring again that the objects of science have an important say in how they are interpreted. 
This last aspect may be reflected in the average performance qualities of the different world 
theories in lithic research. My personal impression is that the ‘integrative’ theories seem to be the 
more inconsistent performers but for different reasons. ‘Mechanism,’ in my view, tends to overstate its 
field of application and often over-extrapolates its findings. It also becomes easily dogmatic (‘Believe in 
this causal principle or don’t do science!’). The primary source of performance inconsistency in ‘organ-
icism’ is its conceptual complexity. It often makes it difficult for practitioners to transfer ‘organicistic’ 
ideas into transparent and digestible argumentations or writings. ‘Organicism,’ too, can become easily 
dogmatic and often refuses to defend itself against its critics (problem of ‘initiates’ and ‘un-
initiates’).856 The average performance of ‘dispersive’ lithic research appears to be more consistent; 
‘formism’ and ‘contextualism’ tend to be on average the more reliable lithic knowledge producers. 
As a final point of contention, one can consider the trade-off between epistemic risk and gain. I 
would argue that ‘synthetic’ perspectives on the lithic record typically involve higher epistemic risk 
since they rely more extensively on interpretive methods (Chapter 3). In exchange, the knowledge gain 
is often exceptionally high. ‘Analytic’ approaches, by contrast, typically invest a lot of resources into 
reducing the epistemic risk involved in lithic inquiry – some of these approaches are specifically de-
signed to eliminate as much residual interpretive load as possible. This, in return, establishes the ten-
dency to yield fairly ‘shallow,’ ‘dull,’ and sometimes somewhat ‘trivial’ conclusions (with the notable 
exception of successful prognosis). This is not to say that ‘analytic’ accounts are less important than 
‘synthetic’ ones, but simply highlights the fact that they tend to be more basic and prima facie appear 
to be much less ‘exciting.’857 
The whole discussion – admittedly sometimes placed on fairly ‘thin ice’ – indicates that the 
potential of the four world theories to contribute to the advancement of lithic knowledge is fundamen-
tally different and clearly hinges upon the dynamics of interaction with their sister theories. The give 
and take between world theories appears to be highly intricate and we should not presume that the 




                                                          
856 This hesitancy to openly defend one’s own position against critics seems to be related to the theory’s internal conceptual 
complexity. To draft a proper and poignant defence of the ‘organicistic’ standpoint would require the investment of much time 
and effort – time and effort that may be better spent through advancing one’s own cause rather than justifying its basic premis-
es. 
857 This trade-off between ‘analytic’ and ‘synthetic’ approaches, if adequate, mirrors the old dilemma of navigating ‘processual’ 
(objective-scientific) and ‘post-processual’ (interpretive-hermeneutic) research in British and American archaeology (e.g., Wylie 
1989). In the words of Lucas (2012: 2): “[t]hat dilemma, one may recall, invoked the opposition between a safe, yet dull descrip-
tion of the archaeological record (artifact physics) and a more speculative, yet exciting interpretation.” 
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FAQ – Frequently Asked Questions 
 
The purpose of this FAQ is to take up some of the criticism possibly raised against the foregoing analysis 
and to clarify its implications as well as my main arguments and standpoints. The aim is to prevent 
misunderstandings from the start and to help readers to clearly see what is claimed or implied, and what 
is not. The selected range of questions cannot account for every possible spark of criticism of course, but 
the provided deliberations should give the reader at least a profound sense of what my answers to non-
anticipated questions may have been. 
 
Don’t you think that you overrate the importance of the French-Anglophone divide in con-
temporary lithic studies? 
Perhaps, and there are certainly different opinions about this issue, including my own. But these view-
points do not matter much in the present problem-context because the question, strictly speaking, is not 
at stake in the study. This study was merely concerned with analysing and evaluating the nature and 
reality of the divide, not with demonstrating its paramount significance (see Introduction). In the same 
way as the mere investigation of a certain lithic collection does not imply that this collection is neces-
sarily more important than other collections, examining the French-Anglophone divide does not imply 
that the divide stands for the most pressing issue in current-day lithic research. This being said, I have 
clearly shown that the divide has some significance (see esp. Chapter 6) and this fact alone is warranting. 
In the end, I leave it to my readership to gauge whether the divide is important enough to keep us 
occupied. 
 
Is the juxtaposition between ‘French’ and ‘Anglophone’ not problematic in itself? Aren’t 
you rather referring to a clash between some (radical) French researchers and all the 
rest? 
Contrary to common belief, a detailed survey of the field reveals that there are not necessarily more 
Anglophone scholars, especially not if one takes into account only those exclusively specialising in lithic 
analysis (these differences are also touched upon in in Chapter 1: pp. 21-23). In numerical terms, the 
two spheres are comparable enough. In addition, I do not conceive of the two poles primarily in terms 
of nationality. Their significance in the foregoing study is rather historical as well as sociological (see 
Appendix I.1). The circumstance that the ‘Anglophone’ world appears to be more permeable to schol-
ars trained elsewhere is part of the relevant division, not a difficulty of the study itself. Positing that the 
category of ‘Anglophone’ is primarily defined negatively, that is, as ‘non-French’, further overlooks the 
many other national research traditions encountered across the Palaeolithic research landscape not in-
cluded in this study. The radicality charge does also not apply since the same cognitive ‘radicality’ can 
arguably be attested to many of the examined Anglophone researchers. 
 
Don’t you distort the internal variability of lithic inquiry on both sides by foregrounding 
the differences between French and Anglophone approaches? 
As I explain in detail in Chapters 2 and 6, it is precisely the advantage of utilizing Pepper’s epistemolog-
ical framework to shed light on both the dynamics of the involved external and internal relationships. 
World hypotheses help to explain, in other words, not only what is put at stake by the divide itself, but 
also what drives the respective French and Anglophone discourses and what the nature of the key de-
bates is. A classic example is the controversial interpretation of Mousterian typological variability in the 
Anglophone world, initiated by Sally and Lewis Binford in the late 1960s, which, as I have shown, can 
profitably be reconstructed as a difficulty to consolidate ‘formistic’ and ‘mechanistic’ research perspec-
tives (cf. Chapter 6: p. 247f.). 
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Does the focus on the ‘divide’ not downplay cross-fertilising interactions between the two 
sides which undoubtedly took place? 
It is true that I have mainly concentrated on the dividing features throughout my analysis. The reason 
is that many prima facie similarities turn out to be delusional after careful examination; this is also why 
I speak of ‘conceptual equivocality’ in Chapter 6. Even though I regard the increasing topical conver-
gence between French and Anglophone lithic research as an opportunity (Chapter 6: p. 263f.), this 
should not belie the circumstance that many terminological convergences cannot be carried through to 
the conceptual level. In the end, the term chaîne opératoire, for example, stands for different research 
projects and theoretical commitments on both sides (cf. Chapter 6: pp. 240-243). Similar research ques-
tions are pursued by different means and concepts are not simply borrowed but translated and adapted. 
I provide a number of examples for this dynamic throughout the chapters (e.g., Chapter 5: p. 184, 192 
and 193 as well as the discussion of conceptual equivocality in Chapter 6: pp. 240-250). Although I do 
not deny the reality of cross-fertilisation at the French-Anglophone interface, my point was to elucidate 
that quite often, the borrowed questions, concepts, or methods develop a ‘life of their own’ in their new 
cognitive environment and are put to use in rather different ways. It is indispensable, in my view, that 
we recognize this dynamic and are aware of it. 
 As a related note, the fact that the divide is perhaps not so much seen as an important issue 
anymore by the participants themselves is probably an outcome of more general transformations which 
have affected Palaeolithic research in the last decade or so. Modern scientific practice in the field tends 
to be hyper-pragmatic. Fighting intellectual battles has become largely anachronistic and the focus now 
lies on pragmatically integrating different lines of analysis within interdisciplinary, and often interna-
tional, teams of researchers. In this way, scholars may contribute to multiple papers which, strictly 
speaking, cannot be consolidated conceptually. This modern situation, perhaps more than before, there-
fore demands the careful investigation of the sociological and historical context of each scholarly pro-
duction. However, this situation does not imply that epistemological differences in lithic research have 
become unreal, nor does it show that approaches are becoming increasingly ‘pluralistic.’ 
 
Why have you not paid more attention to the careful and comprehensive definition of 
what you mean by ‘lithic research’? 
Because any attempt to do so would have undermined my global argument. Understandings of lithic 
research are just as variable as conceptions of ‘technology’ and ‘knowledge’, and it is in fact the whole 
point of the present study to bring to light that the four world hypotheses support divergent understand-
ings of these notions, ‘lithic research’ being no exception. The relevant aspects are explicitly touched 
upon in Chapter 1 and discussed extensively in Chapter 6. 
 A pragmatic understanding of lithic research, as provided at the outset of this study (see ‘Key 
notions’), must hence suffice as a starting point of analysis. 
 
Why does the analysis feature allegedly Anglophone scholars who are neither English nor 
American? 
The two spheres of scholarly practice are not defined by shared nationality or exclusively in terms of the 
current working environment of individuals. Rather, ‘French’ and ‘Anglophone’ simply denote ‘commu-
nities of thought’ (sensu Fleck 1935 [1979]; cf. Chapter 1) and the attribution of individual researchers 
is based on their early education, their intellectual legacy, their entanglement with either of the two 
discursive formations, and their current role and impact in the same (cf. Appendix I.1). The geographic 
mobility of scholars is simply part of the difference between the two systems of practice and thought. 
The various sociograms included in Appendix I.1 further illustrate this circumstance and, among other 
things, allow for a comparative analysis of differential levels of intra-tradition mobility that varying so-





Is it not a problem that the work of some researchers can be tied to a specific world hy-
pothesis with relative ease, while the work of others is much more difficult to attribute to 
a particular canon of structural categories? 
Not at all. In general, this situation simply highlights that the relationship between individual thought 
and collective thought is complex in science, and that research has to operate within a ‘mangle of prac-
tice’ (Pickering 1995). The point is that a concern with world hypotheses is a concern ‘with issues, rather 
than men’ (cf. Pepper 1942: back of the book). World hypotheses operate beyond individual preferences, 
motives, and convictions. Different people may contribute differently and at different times to different 
world hypotheses – a point that I explicitly discuss in my analysis (Chapter 6: p. 251f.); some researchers 
also tend to be more eclectic than others (cf. Chapter 6: pp. 238-240; see also next question). By recog-
nising the non-identity of people and world hypotheses, I give a place to scholarly action and 
acknowledge that individuals have the capacity to make a real difference in the advancement of the cog-
nitive systems they adopt. This also shows that individuals are not completely and utterly at the mercy 
of world theories – an important point if one wishes to avoid blunt reductionism.  
 
Why this focus on individual world hypotheses? Isn’t the real problem that everybody is 
to some extent eclectic and consequently brings to bear hybrid cognitive resources? 
Yes and no. There is no doubt that research often tends to be eclectic, but it is equally true that different 
scholars and lager ‘schools of research’ borrow to varying degrees from the different world theories (cf. 
Chapter 2: pp. 63-67; Chapter 6: pp. 238-240; Afterword: p. 268). Many scholars even reject particular 
world theories – sometimes more explicitly, sometimes less explicitly. Focusing on eclecticism rather 
than on the guiding role of ‘pure’ world theories prevents us from understanding the differential effect 
of these theories, why individual researchers sometimes feel the need to alter their cognitive framing, 
and why particular world theories are so fiercely antagonised by some. I elucidate and illustrate these 
key aspects at various stages of my analysis.  
There are two larger issues, however, which are crucial to take into consideration here. First, 
eclecticism is not per se a negative quality of thought, it is often an important locus of discovery and 
conceptual innovation. The combination and pseudo-integration of structural categories that eclectic 
approaches offer can lead to crucial re-interpretations and refinements of these categories. Similarly, 
new questions and methodologies may be discovered in this way. In general, eclecticism forces some 
kind of synthesis which, in turn, may unlock something new or dismantle previously unrecognised the-
oretical needs. Secondly, recognising the value of ‘purity’ with regards to world hypotheses helps to un-
derstand cognitive advances, confusions, and difficulties which would otherwise remain puzzling. Pep-
per’s (1942) original argument was that a marriage of two counteracting ‘root metaphors’ would inevi-
tably lead to some conflict among interpretive categories and thus ultimately hamper the capacity of the 
respective approaches to criticise their findings without self-undermining (i.e., establish what they 
would consider ‘true’ without serious internal inconsistency). Cognitive progress can hence be defined 
as the overcoming of intrinsic conceptual conflicts by rendering a cognitive system more and more co-
herent; this is also a remedy against unconstraint relativism. Hence, the more general point is that men-
tioned features of scientific practice, arguably, cannot be understood without invoking the notion of 
conceptual ‘purity’. 
The implication is that some cognitive resources should be reserved for refining and cultivating 
the structural categories of each world hypotheses. The only reason why this point was not emphasised 
more strongly in the analysis is that the plurality of world hypotheses appeared to be a more pressing 
concern given the current state of lithic research. 
 
Are ‘integrative’ world theories mono-causal and ‘dispersive’ theories multi-causal? 
No, this is a common misconception. The difference between ‘integrative’ and ‘dispersive’ has nothing 
to do with the spread of determination, let alone with ‘causality’ which is a concept only fully embraced 
by ‘mechanism.’ Rather, the distinction calls to attention the prejudiced structure of reality and the over-
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all strength and importance of determination that goes along with it. Because ‘integrative’ theories con-
sider the world as much stronger determined than ‘dispersive’ theories commonly do, the former have 
less trouble to regard some facts as irrelevant than the latter. Dispersivity, by contrast, especially in 
‘contextualism,’ can imply an indecisiveness about the direction, location, and/or orderliness of deter-
minative relationships. ‘Integrative’ theories may consequently be mono- and multi-causal at the same 
time, but they typically stress the significance of determination as well as its (temporal) structure. A 
classic example is provided by the interpretation of ‘history’ in ‘contextualism’ and ‘organicism.’ For the 
former, history is typically all about contingency and various historical contexts are regarded to co-exist 
or follow up on each other in rather ‘loose’ fashion; for the latter, by contrast, history denotes a deter-
minative process during which counteracting micro-contexts are resolved into a coherent organic whole 
– in other words, the various historical contexts are shown to represent effective stages of long-term 
becoming (cf. Chapter 2). 
  Having said this, the recognition of multi-causality, especially paired with the notion of distrib-
uted agency, is more likely to promote ‘dispersive’ treatments of evidence, but this link is by no means a 
necessary one. 
 
Why is the historical and inter-personal context of the invoked case studies not explicitly 
discussed? 
Because the focus of this study was systematic, not historical (cf. e.g., Cucen 2017 for some aspects of 
this distinction). For relevant historical background information feeding into the selection of case stud-
ies, the reader is referred to Appendix III.4. 
 
What are the implications of the promoted perspective for our understanding of discipli-
nary history? 
Macro-historically, Pepper’s perspective allows us to recognise that the French-Anglophone divide has 
matured only recently, i.e., between the 1960s and 1980s. Before this period of transition, both research 
spheres were arguably anchored in ‘formistic’ thought – in the French case probably complemented by 
a distinct ‘organicistic’ element. The development of the various ‘New’ archaeologies including Paleoan-
thropology would then trigger a marked shift towards ‘mechanistic’ reasoning in the Anglophone world 
– creating the contemporary configuration of ‘formism’ and ‘mechanism.’ The emergence of « Ethnolo-
gie préhistoire » and « Technologie préhistoire » has re-oriented lithic research in France towards ‘con-
textualistic’ inquiry – a trend that was recently supplemented by re-invigorating the ‘organicistic’ herit-
age of the ‘Early’ Leroi-Gourhan and others. Needless to say, this emerging ‘macro-vision’ of the parting 
of ways between French and Anglophone approaches in Palaeolithic archaeology must be further sub-
stantiated by future historical and epistemological research. 
 
Is the division you outline not simply a reiteration of the old chasm between ‘processual-
ism’ and ‘post-processualism’? 
No. These two labels only circumscribe theoretical and conceptual developments in the Anglophone 
world; although the division between ‘processualism’ and ‘post-processualism’ probably re-produces the 
same separation of world theories as the French-Anglophone divide, the French side has come to imple-
ment both ‘contextualism’ and ‘organicism’ in rather different ways than Anglophone ‘post-processual-
ists’ have done. The central point is that ‘post-processualism’ should be understood as a specific histor-
ical manifestation of ‘synthetic’ thought, but is – as several French scholars have emphasised on multi-
ple occasions – ‘not bound to happen everywhere’ (e.g., Coudart 1999). The polarity between ‘processu-
alism’ and ‘post-processualism’ thus describes the internal dynamics of wider archaeological debates in 
the Anglophone research sphere (of course transcending the boundaries of Palaeolithic archaeology), 
yet fails to capture the particular dynamics characterising the discursive field of French « Préhistoire ». 
That most Anglophone lithic research retains a distinct ‘processual’ touch is simply owned to the fact 
that Palaeolithic research developed out of the respective socio-historical and intellectual substrate in 
the Anglophone world. 
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Does the advocated interpretation of the French-Anglophone divide not foster relativism 
and ‘everything-goes’ attitudes? 
Only if some of the central lessons of this study are overlooked. The proposed relativism is constrained 
and well-defined. There is not an infinite number of tenable perspectives but only four, and each of them 
brings into play its own internal standards and logic of reasoning (see esp. Chapter 2). In this way, the 
promoted view steadfastly counters aspirations from epistemological anarchism, defusing the ‘spectre 
of relativism’ once and for all. 
 
Does the promoted perspective not render the involved parties immune to critique? 
No. The bottom line is merely that each of the four world hypotheses has its legit raison d’être. Individual 
approaches can still, and arguably much more effectively, criticised by calling upon the internal stand-
ards of each cognitive framework (cf. Chapter 1: p. 32; Chapter 2: p. 44f.). It is also possible to criticise 
approaches in terms of their eclecticism, but this point needs to demonstrated and carefully argued for. 
In general, there is still plenty of room for applications of particular world theories being more successful 
or productive than others. It is also important to stress that even though I have argued that ‘signature 
critique’ should generally be avoided, the latter often helps in identifying the more general, structural 
weaknesses of the four world theories (see Appendix II.2: esp. p. 429). 
 
Can you give an example for a practical implication of the present study? How can schol-
ars come up with better approaches? 
The first step is to self-consciously identify where one’s cognitive preference or commitment lies. Re-
searchers can then reflect on the interpretive potentials of the associated structural categories – for in-
stance by summoning new metaphors or fields of association – and the relationships between various 
categories. This should of course not be done in the abstract, but always with a particular problem-con-
text in mind. The challenge is to pinpoint productive re-interpretations of the respective structural cat-
egories or root metaphors given particular object-matters. 
 Another strategy would be to search for internal conceptual admixture and/or inconsistency. An 
example is the idea of the ecological ‘niche’, which a die-hard mechanist should probably discard since 
the concept is ‘formistic’ in essence: it implies a quasi-eternal, stable place in nature that can generally 
be defined in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. 
 As detailed in Chapter 6, however, one should not only concentrate on oneself. Other cognitive 
frameworks may be more productive on other cognitive frontiers. The main challenge, then, is to detect 
these promising concepts and to translate them in a problem-oriented manner into one’s own system of 
practice. 
 
What can we expect for other national or transnational research traditions? 
There are two broader possibilities. Other collective entities of lithic research may be guided by different 
configurations of world hypotheses than those encountered at the French-Anglophone interface (cf. 
Chapter 6: p. 265). Alternatively, they may draw on the same world theories as French or Anglophone 
approaches, but have come to cultivate deviating interpretations of the respective ‘root metaphors’ and 
consequently mobilise different variants of the same structural categories or even different variants of 
the same theories (e.g. ‘immanent’ vs. ‘transcendent’ formism, ‘discrete’ vs. ‘consolidated’ mechanism); 
it is also possible that the same structural categories assume varying epistemic roles or become differ-
entially significant for the wider cognitive project advocated. The point is that Pepper gives us the means 






Is the analysis not self-undermining since it ultimately relies on a particular world hy-
pothesis itself? 
The implication of my analysis is indeed that there can be no neutral cognitive ground and that every 
viewpoint is necessarily situated. My own strategy can probably be described as ‘meta-contextualistic’ 
and I have clearly given preference to the qualitative exploration of the French-Anglophone divide. But 
this is not self-defeating since I deliberately acknowledge this deficiency, that my perspective is partial 
and probably colours the divide in a particular manner. However, this analytical choice does not pre-
clude or curtail the investigation of the divide in other terms, e.g. by means of computational-statistical 
methods. My approach does not endeavour to deliver the final answer, but instead calls for further in-
vestigation – the present study is simply the beginning, not the end. This being said, I nevertheless pre-
dict that ‘formistic,’ ‘mechanistic,’ and ‘organicisitic’ inquiry would substantiate the nature and reality 
of the outlined division, even though these inquiries would of course reveal additional details and per-
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The ‘problem of unconceived alternatives’ has been introduced to philosophy of science by Kyle Stan-
ford (2001, 2006). Stanford argues that the most serious challenge to the idea that our current theories 
adequately reflect reality is our inability to even conceive of credible alternatives. Stanford illustrates 
his point with cases from the history of science. He shows that scholars have indeed often failed to 
come up with alternative theories even though these theories were already reasonably well-confirmed 
by the evidence available at that time. This ‘robust historic pattern,’ he suggests, gives us every reason 
to expect that current science faces similar issues. In order to guarantee that we currently possess the 
best theories to explain the presently available evidence, one would need to ensure that we are actually 
testing the full spectrum of promising theory contenders. According to Stanford (2015), there is good 
reason to believe that scientists does not work in this way.  
One reason is that modern science tends to be extremely conservative in inventing, develop-
ing, or even discussing novel or unconventional theories. Another reason is the social and institutional 
structure of science, which promotes fragmentation and hyper-specialisation. Under these conditions, 
it is highly likely that individual scientists are not even able to draw from the full range of already con-
ceived theoretical alternatives. In general, which kinds of theories are envisioned and put forth by par-
ticular researchers also depends on the logic of theorisation, the dynamics of a given discourse, and the 
nature of the already developed space of theories within a given research community.  
Although it has been correctly emphasised that larger research communities may be less vul-
nerable to the ‘problem of unconceived alternatives’ than individual scientists (e.g., Forber 2008; God-
frey-Smith 2008), research communities are also constraining factors of theory-envisioning. There is 
for example no guarantee that different research communities or even smaller social units of research 
have the same capacity for creating and testing new theories. And even if they would generally have 
the same capacity to do so, they may still come up with fundamentally different theories to compete 
with their current theories. Likewise, there is no warrant that such differing ‘collectives of theorisation’ 
will share their theories or even accept them as notable knowledge contenders. It is therefore possible 
that research communities can sometimes even aggravate the ‘problem of unconceived alternatives.’ 
Stanford’s (2015) more recent argument that especially modern science with its funding struc-
ture, highly differentiated institutional apparatus, developed reputation system, and internal control-
mechanisms (i.e., peer-review) has ‘generated steadily mounting obstacles to revolutionary, trans-
formative, or unorthodox scientific theorising’ and ‘fosters an exceedingly and increasingly theoretical-
ly conservative form of inquiry’ is noteworthy in this context. The ability of scholars to conceive of the-
oretical alternatives might therefore be structurally compromised. 
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Dogmatism is a cognitive fallacy. A dogmatists is somebody ‘whose beliefs exceed her/his cognitive 
grounds for belief’ (Pepper 1942: 11). Dogmatism typically entails the outright rejection of beliefs and 
knowledge claims that violate with one’s own structure of belief. It often involves cognitive inflexibility 
and a general unwillingness to engage in serious argumentation. Instead of grappling with the encoun-
tered arguments, dogmatists tend to dismiss their status as argument (‘this is mere opinion!’ or ‘this is 
nothing more than unsubstantiated belief!’) or simply juxtapose their own beliefs claiming that they 
are evidently more convincing. The dogmatist therefore usually resists to search for new cognitive 
grounds, independently of whether they may interfere with his currently held beliefs or not. Accord-
ingly, the ‘dogmatic stance’ is quick in the proclamation of ‘self-evident’ principles and ‘indubitable’ 
facts. Strong appeals to ‘authority’ may also smell suspiciously dogmatic. The dogmatist, as Pepper 
(idem) correctly notes, is thus “a more serious character than the utter sceptic. He is the dictator of 
cognition. He will put you down by main force. And he is no myth.” 
From this characterisation it becomes clear that a ‘dogmatic stance’ is undesirable in science. 
Not only does it sabotage the quest for new and potentially contradictory arguments, it also ‘freezes’ 
scientific discourse and hampers the promotion of new ideas. Perhaps most importantly, however, 
dogmatism undermines the development of a pluralistic outlook in science. Because the dogmatist is 
firm in insisting on the cognitive adequacy of her/his structure of belief and rejects debating alterna-
tive viewpoints, she/he tends to foster epistemological intolerance. Alternative viewpoints can then 
easily be discredited as ‘speculative,’ ‘lacking solid factual grounds,’ or as being ‘non-scientific.’ If sci-
ence aspires to promote the ‘freedom of thought’ and a ‘democracy of opinions,’ dogmatism must 
therefore be opposed. 
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The ‘underdetermination thesis’ posits that for any theory or body of theory, implicit or explicit, and 
any body of observation, there exists at least one other theory, such that both theories are consistent 
with the observations but differ ontologically (cf. Lyre 2011: 235). This idea of theory underdetermina-
tion is not to be conflated with the ‘Duhem-Quine thesis’ claiming confirmational holism (e.g., Boylan 
and O’Gorman 2013) or the ‘Humean problem of induction’ concerning the limit of evidence, especial-
ly past evidence (e.g., Henderson 2018). There are different versions of the ‘underdetermination thesis’ 
and one should in particular distinguish between stronger and weaker variants. Willard Quine (1975: 
313) for instance, who contributed substantially to our understanding of theory underdetermination, 
championed a rather strong version of the thesis:  
Turnbull (2017) distinguishes between four major variants of the ‘underdetermination thesis.’ 
Each of these variants favours a different view of how theory appears to be underdetermined by the 
evidence and when the problem applies. Is underdetermination an issue in every theory choice or do 
only certain theory choices involve underdetermination? The first variant is equivalence underdeter-
mination which holds that every theory is underdetermined by the evidence and there exists conse-
quently at least one rival theory with identical empirical consequences. The second is holist underde-
termination. This view claims that underdetermination follows from the problem of conformational 
holism and that every theory choice is therefore typically stronger determined by its inter-theory de-
pendencies than by the evidence that purportedly supports it. The third variant is transient underde-
termination which claims that future evidence may eventually direct us to conclusively discriminate 
between competing theories, but the current evidence is insufficient to achieve this. The fourth variant 
is practical underdetermination which holds that only a subset of theories in some practices of science 
is underdetermined by the presently available evidence. As Lyre (2011) has indicated, all variants of 
underdetermination may concern either the theory’s ‘entity content’ or its ‘structural content.’ 
 The standard implication of the ‘underdetermination thesis’ is that theoretical knowledge is 
difficult to secure conclusively. There may always be knowledge contenders matching the same obser-
vations. Whether ‘theory’ is understood as an entity that is categorically distinct from ‘data’ or whether 
it concerns a single theoretical claim or a set of interconnected theories does in principle not matter 
here. All science is thus potentially affected by theory and knowledge underdetermination. 
 
“If all observable events can be accounted for in one comprehensive scientific theory – one 
system of the world, to echo Duhem's echo of Newton – then we may expect that they can all 
be accounted for equally in another, conflicting system of the world. We may expect this 
because of how scientists work. For they do not rest with mere inductive generalizations of 
their observations: mere extrapolation to observable events from similar observed events. 
Scientists invent hypotheses that talk of things beyond the reach of observation. The hypoth-
eses are related to observation only by a kind of one-way implication; namely, the events we 
observe are what a belief in the hypotheses would have led us to expect. These observable 
consequences of the hypotheses do not, conversely, imply the hypotheses. Surely there are 
alternative hypothetical substructures that would surface in the same observable ways. Such 
is the doctrine that natural science is empirically under-determined; under-determined not 
just by past observation but by all observable events.” 
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Stephen C. Pepper (1891-1972) was a North American philosopher whose work has largely been forgot-
ten after World War II, partly because of the large-scale diaspora of European, most notably German-
speaking scholars to the United States and the lasting effect this had on Anglophone philosophy. 
Throughout his career, Pepper worked mainly in the ‘pragmatist’ tradition and authored a number of 
seminal contributions in the philosophy of science and in aesthetics, which was his main area of inter-
est. Pepper is perhaps one of the last thinkers to have presented a true panorama – or “complete sur-
vey” as he calls it – of the main cognitive tendencies that Western metaphysics has brought into exist-
ence. This systematic philosophy of the sources of all Western thinking is presented in World Hypoth-
eses (1942), arguably his central text, in which he distinguished between ‘formism,’ ‘mechanism,’ ‘con-
textualism,’ and ‘organicism’ as the four credible modes of Western reasoning. 
The significance of World Hypotheses lies mainly in its uniquely broad cognitive coverage. In 
contrast to the philosophies of Kuhn, Popper, and many others to follow, Pepper’s exposition does not 
start from a particular field of scientific inquiry such as physics or chemistry in order to draw conclu-
sions about science in general, but rather highlights the structured and irreducible diversity of scien-
tific thought, unified only by its foundation in common-sense experience. Pepper’s cognitive map, in 
other words, is capable to cover all areas of science – and not only the natural sciences, mathematics, 
and the life sciences – and anticipates many topics (e.g., incommensurability, pluralism, etc.) that 
dominate current inquiry into the processes we call  ‘scientific’ (cf. Reck 1982). Having said this, the 
common thread in Pepper’s work was his interest in value and in normativity and the role these play in 
all human conduct. His contribution to the philosophy of science is to have shown as one of the first 
that also relies on values enabling specific forms of knowledge. Furthermore, his exposition of meta-
phor as a key source of human insight anticipated much of what was put at stake later by the ‘linguistic 
turn.’ 
 More than thirty years after World Hypotheses, Pepper (1967), in Concept and Quality, ar-
gued to have intuited a fifth root metaphor worthy of being developed and systematised – the ‘purpos-
ive act;’ he proposed a fifth world theory based on it: ‘selectivism.’ These ideas, however, never really 
made an impact on the philosophical community of his time, which in the United States was already 
completely consumed by the legacy of logical and empirical positivism and early analytical philosophy. 
Pepper remains one of the giants of American philosophy who were never really credited for their 






The tension between methodological individualists and methodological holists elucidates some basic 
disputes in most, if not all, of the scientific disciplines. The distinction between methodological indi-
vidualism and methodological holism is closely related to the polarity between ‘analytic’ and ‘synthetic’ 
modes of handling evidence. The debate mainly concerns the focus of analysis, the primacy of micro- 
or macro-explanations, and the granularity of interpretation.  
Courgeau (2003: 4) for example notes that “[t]he distinction between holism and individual-
ism stems from the fact that a social system can be viewed from two opposite perspectives: either as a 
totality endowed with specific properties, irreducible to those of its members, or as a set of individuals, 
such that all social phenomena resolve into individual decisions and actions, without involving any 
supra-individual factors.” 
 
Methodological individualism:  
 analysis departs and revolves around individualisable units of analysis (e.g., the contribution 
of actors and parts);  
 focus on and indispensability of micro-levels of analysis (‘bottom-up’ trajectory);  
 explanation is based on high-granularity observations; compositional view of reality. 
 
Methodological holism:  
 analysis departs and revolves around emergent and not fully individualisable units of analysis 
(e.g. collective action, social phenomena);  
 focus on and indispensability of macro-levels of analysis (‘top-down’ trajectory); 




Root metaphor: (dis-)similarity, matter and form/artefact 
Particulars are parts in the world that can be distinguished from other parts on the basis of their 
qualities, traits, and so forth; each particular is a singularity but also shares some of its features with 
other particulars. 
Characters include the qualities of particulars (e.g., colour, mass, etc.) and the relations among these 
qualities (a triangular flake cannot be rectangular by definition, etc.); distinct features of objects such 
as traits and attributes fall into this category. 
Ties are the specific combinations of particulars and characters; ‘ties’ are ultimately mobilised to as-
sess similarity and difference among particulars. 
Participation describes the ‘relations’ between different structural categories; for instance, particu-
lars can participate in characters and characters can participate in regularities, norms, and/or laws; 
participation hence takes typically ‘set-theoretical’ shape and specifies the organised (numerical) over-
lap of structural categories. 
The Theory of types is a systematisation of the difference between relations and ties resulting in the 
identification of classes. 
A class is a collection of particulars which participate in one or more characters. 
Classification is an organisation of classes, typically proceeding from the more general to the less 
general. 
Norms as regulating natural order in the world; the ‘normalisation’ of worldly order is guided by two 
common-sense insights: (1) artisans manufacturing different objects on the same plan or for the same 
reason, and (2) natural objects existing or developing according to the same plan; a norm is always a 
complex set of characters, so that norms cannot fully ‘particularised’ and thus typically transcend their 
materialisation. 
Matter takes specific forms because it exemplifies particular norms; form is interpreted as a result of 
norms shaping matter. 
Principles of exemplification mediate how and under which circumstances norms are material-
ised. 
Laws are particularly strong norms which regulate occurrences in nature, that is, render them regular; 
they bridge one set of particulars with another set by defining the characters of first set with the char-
acters of the other set; laws ‘exist’ but they have no basic existence other than in ‘form.’   
Basic particulars are the particulars of ‘immanent formism,’ which constitute the ‘field of basic par-
ticulars’ and can participate in norms; they constitute the domain of ‘concrete existence.’ 
Basic participation is the kind of participation sought-for in ‘immanent formism.’ 
Second-order particulars are norms, that is, complex characters or sets thereof (Gestalts), which 
are not fully ‘particularisable’ in basic particulars; second-order particulars constitute the ‘field of sec-
ond-order particulars’ (how dependent this field is on the ‘field of basic particulars’ is typically disput-
ed among formists). 
Participation at a second degree is when complex characters are admitted, consisting of ‘second-
order particulars’ participating at a second degree in other characters. 
Combinations of ‘immanent’ and ‘transcendental formism’ typically superimpose the categories of the 
latter onto the former. 
Existence describes what is ordered and can fully ‘particularised’ by basic particulars; categories of 
‘existence’ are determined by analysing the domain of ‘concrete existence’ consisting of the ‘field of 
basic particulars’ and any characters these particulars may participate in. 
Subsistence describes the field of characters and norms insofar as these are not fully ‘particularisa-
ble’ or exemplifiable by basic particulars (e.g., they might be considered an abstraction from basic par-
ticulars); the analysis of ‘subsistence’ typically centres on ‘ties’ and their ‘relations’; the study of ‘sub-
sistence’ is thus the study of second-order particulars, patterns, norms, and laws. 
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Time/space are typically interpreted as the ultimate ‘subsistent’ categories of all basic particulars 
which are part of the domain of ‘concrete existence’; all basic particulars are then interpreted as partic-
ipating in the laws of physical time and space (physicalist inclination of ‘formism’), alongside other 
forms they may participate in. 
Causality, then, is defined by the participation of patterns/regularities, norms, and laws in basic par-
ticulars regulated through the forms of (physical) space and time. 
Chance is granted in formism and can be attested if no causality or other second-order participation 
can be evidenced. 
Interferences of laws must always be taken into account since particulars and characters may par-
ticipate in many different norms, patterns, and/or laws at the same time; interference may hence al-
ways result in distortion of pattern and techniques need to be devised to detect the ‘normality’ of pat-
tern (e.g., by statistical means).  
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Root metaphor: machine, push-and-pull/causal field 
 ‘Discrete mechanism’ stresses ‘action by contact’ and uses the image of the lever as a push-and-pull 
machine to make sense of the evidence; structural features of nature are loosely and ultimately ‘exter-
nally related.’ 
 ‘Consolidated mechanism’ stresses ‘action at a distance’ and uses the image of the causal field to make 
sense of the evidence (cause-and-effect grounded in the principles of a structural field); structural fea-
tures of nature are ‘internally related’ and ultimately derivative of a structural singularity. 
Field of locations refers to the exact position of the parts of a machine within a spatiotemporal field; 
the location of the parts in relation to one another defines the effectiveness and general functioning of 
the machine and is indispensable for describing mechanistic functioning; the ‘field of location’ is typi-
cally expressed by describing parts in quantitative terms and specifying the work they do in exact 
equations. 
Primary qualities are qualities of parts, typically expressible in exact quantitative terms, which are 
necessary to understand the functioning of the machine and to specify the laws that propel it; primary 
qualities are those qualities that are directly relevant for the type of action observed (e.g., mass, size, 
volume, etc.). 
(Primary) Laws account for the specific configuration of primary qualities in a given field of loca-
tion; this type of law is sometimes referred to as ‘primary law’; primary laws are often described as 
functional equations specifying the observed functioning of a machine. 
Secondary qualities are qualities of parts which are not necessary to explain how a machine works; 
secondary qualities are those qualities that are largely irrelevant for the type of action observed (e.g., 
texture, colour, smell, etc.); dependent on the version of mechanism adopted, secondary qualities may 
be identified as mere ‘epiphenomena,’ that is, as products of causation but having no causal conse-
quences themselves. 
Principles explain why and how secondary qualities are attached to certain parts and why they are 
not randomly distributed among parts; quite often, the description of such principles enters into a 
description of regularities that hold between the primary and secondary qualities of the parts of a ma-
chine. 
(Secondary) Laws account for the specific configuration among secondary qualities in a given field 
of location and the regularities that hold between primary and secondary qualities therein; secondary 
laws are not always demonstrable and are not a necessary feature of every causal explanation. 
Mechanists tend to disagree about the importance of these secondary structural categories in provid-
ing a complete account of reality (i.e., ‘materialism’ amounts to the ignorance of secondary qualities, 
‘cognitivism’ amounts to the ignorance of primary qualities, and ‘reductionism’ is when secondary 
qualities are fully explained by primary laws). 
The inevitable/accidental polarity pertains to the mechanistic intuition that some features of real-
ity are to a lesser degree determined and appear to convey some spark of accidentiality, while other 
features appear to be inevitable outcomes of the world’s inner structure; accidentiality is interpreted as 
independence of the observable details and inevitability is typically defended in relation to laws; ‘dis-
crete mechanism’ often emphasises independence of phenomenal details (secondary qualities), while 
‘consolidated mechanism’ pushes the notion of the inevitability of the observable to the extremes. 
Reality is a category that is defined in relation to the ‘field of locations,’ for whatever appears to be 
‘real’ is real by virtue of its definite location; by contrast, what cannot be safely located in the field of 
locations remains ambiguous and cannot claim concrete existence; spatial and temporal structure 
define the nature of reality in mechanism. 
Space and time are the fundamental categories that make up the basic field of locations and define 
the location of particulars therein; mechanism as a world theory is therefore closely bound to the con-




Field refers to the conception proper to ‘consolidated mechanism’ that the field of locations furnished 
by space-time particulars is of such a consolidated nature that everything to be observed therein obeys 
to a basic and highly determinate integrated field structure (e.g., electromagnetic field, gravitational 
field, etc.) which provides the basis to describe the geometry of the world. 
Atoms or other elementary physical particles differentiate the field of locations and thereby 
enable location and define structure; without these elementary units of matter there would be no field 
and without a field there can be no differentiated locations; elementary units of matter can hence be 
defined as the ‘spatiotemporal volumes’ differentiated by the primary qualities. 
Similarity is interpreted as a (dis-)similarity of field structure including both primary qualities and 
laws as the principle structural features. 
The observable/unobservable distinction accounts for the mechanistic key intuition that directly 
observable features (primary and secondary qualities) are brought into existence by more basic struc-
tural features of the world (laws, regularities, fields). 
Correlation is the term that accounts for the regular association of ‘effective’ and ‘ineffective’ catego-
ries that has to be noted but rarely furnishes a basic explanation; even though correlated qualities 
might not explain, they can be predicted for they are regularly associated with certain configurations of 
primary qualities. 
Specifity of response describes the idea that specific causes have specific consequences for both the 
configuration of primary and secondary categories; this specifity is the ultimate reason for why strong 
determinacy is presumed; causality is ultimately defined by this specifity of response principle. 
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Root metaphor: situation/situationality, historical context/act 
Interpenetration is the basic condition under which features of reality crystallise in incidents of life; 
contextualism typically finds that everything in the world is made up by such incidents, which, in turn, 
consist of acts in context. 
Relations describe the interpenetration of features within a distinct context of reality; it is typically 
accepted that the relations delineating a contextual whole are in-exhaustive. 
Novelty and change describe the insight that most categories required to explain a given context and 
its ‘itemised’ occurrences are not universal but rather unique – they are context-specific; the stipula-
tion of novelty implies that change is categorical rather than derivative and thus emerges as a sort of 
‘normal condition’ – as a status quo rather than something that is in need of explanation (e.g., alterity 
emerges as an epistemological key category). 
Disorder is a consequence of novelty and suggests that not even the order of categories or structures 
can be assumed; although disorder is not predicated or assumed, the ever lurking possibility of disor-
der emerges as a basic feature of contextualistic reality (e.g., order-disorder relations themselves be-
come a target of analysis). 
Quality and texture describe the relative internal uniformity of situated contexts (allowing us to 
speak of different contexts in the first place); quality refers to the immanent total meaning of a context 
and can be defined by the subcategories of ‘spread,’ ‘change,’ and ‘fusion,’ whereas texture refers to the 
detailed grammatical relations (that is, the infrastructure) of a context and can be defined by the sub-
categories of ‘strands,’ ‘context,’ and ‘references’; because contextualism embraces radical novelty and 
change, these categories and subcategories may themselves be amendable to change and constant re-
organisation; quality-texture relations constitute a key area of contextualistic inquiry (e.g., their rela-
tive prominence, etc.). 
Spread characterises the distribution and extension of quality in time and space, e.g., its duration 
(qualitative time) or geographic reach; it maps how and in what sense parts already implicate or at 
least foreshadow their ‘wholeness’; spread defines the presence of a context as whatever contributes to 
the latter’s quality (events are ongoing and processual); the qualitative reading of time that spread 
entails typically results in the emphasis of temporality, rather than dimensional time. 
Change within quality accounts for the radical emergentist outlook of contextualistic reasoning: any 
modification among a whole’s parts will change and irreversibly alter the whole’s total quality as well 
as the signification of its parts; this is conceived of as an ongoing, ‘open,’ and never-ending process. 
Fusion describes the fact that quality constitutes a blending of texture and its details, so that the de-
tails become blurred and almost unrecognisable (i.e., taste is a fusion of a meal’s ingredients); this 
fusion of details is what unifies quality (simplification and unification are therefore generally inter-
preted as a fusion of features, ad infinitum); the total quality of reality is therefore always regarded as 
a fusion of all domains of reality. 
Strands capture the distinct aspects and features of a context which define its infrastructure; strands 
are the details of a context that contribute to its texture; they are further specified by their references. 
Context is what encases and connects (relates) all relevant strands that can be taken to characterise a 
quality’s texture. 
References are intimate features of strands that help to define their role in delineating a context and 
the relationship between strands; references can be ‘linear’ (uni-directional satisfaction), ‘convergent’ 
(multi-directional, complex satisfaction), ‘blocking’ (hindering satisfaction), or ‘instrumental’ (circum-
venting blocked satisfaction by creation of secondary purposeful, intentional, goal-directed, and/or 
desire-driven satisfaction). 
Thickness is a categorical feature of gathering and preparing contextualistic evidence; it responds to 
the inherent complexity of reality (interpenetration, novelty, potential disorder, texture-quality dy-
namics) and accounts for the mutual dependency between meticulous description and the in-depth 
interpretation of evidence (the transition between the two is therefore often blurred). 
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Root metaphor: organism/living being, processual integration/becoming as processual individuation 
(genesis) 
Concealed organic process is what underpins any phenomenal aspect of reality and what gives 
meaning to observable phenomena; organic processes are ‘concealed’ because they are not self-
evident, always need to be diagnosed, and are not directly given in observation (e.g., Bergson’s ‘static 
illusion’ of reality). 
(Organic) Structure is what is achieved or realised by organic processes; organic structures call for 
the analysis of their ‘progressive’ and ‘ideal’ categories. 
Steps or stages define the transition from the progressive to the ideal and specify how concealed 
organic processes realise their organic structure; they hold together what is conceived of as a concealed 
organic development. 
Directedness and irreversibility specify the organisation – that is, the order and the logic of suc-
cession – of the steps involved in a given organic process (teleology and consequentiality of processual 
change). 
The ‘progressive’ categories tend to delineate the space of description; they help to describe incomplete 
appearances and prepare the difficult search for their wholes. 
Fragments of experience are the observable appearances of reality (distributed in space and time) 
which misleadingly suggest isolation, scatteredness, and/or discreteness but can in fact be integrated 
by specifying organic processes that lead via successive qualitative steps to distinct organic wholes 
(fragments are negatively signified by an integration not achieved). 
Nexus(es) delineate the potentiality of fragments to reach integration with other relevant fragments; 
they specify possibilities of connections between fragments and how fragments reach out to other 
fragments to form positive or negative connections; thus, the ‘internal drive’ of fragments to complete 
themselves is organised and channelled by their nexus(es); it is therefore the interplay of nexuses 
which ultimately decides whether and how a range of fragments can reach integration (i.e., relation-
ships between nexuses this also decide what fragments ‘belong together’). 
Contradiction and conflict satisfy the intuition that order is to be found in the becoming (genesis) 
of a phenomenon, rather than in its various forms of static existence (being); contradictions are gaps, 
oppositions, and counteractions among fragments of experience which motivate synthetic integration 
and novelty and thereby facilitate the emergence of new developmental stages; contradictions are the 
preconditions for structural unification in terms of the ‘ideal’ categories (thesis-antithesis-synthesis 
structure); contradictions are necessary features of reality because nexus(es) reach out multi-
directionally and are difficult if not impossible to tame. 
Organic whole is the name for the ultimate resolution of the relevant fragments of reality in a coher-
ent systemic whole; reference to the organic whole is typically made in both the ‘progressive’ and ‘ide-
al’ sets of categories; organic wholes are defined by a high degree of integration (it has to be noted, 
however, that integration may come in levels and so may organic wholes) and this integration may be 
reached by fulfilling three main criteria: (i) high degrees of inclusiveness, (ii) high degrees of determi-
nateness, and (iii) high degrees of organicity (every systemic element implies any other). 
The ‘ideal’ categories tend to delineate the space of interpretation; they generally characterise organic 
wholes and seek to explain away any intrinsic fragmentariness of nature. 
Organic whole (see above). 
Implicitness and transcendence describe the double-edged affair of part-whole relations in organ-
icism; the organic whole is found to have always been implicit in its fragments of experience (fragmen-
tariness, in retrospect, turns out to be misleading and illusionary), while the same whole necessary 
transcends the interactions (i.e., contradictions) of the fragments by means of a total coherency (con-
flict also turns out to be misleading and illusionary) – this is why organic wholes are always abstrac-
tions of appearances; mutual implicativeness and strong interdependency of data are symptomatic of 
such dynamic part-whole relations and are considered to firmly anchor organic wholes; implicitness 
and transcendence define which fragments are relevant and which are irrelevant. 
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Economisation describes the ability of a discovered organic whole to save, that is, to preserve the 
entirety of its fragments of experience without any loss; economisation thus accounts for unification in 
organicism. 
(One may add idealisation as a categorical means to reach out from the ‘progressive’ categories to 
corroborate implicitness and transcendence, to ensure economisation, and to reveal (that is, ‘un-
conceal’) the organic whole; ‘idealisation,’ in this view, can be regarded as a means to ‘harmonise’ all 
relevant fragments in order to secure the ‘ideal’). 
Self-organisation and self-regulation are key conceptions because the general architecture of 
organicistic categories affords the idea that nexuses can be explained and understood in their proces-
sual integration and hence by the analysis of their internal dynamic temporal interaction; this predis-
poses the interpretation of object- and phenomena-specific trajectories of behaviour and change (i.e., 
the identification of distinct ‘modes of being’ or ‘modes of becoming’). 
Complexity is found to be an inherent feature of all organic processes for these are propelled by over-
coming prima facie chaotic elements, e.g., tensions in and between nexuses (contradictions in frag-
ments of reality); this complexity often gives rise to systems thinking. 
Strong emergence accounts for the basic organicistic intuition that our ability to predict concealed 
organic processes and their achievements remains generally limited; integration and individuation can 
be diagnosed and retrodictively made sense of but because the ‘ideal’ categories are the ultimate 
benchmark to judge the dynamics among ‘processual’ categories, the former cannot be deduced from 
the latter. 
Cyclicity is the specific trade-off between particularity and universality found in organicism; although 
different nexuses may be characterised by unique modes of behaviour and transformation, the general 
trajectory of organic processes – metaphorically describable as the succession of ‘birth,’ ‘development,’ 
‘crisis,’ ‘death’ or ‘re-integration’ – is thought be a universal principle of worldly order (the dogma that 
the general structure of facts is predetermined but not the pathways to reach that structure); the re-
sulting developmental scheme is necessary cyclical and long-term processes tend to be depicted as 
governed by various cycles and epicycles. 
349 
 
Scientific pluralism heralds the overcoming of dogmatic tendencies in the practice of science (cf. Box 
2). It entails the basic recognition that there are not only substantial differences in the scientific ap-
proach throughout history, but also at any given moment in time. This ‘horizontal’ heterogeneity and 
basic diversity of scientific approaches is identified not as a deficiency, but as a key quality of the scien-
tific enterprise (e.g., Kellert et al. 2006b: ix; Chang 2012) showcasing the ability of scholars to ‘close in’ 
on a given phenomenon from a variety of different interpretive angles and under variable assumptions 
and epistemological conditions. Appeals to scientific pluralism typically emphasise the natural limita-
tions of various modes of inquiry, yet simultaneously stress the unique potentials of insight that each 
of them affords. The resulting paradox, so the argument goes, can only be resolved if one accepts that 
diverging approaches must somehow complement each other in order to counterbalance the parochial-
ism they all imply. 
 Scientific pluralism calls attention to the irreducible ‘disunity of science’ (cf. Dupré 1993; 
Hacking 1996; Lynch 1998; Cartwright 1999; Cat 2017). It can be seen as a response to both the ‘scep-
tical’ and the ‘dogmatic’ challenge.’ Pluralism is often motivated by the realistic possibility that no sin-
gle account may fully explain any given phenomenon. This situation is sometimes regarded to be a 
consequence of the problem of shifting scales of investigation and the difficulties of defining complex 
phenomena in the first place – a result of the inescapable theory-ladenness of scientific observation. 
Pluralism is also invoked to account for the most difficult and enduring problems of interpretation, for 
example the understanding of quantum mechanics or the determination of the proper unit of selection 
in evolutionary biology (cf. Kellert et al. 2006b: viii). This understanding of science leads to the insight 
that the ‘explanatory and investigative aims of science’ can best be achieved, even in the long run, by 
sciences that are pluralistic in orientation (ibid.: ix-x). Thus, scientific pluralism opposes ‘scientific 
monism’ which holds that there can only be a single ‘true’ perspective on the world and only one 
measure to attain it. 
 The take home message of scientific pluralism is that there are “serious limits for drawing 
metaphysical conclusions from science” (Kellert et al. 2006b: xxiv). Science should be recognised as 
what it is – a diverse set of often inconsistent human practices. Although it certainly tells us something 






















































































































































































































































































































































































The term ‘Anglophone’ is used deliberately vague and somewhat loose in this study. The reason for this 
is the – for historical and sociological reasons – highly interconnected nature of the English-speaking 
world in Palaeolithic research. As show in the main text, English-speaking practitioners share a great 
bulk of research concepts and ideas as well as identify similar persons as the great forefathers of their 
discipline. Even on the institutional level, similar terms are often used to designate the larger research 
enterprise, chairs, and/or departments. The term ‘Anglophone,’ as employed in the present study, 
refers to the totality of Old World Palaeolithic research conducted in the English-speaking world. 
 With ‘English-speaking,’ I exclusively refer to the national research traditions in which English 
is the native language. My usage of the term ‘Anglophone’ is narrower. I define it here primarily as 
comprising the United States of America and the United Kingdom. Research done in Australia and 
Canada is largely excluded from the analysis since it has developed along slightly different historical 
trajectories – for instance, these two countries do not rely heavily on the idea of ‘palaeoanthropology’ 
(sensu Clark and Howell 1966). Australian and Canadian scholars are sometimes nonetheless men-
tioned if necessary, but this is due to the fact that they have been educated in a relevant U.K. or U.S. 
university context – again pointing to the fact that the larger English-speaking world is strongly inter-
connected.858 So, while I do acknowledge that there are some important differences between Palaeo-
lithic research in the U.K. and the U.S., my main point in grouping them together for the purpose of 
this analysis is that they undoubtedly share what can be termed a ‘discursive formation’ and are able to 
engage into mutually meaningful debates. The results of my analysis confirm this assertion (indeed, 
Chapter 6 offers some poignant thoughts on why this is the case). 
 Yet, critical readers will perhaps stumble upon the prima facie apparent asymmetry between 
French and Anglophone research traditions since the latter – as we have seen – comprises more than 
one modern-day country. However, this asymmetry only exists at first glance since lithic analysis plays 
differential roles as a research practice in distinct national research-contexts. There is good reason to 
believe, for example, that the total amount of scholars that primarily contribute to the lithic research 
endeavour is roughly comparable between French and Anglophone contexts (whereas French Palaeo-
lithic archaeology appears to be mainly driven by lithic inquiry, the Anglophone context is more mixed 
and multi-stranded and lithic analysis occupies a more ambiguous position there; see especially Chap-
ter 1). There is also good reason to believe that the actual number of active scholars on the ‘other’ side 
is greatly underestimated by each tradition. 
 The term ‘French’ is used in a similar vein. It designates the aggregate of Old World Palaeolith-
ic research conducted in the institutional context of French « Préhistoire ». Although national research 
contexts such as Belgium and Italy remain strongly influenced by ideas and approaches developed in 
France, and there clearly exists some permeability between these intellectual contexts, the present 
analysis focuses primarily on the French research-context sensu stricto, drawing on some of the rele-
vant non-French scholars only if appropriate or necessary. 
 Above all, the signification of both terms is thus socio-historical. The attribution of individual 
scholars and the identification of larger constellations of research reflect this basic circumstance. The 
                                                          
858 All of this casts light on the necessity to conduct a historical and sociological survey before selecting the units of analysis. 
Although this comprehensive survey cannot be presented here for reasons of scope, it remains a key prerequisite of the present-
ed conceptual analysis and it should be kept in mind that socio-historical considerations hence always feed into the analytical 
decisions made in this work. 
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purpose of the following sub-sections is to outline the cornerstones of the therefore necessary socio-
historical analysis preceding the epistemological inquiry which forms the core of the present work. 
 
The designation of French and Anglophone researchers does not strive to be ‘emic,’ that is, to reflect 
their self-identification. Neither is it based on the type of passport one holds, or, more generally, the 
nationality of a scholar. Rather, the significance of ‘French’ and ‘Anglophone’ is purely of sociological 
and a product of the history of the discipline in France and the two ‘Anglo-Saxon’ home countries, the 
United States of America and Great Britain. Three main criteria were used to determine the place of an 
individual scholar on either side of the divide: 
 Participation in a legacy: academic mentor(s)/teacher(s) and context of institutional train-
ing, especially during the formative period of the doctorate and, potentially, early post-doc 
phase; wider ‘school’ of thought; etc. 
 Position within a (positive) citation network: the bibliographic space in which the re-
searcher’s work is situated and regularly taken up/referred to in a positive manner 
 Influence/importance in the two discursive formations: initiation of key debates; 
training of key figures; institutional position; general place within the wider social web of a re-
search tradition; etc. 
In this way, some scholars may turn out to be irrelevant for the divide, of course, since their work 
forms part of a different current of Palaeolithic research. 
 Furthermore, the assignment of individual lithic researchers was guided by the construction of 
schematic ‘sociograms,’ visualising the relationship between individuals, different generations of 
scholars as well as particular institutional and personal legacies within two-dimensional space. These 
sociograms also clarify the socio-historical ties between the development of lithic research in the Unit-
ed States and the United Kingdom (for additional historical background, see Chapter 1 and Appendix 
III.4). The resulting social matrices do of course not exist in isolation, but their internal integrity is 
strong enough to warrant their separate treatment. Ultimately, the decisive factor for the attribution of 
a researcher is her/his overall position in a matrix. The attribution is consequently analytical and not 
just a matter of subjective verdict – considerable time and effort has been spent to perform the respec-
tive research and to do justice to the involved complexities. 
 
The reconstruction of the three social matrices – French, U.S. American, and British – is based on 
three lines of research: 
 Extensive survey of doctoral dissertations, especially with regards to the main supervi-
sor(s), the configuration of the advisory committee, and the information given in the acknowl-
edgements 
 Examination of institutional biographies of key players, paying particular attention to 
horizontal developments in cognate fields at these institutions and potential influences from 
colleagues within Palaeolithic archaeology working there at the same time; entanglement with 
prestigious non-university organisations (e.g., national academies of science) 
[practically, this analysis comes close to a survey of key CVs and their socio-historical context] 
 Extensive survey of the historical background, especially taking into consideration in-
stitutional histories, the histories of specific research groups and ‘schools of thought’ within 
the field, and the general currents of intellectual development in the three analysed contexts 
The outcome of this research was complemented by and, if necessary, calibrated against, personal 
interviews and informal conversations with various lithic practitioners from both sides. 
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 For the French research-context, historical background information was gathered from the 
following key sources, among others: Bordes 1968; Dauvois 1976; Schnapp 1980, 1993; Tixier et al. 
1980; Audouze and Leroi-Gourhan 1981; Audouze 1999; 2002; Stoczkowski 1990, 1991, 1992a, 1992b, 
1994, 1995, 2002; Julien 1991; Geneste 2010 [1991]; Pelegrin 1991, 2004, 2011; Schlanger 1991, 1994, 
2004, 2005, 2012, 2015; Gallay 1991, 2003, 2011; Gallay et al. 1992; Soulier 1994, 2003, 2005, 2009, 
2011, 2015; Coye 1997, 2005, 2006, 2015; Richard 1992; Debenath et al. 1992; Groenen 1994, 1996; 
Coudart 1999; Wisniewski 2003; Audouze and Schlanger 2004; Dubois and Bon 2006; Hurel 2007, 
2011; Lippé 2007, 2010, 2012; Bidet 2007; Bon 2009; Djindjian 2009, 2013, 2016; de Villiers 2010; 
Delpech and Jaubert 2011; Hurel and Coye 2011; de Beaune 2011, 2016; Valentin 2011, 2015; Guillom-
et-Malmassari 2012; Coye and Hurel 2013; Roux 2013; Loiseau 2014; Boissinot 2011, 2015; Plutniak 
2015, 2016; Perlès 2016; Delage 2017; Audouze et al. 2017. In addition, the study draws on the insight-
ful work of Ramírez-Galicia (2016), profiting especially form his comprehensive audio coverage of 
interviews with Parisian key players (18 interviews in total, cf. ibid.: 51f.). 
 For the Anglophone context of lithic research, the reconstruction of the historical background 
relies on the following key sources, among others: Willey and Phillips 1958; Howell 1963, 1972, 2003; 
Clark and Howell 1966; Tiger and Fox 1966; Lee and deVore 1968; Coles and Higgs 1969; Fox 1975; 
Higgs 1975; Barker and Dennell 1976; Schiffer 1976; Isaac 1977c; Meltzer 1979, 2011; Hammond et al. 
1979; Reid 1980; Willey and Sabloff 1980; Cohn 1980; Daniel 1981; Binford and Sabloff 1982; Clark 
and Stafford 1982; Raab and Goodyear 1984; Wylie 1985, 2002; Clark 1986; Dunnell 1986; Bettinger 
1987; Adams and Adams 1991; Nelson 1991; Sackett 1991, 2014; Clark 1991a, 2003; Walter 1993; Cor-
ruccini and Ciochon 1994; Mellars 1996; Bernbeck 1997; Chazan 1997, 2014; Clark and Willermet 
1997; Trigger 1998, 2003, 2007 [1996]; Bailey 1999; Fagan 1999, 2005; Lyman and O’Brien 2000; 
Bleed 2001; Gamble 2001; Roebroeks and Corbey 2001; Schick and Toth 2001; Torrence 2001; Straus 
2002a, 2007, 2017; Monigal 2002: 121-135; Shott 2003; Wendorf 2003; Shennan 2004, 2008; Corbey 
2005; White 2007; O’Connor 2007; Sommer 2007, 2015; Díaz-Andreu 2007; Butzer and Klein 2007; 
Hudson 2008; Dibble 2008; Goodrum 2009, 2014; Wargo 2009; Freeman 2009; Shea and Lieberman 
2009; Johnson 2010; Boyle et al. 2010; Sept and Pilbeam 2011; Abramiuk 2012; McNabb 2012a; Tos-
tevin 2012; Lucas 2012; Van Reybrouck 2012; Klein 2013; Monnier and Missal 2014; Murray 2014, 
2017; Kelly 2014; McCall 2015; Shea 2015; Mathewson 2016; Doolittle 2016; Dibble et al. 2017; Lycett 
and Shennan 2018. 
 This extended literature study included the close reading of obituaries/necrologies as well as 
introductory parts of relevant Festschriften or commemorative volumes. 
 
The graphs are organised along two axes: the horizontal x-axis structures the sociological landscape of 
each research-context according to its key institutions, the vertical y-axis provides a rough and non-
proportional measure of time, with the ‘historical stream,’ so to speak, proceeding from top to bottom. 
The smallest units are represented by individual scholars (small rectangular frames) which occupy 
specific positions within their associated institutional space-time grid. 
 Lines indicate personal influences of varying strength/importance (line weight), arrows ex-
press changes in institutional affiliation (new institutional positions are additionally highlighted by 
faded unit frames). 
 Frame-strengths indicate the relative centrality of researchers in developing or exposing their 
research-context; coloured frames stand for particular disciplinary inputs (e.g., economic theory, ecol-
ogy, sociology, anthropology of techniques, etc.); special frame-shapes signal special/unusual socio-
historical positions. 
 Graphs do not engross completeness. Instead, they serve as heuristic tools to contextualise and 
situate the work of individuals in terms of matrix-specific social and historical coordinates. 
 Note that the sociogram method greatly facilitates the analysis of individual cross-over and 
institutional exchange between national research contexts; it also enables the characterisation of par-
ticular social spaces of inquiry in terms of their organisational centrality and de-centrality. Moreover, 
416 
 
the resulting matrices can be examined in terms of their general permeability and internationality, but 
also in terms of their structural conservativism, if any. 
 
Each of the three reconstructed sociograms is presented separately below, starting with the French 
case and followed by the U.K. and U.S. examples. As a disclaimer, the reader should keep in mind that 
the overarching goal here was not completeness, but the recognition of structural features in the social 
organisation of lithic research and the informed placement of the case study protagonists into their 



























































All case studies are necessary historical – they naturally derive from a historical context and both the-
matise and entail this context. Adopting such case studies for analytical, argumentative, and/or 
demonstrative purposes prompts what Joseph Pitt (2001) once baptised ‘the dilemma of case studies’. 
In general, this problem consists of the difficulty to avoid either falling prey to a certain selection bias 
or to become persuaded to overgeneralise from a single case (cf. Currie 2015). In philosophical terms, 
the problem consists of consolidating what in the Anglophone world is known as the ‘philosophy of 
science’ and the ‘history of science’. This, in turn, breaks down into whether the role of utilised case 
studies is conceived primarily in ‘conceptual’ or in ‘historical’ terms. The general problem is that none 
of the two can do its work without taking the other seriously. In other words: if we want to defend, 
demonstrate, or illustrate a certain conceptual claim – for instance that certain groups of scholars tend 
to produce certain types of results – the question is always whether the chosen cases are really repre-
sentative or whether they simply serve the analytical intention in a satisfactorily manner; if one starts 
from history, the problem is not necessarily smaller since there is always the risk of ‘forcing’ a concep-
tual claim onto a historical context. Also, the historical perspective makes it especially difficult to de-
rive any case-transgressive finding since each case of course reflects its historical situatedness. For 
these reasons it is so fundamental to specify the grounds of case study selection and to discuss what 
kind of insights they enable.  
My general strategy is to follow Scholl and Rätz (2011: 75), who consider concepts drawn from 
philosophy as rather abstract and generalised entities whereas ‘historical facts’ (and case studies are 
such historical facts) can be seen as particulars. This allows us to conceive the relationship between 
historical cases and philosophical concepts in a more pragmatic and less problem-infused manner. 
Because of their abstractness and generality, philosophical concepts cannot be expected to be fully 
exemplified by historical cases. Rather, they tend to be instantiated and interpreted to various degrees 
by different historical research contexts. This is the co-constitutive relationship between historical 
framing and conceptual significance that forms the basis of the present study. As Giere (2011: 60f.), for 
instance, puts it: the analysis of general concepts should allow for the elaboration of a general theory 
of science – such a theory is provided by Pepper’s world hypotheses perspective described in Chapter 
2; this theory, however, is also in need of confrontation with actual cases of scientific practice. Distin-
guishing between general theoretical dimensions of science and particular historically situated practic-
es helps to deflect the ‘fallacy of normativity’ – the temptation to search for standards of science which 
lie outside of the practical realities of science. The premise is that the power of concepts can only be 
evaluated by confronting them with how (if at all) they operate in specific historical cases, and not 
independently of such a context. 
The general rationale of selecting cases has been the following: the constants of these case studies were 
defined as lithic assemblages, while the variables were defined as scholars and their conceptual re-
sources. This is because the aim of the comparison was to investigate how differences in approach 
effect (if at all) the interpretation of the same collection of lithic artefacts. In other words: whether the 
conceptual resources of scholars had an impact on what they could learn from these collections and 
how big this impact was. Keeping the factor of lithic assemblages constant makes it thereby easier to 
focalise on the most important disparities that emerge at different steps in the research process. 
 As laid out in some detail in Chapter 1, all of the selected case studies originate from the period 
between the 1980s and the early 2000s. This is not coincidental since this is precisely the formative 
period for both current-day French and Anglophone lithic research endeavours.  
 The representativity of the cases is more difficult to assess. This has primarily to do with the 
fact that there was only little choice involved in selecting them. Finding a single assemblage which has 
been studied to a sufficient extent by at least one scholar with a solid French and by another scholar 
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with a solid Anglophone research background is difficult to meet in practice. This situation is a result 
of unfortunate site and assemblage ‘protectionism’ – a practice as old as archaeology itself. Yet, that 
particular sites continue to be studied by particular scholars is also the result of different sites playing 
different roles in different discursive fields and narratives. The epistemic interest to re-study a given 
assemblage from another perspective is thus practically often limited. 
 Having said this, the three case studies mobilised in Chapter 1 and 3 were the only ones that I 
could find in the literature meeting all the mentioned requirements. This fact has a negative and a 
positive consequence. Negative is that the selection of cases might by rather arbitrary and that there 
may be some redundancy due to this (e.g., Boëda features twice). Positive, however, is that their selec-
tion was not dependent on a particular thesis to be defended since the selection was guided by maxi-
mally pragmatic considerations. One can in fact interpret this pragmatic selection as a form of ‘auto-
randomisation.’ 
 To clarify the nature of cases, it is helpful to draw on the taxonomy of historical case-types 
established by Scholl and Rätz (2016: 77-86, 82-83). According to these authors, one can at least dis-
tinguish between four main categories of case studies, each of them tied to a distinct informative value: 
(i) Hard cases; (ii) Paradigm cases; (iii) Big cases; and (iv) Randomised cases. The first category of 
case studies, ‘hard cases,’ is typically selected to challenge conceptual claims, not to illustrate them; 
cases that violate expectations or standard views and that are generally difficult to accommodate are 
looked for in this category. The second category, ‘paradigm cases,’ is usually mobilised to exemplify 
more or less typical instances of the type of science or field under consideration; cases selected here 
have become some sort of role models for how their particular science works – they are often regarded 
as guiding examples for their peers, showcasing how one ought to do a particular kind of analysis. The 
identification of ‘paradigm cases’ therefore requires some support from historical research. ‘Big cases’ 
typically thematise some important scientific achievements in a given discipline or field; this may or 
may not include that these cases have given rise or motivated specific (new) branches of research or 
acted as a template for a substantial number of further work – some of these factors may bring them 
rather close to ‘paradigm cases’. The main concern of using ‘big cases’ is their generalisability. ‘Ran-
domised cases,’ finally, are selected by some sort of sampling mechanism to avoid any form of selec-
tion bias. 
 From the exposition of the three chosen case studies in Chapter 1, it becomes clear that most of 
them are ‘big cases’ while some are likely also ‘paradigm cases’ (Table I.1). Whether any case study is 
‘hard’ primarily depends on the questions one wishes to ask. They are, for example, clearly ‘hard cases’ 
if we wish to ask whether lithic technology can be comprehensively studied with a single method, say 
the ‘Scientific Method.’ Because my main motivation was to select cases that are able to thematise the 
strength of evidential constraints and the role of conceptual framing in lithic analysis, all of them are 
also ‘hard cases’ in order to evaluate the intuition that scientific results in Palaeolithic archaeology are 
primarily constrained by the objects of study themselves. Most selected cases are also ‘paradigmatic’ 
for their respective research sphere for at least one important reason. Although it could, for instance, 
be generally questioned whether Dibble and Boëda are representative figures for their research tradi-
tions, (mainly because of the radicality of their opinion and approach), they can still tell us something 
very important. I would indeed argue that their ‘boundary status’ is precisely what renders them so 
illuminating. By pushing the basic epistemology of their research contexts to the limits and by chal-
lenging it, boundary cases reflect how particular approaches tend to accentuate, refine, and/or re-
negotiate their conceptual core. Extremes therefore help us to better understand what is ‘ordinary’ in 
the research context they originate from and talk about. In other words, extremists can serve as ideal-
types for their respective research backgrounds, in this way becoming ‘paradigm cases;’ they tell us 
something about the epistemic potentials and possibilities of the modes of cognition they generally 
harness. The fact that they sometimes ‘overstate’ their research epistemology allows us to better recog-
nise what this epistemology is all about – a condition that is analytically exploited here. 
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The following table provides an overview of the most notable scientific journals (including a selection 
of important but non-ranked journals in the French case) in which the results of French and Anglo-





From a methodological perspective, the strength of Pepper’s meta-theoretical framework is twofold: it 
(a) provides a general taxonomy to capture the full spectrum of epistemological stances present in 
lithic analysis, and it (b) specifies and elaborates an inventory of structural categories and concepts 
which characterise these stances. This is of great methodological interest since it helps to disentangle 
the multi-paradigmatic and multi-stranded nature of the lithic research enterprise and to focalise the 
common trends and fundamental rifts in a goal-oriented manner. Specifically, (a) allows to clarify the 
general epistemological structure of lithic studies and how it relates to differences in research tradi-
tions and other social factors; it enables the comparison of basic strategies of knowledge production 
with socio-historically distinct context of knowledge-formation. Complementarily, (b) helps to under-
stand how knowledge production in a given epistemological context works, and greatly facilitates the 
identification of key concepts in the analysis of case studies; Pepper’s structural categories can guide 
the analysis of lithic knowledge production in these cases and allow us to better comprehend the role 
and significance of the various methods, theories, concepts, and data mobilised. 
 The utilisation of Pepper’s meta-theoretical categories is primarily pragmatically motivated, 
even though the present author believes that the high epistemic success of mapping them onto lithic 
research practices at the French-Anglophone interface also warrants their ontological reading (cf. 
Chapter 6). In any case, Pepper’s categories allow us to speak about similarities and differences in lith-
ic practice in a problem-oriented manner and without getting lost in intricacies and details; the catego-
ries also enable to distinguish more effectively between levels of conceptual significance and between 
significance in terms of intra-theoretical variability and inter-theoretical diversity as well as between 
necessary categories (‘conceptual core’) and derived or supplementary categories (‘conceptual jacket’). 
It has to be noted, however, that, although I present most of the structural categories that Pep-
per identifies for each of the four world hypotheses, I have also tried to tailor them to my needs. This 
means that I have translated some of the concepts by pointing out some of their most important re-
search consequences or methodological correlates within lithic research. I hope that this makes it easi-
er for the reader to follow my line of reasoning and to recognise the significance of the mobilised con-
cepts. For this reason, the description of the conceptual space of each world theory already anticipates 
(at least partly) what is to follow in the conceptual analysis of the case studies. 
 The perhaps most important purpose of Pepper’s meta-theoretical framework is that it pro-
vides meaning to otherwise isolated features of research; it helps us to understand how structural cate-
gories and concepts relate to one another, how they are imbricated in a particular theory of cognitive 
criticism, how this affects the construction and handling of data, and the ways these are ultimately 
connected. As the present study hopes to show, these interrelationships are crucial to understand if we 
wish to develop an instructive epistemology of lithic knowledge production. 
 
Due to the strict cognitive autonomy of world hypotheses (Pepper 1942: 98), a world theory’s inherent 
difficulties, possible partialities, weaknesses, and/or inadequacies cannot legitimately be judged from 
the perspective of the rival theories, even if these turn out to be relatively adequate in their own right 
(cf. ibid.: 115). Rival theories may render us ‘sensitive’ for particular problems that a theory faces and 
may help to identify or point to these problems, but they cannot criticise them effectively since they 
can only do so from their own vantage point.  
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That even the four relatively adequate world theories carry some serious sources of inadequacy 
must thus be shown by internal analysis – by a demonstration that these difficulties arise out of the 
structural categories proper to each theory. In Pepper’s (1942: 115) own words, a world theory must 
“convict itself of inadequacy” and often does so in the course of its historical development when schol-
ars try to clarify and/or refine its structural categories. The more obvious structural inadequacies of 
each theory provide a constant incentive to develop various forms of eclecticism; these are, as Pepper 
notes, well-attested in Western intellectual history. 
The most basic inadequacies of the four relatively adequate world theories derive from the ‘dispersive’-
‘integrative’ polarity of world hypotheses; they are an immediate consequence of the necessary trade-
offs between these two poles of global conceptualisation.  
‘Dispersive’ theories, as we have seen in Chapter 2, face no difficulties in taking all facts seri-
ously that are available to them but generally lack in precision. ‘Dispersivity,’ therefore, often puts 
scholars into a position in which they have to deal with a range of equally consistent interpretations to 
which their facts are amendable (Pepper 1942: 144). Since it is difficult for these theories to explain 
away any ‘facts,’ they need to find ways to narrow down how these can be interpreted and to constrain 
the effects of differential emphasis. This is the price of sustaining a ‘high explanatory coverage’ of facts. 
The sheer amount of factual information that ‘dispersive’ world theories have to process simply ham-
pers their ability to give a precise explanation for all of them. They have difficulty with providing focus 
and tend to offer general types of explanations whose connection to the observed factual configura-
tions is often loose at best. 
‘Integrative’ theories, on the other hand, face the exact opposite difficulty. Their strength is to 
ensure precision but they lack in scope. This typically means that they have to explain away facts that 
they consider irrelevant or detrimental to the explanation of a phenomenon – in Pepper’s (1942: 145) 
terms, they are constantly “tempted to throw “facts” out into the “unreal” and by whishing perhaps too 
hard to get everything into one determinate order, they have to deny the reality of a good many 
things.” This is why ‘integrative’ world theories tend to distort and truncate reality – they have a ten-
dency to reduce the richness of worldly experience and to make a lot, probably too much, out of the 
idea that some things may be illusionary and exist only in appearance. 
We can generally state that ‘integrative’ world theories tend to overestimate the role and de-
gree of order that persists in reality; they presume that order is categorical, typically implying that 
some facts are more relevant than others for explanatory purposes (i.e., overemphasis of ‘directed’ and 
‘strong’ determination). ‘Dispersive’ world theories, to the contrary, tend to underestimate the role and 
degree of order (i.e., overemphasis of ‘pluri-directed’ and ‘weak’ determination), yet paradoxically of-
ten overestimate the world’s latitudinal interconnectivity – that is, that all facts are potentially equally 
important for explaining whatever needs to be explained. The latter is perhaps especially pronounced 
within ‘contextualistic’ modes of inquiry. 
A similar type of distortion is likely associated with the trade-off between ‘analytic’ and ‘synthetic’ 
world theories; both types of world theories are inconsistent with our intuition that the world affords a 
rich spectrum of experience and knowledge. 
 ‘Analytic’ world theories, as we have seen in Chapter 2, place primary emphasis on parts and 
thereby reduce wholes to be compositional features of reality; this, again, tends to result in the denial 
of independent existence of wholes although common-sense experience tells us that wholeness is a 
highly effective feature of reality. It is likely that something of importance gets lost in this approach. 
 ‘Synthetic’ theories face a similar problem: they likely over-emphasise wholeness and the exis-
tential dependency of parts on wholes; these theories hence gravitate towards rejecting the explanatory 
value of isolated parts and recast them as merely derivative. They additionally face the difficulty of 
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reaching out to the wholes they aim to describe and explain, since they have to insist that these are 
‘more’ than the sum of their parts. 
 We can generally state that ‘synthetic’ world theories tend to over-complexify matters in reali-
ty, whereas ‘analytic’ theories tend to over-simplify them. The point is that in ‘synthetic’ approaches 
‘complexification’ is typically a methodological manoeuvre to detail part-whole relationships; in ‘ana-
lytic’ inquiry, complementarily, ‘simplification’ serves as a tool to demonstrate that the character of a 
whole follows from the characters of its parts, without any substantial loss. The over-complexification 
of largely synchronic relations is characteristic for ‘contextualism,’ while the over-complexification of 
temporal-diachronic relations seems diagnostic for ‘organicism.’ Over-simplification in ‘formism’ typi-
cally concerns the link between ‘subsistence’ and ‘existence,’ while in ‘mechanism’ it seem to be a con-
sequence of pinning down fixed causal structures.  
According to Pepper (1942: 155f.), a prime source of inadequacy in formism is likely rooted in the dis-
tinction between relations and ‘ties’ (see Chapter 2: Box 6 for an explanation of these concepts in 
formism); the two, in Pepper’s eyes, are regularly confused and this, in turn, creates major inconsist-
encies which threaten to bring down the theory altogether. The imperative nature of the relation-‘tie’ 
distinction is a consequence of the basic categories of ‘immanent formism and I will shortly recon-
struct them here to expose the difficulty. 
 In ‘immanent formism,’ we can distinguish between (i) ‘characters’, (ii) ‘particulars’, and (iii) 
‘participation’. The crucial concept is ‘characters’ since these describe the qualities attached to particu-
lars and the relations among these qualities (Pepper 1942: 154). The difference between characters and 
particulars is that distinct particulars can have the same characters; furthermore, some qualities are 
preclusive to one another – for a particular which is blue cannot be red at the same time, except for it 
being “bluered” but this would be another character altogether (ibid.: 155). This implies that characters 
logically involve relations among qualities. Now, since ‘ties’ in formism are defined as specific combi-
nations of characters and particulars, that is, as character-particular relationships, ‘ties’ appear to rep-
resent some sort of second-order relations. Here the confusion begins. As Pepper (ibid.: 155f.) points 
out: “[t]ies are [thus] relations which are not relations. This sounds very much like a self-
contradiction, and seems to indicate a categorical inadequacy. I rather think it is.” At the very least, to 
distinguish between ‘ties’ and relations turns out to be very difficult in empirical research. The distinc-
tion, however, must be defended since (dis-)similarity, the root-metaphor of formism, is not gauged as 
a relation but rather as a ‘tie’ (ibid.: 156). 
Moreover, the relation-‘tie’ distinction turns out to be substantial in formism since one of its 
main instruments, the ‘Theory of Types’, appears to be a logical systematisation of this differentiation 
(Pepper 1942: 158). If the distinction is not uphold, in other words, formistic typologies run into the 
danger of becoming empty, i.e., ‘meaningless’ abstractions. Following Pepper (ibid.: 156), the ‘Theory 
of Types’ relies on the principle that the concepts which are employed to analyse other concepts cannot 
themselves be included in the concepts analysed. Although this statements appears to be perfectly 
sound, it immediately unmasks a potential source of incompleteness in formism; from the logical prin-
ciple it follows that descriptions of the world as a whole are meaningless – a typical credo of modern 
positivists as Pepper says – because we need to employ concepts which themselves are withdrawn 
from analysis. For this reason, analysis can never include the totality of fact and this means that form-
ism is potentially self-undermining as a world theory. From this perspective, the ‘Theory of Types’ can 
be understood as a formula which tells us which concepts can be safely employed and which need to be 
excluded from the analysis to avoid conceptual trouble (ibid.: 158). At its heart, it tells us to not con-
fuse relations and ‘ties’ as they are constructed and interpreted in formism. It is for this reason that the 
‘Theory of Types’ presupposes the formistic world theory – the logical principle it rests on can thus not 
be mobilised to show that ‘synthetic’ world theories are fallible. Moreover, it presupposes the very dif-
ficulties it was proposed to solve – it merely helps navigating the distinction between relations and 
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‘ties’. This, according to Pepper (idem), is mere “hypostatisation.” He adds (ibid.: 158f.): “[the ‘Theory 
of Types’] probably represents an irremediable inadequacy within the formistic world theory, and 
points to a region where the theory in terms of its own logic confesses its inadequacy.” 
The central tool in formism to bring order to the world, classification, is particularly suscepti-
ble to pave the ground for categorical self-contradiction (cf. Pepper 1942: 161). The reason is that clas-
sifications and the delineation of classes are usually dependent on the ‘Theory of Types’. Formism fac-
es problems when talking about all of its particulars at once because then all particulars, strictly speak-
ing, do belong to no class, they simply form the category of all particulars. If the intuition of similarity 
on which formism rests is correct, this category must possess no character by definition. But this re-
veals a potential contradiction, for something having no character cannot be true, since having the 
character of no character appears to be self-contradictory (idem). A similar problem is faced when 
formism attempts to foster its grip on a single particular which has no class either (for a class cannot 
be defined by self-identity but by ‘ties’). The difficulty is that a class, in the end, cannot be defined by 
characters, particulars, and/or participation alone and also cannot constitute a separate category of 
itself; it is simply the operation of all of the three formistic categories and as such completely analysa-
ble into the functioning of those categories (ibid.: 162). Classification, too, needs to assure the concep-
tual and operative distinction between its categories, again showing that relations and ‘ties’ must not 
be confused. 
 
A second source of relative weakness results from the practical implementation of the distinction be-
tween ‘existence’ and ‘subsistence’ which is fundamental to formistic explanations (cf. Chapter 2: Box 
6). The acceptance of ‘subsistent’ categories which are not fully ‘particularisable’ predisposes formists 
to quickly adopt standard interpretations of patterns and/or types of evidence grouped into particular 
classes, i.e., interpretations that mobilise conventional ‘subsistent’ categories. This is to say that ex-
plaining by ‘subsistence’ is particularly vulnerable to accept readings which are en vogue. (This goes 
hand in hand with the difficulty in formism to forcefully differentiate between different readings of 
equally amendable sets of facts). Another side of essentially the same difficulty is the tendency to apply 
abductive reasoning (reasoning according to the simplest explanation) informed by earlier research to 
make sense of the evidence. ‘Subsistent’ categories, in other words, are often too quickly and too un-
critically extrapolated from one area of inquiry into another in order to explain what is observed there. 
Interpretation then becomes a question of evaluating the plausibility of particular ‘subsistent’ candi-
dates themselves and is hence threatened to become critically detached from the actually available 
evidence – from the realm of ‘existence’. 
The inherent tension between ‘analyticity’ and ‘subsistence’ in formism is also troublesome 
and may be another source of self-contradiction. As an ‘analytic’ world theory, formism assumes that 
the world is fully analysable into its parts, but practically admits that some features are not for these 
subsist (Pepper 1942: 168f.). Especially when the category of ‘subsistence’ is interpreted as being made 
up by ‘second-order particulars’ (cf. Chapter 2: Box 6), ‘subsistence’ turns out to be not fully ‘particu-
larisable,’ which is another way of saying that it is not fully analysable into elementary characters 
(ibid.: 169). ‘Subsistent’ entities in this sense, e.g., formistic norms and laws, are precisely those which 
are defined as complex characters and patterns (Gestalts), or as combinations of the two (idem). 
In general, the stipulation of some particulars as the most basic ones threatens to collapse 
formism and to transform it into a ‘mechanism’ in disguise. This is perhaps most evident in the case of 
space and time which tend to be conceptualised as basic particulars by formists (Pepper 1942: 174). 
Not only is the problem of ‘ties’ aggravated by this manoeuvre (idem), it also undermines the distinc-
tion between ‘existence’ and ‘subsistence’ because space and time – qua basic particulars – are then 
recast as structural features of concrete reality, and therefore find themselves within the realm of ‘ex-





The perhaps most severe conceptual weakness of formism derives from its basic assumption of dis-
creteness. This assumption is so essential that abandoning it would lead to a full collapse of the theory 
and in fact marks the gateway to ‘mechanism’ (Pepper 1942: 184) – this is also part of the trouble of 
recasting space and time as basic features of reality for it easily leads to the conception of a determina-
tive spatiotemporal field, a conception proper to ‘mechanism’. Conversely, formism asserts, by virtue 
of its structural categories, that the world is hold together by a number of discrete and therefore sepa-
rate laws, norms, and/or regularities; the possibility for integrating them into a single structure or 
system poses a constant threat to undermining the validity of the theory (idem). Formism consequent-
ly has to invest cognitive resources to secure the discreteness and fragmentation of nature and must in 
principle insist on an incomplete integration of facts; the problem is that formism cannot demonstrate 
that such integration is impossible and hence relies on negative, mainly illustrative arguments. This 
translates into a general weakness of ‘dispersive’ theories outlined before: “[their] looseness in categor-
ical structure and consequent lack of determinateness” (ibid.: 185).  
A consequence of this categorical ‘looseness’ is that according to formism, there is no definite 
or finite number of entities, classes, or categories to be found in the world; in order to answer ques-
tions like “what constitutes one particular, or one character, or one norm or law?” or “[h]ow many 
particulars are there in a sheet of paper?,” “[h]ow many in the flight of an airplane?,” and “[h]ow can 
we definitely tell a tie from a relation?,” formists cannot help but to contend that more data is needed, 
and formism thus leaves us with much ‘vagueness,’ ‘vacillation,’ and ‘indefiniteness’ (Pepper 1942: 
185). 
A basic difficulty in mechanism is the constant back and forth between ‘discrete’ and ‘consolidated’ 
interpretations of its root metaphor, which, according to Pepper (1942: 186), threatens to undermine 
the theory’s coherence and integrity and thus seems to point to a fundamental inadequacy of the theo-
ry itself. In a nutshell, whereas forms of ‘discrete mechanism’ easily collapse into ‘formism,’ ‘consoli-
dated’ versions tend to become as radical as to reduce most of their categories to one causal singularity 
and thus greatly lack explanatory scope. 
The first and perhaps most central issue in mechanism is an outgrowth of the theory’s inherent cate-
gorical duality – the conceptual differentiation between its ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ categories (see 
Chapter 2: Box 7). Since these categories are defined in contrast to one another, they also depend on 
one another. Now, according to Pepper (1942: 194), the history of Western thought clearly shows that, 
notwithstanding, mechanism seems to incentivise its advocates to concentrate on either of the two 
categories. This obviously poses a constant threat to the overall scope of interpretation issued under 
the mechanistic banner – ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ categories need each other to provide the scope 
required for a relatively adequate world theory (ibid.: 195). Pepper (idem) notes: “[i]t turns out, ulti-
mately, our cognitive evidence for the structure and the details of the cosmic machine described 
through the primary qualities comes entirely from materials within the secondary qualities. The more 
detailed the development of the primary categories, the more obvious this fact becomes. And, on the 
other side, it turns out that the very conception of the secondary categories depends upon their con-
trast with the primary categories, so that any attempt to develop the former without the latter defeats 
itself, that is, implies what it denies.” 
 In other words: because ‘mechanists’ seem to be inclined to reduce ‘secondary’ qualities to 
‘primary’ qualities or the other way around, they tend to eliminate part of what their theory depends 
upon. Both ‘physicalism’ (or strong variants of ‘materialism’) and ‘cognitivism’ (or strong versions of 
‘idealism’) are harbingers of this tendency. From the perspective of Pepper’s world hypotheses theory, 
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such colonisation of one set of categories with the other set can hence only be self-contradictory and 
clearly undercuts the cognitive adequacy of mechanism. Much of this problem is a consequence of the 
general difficulty to navigate the gap between Appearance and Reality proper to the ‘integrative’ world 
theories. 
The second problem is rooted in the assumption that the world is of a highly ordered and determinate 
nature. This issues the mechanistic tendency to believe in various versions of the Laplacian demon, 
that is, to assume that things that happen in the world can largely be said to have happened inevitably 
– in other words: to know all the relevant details of the world and all the relevant laws or regularities 
holding them together essentially means to know what will happen. Determinateness translates into 
inevitability and inevitably translates into the general predictability of events and phenomena. This 
conceptual inclination, however, generally conflicts with the motivation in ‘mechanism’ to cast the 
world into ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ categories – namely to assert that the former are ‘effective’ while 
the latter are not (cf. Chapter 2: Box 7). In practice, this means that ‘secondary’ qualities often turn 
out to be accidentally rather than inevitable tied to or associated with ‘primary’ qualities and/or ob-
servable phenomena. This tension constantly threatens to destabilise the structural architecture of 
mechanism from within. 
 Moreover, the tension between what can be said to be ‘accidental’ and what can be said to be 
‘inevitable’ can easily lead to mechanism dissolving into ‘formism’ for the independence of some quali-
ties (‘secondary’ qualities) from laws and/or regulatory principles paves the way for the conception 
that laws are nothing more than basic forms which are repeatedly exemplified or instantiated in what 
is the spatiotemporal field – a conception that is proper to ‘formism’ (cf. Pepper 1942: 210). This is the 
trouble with mechanism: it cannot accept the essentially timeless and ever-continuing repetition of 
laws as exemplifications in space and time without falling into ‘formistic’ reasoning, but the rejection 
of this conception leaves no alternative as to accept that some things may not be inevitable – that there 
must be leeway for novelty and emergence. 
 According to Pepper (1942: 211), the only way to avoid the collapse of mechanism into a form 
of consolidated ‘formism’ is to “embed the primary qualities and the laws firmly in the spatiotemporal 
field” so that most of the residual discreteness is eliminated. Mechanism cannot accept discreteness 
since it is an ‘integrative’ theory; discreteness implies strict similarity and therefore ‘formism.’859 A 
‘discrete’ mechanism would be self-contradictory (idem). To avoid conceptual discreteness, however, is 
extremely difficult to accomplish, especially with the categories that mechanism has at its disposal; 
mechanists need to distinguish between ‘primary’ qualities, ‘secondary’ qualities, laws, and the ‘field of 
location’ in order to relate them mechanistically and to provide an account of reality – these categories, 
in other words, are automatically rendered somewhat discrete in order to make them accessible and 
analysable. This is the ever-present doorway to ‘formism.’ From this difficulty it follows that mecha-
nism has to be radical in explaining away the actual ‘existence’ of its own categories and to turn them 
into mere heuristic devices; ultimately, mechanism, in order to avoid existential discreteness, can 
therefore only accept the existence of space-time particulars (things are only real if they have a time 
and a place), a principle that can never be abandoned without self-undermination (idem). 
 In essence, mechanism hence faces major difficulties and self-made problems in accepting 
non-predictability, chaos, and chance and the statistical approximations of regularity is only accepta-
ble as a convenient instrument to get a hand on the determinate nature of the world’s field structure – 
a conception that cannot be abandoned without abandoning ‘mechanism’ itself. This almost inevitably 
leads to forms of existential minimalism: to uphold the internal consistency of its categorical structure, 
mechanism must defend the notion that only a single particular can exist and the search for this par-
ticular singularity must have research priority (cf. Pepper 1942: 214). This is why mechanism gravi-
tates towards its ‘consolidated’ interpretation and tends to recast the world as an amalgamated field 
                                                          




structure – as a consolidated ‘spatiotemporal-gravitational-electromagnetic field’ (idem). Explanations 
which do not target this basic level of explanation are simply dismissed as irrelevant. 
A practical weakness of mechanism and a major obstacle to its progression is the regular confusion of 
correlation and causation; to be effective and maximally adequate, mechanism cannot abandon this 
distinction because abandoning it would also bring down its constitutive categorical duality (‘primary’ 
vs. ‘secondary’ categories). In actual research, this problem is aggravated because what is given in ob-
servation is primarily ‘secondary’ qualities and the structure-giving entities of the spatiotemporal field 
remain unobservable; correlation is thus largely restricted to describe the relationships among ‘sec-
ondary’ qualities, relationships that may be ‘ineffective’ and ‘accidental.’ Correlation, therefore, cannot 
bridge the gap between ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ categories and can never quite reach the basic level 
of explanation which mechanism aspires to reach. Yet, most of the time, mechanists have no choice but 
to use correlations to identify potential causal relationships, if only to narrow down the space of poten-
tially relevant causal relationships. The threat of confusion is therefore omnipresent. Confusion might 
even serve as a tool of legitimation for correlations to serve as a proxy for causality and easily confirms 
the regular and well-ordered structure of reality. 
 This leads us to a more basic problem in mechanism which has already been alluded to but not 
spelled out yet: the impossibility to consolidate ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ qualities without transition-
ing to ‘formism’ (Pepper 1942: 220, 230). This issue is linked to the problem of correlation for mecha-
nists tend to note correlations between ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ qualities in the hope to predict the 
latter from the former; this, again, threatens to undermine the constitutive and necessary complemen-
tarity between ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ qualities (cf. ibid.: 218). As Pepper (ibid.: 231) adds, “the gap 
between the primary and secondary categories still remains the centre of inadequacy for mechanism.” 
It indeed remains largely unclear how mechanism can reach out from the phenomenal world to the 
basic structure of the world without involving itself into basic contradictions. It is quite symptomatic 
that mechanists increasingly use methods of approximation to establish principles of determination 
but through such approximation they also never quite reach what they are looking for – their target of 
analysis (the most basic structure of reality) turns out to be fundamentally deprived from their analyti-
cal grip. 
From the dual structure of categories another cardinal mechanistic problem emerges, an issue that has 
variously been described as the ‘mind-body problem’ (cf. Pepper 1942: 217, 220f.) and that is – not 
accidentally – tied to one of the great historical father figures of the theory: René Descartes. The mind-
body problem is another consequence of the general difficulty in mechanism to bridge the gap created 
by its dual categorical structure. 
 The reconstruction of the problem may proceed as follows: since mechanists must accept the 
existential distinction between ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ qualities but at the same time seek to estab-
lish that the latter are predictably correlated with the former, it seems unavoidable to conceive of ‘sec-
ondary’ qualities as some sort of emergent or supervening qualities – irreducible but nonetheless cor-
related features of the spatiotemporal field (cf. Pepper 1942: 221); to avoid giving way to ‘formism,’ 
mechanism further needs to ensure that its elementary units of matter are not just defined as ‘imma-
nent forms;’ this in turn implies that the spatiotemporal machinery which mechanism seeks to under-
stand is to be regarded as a highly structured field that never quite repeats itself in all of its details 
(idem). The same accounts for the ‘secondary’ qualities which even as emergent qualities can never 
quite repeat themselves in all of their details if one is to counter the persisting immanence of reality 
propagated by ‘formism’ as a world theory (idem). From this a conceptual dilemma emerges: if even 
the ‘secondary’ qualities will never repeat themselves in all of their details, they can also never be com-
pletely predicted and hence cannot really be said to correlate with the ‘primary’ categories (ibid.: 220). 
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But how can one then reach out to the primary categories in the first place? This short but rather ab-
stract reconstruction of the mind-body problem should be sufficient to show that mechanism can 
hardly escape from it. Ultimately, the problem carries the seeds of mechanistic self-contradiction and 
poses a severe threat to impair the conceptual integrity of the theory. 
 
How facts are compared, selected and emphasised is a fairly unconstrained business in contextualism; 
it follows that evidential decision-making – that is, specification of which features of reality to include 
in the analysis, which to carry through the analysis, and which to neglect – appears to be as arbitrary 
as in no other theory (cf. Pepper 1942: 233f.). The theory typically circumvents this difficulty by its 
procedural logic – by asserting that analytical trial-and-error learning and time will tell which features 
to highlight and which to carry through the analysis. The problem is therefore mainly of a practical 
nature and pertains to the scholarly limitation of analytical resources including time; epistemic pa-
tience and endurance are qualities which must hence be invoked as preconditions of interpretive suc-
cess in contextualism – a precondition which is difficult to ensure and sustain and often conflicts with 
the short-term interests of its practitioners.860 
A main disadvantage of contextualism derives from its radical interpretation of change incorporated in 
its structural categories; the implication of this interpretation – placing natural emphasis on qualita-
tive novelty and change – is that unchangeability (immutability) is denied as a structural feature of 
reality (cf. Pepper 1942: 234). This also entails the rejection of a unity of reality and all possible obser-
vations about it. Moreover, it generally undermines the ability of contextualists to compare disparate 
observations and findings – the radical and categorical heterogeneity of the world which is a conse-
quence of the contextualistic categories hence threatens to undercut the capacity of contextualitsts to 
effectively communicate their findings and to defend their significance. But the openness for radical 
change has two further, perhaps more substantial, implications. 
 On the one hand, contextualism is “permanently threatened with evidences for permanent 
structures in the nature” (Pepper 1942: 235) and therefore easily develops sceptical attitudes towards 
the possibilities of effective synthesis and integration. It also has to fight all evidence of permanency 
and regularity presented by the ‘integrative’ theories. On the other hand, contextualism is potentially 
self-undermining because it, too, relies on conventional terms, methods, and concepts to advance its 
case and to make sense of its evidence; this means that, ultimately, certain generalities in meaning and 
significance have to be accepted in order to start any inquiry and to talk about evidence and interpreta-
tion, even if these are later dismissed in favour of others. Insofar as these methods, terms, and con-
cepts cannot be unchangeable structures, they are always suspicious and constantly need to be revised. 
It is questionable how contextualists can escape this loop – the typical strategy is to accept it as a gen-
eral condition of knowledge formation and to recast it positively. Contextualism is nonetheless gener-
ally threatened to impair its own ability to ‘talk about’ and define what it finds and thus to get lost in 
the ever-changeable quality and endless richness of the cosmic whole. 
 As a result of all of this, contextualism cannot hope to find strong legitimation in its own cate-
gories to transcend the historicity of its own findings; contextualism, in other words, cannot exclude 
itself from being situated and harbouring context-specific categories and concepts. This is a likely 
source of over-emphasising alterity and ‘otherness’ and thereby distorting similarity and ‘sameness’ in 
reality. It is an advantage insofar as contextualism, because of this inclination, is perhaps most eager 
                                                          
860 It is important to note, however, that this weakness also implies that credible insights and knowledge in ‘contextualism’ are 
typically gathered on temporalities which differ from the other theories; ‘contextualistic’ inquiry subscribes to a long-term pro-
ject of knowledge-formation which has no definite end. 
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among all the world theories to be self-critical and to highlight again and again its own epistemic limi-
tations, and hence to develop source criticism and epistemological critique, often leading to anti-
positivistic attitudes – what Pepper (1942: 252) characterises as its inability to exclude itself from its 
propositions, “to make an exception of oneself.” It is a disadvantage insofar as reaching out to histori-
cal contexts other than one’s own is always problematic, stained in uncertainty, and can never be based 
on safeguarded conceptual grounds; it always remains a working hypothesis at best. The categories 
and subcategories that contextualism develops are thus always threatened to be categories and subcat-
egories mainly of our epoch, the epoch in which the investigator is living and working (ibid.: 236). 
Rival world theories identify this as the inability of contextualism to generate reliable knowledge 
claims about other historical or cultural contexts beyond the reassurance of the radical difference of 
these contexts – this is partly ironic, since contextualism is the one world theory which takes change 
and novelty most serious, but cannot do so without serious repercussions as we have seen. 
 
From what has been said so far, it follows that contextualism generally confronts its practitioners with 
a difficult analytical task and cannot provide them with generalisable or invariable guidelines for anal-
ysis; analysis in contextualism is therefore extremely demanding and plastic – clearly, it is nothing 
that can be standardised to a high degree. Again, the issue, then, is mainly practical in nature since it 
follows that to practice contextualism in a satisfactory manner is meticulously difficult and will proba-
bly produce many false negatives or loose ends despite of it being proficiently executed. Contextual-
ism’s weakness is its adherence to the dogma of ‘nothing can be presumed other than nothing is pre-
sumable.’ This not only makes it difficult to reject anything – contextualism is the most ‘liberal’ theory 
in this regard (cf. Pepper 1942: 235) – it also affects the clarify and integrity of the theory itself. For the 
credo that ‘nothing can be presumed other than nothing is presumable’ strikes a dubious balance be-
tween being tautological and being logically inconsistent. Ultimately, contextualism may ask too much 
from scholars to develop its full potential and therefore often drifts away from its conceptual core re-
sulting in eclecticisms with the other world theories. 
 
By the particular way in which contextualism rejects the dogma of complete ‘analyticity’ and recasts 
element analysis as intrinsically distorting (Pepper 1942: 248), it also introduces the assumption that 
no final or complete analysis of anything is achievable (ibid.: 249). Contextualistic analysis cannot 
escape what Pepper (idem) calls the “sheering effect,” that is, the somewhat arbitrary ingression and 
categorical openness of analysis and reasoning. In fact, the more one contextually digs into reality – 
into its quality and texture – the more one has to revise what one has to be taken for granted in the 
beginning (ibid.: 249f.). This ongoing revision of findings and certainties will never stop and continue 
ad infinitum; contextualists cannot escape this ever-growing stream of novelty and analysis and 
knowledge thus appear to be “bottomless” (ibid.: 250). There is no clear beginning and no clear end of 
the interpretive journey. The only way out seems to be to admit that both entry and end points of anal-
ysis are more or less contingent or to conventionalise them – but this, too, remains arbitrary. In total, 
knowledge and analysis remains always unfinished in contextualism and this inherently problematises 
the status of knowledge claims therein. A general weakness of ‘dispersive’ theories joins forces with 
this unfinishability: there are many and equally revealing but nevertheless non-comparable ways of 
finding contextual meaning in evidence (idem). Combined, this issues the threat of conducting analysis 






The problem of uncertainty is an amalgamation of all the three problems discussed before. The inher-
ent uncertainty of knowledge that contextualism seems to imply leads to a general difficulty to clearly 
distinguish between what is positively analysable in the world (that is, whether and to what degree 
references are traceable, if only into past and future contexts) and what is not (‘blocked’ strands and 
references), and whether this is primarily the result of processes operating in the world or has more to 
do with the inability of researchers to find meaningful references and relations – a condition that may 
be defined as “cognitive blocking” (Pepper 1942: 279; see Chapter 2: Box 8). In general, this makes it 
very difficult to distinguish between interpretive significance and irrelevance in contextualism. The 
issue is serious and typically engenders endless and often circular debates about evidential and argu-
mentative details and potential biases both in the available data and in scholarly cognition. Again, the 
structural category of novelty undermines any certainty claims that are able to transcend the here and 
now. There is a threat here that contextualism confuses itself. 
In a sense comparable to ‘formism,’ contextualism faces the serious threat that its operational catego-
ries are clarified by other theories and thus overcome by the competing conceptions of truth that these 
theories harbour (Pepper 1942: 278f.). The contextualist can do nothing on her/his own to prevent this 
clarification from happening and may thus only admit: “catch me if you can!” (ibid.: 279). 
 Contextualism’s perhaps greatest strength is at the same time one of its main weaknesses: its 
basic pragmatism and extreme interpretive elasticity. The key issue here is the difficulty of extrapolat-
ing insights from one context to another, or even using insights from one context to intuit or pre-
organise the evidence from another context and to formulate some general expectations – this proce-
dure, as we have seen, is greatly hampered by contextualism’s insistence on novelty, change, and con-
text-specificity. The implication is that contextualism tends to accept only the primary and context-
specific corroboration of knowledge claims, what Pepper (1949: 279) terms ‘direct verification’, and is 
generally extreme sceptic when indirect, context-detached or context-transcendent lines of evidence 
and argumentation are utilised. According to Pepper (idem), this leads to the following dilemma to 
characterise the situation of contextualism:  
The only escape is to insist on the possibility that even those features of nature which seem to 
be context-transgressing at first glance, might turn out to be bound by some larger context, perhaps of 
time itself.  
The contextualist, in other words, has to extend his notion of contextual framing from local-
ised contexts to larger-scale contexts such as ‘domains’ or ‘realms’ of reality and to assert the specifity 
of categories, concepts, behaviours within these divisions; she/he will then typically contend that time 
itself delineates different context and we cannot know that the generalities we observe now will remain 
generalities if we extend our temporal scope – she/he will ask how one can know that generalities in 
the here and now will not change in the course of time and so turn out to be context-specific after all. It 
should be obvious, however, that contextualism can never provide evidence for why this must neces-
sarily be the case. 
 Even though contextualistic knowledge is typically very rich, it tends to remain insular. This 
insularity, rooted in the elasticity of contextualism’s structural categories, turns out to be its cardinal 
weakness. It cannot stop to posit “the ultimacy of blocking, novelty, fusion, and so forth […] only in the 
end to find that his greatest difficulty arose in his [the contextualist’s] inability, without retreating, to 
specify the structural features of nature” (Pepper 1942: 303f.). At some point, contextualism, too, has 
“to admit integrative structures surrounding and extending through given events though these struc-
“[e]ither you must confine yourself to believing only in the facts of direct verification, in which 
case your theory lacks scope; or if you admit the validity of indirect verification, you must 
admit that nature has a determinate structure and so fall into the contradiction of both affirm-
ing and denying this structure of nature.” 
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tures endanger its categories” (ibid.: 281). This is the source of the constant danger of self-
contradiction that haunts contextualism as a world theory, carrying the fruits of serious cognitive in-
adequacy. 
 Lastly, we should recall that the perhaps most difficult task for relativists in general – and 
contextualism clearly trends towards relativistic conceptions of reality – remains to explain why the 
claim that everything is context-specific or relative to a context does not include the very statement of 
context-specificity itself, which then, too, turns out to be context-specific and not generally valid. 
Hence, there remains little ground for accepting radical novelty on worldwide scale without falling 
prey to this fallacy. Contextualism is always threatened to undercut itself in this regard. 
The main source of cognitive inadequacy in organicism can be found in the categorical polarity be-
tween its ‘progressive’ and ‘ideal’ categories (Pepper 1942: 281f.; see Chapter 2: Box 9); just like in 
‘mechanism,’ this polarity gives rise to an inherent conceptual dualism provoking categorical friction 
and implying tendencies of self-contradiction. The polarity sits at the heart of the specific organicistic 
problem of transition from the ‘progressive’ and ‘ideal’ categories which is structurally similar to the 
transition from ‘primary’ to ‘secondary’ qualities found in ‘mechanism.’ As mentioned before, we are 
facing a general difficulty of ‘integrative’ theories here, a difficulty that derives from their attempt to 
navigate and ultimately resolve the conceptual distinction between Appearance and Reality on which 
they are based. That such attempts can only be self-undermining should have become evident. 
 Organicists find it generally tempting to reduce reality to its ideal categories and often pro-
claim that only those categories truly “exist” (Pepper 1942: 282). This essentially means the reality of 
appearances which are identified with the ‘progressive’ categories and may distort what is structurally 
given. A full reduction of the ‘progressive’ categories to the ‘ideal’ ones is nothing else than denying 
one’s own categorical preconditions which is potentially self-contradictory and at least greatly restricts 
the scope of the theory. ‘Progressive’ and ‘ideal’ categories are co-dependent and over-emphasising or 
denying one of the two poles does only harm to the integrity, consistency, and clarity of the theory. If 
the ‘ideal’ categories, on the other hand, are omitted, organicism runs the risk of becoming a refined 
version of ‘contextualism’ where temporal integration is simply re-interpreted in the light of the root 
metaphor ‘historical event’/‘situationality’ (idem). Hence, the conceptual symmetry between ‘progres-
sive’ and ‘ideal’ categories must not be abandoned but the drive for integration and consolidation in 
organicism often motivates scholars to do so. 
 The problem can also be recast as a problem of transition. What one observes and what is giv-
en in experience is mostly if not exclusively the ‘progressive’ categories – the appearances of reality; 
the question is therefore always how one can safely bridge these appearances or make them usable to 
reach out for the ‘ideal’ reality. Independently of how one solves this issue, much depends on the na-
ture and structure of appearances and they must therefore always retain their analytical value (Pepper 
1942: 283). To discredit them, render them epiphenomena, or to explain them away entirely makes the 
theory somewhat unbalanced, internally incomplete, and suspicious to say the least. The tendency of 
the ‘ideal’ categories to monopolise reality, in other words, poses a constant threat to the conceptual 
integrity and consistency of the theory. 
The second issue arises out of the interpretive focus on integration which is at the core of organicism. 
How integration can be reached and is used in organicistic inquiry, however, suggests an infinite re-
gress, an unbreakable loop of integration, disintegration, and re-integration. The reason is that organi-
cistic integration is typically reached in levels and each integration of parts (i.e., fragments of reality) 
produces wholes which can be turned into new fragments because they are surrounded by other 
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wholes and therefore confirm a new level of conflict; there is no reason to believe that this logic can 
ever be broken (Pepper 1942: 298f.). In fact, the entire point of the ‘ideal’ categories is that they are 
‘ideal’ and may therefore never be reached, achieved, or accomplished. This practically means that 
organicism can never be complete and always remains an approximation of the ‘ideal’ categories it 
seeks to map. Comparable to ‘contextualism,’ organicism is therefore also threatened to indulge into 
integrative analysis for analysis’ sake; it provides an epistemic drug which motivates scholars to dig 
ever deeper into the structure of reality only to discover that the structure is likely ‘bottomless’ and 
extremely complex. Another way of saying this is to confess that the objective of integration turns out 
to be an ‘ideal’ category itself. 
Another paradox is suspicious in organicism: the relationship between conflict and integration. Con-
tradictoriness turns out to be a categorical precondition of integrability in organicism. This is why con-
flict mast be assumed to be a general feature of reality; to secure the integrability of reality, conflict is 
exiled to the realm of appearances and is thus found to be a characteristic mainly of the ‘progressive’ 
categories. This is why organicists need to be ‘generally dogmatic about the inherent contradictoriness 
of all experience short of the absolute” (Pepper 1942: 302f.). This situations has two consequences: it 
may (i) greatly distort harmony and structure in appearance, and (ii) show that the structural catego-
ries of organicism are fallible themselves.  
The first consequence can be reconstructed as follows: it is only out of the contradictoriness of 
all fragments, which therefore turn out to be partial facts, that the organicist can find evidence for the 
coherence of all absolute facts (integrated organic wholes) – it follows that there can be no partial fact 
which really stands for itself and this is a source of great potential distortion since all the fragments of 
reality are consequently deprecated and not taken seriously (cf. Pepper 1942: 302). In pair with the 
fact that the ‘ideal’ or ‘absolute’ almost always escapes our analytical grip, we are always left with some 
degree of partiality and we may suspect that this is precisely where organicism has to confess its own 
incompleteness. In addition, organicism is generally vulnerable to all evidence that shows strong co-
herence among fragments for this threatens to undermine the category of conflict. Yet, because of the 
crucial role of time in organicism, it remains unclear how much coherence in appearance is enough to 
dissolve the theory – this in itself might be considered a weakness. 
The second consequence is perhaps best exemplified by the general argumentative strategy of 
organicistic inquiry. Organicists first tend to show that conflict applies to appearances and that the 
fragments of reality therefore turn out to be isolated and fragmentary, only to show thereafter that this 
fragmentariness turns out to be illusionary and can in fact be transcended if one only finds the correct 
organic whole to resolve the fragments (cf. Pepper 1942: 304f.). This appears to be suspiciously self-
undermining since the organicistic strategy to find order in reality appears to consist in disproving or 
at least temporally rejecting its own categories (only to later re-introduce them again) – this again 
opens the door for denying the existence of ‘progressive’ categories and may result in further self-
restraint. The trouble is to assert conflict in reality only to then claim that the conflict turns out to be 
illusionary. We may ask why, then, has conflict to be presupposed in the first place? The answer is that 
‘conflict’ primarily has a methodological status – but this is difficult to uphold given that the structural 
architecture of organicism and organicistic interpretations of ‘conflict’ too often involve ontological 
claims.  
Another important tension endangering the internal consistency of organicism results from the ten-
dency to emphasise the specificity of pathways that lead to the integration of wholes in duration and 
the organicistic aspiration to remove all residual conflict through integration. Object- and phenome-
non-specific behaviours and developments threaten to undermine such integrability and the heteroge-
neity of reality – an important practical assertion of organicism – turns in this way out to be illusion-
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ary as well. This is clearly problematic and reveals that organicism has difficulties to consistently em-
brace the determinate structure of reality it presupposes. 
As a ‘synthetic’ theory, organicism faces a similar problem as ‘contextualism’ in dealing with the open-
endedness of analysis, an interminability it ultimately has to self-admit (Pepper 1942: 308). This open-
endedness is for instance implied in the organicistic conception of truth which culminates in the claim 
that truth itself is nothing else than an ever evolving cognitive capacity to integrate. The basic issue 
here is whether organicism ultimately has to confess that humans, human cognition, and human life 
are only incomplete appearances themselves, that they remain fragmented and are too much stained in 
bias and ignorance as to effectively reach out to the ‘ideal’ or ‘absolute’ (which would be ‘more-than-
human’). We can ask, in other words, whether organicism simply demands too much of human cogni-
tion and whether human life cycles are too short to give justice to the need to integrate partial facts 
over time in order to grasp the coherency that emerges from them. Organicism thus renders the tem-
porality of scholarly inquiry as problematic as no other theory and thereby issues a certain scepticism 
about its own success. The theory has to confess that it is extremely challenging and difficult to master 
in this regard; it consequently affords extreme analytical complexity (in particular when it comes to 
the interpretation of ‘time’) – a complexity that can easily result in epistemic aberrancy.  
Time and truth are intimately connected in organicism. This has many advantages but also provokes 
some difficulties. The first is that the temporalisation of truth inevitably results in truth coming in 
degrees (Pepper 1942: 310f.). This not only makes it difficult to directly compare individual knowledge 
claims but is also largely at odds with the general organicistic intuition that the world is of a determi-
nate order. The second difficulty has to do with the role of time itself. Time is both a precondition and 
a barrier to organicistic knowledge (ibid.: 281).  
This paradox paves the ground for conceptual friction and likely indicates some general inade-
quacies of the theory. To begin with, time is recast as something that is needed for integration; time is 
what organises fragmentation and what ultimately explains why reality persists through ‘conflict;’ but 
this also means that it is because of our temporal existence that we can only see conflict where there is 
order to be expected. This has two further implications: first, time cannot be ‘real,’ it must be an ap-
pearance and therefore belong to the ‘progressive’ categories; second, ‘ideal’ facts must be timeless and 
immutable, they must ultimately be eternal (ibid.: 313). This leads to the paradoxical situation that a 
temporal perspective is required to identify relevant facts, nexuses, and trajectories of integration as 
well as to find truth and order in conflict, but time concurrently needs to be explained away to secure 
the aspired order; organicism tends to take time seriously and “disparagingly” at the same time (ibid.: 
280f.).  
Having said this, already the tendency to explain away time should be suspicious for the im-
portance of time seems to be such a strong common-sense experience and there appears to be a lot of 
evidence for its significance. Explaining away time therefore seems to be a high price to pay – it un-
masks a lack of scope since the price of including all relevant facts is to exclude the fact of time (ibid.: 
314). 
 
Hans-Peter Hahn (2013: 33-37, Abbildung 1.3) has recently distinguished between two modes of pred-
icating the world, both prominently advocated in anthropological theory: (a) the ‘layer-cake model’ 
[Schichttortenmodell]; and (b) the ‘pound-cake model’ [Rührkuchenmodell] (Fig. II.1). According to 
Hahn, the former presupposes a ‘bottom-up’-structured and well-organised world where different 
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domains of reality determine each other in a directed and largely pre-ordained manner (cf. ibid.: 34); 
the resulting ‘layers’ even provide normative orientation for the lower segments which are supposed to 
be ‘easier’ to reconstruct. The latter, by contrast, assumes a ‘messy’ and complicated world where dif-
ferent domains of reality merge and tangle into each other, so that the boundaries of some (or all) do-
mains begin to disintegrate (cf. ibid. 34f.); the resulting ‘mixture’ of reality suggests a co-dependency 
of all domains – culminating in the view that each domain implicates all other domains. While the 
‘layer-cake-model’ is consistent with the regulative idea of the Homo oeconomicus, the ‘pound-cake 
model’ supports the regulative idea of l’homme total.  
 These two ideal-typical models of the basic structure of the world can be taken to illustrate two 
of Pepper’s world theories and their differences: the ‘layer-cake model’ [Schichttortenmodell] clearly 
epitomises how ‘mechanism’ typically conceptualises worldly affairs, whereas the ‘pound-cake model’ 







The diagrammatic representation of pathways and structures of reasoning helps to visualise how 
scholars precede from their data to their conclusions. The resulting graphical outputs specify when and 
how arguments are made, how data is handled, which data-processing procedures are used and what 
the general strategy of sense-making is. These outputs are what I call ‘schemes of reasoning and infer-
ence-making’ – graphical outputs that generally place emphasis on the inter-link between the various 
elements of reasoning. The main advantage of using them is to ‘objectify’ how evidence is treated and 
made sense of and to thereby make it transparent and easily accessible; this, in turn, enables smooth 
structural comparison between varying lithic approaches. The method I have used is simple but effec-
tive and – to my knowledge – has never been applied to the practice of Palaeolithic archaeology before. 
The methodological procedure is as simple as it is challenging: 
 The first step is close and critical reading of the research output (paper or monograph) in 
question. Part of this is the specification of analytical boundaries – that is, the determination 
of the target of analysis. In monographs, for instance, one may only be interested in exposing 
the logic and structure of reasoning with regards to a specific object of study – for example 
with regards to a single lithic assemblage even though the monograph analyses multiple as-
semblages.  
 The second step is to identify, simplify and arrange the main analytical steps and to list them 
in chronological order. This involves a preliminary determination of their role and their status 
(e.g. as main arguments, sub-arguments, supporting arguments, and so forth). Here, the hier-
archy of the identified elements of reasoning is already a critical feature to address.  
 The third step is to note conclusions and sub-conclusions that emerge at various juncture 
points of the analysis. This is also the moment to note a simplified version of the global re-
search conclusion (if necessary in levels of interpretive progression, abstraction, and/or gen-
eralisation).  
 The fourth step is to check for the overall consistency of the noted steps with regard to the 
conclusions and sub-conclusions and to ensure that the latter logically and/or argumentatively 
follow from the identified analytical steps and their progression. The result is the identification 
of the overarching logic and structure of reasoning. Everything that does not directly follow 
from what has been noted already and that is crucial for this logic and structure is noted sepa-
rately. If consistency and transparency of the structure of reasoning with regard to the role and 
status of each element could not be reached, one must return to the first step and reiterate the 
procedure until clarity has been gained. 
 The fifth step consists of graphically outlining/drawing the identified global structure of rea-
soning. The representational focus should thereby lie on the interdependency (and independ-
ency/synchronicity) of various ‘lines of reasoning’ and their chronological unfolding – in other 
words: on the horizontal (distinct but equally important pathways of reasoning) and vertical 
(chronological order of pathways of reasoning) structure of reasoning. A number of conven-
tions are to be followed in order to do so; these are described below. It is to be stressed, how-
ever, that additional conventions and symbols may be introduced at any point as long as they 
are equally applied to all of the analysed cases. 
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Boxes: boxes signify distinct segments or elements of reasoning and determine what elements are to be 
connected in order to arrive at the final conclusion. 
Arrows: arrows connect various boxes and indicate the direction of the connection as well as the im-
portance of the connection (regular lines show more important connections than doted lines which 
indicate structural relationships). 
Colours: elements of reasoning which are primarily internal to the analysis are displayed in grey or 
black dependent on their importance (progressive elements are usually shown in grey, whereas conclu-
sions and sub-conclusions are shown in black); boxes with grey filling designate elements of reasoning 
which refer to other relevant findings in the same study based on other data (e.g. comparative data not 
identical with the data used in the analysis under consideration); elements of reasoning which are 
largely external to the analysis of data are shown in orange (e.g. general high-level theory mobilised 
prior to analysis, generalisation made before and or after the analysis and that do not follow necessari-
ly from the available evidence, supporting arguments which are imported from the outside); green is 
generally used to designate a positive analytical finding (e.g. positive correlation, statistical test reveal-
ing significant differences, etc.); red is generally used to mark negative analytical findings (e.g. failed 
identification of statistical differences, argument of rebuttal, etc.). 
Circles with a plus/minus: circles signify the execution of a statistical and/or quantitative procedure; 
the nature of the procedure is specified by adding a textual description to the circle (if not specified 
further, circles stand for simple quantitative statistics); the size of the circle indicates how significant 
the findings are; the colour specifies whether or not the procedure yielded a positive or negative results 
(see supra). 
Results of analysing the scheme of reasoning and inference-making that are not provided in the main 









The following figure is an attempt to graphically synthesise what has been found in Chapter 3, partly 
based on the delineation and comparison of schemes of reasoning and inference-making. Figure 
III.4 captures the key elements and the general architecture which has been found to typify scientific 
reasoning in French and Anglophone lithic analysis respectively. 
In a recent survey on persistent definitions of complexity in the literature on technological evolution, 
Vaesen and Houkes (2017) have identified nine understandings of the concepts. Each of the definitions 
implies different ‘adequacy criteria’ for testing what the author term ‘complexity thesis,’ the idea that 
there is a cumulative trend in technological evolution. The list of criteria and definitions they provide 
has heuristic value also independently of the ‘complexity thesis.’ Their summary table is therefore re-
produced here. The nine definitions are used as a reference and are compared with the dominant 
French and Anglophone notions of complexity in order to retrace which part(s) of the spectrum of 
possible definitions is covered by both research spheres. We should keep in mind, though, that Vaesen 
and Houkes’ list has been designed for the ‘theory-hypothesis-test’ mode of science and their explica-
tions may therefore lean towards an ‘analytic’ understanding of complexity. 
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In an earlier version of their paper, the authors listed a total of ten different conceptions of complexity. 
The missing definition [10] is what Richerson and Boyd (2005) have termed ‘adaptive complexity.’ 
Adaptive complexity refers to the degree to which a system is adapted to its environment. Similarly as 
definitions nr. [8] and [9], this definition can be applied to both artefacts and behaviour. 
The list of chosen case studies and discursive fields to illustrate persistent ‘tropes’ of the four world 
theories in French and Anglophone lithic research is necessarily selective and incomplete. The purpose 
of the case studies is to demonstrate – although they of course cannot do so comprehensively – that 
Pepper’s world hypotheses theory furnishes conceptual categories which greatly facilitate an under-
standing of the various cognitive strategies underlying actual lithic research and that these are largely 
different if we compare the two research formations. Their purpose is to exemplify, metaphorically 
speaking, that the Pepperian ‘cake’ constructed in Chapter 2 can in fact be ‘eaten’ and that it ‘tastes 
well’ and produces only little ‘leftovers.’ 
The selection of case studies was guided by the following rationale: the cases should be as rep-
resentative as possible with regards to how a research paper or monograph typically looks like in the 
respective research context; they should, if possible, represent classic findings (e.g., in Anglophone 
research that ecological conditions play a key role in shaping lithic technologies) and discussions; they 
should refer to relatively recent publications although some classic studies (e.g., Boëda 1988; Henry 
1995) have been included to demonstrate the historical continuity of cognitive strategies. The aim of 
case study selection was to render the nature and number of cases on each side and in each category as 
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comparable as possible (e.g., a comparable structure of case studies for the ‘integrative’ theories and 
for the ‘dispersive’ theories). 
 Some further clarifications are in order here. The Anglophone cases illustrating ‘formism’ 
(Chapter 4, first part) reflect the following premises and analytical decisions: first, I wanted to show-
case the proclivity to concentrate on shape and physical form, and the current trend to do so with high 
resolution data and as much quantitative information as possible; secondly, I have selected demogra-
phy, cognition and social/cultural transmission as representatives for typical ‘subsistent’ categories; 
thirdly, I have tried to depict the recent trend to return to phylogenetic reasoning and to apply multi-
variate (attribute- and/or trait-based) methods (this includes ‘data-first’ approaches with a trend to-
wards ‘big data’); fourth, my selection hopes to reflect the importance of ‘classification,’ the influence 
of phenotype-oriented evolutionary theory (including cultural transmission theory), as well as the im-
pact of the archaeologies of David Clarke and Desmond Clark (Analytical Archaeology, World Ar-
chaeology, Economic Archaeology, Geographic Archaeology) and of British Cognitive Archaeology 
on this type of lithic research. 
 The Anglophone cases  illustrating ‘mechanism’ (Chapter 4, second part) have been selected 
based on the following considerations: first, reduction theories and the notion of the ‘reduction se-
quence’ are showcased as a key area of theorisation and investigation; secondly, Ecological Archaeolo-
gy and Behavioural Ecology have been selected as highly influential candidates to analyse lithic tech-
nology in light of functionality, mobility, and the environment (including prey- and habitat-selection); 
third, the environment is depicted as a core area of inquiry and I am convinced that strong variants of 
history-poor ‘adaptationism’ and ‘selectionism’ characterise the ‘mechanistic’ reading of evolutionary 
and ecological theory with regards to lithics; fourth, I wanted to highlight the role of the New Archae-
ology in the wake of Lewis Binford and others and of Paleoanthropology in the wake of Clark F. How-
ell and Desmond J. Clark as central research backgrounds (modelling scientificity mainly on physics 
and the life sciences). 
 The selected French cases illustrating ‘contextualism’ (Chapter 5, first part) group three main 
strands of research together: the ‘late’ Leroi-Gourhan’s « Palethnologie » (or « Ethnologie pré-
histoire »), the classical ‘technological approach’ relying on chaîne opératoire methodology in the 
wake of Jacques Tixier and his students (also known as « Technologie préhistoire »), and the ‘techno-
economic approach’ to lithic technology with an emphasis on mobility and the organisation of raw 
material use inspired by the work of Catherine Perlès, Jean-Michel Geneste, and others. Furthermore, 
the selection of the case studies aims to clarify some frequently held misconceptions, including the 
status and role of ‘types’ and ‘typology’ in lithic research; mobility and economy are discussed in con-
junction with the techno-economic paradigm in order to contrast the treatment of these topics with the 
findings of Chapter 4; in addition, I use some of the emerging strands of inquiry tied to the work of the 
Toulouse group (cf. e.g., Renard and Ducasse 2015), which I consider a new potential institutional 
player alongside Paris and Bordeaux; and I, lastly, present the French understanding of ‘mental refit-
ting’ for easy contrast with Anglophone interpretations. 
 The French cases  that have been chosen to represent ‘organicism’ (Chapter 5, second part) 
represent more recent trends in the French scene; they mainly group together newer approaches that 
target long-term developments (longue durée), the main branches of which can be tied to « Paléo-
histoire » (Nicole Pigeot, Boris Valentin, François Bon, Grégor Marchand) and the ‘techno-genetic 
approach’ (Éric Boëda). In this context, I have chosen to thematise time as a central concept and the 
idea that technology evolves ‘organically,’ bringing into focus French philosophy of technology and 
Bergsonian understandings of evolution which contrast with the dominant interpretations of evolution 
in Anglophone research; in order to counterbalance the somewhat abstract character of these new 
research trajectories, I have selected Éric Boëda’s classic study of Levallois recurrent as a potential 
early case of ‘organicistic’ assemblage-level analysis, even though this status remains somewhat debat-
able. 
 It goes without saying that a broad historical and conceptual survey of the wider landscape of 
approaches in French and Anglophone Palaeolithic archaeology is a prerequisite for this logic of case 
study selection. Such a survey was conducted prior to analysis but cannot be discussed here in detail 
(but see Fig. III.5 for an overview). It must suffice to say that I tried to be as sensitive as possible for 
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the most recent trends within each research context and to take into account the relative importance of 
different authors in shaping or representing these research contexts. Each of these decisions is of 
course debatable, but such a debate must always be specific about what is considered to be ‘at the cen-
tre’ of each research formation. My approach takes an explicit stance in this regard.  
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This section gathers additional pictorial sources of evidence, taken from Boëda’s original study on the 
lithic assemblage from Biache Saint-Vaast IIA, to illustrate and perhaps clarify some of the claims 







The following original quotes, found in the literature in French, have been translated by the present 
author into English and are listed here in their original form for easy reference and for the sake of in-
terpretive transparency. The English translations are provided in the main text. The order of quotes is 
the order of appearance in the text. 
Q.1 Balandier (1974) 
« […] La seconde tentation pourrait être désignée comme celle de l’ « ésotérisme ». Elle détache de 
l’ordre des réalités auquel elle substitue une construction logicienne, un édifice complexe de catégo-
ries, principes, notions et concepts auquel on n’accède que par initiation. La logique liant ces derniers 
est alors postulée identique à la logique du réel ;  l’ordre des choses importe moins que l’ordre des 
mots. Et les critères de l’acquiescement deviennent à terme ceux de la foi, plus que ceux de la raison 
scientifique Cette tentation réalisée transforme les écoles scientifique en chapelles ou sectes, les con-
troverses en débats scolastiques et les doutes en hérésies. » (Balandier 1974: 7f.) 
Q.2 Perlès (1974) 
« Si, grâce à [l’archéologie], nous connaissons de l’homme préhistorique quelques aspects de sa per-
sonne physique, de sa vie économique, artistique ou religieuse, c’est surtout sous l’angle du fabricant 
d’outils que l’homme de cette époque se révèle à nous. Bien souvent en effet, seule la pierre taillée de-
meure et témoigne de l’ancienne présence et des activités d’un groupe humain. De ce fait, l’outil de 
pierre acquiert une valeur considérable dans bien des domaines de la recherche préhistorique. » (Per-
lès 1974 : 816) 
Q.3 Boissinot (2011) 
« N’importe quel archéologue de bonne foi reconnaîtra en effet que l’interprétation qu’il donne des 
vestiges est une parmi bien d’autres plausibles ; qu’il faudrait pour bien faire entreprendre l’inventaire 
de tous les scénarios envisageables […] Cette pluralité à considérer de front est en effet difficile à pen-
ser : l’esprit n’est pas préparé à traiter des informations aussi disparates, parfois contradictoires. Pour 
le dire en quelques mots, cette pluralité tient en partie au caractère fragmentaire des objets à considé-
rer : le monde des restes est une totalité amputée selon des lois variées, celles du hasard n’étant pas 
négligeables. » (Boissinot 2011 : 267) 
Q.4 Perlès (2016): 
« […] Ma conclusion, aujourd’hui, est l’inverse : je pense qu’au-delà de certaines convergences séman-
tiques, le divorce entre approche française et approche anglo-saxonne est profond, et que les diver-
gences sont, en réalité, aussi profondes à l’heure actuelle qu’elles l’étaient lors des balbutiements des 
approches technologiques (lithiques) de chaque côté de l’Atlantique. » (Perlès 2016: 213) 
Q.5 Bon (2009): 
« […] Surtout, l’essor démographique expliquerait en partie la redéfinition de fonctionnements so-
ciaux. Cette perception est fortement influencée par la tradition anglo-saxonne, en particulier améri-
caine, dont l’école néo-évolutionniste considéra de longue date la démographie comme l’un des princi-
paux moteurs de la transformation des sociétés humaines. […] Or parmi ces travaux, nombreux sont 
ceux qui jugent que ce facteur démographique est étroitement lié aux variations environnementales. 
Indépendamment de ses liens éventuels avec la démographie, le thème des conditions environnemen-
tales rejoint une vive préoccupation des écoles anglo-saxonnes, et leur influence est déterminante en 
ce domaine, tant dans l’affirmation de l’importance de ce thème que dans la façon de l’aborder. Depuis 
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longtemps déjà, plusieurs de ces écoles articulent leur démarche intellectuelle autour de la recherche 
de modèles à portée générale : elles élaborent un modèle prédictif, le plus souvent inspiré par des si-
tuations contemporaines dont il convient de mesurer le degré d’application au contexte archéologique. 
Cette méthode repose sur le postulat que des comportements universaux sont susceptibles de trans-
cender les barrières temporelles et d’être identifiés. Parmi ces universaux, l’accent est très souvent mis 
sur la relation de l’homme à son environnement au prisme déterminisme relativement strict. En 
d’autres termes, l’élaboration d’un modèle d’exploitation de l’environnement à partir de la confronta-
tion de contextes ethnologiques actuels leur sert à interpréter les données archéologiques, dont la col-
lecte leur permet de confirmer – ou non – une hypothèse préétablie. Cette orientation intellectuelle 
s’exprime notamment avec la New Archeology, créée dans les années 1960 selon ces principes. Cette 
approche hypothético-déductive s’oppose à la démarche la plus courante en Europe, et notamment en 
France, qualifiée d’inductive : la collecte des faits est censée précéder l’élaboration de modèles, et non 
répondre à une idée préconçue. » (Bon 2009: 119f.; original emphasis) 
« […] Toutefois, une relation mécanique entre ces mutations environnementales et les changements 
d’équipements doit être envisagée avec prudence […] » (ibid.: 179; original emphasis) 
« […] Toutefois, il n’existe pas d’équation unilatérale entre un type d’arme et un milieu donné. » (ibid.: 
182) 
« […] Toute société transparaît donc d’abord sous les traits de son adaptation à son environnement. 
Mais cette notion mérite d’être correctement évaluée : elle signifie, selon nous, l’adaptation à des con-
ditions naturelles particulières de prérogatives sociales procédant d’une dynamique interne. En ce 
sens, ces contraintes naturelles œuvrent sur l’écorce d’une société, et non en profondeur. Ainsi, le fait 
de privilégier une démarche plus ou moins collective en matière de chasse, de promouvoir des techno-
logies conférant aux équipements de chasse une place plus ou moins prépondérante, répondent à des 
impératifs sociaux indépendants des conditions du milieu naturel. De la même façon, ce n’est jamais 
l’environnement qui impose à un groupe humain de devenir agriculteur et pasteur mais une évolution 
propre à l’homme et à ses sociétés qui peut y conduire. Certes, le milieu peut faire obstacle à ou favori-
ser telle transformation comportementale, mais il s’agit dans tous les cas de façon passive. De telle 
sorte que l’environnement n’est pas une cause mais un moyen de cette évolution. Les expressions 
technologiques et économiques d’une culture se révèlent donc l’alliage de déterminants externes et de 
déterminismes internes parfaitement indépendants de ces derniers. » (ibid.: 243) 
« […] Mais l’important est de percevoir l’articulation de ces divers domaines – économique, technique, 
religieux – autour de la structure idéologique qui fait d’un groupe humain une véritable société hu-
maine. Et cela sans partir du présupposé que les domaines les plus accessibles, comme ceux relevant 
de l’identité techno-économique d’une population donnée, agissent sous la forme d’un déterminant 
plus puissant que d’autres composantes de cette société. » (ibid.: 324) 
Q.6 Marchand (2014): 
« Sa [la New Archeology de Binford] conséquence dans l’étude du Mésolithique européen au cours des 
années 1980 et 1990 a été – hélas – l’inévitable conclusion de tous les articles sur la société adaptée à 
son environnement et sur le site placé à la croisée de niches écologiques diversifiées… La déformation 
des principes de l’archéologie processuelle, pourtant autrement fructueuse, entraînait finalement les 
recherches sur les chasseur-cueilleurs du passé dans une dimension sans histoire : un comble ! De fait, 
la notion d’adaptation ne doit pas être appliquée sans chercher les moyens de la démontrer, sinon elle 
conduit à une vision figée des changements [Bettinger 1987]. » (Marchand 2014: 103) 
Q.7 Marchand (2017): 
 « Je fais partie des rares archéologues qui pensent – et espèrent – qu’un jour, une bonne part des 
travaux sur la préhistoire pourra être livrée exclusivement en images, en dessins et en schémas. » 
(Marchand in Mevel 2017: 10) 
« Qu’est-ce qui impulse ces changements perceptibles dans la culture matérielle ? Comment s’est opé-
rée cette mutation sur le substrat magdalénien ? […] Les liens entre d’une côté les bouleversements 
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climatiques et écologiques du Tardiglaciaire, et de l’autre ces mutations substantielles des symboles et 
des techniques, siègent bien évidemment au cœur de tous les débats […]. » (ibid.: 9) 
Q.8 Tixier (1978): 
« […] J’ai délibérément écarté la voie de la typologie fonctionelle. C’est faute de données sur le com-
portement des hommes préhistoriques à travers leurs activités avec leur outils, faute de pouvoir, en-
core à l’heure actuelle, discerner les intentions d’utilisation, que je me suis attaché à saisir les inten-
tions de taillée. […] Pour qu’un terme soit précis, sans equivoque, il doit contenir en lui-même 
l’intention de l’artisan qui a taillé un outil préhistorique. » (Tixier (1978 [2012]: 115, 117) 
Q.9 Ploux (1988): 
« […] [C]hacun des artéfacts issu d’une même ensemble a un destin potentiellement différent. Cette 
situation ménage donc la possibilité de mettre en évidence les inter-actions entre chaque processus 
technique – au mieux identifiable à partir d’un grattoir dont les micro-traces d’usage indiquent le tra-
vail de la peau, d’un burin ayant travaillé le bois animal, etc. – et chaque chaîne technique. […] En 
réalité, une multitude de modalités est envisageable, selon que le schéma d’inter-action établit une 
correspondance entre un processus et une ou plusieurs chaînes, que chaque chaîne participe ou non à 
plusieurs processus, qu’à l’intérieur d’une même chaîne, les mêmes artéfacts interviennent successi-
vement dans plusieurs processus, soit sous la même forme, soit après transformation. À l’échelle d’un 
assemblage, toutes ces modalités ou seulement certains d’entre elles peuvent être représentées, illus-
trant des attitudes fort différentes vis-à-vis de l’organisation des activités techniques. L’importance de 
ce type d’informations a d’ailleurs été soulignée plusieurs fois […] » (Ploux 1988: 39) 
« […] [Le] déroulement [de la chaîne opératoire] se présentant comme un enchaînement de moyens 
organisés dans le temps et dans l’espace, la chaîne technique peut être découpée en séquences opéra-
toires spatiotemporelles » (ibid.: 41). 
Q.10 Boëda (1986): 
« La pointe Levallois peut résulter de conceptions de taillée différentes qu’une détermination simple-
ment typologique ne permet pas de mettre en évidence. Seule l’analyse technologique des connais-
sances mises en jeu pour sa réalisation peut montrer la variabilité potentielle des conceptions volumé-
triques des nucléus et des méthodes qui en resultant. » (Boëda 1986: 263) 
Q.11 Pelegrin (1995): 
« […] Il faut alors faire appel à ce qui pourrait s’appeler le remontage mental : 1’étude de chacun des 
objets lithiques, selon sa morphologie, la présence et position du cortex, l’ordre et 1’aspect des négatifs 
d’enlèvements (visibles tant sur les enlèvements que sur les nucléus : observation de schémas diacri-
tiques) témoins d’une brève séquence antécédente, peut permettre, en les resituant mentalement les 
uns par rapport aux autres et par rapport au bloc brut, de reconstruire l’agencement ordonné dont ils 
sont les restes (notion essentielle formalisée par J. Tixier 1978). […] Une telle opération mentale, qui 
réoriente les pièces dans les trois dimensions de 1’espace et selon 1’ordre de leur détachement, s’appuie 
sur une « logique technique » qui demande une bonne pratique de 1’étude de collections et profite 
toujours d’une expérience de la taille des roches dures (cf. la lecture technologique des pièces lithiques 
: J. Tixier et al., 1980, p. 35) » (Pelegrin 1995: 23f., original emphasis changed from bold to italics). 
Q.12 Renard and Ducasse (2015): 
« […] nous avons pris le parti d’une présentation « intégrée » et qualitative des données en opposant 
deux ensembles : le Solutréen récent d’un côté (c.-à-d. Solutréen à pointes à cran) et le Badegoulien de 
l’autre (c.-à-d. Badegoulien ancien et récent). Les hypothèses ainsi proposées reposent sur une vision 
synthétique « moyennée » de chacun de ces ensembles, nécessaire à une mise en perspective la plus 
large possible » (Renard and Ducasse 2015: 195) 
« Le statut de chacune de ces productions [lithiques] est donc défini au regard de l’ensemble du sys-
tème technique lithique afin de juger de l’investissement techno-économique qui leur est respective-
ment conféré ainsi que de leur niveau de dépendance réciproque (intégration ou disjonction des objec-
458 
 
tifs, « hiérarchie » économique). Les productions lithiques solutréennes et badegouliennes ont ainsi pu 
être comparées terme à terme afin de mesurer leur degré d’affinité techno-économique. » (ibid.: 194) 
« […] l’approche techno-économique montre qu’entre Solutréen et Badegoulien, c’est la structuration 
même du système technique qui semble avoir subi de profondes modifications. Le Badegoulien du 
Sud-Ouest français apparaît en effet comme un moment de refonte de l’architecture techno-
économique du système de production et de gestion des équipements lithiques […]. Cette refonte se 
traduit notamment par un nouveau rapport économique entre outillage domestique et armes de 
chasse, nouvel équilibre dont nous proposons d’explorer les corrélats en termes d’organisation spatio-
temporelle des activités » (idem) 
Q.13 Pelegrin (2011): 
« Le point important, que je souhaite souligner ici, est ce que l’articulation de la méthode de taille avec 
les outils et restes bruts permet non seulement d’établir les règles de gestion : quelles classes morpho-
logiques de support se retrouvent dans telles classes d’outils ; mais aussi de percevoir la ou les priorités 
sous-jacentes à ces règles de gestion. On peut alors passer de la diversité des méthodes de taille à la 
diversité techno-économique du système lithique. » (Pelegrin 2011: 146) 
Q.14 Valentin (1995): 
« [Le système technique] résulte des relations fonctionnelles entre les différentes parties constitutives 
qui peuvent être considérées comme des sous-systèmes. Le fonctionnement peut être défini non pas 
uniquement par les ‘lois de relations internes’ de la production lithique mais aussi par la prise en 
compte de sa finalité, c’est à dire de sa fonction [c’est nous qui soulignons], notions complémentaires 
et intégrées […]. Une production lithique est donc à la fois organisée par ses relations avec les autres 
sous-ensembles du système technique, par sa finalité (fabriquer des outils est la plus évidente), et par 
ses moyens (matériels et intellectuels). » (Valentin 1995: 24) 
« Cette démarche impose une reconstitution fidèle des objectifs assignés à la chaîne opératoire ainsi 
qu’une appréciation fine des circonstances de sa réalisation (“l’espace du possible”). Quand ces cir-
constances sont correctement appréciées, le préhistorien est en mesure d’évaluer si telle ou telle moda-
lité est l’unique réponse obligée dans une situation donnée (quand “l’espace du possible est fermé” 
[Pelegrin 1995]) ou s’il s’agit d'une des solutions envisageables parmi un ensemble d’options possibles. 
C’est une évaluation difficile, qui fait appel nécessairement à une compréhension globale de la chaîne 
opératoire […]. » (ibid. : 27, original italics). 
Q.15 Perlès (1988): 
« Dans tout ensemble archéologique, il existe des pièces (combinaisons d’attributs) ou des attributs 
(techniques de fabrication, formes, matières premières, etc.) considérés comme caractéristiques de cet 
ensemble [...]. C’est pour mettre clairement en évidence [des] différences (ou ressemblances) que le 
préhistorien élabore une typologie, ou utilise une typologie déjà existante. Lors de l’élaboration d’une 
typologie, fondée sur des groupes de pièces (combinaisons complexes d’attributs), on opère nécessai-
rement une hiérarchisation des caractères [...]. Une typologie est donc très différente d’une classifica-
tion puisque chaque pièce pourrait, à strictement parler, appartenir à plusieurs types [...]. Mais c’est le 
propre d’une typologie de mettre en exergue les caractères qui permettent de résoudre des problèmes 
archéologiques précis [...]. En principe, une typologie devrait être conçue en fonction du problème 
posé (qui dicte le choix des caractères pertinents), et plusieurs typologies pourraient être appliquées au 
même ensemble pour résoudre des problèmes différents. […]Quel qu’en soit à nos yeux l’intérêt, une 
classification exprimera toujours une structure réelle du matériel étudié, puisqu’elle est fondée sur des 
propriétés intrinsèques de celui-ci. C’est là une des différences avec une typologie où l’on choisit au 
contraire de privilégier certains caractères, de les hiérarchiser en fonction du problème pose. » (Perlès 
1988: 1080; cited after Valentin 1995: 2, footnote 2) 
Q.16 Cresswell (1976): 
« Les chaînes opératoire techniques ont deux caractéristiques essentielles : une cohérence interne, et 
une relation organique avec la structure sociale. » (Cresswell 1976: 6) 
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Q.17 Boëda (1988): 
« […] Ils [les tailleurs de Biache Saint-Vaast (niveau IIA)] étaient, semble-t-il, prisonniers des limites 
inhérentes à la conception volumétrique du nucléus Levallois, qui fixe à chacune des deux surfaces une 
fonction bien précise. » (Boëda 1988: 191f.) 
« […] L’étude des nucléus doit être première. Le nucléus est le plus important vecteur d’informations 
pour déterminer le concept de taille utilisé, de plus il porte en lui les stigmates de la ou des méthodes 
et techniques utilisée. L’analyse des éclats prédéterminants et prédéterminés est seconde : c’est de 
cette étude que sera définitivement déterminée la ou les méthodes employées par le tailleur. Cette arti-
culation méthodologique entre nucléus et éclats doit évidemment tenir compte des capacités 
d’information fournies par les artefacts d’un gisement. » (ibid.: 1985). 
Q.18 Perlès (1998): 
« Mais il y a là un double problème : en premier lieu, ni l’échelle de temps ni la nature du temps sont 
les mêmes selon que l’on observe les changements climatiques (cycliques), l’évolution des végétaux 
(linéaire et très lente), l’évolution des faunes (linéaire elle aussi mais nettement plus rapide)… Il n’y a 
pas un temps de la préhistoire, qui sont pertinent pour tous les phénomènes étudiés, a fortiori pour les 
phénomènes humains. En second lieu, les causes de changement ne sont pas non plus les mêmes : ni 
les variations de l’orbite terrestre, qui sont à l’origine des cycles climatiques, ni les lois de la reproduc-
tion sexuées, à l’origine des transformations des espèces biologiques, ne peuvent prétendre expliquer 
l’« évolution des bifaces » ou le passage d’une économie de prédation à une économie de production. Il 
existe donc bien un camp de réflexion autonome, celui du « temps culturel », de sa nature et de ses 
rythmes. » (Perlès 1998: 17f., original emphasis) 
Q.19 Valentin (2008a): 
« Lent ou rapide, calme ou heurté, le rythme possiblement changeant de cette histoire préhistorique 
reste à mesurer beaucoup plus finement, et les circonstances de ses soubresauts éventuels méritent 
plus d’explications. C’est cela que vise l’ambition paléohistorique quand elle est fermement épaulée par 
la palethnologie. » (Valentin 2008: 28f.; also cited in Bon 2009: 185) 
Q.20 Valentin (2011): 
« […] Il reste que ce découpage du Paléolithique récent rend imparfaitement compte des variations 
régionales et historiques, et surtout des transitions s’opérant à des rythmes différents non seulement 
selon les régions mais aussi selon les domaines d’invention. » (Valentin 2011: 31) 
Q.21 Godelier (2007): 
« [L]’homme n’est pas seulement un être qui s’adapte, il est un être qui s’invente. C’est un être qui ne 
peut pas vivre en société sans se donner ou recevoir dès sa naissance la capacité de produire de la so-
ciété pour vivre. » (Godelier 2007: 189) 
Q.22 Boëda (2013): 
« […] Les arguments sont à rechercher dans la cohérence du système technique par l’approche techno-
fonctionnelle et non pas par la tracéologie qui ne fait que confirmer l’existence de l’emmanchements, 
sans nous informer de ses spécifités. » (Boëda 2013: 222) 
« […] De la même façon, dans le cas de Type Pyramidal E2, plusieurs méthodes permettent de pro-
duire uniquement des lames ou, au contraire, une mixité technique composée de lames de 
d’enlèvements triangulaires dont des pointes dites Levallois. En revanche, dans le cas du discoïde 
comme du pyramidal, la direction des enlèvements n’a pas de valeur de différenciation de méthodes. 
En effet, pour que l’exploitation d’un premier volume utile conduise à un second volume utile, il faut, 
dans le cas de discoïde, nécessairement employer des enlèvements de différentes directions, et, dans le 
cas du pyramidal, des enlèvements de même direction. Les directions changeantes ou uniformes relè-
vent nettement plus d’une nécessité structurelle que de l’expression d’un caractère culturel, à l’opposé 
de ce que l’on verra pour le nucléus Levallois et certains nucléus laminaires du Paléolithique supé-
rieur. » (ibid.: 146) 
460 
 
« La technique, au même titre que la magie ou la religion, est une façon d’être au monde. Cette évalua-
tion culturelle de la réalité technique passe par l’investigation de la nature technique de l’objet, en re-
pensant l’objet à travers sa technicité et en reconsidérant l’objet technique dans une couplage structu-
rel avec l’Homme, lui-même en devenir. Cette notion de couplage implique nécessairement une coévo-
lution de l’Homme et de la technique cette dernière étant régie par des « lois d’évolution ». » (ibid.: 
28) 
« Si nous pouvions nous dépouiller de tout orgueil, si pour definer notre espèce, nous nous en tenions 
strictement à ce que l’histoire et la préhistoire nous presentment comme la caractéristique constant de 
l’homme et de l’intelligence, nous ne dirions peut-être pas Homo sapiens, mais Homo faber. » (Berg-
































In 1959, the British scientist and novelist Charles P. Snow caused an uproar when delivering his now 
famous Rede Lecture: The Two Cultures. He argued that ‘the intellectual life of the whole of Western 
society’ is divided by two cultures of thought. These ‘two cultures,’ he contended, can be characterised 
as co-existing, but mutually estranged spheres of knowledge production and knowing. They, he insist-
ed, tend to know very little about each other, typically dislike each other, and are inclined to exchange 
hostilities and basic criticism. In recent decades, a similar chasm has become more and more apparent 
within Old World Palaeolithic archaeology. This field is also torn apart between two ‘cultures’ of re-
search: the French tradition on the one hand, and Anglophone research, primarily represented by 
American and British scholarship on the other. The discord between the two dates back at least to the 
‘Binford-Bordes debate,’ but has taken even clearer shape in recent years. Whereas French research is 
traditionally rooted in the humanities, especially history and ethnology, Anglophone research models 
itself increasingly on the natural and life sciences, especially ecology, biological anthropology, and the 
larger field of evolutionary studies. This situation is, for instance, well reflected in the opposition be-
tween « Palethnologie » and Paleoanthropology – two largely incompatible visions of the discipline 
that play a key role in the development of Palaeolithic research on both sides. 
 In this dissertation, I take stock of this chasm between French and Anglophone research with-
in the domain of lithic analysis. My focus is epistemological. I focus not so much on lithic data them-
selves, but on different ways of handling them. By comparing the latest French and Anglophone ap-
proaches to the lithic evidence, I assess the cognitive underpinnings of what we may call the ‘French-
Anglophone divide.’ The main contention is that the divide, although occasionally touched upon in the 
expert literature, has hitherto not received the attention it deserves. I demonstrate that the conflict 
between French and Anglophone lithic research signifies a proper bifurcation of the research land-
scape and engenders mutually exclusive knowledge claims. The French-Anglophone interface is found 
to generate a steep cognitive threshold, predisposing scholars to cultivate antagonistic perceptions of 
the past, to organise research differently, to harness incompatible methodological and conceptual re-
sources, and to participate in largely distinct discursive spaces. The divide is thus not only of scholastic 
interest or a matter of mere theoretical concern, but has tangible consequences for how lithic research 
is undertaken and what its possible outcomes are.  
 My analysis proceeds in four steps. First, I take stock of the available literature that directly or 
indirectly gives voice to the divide and place it into the wider context of lithic knowledge formation in 
Palaeolithic archaeology. Secondly, I introduce American philosopher Stephen C. Pepper’s framework 
of world hypotheses and develop a conceptual toolkit to effectively compare lithic practice in both re-
search spheres. Thirdly, I apply the derived concepts to selected cases deemed representative of 
French and Anglophone lithic inquiry. In a final step, I apply Pepper’s notion of ‘world hypotheses’ to 
the divide and develop an argument for pluralism in lithic analysis. 
 The first part of Chapter 1 outlines the problem of lithic knowledge and its relevance for Pal-
aeolithic research. It is argued that lithic data carry a heavy burden since their abundance and sturdi-
ness render them the primary foothold for picturing human behaviour in the deep past. But although 
much hinges on our ability to effectively interrogate this evidence, the record itself remains notoriously 
incomplete and scanty. This basic condition makes lithic knowledge generally vulnerable to underde-
termination. Underdetermination occurs when multiple, yet incompatible interpretations are equally 
supported by the evidence. The social realities of research, moreover, often cloud the gravity of such 
issues. The dynamics of particular research communities tend to support a general tenacity of view-
points, typically preventing practitioners from exploring alternative viewpoints or incentivising them 
to work around underdetermination by retreating to dogmatic positions. A classic symptom of conflict-
ing research communities is that individual scholars have considerable difficulty respecting and un-
derstanding their counterparts – the two communities seem to relate to one another just like two ships 
passing in the night without even recognising the respective ‘other.’ The result is a trend to wage dis-
putes as partisan and to regularly ‘talk past each other.’ 
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 In the second part of Chapter 1, I review the evidence for serious misunderstandings and 
disagreements caused by the French-Anglophone boundary. It is shown that lithic experts from both 
camps tend to reject each other’s most basic assumptions and are generally sceptical about the cogni-
tive value of approaches on the ‘other’ side. The tone and rhetorical quality of the critique as well as the 
commonality of ‘talking past each other’ reveal deeply engrained hostilities and an inability to bridge 
the communicative gulf established by the divide. The confrontation of the prevailing characterisation 
of Palaeolithic research, its theoretical affinities, and its disciplinary identity confirms the presence of 
mutually exclusive orientations of inquiry. The disparity is also echoed in the institutional framing of 
lithic research and the dominant pathways of disseminating its findings. But although the critique is 
equally resolute and poignant on both sides, there is a clear asymmetry of negotiating it in press. While 
some Anglophone scholars have openly addressed the apparent chasm of approaches, French experts 
have only rarely responded to these calls and tend to deal with the divide more indirectly, preferably in 
monographs where one’s own approach can comfortably be contrasted with rivalling research para-
digms. To illustrate this general divergence of lithic research traditions, I introduce three concrete 
cases of conflict in which French and Anglophone representatives have studied broadly the same lithic 
materials, but put forth irreconcilable interpretations of the evidence (to wit: Biache Saint-Vaast level 
IIA, Gouzeaucourt G, and Kulna’s Micoquian layers). The analysis of these cases supports the idea that 
the French-Anglophone divide expresses a basic problem of underdetermination. 
 Chapter 2 introduces Pepper’s world hypotheses theory. The key proposition is that the his-
tory of Western thought can be broken down into a small number of world hypotheses: theories about 
the world specifying key assumptions and directing inquiry on a basic level. According to Pepper, only 
four of these theories have hitherto proven cognitive adequacy. These theories are ‘formism,’ ‘contex-
tualism,’ ‘mechanism,’ and ‘organicism.’ They represent equally well-supported perspectives on the 
world and ‘how it generally hangs together.’ Each world theory supplies a distinct canon of structural 
categories, subscribes to varying bodies of method and theory, promotes different kinds of data, and 
relies on a specific mode of knowledge corroboration not shared by the other world theories. 
 Pepper’s four relatively adequate world theories can be divided into two groups of two. The 
first distinction is between ‘analytic’ and ‘synthetic’ theories. The former emphasise the priority of 
parts and presuppose that wholes are derived features of the world. The latter, by contrast, defend the 
prerogative status of wholes and insist on the whole-dependency of parts. The second distinction is 
between ‘integrative’ and ‘dispersive’ theories. Whereas the former assume that the world is a highly 
determined place and typically focus on a few constitutional relationships, the latter recognise the 
world as a weakly determined place and seek to account for as many facts at the same time as possible. 
‘Formism’ and ‘mechanism’ are ‘analytic’ world theories, while ‘contextualism’ and ‘organicism’ are the 
‘synthetic’ ones. Likewise, ‘formism’ and ‘contextualism’ are ‘dispersive’ theories, whereas ‘mechanism’ 
and ‘organicism’ uphold the banner of ‘integrativity.’  
These world theories are insular, cannot be reduced to one another, and endorse different sets 
of cognitive values. Yet, each theory is also fallible and contains an ‘ulcer of self-contradiction.’ The 
implication is that although all four theories enable highly adequate readings of the evidence, all of 
them are also likely to furnish merely an incomplete picture of whatever they investigate. Each theory 
pictures the world differently, but none can be elevated above all others. 
 Chapters 3 to 5 apply world hypotheses theory to seminal cases of lithic research, testing the 
intuition that French lithic inquiry is based on ‘synthetic’ understandings of technology while Anglo-
phone approaches tend to process lithic data ‘analytically.’ The demonstration proceeds in several 
steps. Chapter 3 lays out some of the most basic, yet perennial differences between French and Anglo-
phone lithic approaches and shows that these can be considerably clarified by mapping them onto the 
‘analytic’-‘synthetic’ dichotomy. The cognitive value of this separation is demonstrated by comparing 
the logic of lithic recording, the nature of research design and inference-making, the role of theory and 
data, and the preferred modes of visualisation in both research spheres. As a final case in point, diverg-
ing interpretations of variability and complexity in lithic research are examined. 
In Chapter 4, it is shown that Anglophone approaches disintegrate into ‘formistic’ and 
‘mechanistic’ branches of investigation. The ramifications of ‘formism’ are illustrated by four case 
studies: (f-i) Scerri et al.’s multivariate analysis of North African MSA technology; (f-ii) Conard et al.’s 
proposition of a simplified core taxonomy for studying technological variability in the African Stone 
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Age; (f-iii) morphometric and phylogenetic perspectives to the lithic data championed, among others, 
by Lycett and Archer et al.; and (f-iv) the longstanding debate on handaxe symmetry in British Palaeo-
lithic research. The reliance on ‘mechanism’ is showcased by three similarly diagnostic cases: (m-i) 
Henry’s dimensional approach to lithic reduction; (m-ii) Dibble’s scraper reduction model put forth to 
explain interassemblage variability in the European Mousterian; and (m-iii) the wider discourse on 
technological adaptation and the ecological role of lithic artefacts. All of these examples illustrate that 
lithic inquiry in the Anglophone world is anchored by concepts that are ultimately furnished by the 
‘analytic’ world theories. 
Chapter 5 discloses French lithic research as an interplay between ‘contextualistic’ and ‘or-
ganicistic’ strands of inquiry. The ‘contextualistic’ underpinnings of many French approaches are re-
vealed through the examination of four case studies: (c-i) the ‘technological approach’ and its reliance 
on ‘lecture,’ ‘mental refitting,’ and the deployment of the schéma diacritique; (c-ii) Renard and 
Ducasse’s interpretation of structural differences between the lithic technologies of the Developed 
Solutrean and the Badegoulian of South-Western France; (c-iii) the techno-economic paradigm and its 
interpretive approach to raw material economy and mobility; and (c-iv) the role and meaning of lithic 
types in French technological research. The French dependence on ‘organicistic’ categories is revealed 
through the examination of three equally striking cases: (o-i) Boëda’s original interpretation of ‘Leval-
lois recurrent’; (o-ii) « Paléohistoire » and its insistence on multiple temporalities and conflicts of 
evolutionary becoming; and (o-iii) the ‘techno-genetic’ paradigm and its analysis of ‘technical lineages.’ 
The investigation of these test-cases confirms that French approaches tend to rely on a ‘synthetic’ 
grasp of the lithic evidence. 
Chapter 6, finally, reviews the main findings and discusses their implications. I conclude that 
the divide is indeed complete, affects all levels of inquiry, and can therefore hardly be ignored. The 
insights gained from the preceding examination permits the reinterpretation of the key axes of diver-
gence in the light of Pepper’s world hypotheses. This not only enhances our understanding of the diffi-
culties that French and Anglophone practitioners face when they engage with one another, but also 
allows the identification of hitherto unrecognised points of friction. Analysing the French-Anglophone 
divide in terms of Pepper’s structural categories allows us to gauge the cognitive bearing of underde-
termination in lithic inquiry. However, the key point is that all of the clashing approaches need to be 
respected for what they offer: adequate perspectives to an inherently problematic record. Since these 
perspectives are equally fallible yet cognitively distinct, no singular viewpoint can reasonably claim 
superiority. To discard any of the involved cognitive tendencies would be dogmatic and is simply unaf-
fordable if we wish to profit from the broadest possible base of lithic evidence.  
This reconstruction of the French-Anglophone divide suggests that (i) a ‘pluralistic stance’ in 
lithic research is required and that (ii) a more balanced, but nonetheless critical attitude towards cog-
nitive ‘others’ should be cultivated. Instead of waging knowledge-conflicts as partisan, practitioners 
should acknowledge the cognitive ‘other’ as a proficient expert rather than a misguided competitor. A 
re-consideration of ‘critical practice’ in the field is thus long overdue. By revisiting the disputes and 
interpretive divergences between French and Anglophone researchers enumerated in Chapter 1, it is 
demonstrated that criticism at the French-Anglophone interface often misses its mark or fails to be 
effective because these basic lessons are currently not taken seriously enough. I conclude that an hon-
est rapprochement between the two research spheres is only possible if we come to accept divergent 
viewpoints as alternative and keep the conversation going. The chapter brings the analysis to a close 

















In 1959 zorgde de Britse wetenschapper en schrijver Charles P. Snow voor tumult bij het uitspreken 
van de beruchte rede The Two Cultures. Hij argumenteerde dat ‘het intellectuele leven van de hele 
westerse samenleving’ is opgesplitst in twee sterk verschillende denktradities. Deze ‘twee culturen’, zo 
stelde hij, kunnen worden aangemerkt als twee co-existerende, maar van elkaar vervreemde gebieden 
van kennis en kennisproductie. Volgens Snow weten ze weinig van elkaar en hebben ze een hekel aan 
elkaar. Over en weer uiten ze vijandelijkheden en kritiek.  
De afgelopen decennia tekent zich een vergelijkbare kloof af binnen de paleolithische 
archeologie. Ook hier zijn er twee ‘onderzoeksculturen’: de Franse traditie en de Engelstalige traditie  - 
waarbij de laatstgenoemde grotendeels vertegenwoordigd wordt door Amerikaanse en Britse 
wetenschapsbeoefening. De onenigheid gaat ten minste terug tot het ‘Binford-Bordes debat’, maar is 
de laatste jaren steeds duidelijker geworden. Terwijl Frans onderzoek traditioneel geworteld is in de 
geesteswetenschappen, in het bijzonder geschiedenis en etnologie, modelleert het Engelstalig 
onderzoek zich steeds meer naar de natuur- en levenswetenschappen, met name ecologie, biologische 
antropologie en evolutionaire studies. De huidige status quo blijkt onder meer uit de tegenstelling 
tussen palethnologie en paleoanthropology. Twee grotendeels onverenigbare visies op de discipline 
spelen een sleutelrol in het paleolithisch onderzoek. 
Deze studie richt zich in het bijzonder op verschillen tussen Franse en Engelstalige lithische 
analyse. De invalshoek is epistemologisch: niet primair gericht op de lithische data zelf alswel op twee 
verschillende manieren waarop daarmee wordt omgegaan. Recente Franse en Engelstalige strategieën 
van lithische analyse worden vergeleken teneinde de respectievelijke cognitieve onderbouwingen 
zichtbaar te maken. In de vakliteratuur zijn deze onderbouwingen tot nu toe niet serieus genoeg 
genomen. Er is sprake van strijdige kennisclaims. De betreffende wetenschappers zijn geneigd 
antagonistische standpunten over het verleden in te nemen; onderzoek anders te organiseren; 
onverenigbare methodologische en conceptuele hulpmiddelen in te zetten; en te opereren in goeddeels 
gescheiden discursieve ruimtes. De kloof is dus niet alleen een kwestie van puur scholastieke interesse 
of een theoretisch dispuut, maar heeft tastbare gevolgen voor de manier waarop lithisch onderzoek 
wordt uitgevoerd en wat de mogelijke uitkomsten zijn. 
De analyse van deze fundamentele divergentie vindt plaats in vier stappen. Ten eerste wordt de 
literatuur geïnventariseerd die deze splitsing direct of indirect uitdrukt. Ten tweede wordt de filosoof 
Stephen C. Pepper geïntroduceerd met zijn raamwerk van “wereldhypothesen”. Met dit conceptueel 
apparaat kunnen lithische praktijken in beide onderzoekssferen doeltreffend vergeleken worden. 
Vervolgens, ten derde, wordt dit apparaat toegepast op representatieve casussen uit beide tradities. In 
een laatste stap wordt de Frans-Engelstalige kloof geëvalueerd in termen van Peppers 
wereldhypothesen en worden enkele implicaties ontwikkeld voor pluralisme in lithische analyse. 
Het eerste deel van hoofdstuk 1 schetst de problemen die bij lithische analyse optreden en hun 
relevantie voor paleolithisch onderzoek. Men denkt veelal dat lithische data, vaak in overvloed 
aanwezig, een robuust houvast biedt voor de reconstructie van gedrag in het verre verleden. Hoewel 
veel afhangt van ons vermogen dit bewijsmateriaal effectief te ondervragen is het archeologische 
bestand echter notoir onvolledig en beperkt. Hierdoor is lithische kennis algemeen gesproken 
kwetsbaar voor ontoereikende bewijsvoering. Hiervan is sprake wanneer meerdere, met elkaar 
onverenigbare interpretaties even sterk door het bewijsmateriaal worden ondersteund. Bovendien 
vertroebelt de sociale werkelijkheid het van onderzoek vaak het zicht op de ernst van zulke kwesties. 
Gemeenschappen van onderzoekers neigen ófwel ertoe vast te houden aan de eigen standpunten en 
alternatieve gezichtspunten niet te onderzoeken ófwel onbepaaldheid te vermijden door een 
dogmatische positie in te nemen. Symptomatisch is het gebrek aan respect van individuele 
wetenschappers voor hun tegenhangers. De gemeenschappen van onderzoekers lijken zich te 
verhouden als two ships passing in the night, zonder de ander zelfs maar te herkennen. Ze vechten 
geschillen uit als partizanen en praten doorgaans langs elkaar heen. 
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In het tweede deel van hoofdstuk 1 worden enkele serieuze serieuze misverstanden en 
meningsverschillen besproken die samenhangen met de Frans-Engelstalige kloof. Lithische experts uit 
beide kampen neigen ertoe over en weer elkaars meest basale aannames te verwerpen. Ook zijn ze over 
het algemeen sceptisch over de waarde van ‘andere’ benaderingen. Hun toon,  hun retoriek en hun 
langs elkaar heen praten laten een diep gewortelde vijandigheid zien jegens de andere traditie. Er lijkt 
sprake te zijn van een fundamenteel onvermogen tot communiceren, ook in desbetreffende 
institutionele kaders en wat betreft de gebruikelijke routes voor het verspreiden van bevindingen.  
Hoewel de kritiek over en weer even resoluut en fel is overheersen Engelstalige woordvoerders. 
Een aantal van hen heeft genoemde kloof openlijk aangekaart. Franse experts daarentegen hebben 
maar zelden op oproepen gereageerd. Ze gaan veel indirecter met de situatie om, bij voorkeur via 
monografieën waarin zij hun eigen benadering vergelijken met rivaliserende onderzoekparadigma’s. 
Ter illustratie worden drie concrete conflictgevallen besproken waarin Franse en Engelstalige 
vertegenwoordigers in grote lijnen hetzelfde lithische materiaal hebben bestudeerd, maar 
onverenigbare interpretaties geven - Biache Saint-Vaast niveau IIA, Gouzeaucourt G en de Micoquian 
lagen van de Kulna grot. Geargumenteerd wordt dat de Frans-Engelstalige kloof samenhangt met een 
fundamenteel probleem betreffende ontoereikende bewijsvoering. 
Hoofdstuk 2 introduceert Peppers theorie van “wereldhypothesen”: algemene theorieën over 
de wereld die onderzoek op een basisniveau aansturen. Zijn idee is dat in de geschiedenis van het 
westerse denken een beperkt aantal wereldhypothesen bepalend was. Vier van deze theorieën hebben 
volgens hem stand gehouden, te weten ‘formalisme’, ‘contextualisme’, ‘mechanisme’ en ‘organicisme’. 
Deze vier bieden gelijkwaardige, goed onderbouwde perspectieven op de wereld en hoe deze algemeen 
gesproken samenhangt. Elk van deze wereldtheorieën heeft een eigen canon van structurele 
categorieën; levert een eigen variëteit van methoden en theorieën; bevordert het verzamelen van een 
specifiek type gegevens; en vertrouwt op een specifieke vorm van kennisbevestiging, incompatibel zijn 
met die van andere wereldtheorieën. 
De vier relatief adequate wereldtheorieën vallen uiteen in twee groepen van twee. Een eerste 
onderscheid betreft het verschil tussen ‘analytische’ en ‘synthetische’ theorieën. De eerstgenoemde 
benadrukken de prioriteit van delen en zien gehelen slechts als afgeleide kenmerken van de wereld. De 
laatstgenoemde daarentegen zien gehelen als primair en bezien delen enkel vanuit hun afhankelijkheid 
van een geheel. Het tweede onderscheid betreft het verschil tussen ‘integratieve’ en ‘dispersieve’ 
theorieën. De eerstgenoemde nemen aan dat de wereld in sterke mate gedetermineerd is en 
concentreren zich doorgaans op enkele intrinsieke relaties tussen delen. De laatstgenoemde zien de 
wereld als zwak gedetermineerd en trachten zoveel mogelijk feiten tegelijkertijd te verklaren. 
‘Formisme’ en ‘mechanisme’ zijn ‘analytische’ wereldtheorieën, terwijl ‘contextualisme’ en 
‘organicisme’ ‘synthetische’ theorieën zijn.  ‘Formisme’ en ‘contextualisme’ zijn ‘dispersief’, terwijl 
‘mechanisme’ en ‘organicisme’ ‘integratief’ zijn.  
Deze wereldtheorieën zijn over het algemeen insulair, onherleidbaar tot elkaar, en ondersteunen 
nogal verschillende cognitieve waarden. Tevens is elke wereldtheorie feilbaar en bevat ze een ‘gezwel 
van zelfcontradictie’. De consequentie is dat alle vier de theorieën adequate maar tevens, opmerkelijk 
genoeg, onvolledige lezingen van de data leveren. Elke wereldtheorie beeldt de wereld anders uit, en 
geen enkele steekt er met kop en schouders bovenuit! 
In de hoofdstukken 3, 4 en 5 worden enkele doorsnee voorbeelden van lithisch onderzoek 
onderzocht vanuit Peppers epistemologie. Onderzocht wordt in welke mate Frans lithisch onderzoek 
gebaseerd is op een ‘synthetische’ visie op technologie, en Engelstalig onderzoek op een ‘analytische’ 
visie. Dit gebeurt in vijf stappen.  
Hoofdstuk 3 beschrijft een aantal fundamentele,  langdurige verschillen tussen Franse en 
Engelstalige lithische benaderingen in termen van ‘synthetisch’ versus ‘analytisch’. Dit blijkt goed te 
werken. Concreet wordt gekeken naar de logica achter registratie van vuursteen, de aard van 
onderzoekvoorstellen, de stijl van redeneren, de rol van theorie en data, en de wijze van visualiseren. 
Vervolgens komen de sterk divergerende interpretaties van lithische variabiliteit en complexiteit aan 
de orde. 
Hoofdstuk 4 laat zien hoe er bij Engelstalige benaderingen sprake is van ‘formistische’ en 
‘mechanistische’ onderzoeksvelden. Varianten van ‘formisme’ worden geïllustreerd met vier 
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gevalsstudies: (f-i) de multivariate analyse van Noord-Afrikaanse MSA technologie van Scerri et al.; (f-
ii) een voorstel voor een vereenvoudigde kerntaxonomie bij het bestuderen van technologische 
variabiliteit in de Afrikaanse prehistorie van Conard et al.; (f-iii) morfometrische en fylogenetische 
perspectieven op lithische gegevens van onder anderen Lycett en Archer et al.; en (f-iv) het langdurige 
debat over de symmetrie van bifaciale werktuigen in Brits paleolithisch onderzoek.  
De ‘mechanistische’ invalshoek blijkt bepalend in drie, onderling vergelijkbare diagnostische 
gevalsstudies: (m-i) Henry’s dimensionale benadering van lithische reductie; (m-ii) Dibbles schraper-
reductiemodel ter verklaring van de variabiliteit in vuursteenassemblages in het Europese Moustérien; 
en (m-iii) het bredere discours over technologische aanpassing en de ecologische rol van stenen 
werktuigen. Bij alle zes gevalsstudies blijkt hoe lithisch onderzoek in de Engelstalige wereld verankerd 
is in ‘analytische’ wereldtheorieën. 
Hoofdstuk 5 reconstrueert de Franse traditie van lithisch onderzoek in termen van een 
wisselwerking tussen ‘contextualistische’ en ‘organistische’ onderzoeksvragen. De contextualistische 
onderbouwing van veel Franse benaderingen wordt blootgelegd in vier gevalsstudies: (c-i) de 
‘technologische benadering’ met behulp van ‘lezing’, ‘mentale terugplaatsing’ en het inzetten van het 
schéma diacritique; (c-ii) Renard en Ducasse’s interpretatie van structurele verschillen tussen 
lithische technologieën van het latere Solutréen en het Badegoulien van zuidwest Frankrijk; (c-iii) het 
techno-economische paradigma en de interpretatieve benadering van grondstoffeneconomie en 
mobiliteit; en (c-iv) de rol en betekenis van vuursteentypes in Frans technologisch onderzoek.  
De organistische inslag van Franse benaderingen komt vervolgens naar voren in drie 
opvallende gevalsstudies: (o-i) Boëda’s oorspronkelijke interpretatie van ‘Levallois récurrent’; (o-ii) de 
‘Paléohistoire’ met haar nadruk op “meerdere temporaliteiten” en conflicten in evolutionaire genese; 
en (o-iii) de analyse van technische afstammingslijnen in het ‘techno-genetische’ paradigma. Duidelijk 
blijkt dat deze Franse benaderingen er een ‘synthetisch’ begrip van lithische bewijsmateriaal op na 
houden.  
Inzichten uit de voorgaande hoofdstukken combinerend zet hoofdstuk 6 tenslotte de 
bevindingen op een rij en ontwikkelt het enkele implicaties. De kloof tussen Frans en Engelstalig 
lithische onderzoek is radicaal en beïnvloedt alle niveaus van onderzoek. Meer begrip is vereist voor de 
problemen waarmee wetenschapsbeoefenaars uit de twee kampen worden geconfronteerd als zij met 
elkaar communiceren. De resultaten maken het ook mogelijk enkele tot nu toe niet onderkende punten 
van frictie te identificeren. Peppers epistemologie helpt zeer bij het omgaan met ontoereikende 
bewijsvoering in lithische analyse. De belangrijkste bevinding van dit proefschrift is dat alle 
conflicterende benaderingen moeten worden gerespecteerd voor wat ze te bieden hebben: adequate 
perspectieven op een inherent problematische archeologische bestanden. Deze perspectieven zijn in 
gelijke mate feilbaar. Geen van deze perspectieven kan redelijkerwijs superioriteit claimen over 
andere. Het opzij zetten van een ervan zou zonder meer dogmatisch en ondoordacht zijn als we streven 
naar de breedst mogelijke fundering voor lithische analyse. 
De reconstructie van de Frans-Engelstalige divergentie suggereert dat een ‘pluralistische 
houding’ in lithisch onderzoek een vereiste is en dat een meer uitgebalanceerde, maar niettemin 
kritische houding tegenover ‘anderen’ moet worden gecultiveerd. In plaats van kennis-conflicten als 
partizanen uit te vechten zouden wetenschapsbeoefenaars de cognitieve ‘ander’ moeten erkennen als 
een bekwame expert in plaats van deze weg te zetten als een misleidende concurrent. Een 
heroverweging van de ‘kritische praktijk’  in het veld zoals hier ontwikkeld heeft lang op zich heeft 
laten wachten.  
Als we de geschillen en verschillen tussen Franse en Engelstalige onderzoekers (Hoofdstuk 1) 
nu opnieuw bezien blijkt dat kritiek op het Frans-Engelstalige grensvlak vaak zijn doel mist of 
inefficiënt is omdat basisbeginselen niet serieus worden genomen. Een eerlijke rapprochement tussen 
de twee onderzoeksferen is alleen mogelijk als we de verschillende invalshoeken accepteren als 
gelijkwaardige alternatieven en proberen de dialoog gaande te houden. Tot besluit van dit onderzoek 
naar de Frans-Engelstalige kloof in lithische analyse worden enkele suggesties in deze richting gedaan. 
 
Translated by Norbert Peeters                                                                                                                   
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